| Chapter |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
| Applications to Industrial Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
| Applications to Industrial Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Auction Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
| Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
| Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
| Bayesian Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
10 |
| Bundling Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| Bundling Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Cheap Talk Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
| Cheap Talk Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
| Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
19 |
| Common-Value Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
| Common-Value Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Correction to: Strategy and Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| Dominance Solvable Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
| Dominance Solvable Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
23 |
| Equilibrium Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
| Erratum to: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
| Erratum to: Strategy and Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
| First-Price Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| First-Price Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
38 |
| First-Price Auctions: Extensions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| First-Price Auctions: Extensions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
| Incomplete Information, Signaling, and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
| Incomplete Information, Signaling, and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| Introduction to Games and Their Representation |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
17 |
| Mechanism Design |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
17 |
| Mechanism Design |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Mergers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Mergers and Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
21 |
| Mixed Strategies, Strictly Competitive Games, and Correlated Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| Mixed Strategies, Strictly Competitive Games, and Correlated Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
| Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
| Monopoly |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
| Monopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
16 |
42 |
| More Advanced Signaling Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
| More Advanced Signaling Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Multi-Unit Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Multi-Unit Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| Nash Equilibria in Games with Continuous Action Spaces |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
| Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
| Networks and Switching Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Networks and Switching Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
| Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
9 |
| Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
| Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
19 |
| Procurement Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Procurement Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
18 |
| Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
| Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
| R&D Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| R&D Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Regulating Imperfectly Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
| Regulating Imperfectly Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
| Repeated Games and Correlated Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
| Repeated Games and Correlated Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Second-Price Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
30 |
| Second-Price Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Sequential Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
| Sequential Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Sequential-Move Games with Complete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
30 |
| Sequential-Move Games with Complete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
| Signaling Games with Continuous Messages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
16 |
| Simultaneous Price Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
| Simultaneous Price Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
| Simultaneous Quantity Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
| Simultaneous Quantity Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
| Simultaneous-Move Games with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
| Simultaneous-Move Games with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
93 |
| Subgame Perfect Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| The Revenue Equivalence Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| The Revenue Equivalence Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
15 |
| Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
74 |
| Total Chapters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
43 |
73 |
252 |
827 |