| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Machine-Learning History of English Caselaw and Legal Ideas Prior to the Industrial Revolution I: Generating and Interpreting the Estimates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
10 |
24 |
122 |
| A Machine-Learning History of English Caselaw and Legal Ideas Prior to the Industrial Revolution II: Applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
78 |
| A Macroscope of English Print Culture, 1530-1700, Applied to the Coevolution of Ideas on Religion, Science, and Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
30 |
| Allocating Law-Making Powers: Self-Regulation vs. Government Regulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
257 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
1,341 |
| Caveat venditor: The conditional effect of relationship-specific investment on contractual behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
305 |
| Design and Evolution in Institutional Development: The Insignificance of the English Bill of Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
142 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
235 |
| Did Caselaw Foster England’s Economic Development during the Industrial Revolution? Data and Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
18 |
| Does respondent reticence affect the results of corruption surveys ? evidence from the world bank enterprise survey for Nigeria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
185 |
| Doing the survey two-step: the effects of reticence on estimates of corruption in two-stage survey questions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
74 |
| End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
188 |
| Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey |
0 |
0 |
1 |
934 |
0 |
10 |
25 |
2,185 |
| Firms Facing New Institutions: Transactional Governance in Romania |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
142 |
| Fostering Civil Society to Build Institutions: Why and When |
0 |
0 |
0 |
109 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
209 |
| From Status to Contract? A Macrohistory from Early-Modern English Caselaw and Print Culture |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
7 |
21 |
41 |
| Identifying Reticent Respondents: Assessing the Quality of Survey Data on Corruption and Values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
524 |
| Institutions and Firms in Transition Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
308 |
| Institutions and Transition |
1 |
1 |
1 |
123 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
283 |
| Law, Relationship, and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprise |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
377 |
| Law, Relationships, and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
207 |
| Lawyers and Politicians: The Impact of Organized Legal Professions on Institutional Reforms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
476 |
| Mapping the landscape of transactions: the governance of business relations in Latin America |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
336 |
| Measuring Transaction Costs Using Survey Data on Sales Agreements |
0 |
1 |
1 |
128 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
263 |
| Misunderestimating corruption |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
310 |
| Spatial Spillovers in the Development of Institutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
169 |
0 |
5 |
17 |
412 |
| The Relative Levels and the Character of Institutional Development in Transition Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
166 |
| The Role of Law in China's Economic Development |
0 |
2 |
3 |
470 |
0 |
10 |
22 |
1,712 |
| Toward Understanding 17th Century English Culture: A Structural Topic Model of Francis Bacon's Ideas |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
103 |
| Transactional Governance Structures: New Cross-Country Data and an Application to the Effect of Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
7 |
15 |
33 |
| Which Enterprises (Believe They) Have Soft Budgets? Evidence on the Effects of Ownership and Decentralization in Mongolia |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
2 |
2 |
18 |
219 |
| Which Enterprises (Believe They) Have Soft budgets after Mass Privatization? Evidence from Mongolia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
203 |
| Which mechanisms support the fulfillment of sales agreements? Asking decision-makers in firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
136 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
4 |
10 |
3,355 |
10 |
102 |
381 |
11,221 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Darwinian theory of institutional evolution two centuries before Darwin? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
60 |
| A machine-learning history of English caselaw and legal ideas prior to the Industrial Revolution I: generating and interpreting the estimates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
36 |
| A machine-learning history of English caselaw and legal ideas prior to the Industrial Revolution II: applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
17 |
| A macrohistory of legal evolution and coevolution: Property, procedure, and contract in early-modern English caselaw |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
25 |
| A methodology for testing comparative economic theories: Theory and application to East-West environmental policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
118 |
| A model of electroral competition with interest groups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
202 |
| A note on variables and observations in factor analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
70 |
| Allocating lawmaking powers: Self-regulation vs government regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
255 |
| An evaluation of the success of the hungarian economic reform: An analysis using international-trade data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
52 |
| An examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in OECD countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
54 |
| Can Neoclassical Economics Underpin the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
90 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
397 |
| Caselaw and England's economic performance during the Industrial Revolution: Data and evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
0 |
4 |
17 |
30 |
| Caveat Venditor: The Conditional Effect of Relationship-Specific Investment on Contractual Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
25 |
| Characterizing a legal–intellectual culture: Bacon, Coke, and seventeenth-century England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
25 |
| Characterizing a legal–intellectual culture: Bacon, Coke, and seventeenth-century England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
30 |
| Comparative growth and comparative advantage: Tests of the effects of interest group behavior on foreign trade patterns |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
21 |
| Competition and Privatization Amidst Weak Institutions: Evidence from Mongolia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
415 |
| Design and evolution in institutional development: The insignificance of the English Bill of Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
79 |
| Did the Independence of Judges Reduce Legal Development in England, 1600–1800? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
26 |
| Did the theory of market socialism answer the challenge of Ludwig von Mises? A reinterpretation of the socialist controversy |
1 |
1 |
4 |
98 |
4 |
5 |
19 |
261 |
| Electoral Politics, Interest Groups, and the Size of Government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
613 |
| Endogenous Technological Change and Optimal Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
56 |
| Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
0 |
6 |
192 |
1,926 |
| Evolutionary and Radical Approaches to Economic Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
16 |
352 |
| Firms facing new institutions: transactional governance in Romania |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
113 |
| Fostering civil society to build institutions Why and when1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
89 |
| Glamour and value in the land of Chingis Khan |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
4 |
16 |
271 |
| How Far Has the Transition Progressed? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
325 |
| How to Haggle and to Stay Firm: Barter as Hidden Price Discriminatio n |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
318 |
| Identifying Reticent Respondents: Assessing the Quality of Survey Data on Corruption and Values |
0 |
1 |
1 |
82 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
458 |
| Incentives and income under market socialism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
78 |
| Industry Characteristics and Interest Group Formation: An Empirical Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
414 |
| Interest groups and the size of government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
141 |
| Lasting Legal Legacies: Early English Legal Ideas and Later Caselaw Development During the Industrial Revolution |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
6 |
15 |
31 |
| Law, Relationships and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
22 |
| Lawyers and politicians: the impact of organized legal professions on institutional reforms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
6 |
12 |
161 |
| Limitations on the use of information-revealing incentive schemes in economic organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
50 |
| Memories of colonial law: The inheritance of human capital and the location of joint ventures in early-reform China |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
50 |
| Misunderestimating Corruption |
0 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
151 |
| Non-Price Rationing of Intermediate Goods in Centrally Planned Economies: A Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
200 |
| Of families and inheritance: law and development in England before the Industrial Revolution |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
15 |
29 |
| Optimal Growth Models as Economic Planning Tools |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
171 |
| Ownership, exit and voice after mass privatization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
78 |
| Planning and coordination of economic policy in market economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
51 |
| Playing Political Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
| Product Quality, Market Signaling and the Development of East-West Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
71 |
| Public choice and the transformation of socialism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
74 |
| Quiet revolutions in early-modern England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
19 |
| Representation of Choice in Long-Term Planning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
9 |
| Result-oriented and process-oriented evaluations of indicative planning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
225 |
| Revisiting the emergence of the rule of law in Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
22 |
| Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered. By Don Lavoie (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 192p. $34.50) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
8 |
12 |
123 |
| Spatial spillovers in the development of institutions |
0 |
1 |
2 |
58 |
1 |
10 |
19 |
289 |
| Symposium on Economic Transition in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
238 |
| The Applicability of information-revealing incentive schemes in economic organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
44 |
| The Culture of Policy-Making in the Transition from Socialism: Price Policy in Mongolia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
227 |
| The Economics of Sharing: A Transactions Costs Analysis of Contractual Choice in Farming |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
4 |
16 |
504 |
| The Effect of (the Absence of) Multinationals' Foreign Direct Investment on the Level of Eastern European Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
114 |
| The Microeconomic Efficiency Argument for Socialism Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
| The Performance of Multiperiod Managerial Incentive Schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
164 |
| The Transition According to Cambridge, Mass |
0 |
0 |
0 |
145 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
578 |
| The Way We Were: Reflections on the Comparative History of Comparative Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
52 |
| The devolution of centrally planned economies |
0 |
1 |
4 |
180 |
2 |
5 |
20 |
368 |
| The problem of equity in determining managerial rewards in public enterprises: A comment on A. Bergson, "Managerial risks and rewards in public enterprises" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
91 |
| The relationship between economic growth and the speed of liberalization during transition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
156 |
| The size of public employment: An empirical study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
92 |
| Toward understanding 17th century English culture: A structural topic model of Francis Bacon's ideas |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
121 |
| When Privatization Should Be Delayed: The Effect of Communist Legacies on Organizational and Institutional Reforms |
0 |
1 |
1 |
98 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
288 |
| Which Enterprises (Believe They) Have Soft Budgets? Evidence on the Effects of Ownership and Decentralization in Mongolia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
128 |
| Which mechanisms support the fulfillment of sales agreements?: Asking decision-makers in firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
99 |
| Total Journal Articles |
2 |
6 |
26 |
1,807 |
31 |
191 |
907 |
12,463 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.