| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
52 |
| A Model of the Origins of Basic Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
51 |
| Agenda Setting Power in Organizations with Overlapping Generations of Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
47 |
| An Economic Model of Child Custody |
0 |
0 |
0 |
178 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
1,215 |
| An Economic Model of Child Custody |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
41 |
| An Economic Model of Child Custody |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
471 |
| An economic model of child custody |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
361 |
| Bargaining Equilibrium in a Non-Stationary Environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
0 |
6 |
13 |
301 |
| Bargaining Without Commitment (Now published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2 (1990), pp.291-297.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
110 |
| Bargaining and Hold-up: The Role of Arbitration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
55 |
| Bargaining and Hold-up: The Role of Arbitration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
46 |
| Bargaining and hold-up: the role of arbitration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
40 |
| Bargaining equilibrium in a non-stationary environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
10 |
15 |
42 |
| Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
6 |
12 |
34 |
| Competition and Efficiency in Markets with Quality Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
42 |
| Control Rights in Complex Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
25 |
| Control Rights in Complex Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
229 |
| Control Rights in Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
267 |
| Control Rights in Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
194 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
516 |
| Cooperation in a State of Anarchy |
0 |
1 |
2 |
23 |
0 |
5 |
15 |
61 |
| Cooperation in a State of Anarchy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
42 |
| Corruption, Extortion and Evasion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
1,294 |
| Corruption, Extortion and Evasion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
18 |
1,101 |
| Corruption, extortion and evasion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
109 |
| EX-ANTE PRICE COMMITMENT WITH RENEGOTIATION IN A DYNAMIC MARKET |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
24 |
| EX-ANTE PRICE COMMITMENT WITH RENEGOTIATION IN A DYNAMIC MARKET |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
115 |
| Ex Ante Price Commitment with Renegotiation in a Dynamic Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
52 |
| Ex ante Price Commitment with Renegotation in a Dynamic Market Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
112 |
| Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
38 |
| Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
30 |
| Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
65 |
| Experimentation in Dynamic R&D Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
66 |
| Imperfect Competition and Efficiency in Lemons Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
22 |
| Imperfect Competition and Efficiency in Lemons Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
1 |
7 |
18 |
150 |
| Imperfect Competition and Efficiency in Lemons Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
47 |
| Limit Points in a Bargaining Model of a Decentralised Market I (Revised version now published in Economic Theory 3 (1993), pp.353-363.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
74 |
| On the Foundations of Basic Property Rights, Part I: A Model of the State-of-Nature with Two Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
411 |
| On the foundations of basic property rights, Part I: A model of the state-of-nature with two players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
35 |
| Power and Inefficient Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
85 |
| Sequential Bargaining in a Small Market with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
| Strategic Bargaining and Competitive Bidding in a Dynamic Market Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
604 |
| The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
248 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
2 |
6 |
1,346 |
14 |
127 |
442 |
8,742 |
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