| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dynamic Microeconomic Model with Durable Goods and Adaptive Expectations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
185 |
| A General Theory of Cooperative Solutions for Games with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
164 |
| A Theory of Voting Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
371 |
2 |
7 |
19 |
782 |
| Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
219 |
| An Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in a Linear Monetary Economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
79 |
| An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
187 |
| An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
6 |
429 |
| An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three- Way Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
422 |
| An Extension of the Kakutani Fixed Point Therorem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
210 |
| An Introduction to Game Theory |
0 |
1 |
4 |
659 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
1,649 |
| Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
253 |
| Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
167 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
349 |
| Autobiography |
0 |
0 |
1 |
101 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
271 |
| Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules Without the Ordering Assumption |
0 |
1 |
1 |
88 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
258 |
| Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory |
0 |
0 |
2 |
361 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
675 |
| Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
236 |
| Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,179 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
1,907 |
| Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
309 |
| Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
148 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
640 |
| Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
320 |
| Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
230 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
555 |
| Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
298 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
502 |
| Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
393 |
| Dual Reduction and Elementary Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
195 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
900 |
| Dynamic Matching Problems With Incentive Constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
114 |
| Economic Analysis of Constitutions |
0 |
3 |
3 |
403 |
0 |
7 |
9 |
852 |
| Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
211 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
753 |
| Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
2 |
672 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
1,869 |
| Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,276 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
2,183 |
| Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
218 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
489 |
| Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
228 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
663 |
| Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
122 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
384 |
| Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory |
0 |
0 |
3 |
461 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
928 |
| Graphs and Cooperation in Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,193 |
6 |
7 |
10 |
2,265 |
| Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem |
1 |
1 |
2 |
257 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
747 |
| Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems |
0 |
2 |
3 |
318 |
2 |
7 |
13 |
796 |
| Informational Origins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters |
0 |
0 |
2 |
69 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
278 |
| Interview with the 2007 Laureates in Economics Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson |
0 |
1 |
2 |
295 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
688 |
| John Nash's Contribution to Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,317 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
8,055 |
| Large Poisson Games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
514 |
3 |
7 |
15 |
1,777 |
| Linear Functionals of Convex Sets with Applications to Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
393 |
| Linearity, Concavity, and Scale Invariance in Social Choice Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
146 |
| Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
706 |
| Local foundations for better governance: A Review of Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao's Localizing Development |
0 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
125 |
| Mechanism Design |
0 |
1 |
1 |
447 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
796 |
| Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
251 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
567 |
| Moral hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents |
0 |
1 |
3 |
120 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
206 |
| Multistage Games with Communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
143 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
373 |
| Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
153 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
345 |
| OLIGARCHIC PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY IN RUSSIA |
0 |
0 |
1 |
140 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
372 |
| Oligarchic Property Rights and Investment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
104 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
254 |
| Optimal Auction Design |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1,864 |
5 |
12 |
27 |
3,557 |
| Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
285 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
500 |
| Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory |
0 |
1 |
5 |
590 |
2 |
3 |
19 |
1,018 |
| Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster |
0 |
2 |
2 |
205 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
675 |
| Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
167 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
477 |
| Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games |
0 |
3 |
3 |
323 |
3 |
9 |
13 |
1,057 |
| Prices and Market Imbalance Indexes in a General Equilibrium Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
178 |
| Proportional Representation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
586 |
| Refinement of the Nash Equilibrium Concept |
0 |
2 |
4 |
149 |
5 |
11 |
17 |
224 |
| Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept |
0 |
0 |
1 |
647 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
1,330 |
| Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs |
2 |
2 |
2 |
337 |
8 |
9 |
11 |
677 |
| Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication |
0 |
0 |
3 |
194 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
779 |
| Solutions for Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
192 |
| Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
166 |
| Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
| The Past, Present, and Future of Economics: A Celebration of the 125-Year Anniversary of the JPE and of Chicago Economics |
0 |
4 |
16 |
560 |
5 |
17 |
45 |
1,029 |
| The strength of American federal democracy: lessons for global development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
164 |
| Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
377 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
1,190 |
| Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
134 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
175 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation |
1 |
1 |
1 |
145 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
365 |
| Value of Games in Partition Function Form |
0 |
0 |
0 |
166 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
369 |
| Values of Games Without Sidepayments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
141 |
| Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information |
0 |
1 |
2 |
197 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
547 |
| Viscous Population Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
749 |
| Working Paper 300 - Village Communities and Global Development |
0 |
1 |
5 |
41 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
150 |
| Total Working Papers |
4 |
30 |
99 |
20,716 |
148 |
308 |
561 |
55,454 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
9 |
| A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
122 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
461 |
| A Theory of Voting Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
3 |
33 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
100 |
| A dynamic microeconomic model with durable goods and adaptive expectations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
97 |
| A macroeconomic model of Russian transition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
454 |
| Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
193 |
| An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
464 |
| An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
418 |
| Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
499 |
| Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures |
0 |
1 |
1 |
242 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
1,184 |
| Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
121 |
| Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three‐way, Experimental Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
| Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
454 |
| Capitalist investment and political liberalization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
168 |
| Comments on "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I--III Harsanyi's Games with Incoplete Information" |
0 |
0 |
3 |
26 |
2 |
8 |
17 |
147 |
| Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
201 |
| Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
188 |
| Construction de l'Etat, leadership et démocratie locale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
| Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
275 |
| Decisiveness of contributors’ perceptions in elections |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
79 |
| Dual Reduction and Elementary Games |
0 |
0 |
5 |
71 |
2 |
2 |
12 |
224 |
| Economic Effects of Constitutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
| Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
201 |
| Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
6 |
419 |
2 |
2 |
22 |
967 |
| Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information |
1 |
1 |
1 |
748 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
1,605 |
| Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading |
0 |
2 |
7 |
1,395 |
3 |
13 |
32 |
2,652 |
| Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
249 |
| Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy |
0 |
1 |
3 |
31 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
204 |
| Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
183 |
| Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory |
0 |
0 |
2 |
215 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
459 |
| Game Theory and the First World War |
0 |
2 |
7 |
67 |
3 |
8 |
19 |
144 |
| Game-Theoretic Models of Politics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
160 |
| Game-theoretic Consistency and International Relations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
46 |
| Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1,298 |
3 |
9 |
38 |
3,737 |
| Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems |
0 |
3 |
3 |
26 |
3 |
7 |
11 |
67 |
| Informational origins of political bias towards critical groups of voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
113 |
| John Nash's Contribution to Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
181 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
683 |
| Large Poisson Games |
0 |
0 |
4 |
207 |
4 |
7 |
14 |
503 |
| Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
341 |
| Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
527 |
| Linking the best and worst of global trends |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
| Local agency costs of political centralization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
| Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
589 |
3 |
5 |
10 |
1,170 |
| Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
74 |
| Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
92 |
| Multistage Games with Communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
532 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1,449 |
| Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,530 |
1 |
8 |
19 |
4,888 |
| Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
16 |
| On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science |
0 |
1 |
4 |
47 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
102 |
| Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1,383 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
2,377 |
| Outlook for democracy and democratic institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
16 |
| Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
67 |
| Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory |
0 |
0 |
2 |
308 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
635 |
| Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
395 |
| Political Economics in the Journal of Political Economy: Six Landmark Papers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
219 |
| Population uncertainty and Poisson games |
1 |
3 |
6 |
357 |
7 |
11 |
20 |
1,100 |
| Population uncertainty in contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
258 |
| Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,322 |
5 |
11 |
20 |
2,370 |
| Rethinking the Principles of Bank Regulation: A Review of Admati and Hellwig's The Bankers' New Clothes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
475 |
| Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication |
0 |
0 |
1 |
67 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
236 |
| Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
103 |
| Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
93 |
| The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State |
0 |
0 |
3 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
63 |
| Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
136 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
344 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
271 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
247 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
582 |
| Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
175 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
662 |
| Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information |
0 |
1 |
2 |
164 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
374 |
| Viscous population equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
138 |
| Total Journal Articles |
2 |
18 |
94 |
13,843 |
106 |
245 |
619 |
37,368 |
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