| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dynamic Microeconomic Model with Durable Goods and Adaptive Expectations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
192 |
| A General Theory of Cooperative Solutions for Games with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
169 |
| A Theory of Voting Equilibria |
0 |
1 |
1 |
372 |
14 |
36 |
67 |
842 |
| Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
226 |
| An Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in a Linear Monetary Economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
80 |
| An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
193 |
| An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
437 |
| An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three- Way Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
428 |
| An Extension of the Kakutani Fixed Point Therorem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
213 |
| An Introduction to Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
4 |
662 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
1,667 |
| Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
261 |
| Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
167 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
353 |
| Autobiography |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
274 |
| Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules Without the Ordering Assumption |
1 |
1 |
3 |
90 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
269 |
| Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory |
0 |
1 |
2 |
362 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
683 |
| Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
242 |
| Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1,180 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
1,922 |
| Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
315 |
| Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
148 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
647 |
| Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
2 |
5 |
17 |
332 |
| Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
230 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
561 |
| Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
299 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
509 |
| Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
399 |
| Dual Reduction and Elementary Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
195 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
905 |
| Dynamic Matching Problems With Incentive Constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
118 |
| Economic Analysis of Constitutions |
1 |
1 |
4 |
404 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
860 |
| Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
211 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
763 |
| Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
4 |
675 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1,913 |
| Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,278 |
0 |
4 |
42 |
2,220 |
| Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
219 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
505 |
| Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
228 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
670 |
| Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory |
0 |
1 |
1 |
123 |
4 |
5 |
18 |
397 |
| Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
461 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
933 |
| Graphs and Cooperation in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,193 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
2,273 |
| Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem |
0 |
0 |
2 |
258 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
766 |
| Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
318 |
3 |
4 |
33 |
822 |
| Informational Origins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
283 |
| Interview with the 2007 Laureates in Economics Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson |
0 |
0 |
1 |
295 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
703 |
| John Nash's Contribution to Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,317 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
8,061 |
| Large Poisson Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
515 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
1,791 |
| Linear Functionals of Convex Sets with Applications to Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
400 |
| Linearity, Concavity, and Scale Invariance in Social Choice Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
151 |
| Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
714 |
| Local foundations for better governance: A Review of Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao's Localizing Development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
130 |
| Mechanism Design |
0 |
0 |
2 |
448 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
805 |
| Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
251 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
579 |
| Moral hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents |
0 |
0 |
1 |
120 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
216 |
| Multistage Games with Communication |
1 |
1 |
2 |
145 |
2 |
3 |
17 |
384 |
| Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
153 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
349 |
| OLIGARCHIC PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY IN RUSSIA |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
380 |
| Oligarchic Property Rights and Investment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
104 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
264 |
| Optimal Auction Design |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1,868 |
1 |
6 |
49 |
3,594 |
| Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
285 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
503 |
| Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory |
0 |
1 |
3 |
592 |
1 |
5 |
16 |
1,029 |
| Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster |
0 |
0 |
2 |
205 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
680 |
| Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games |
0 |
1 |
4 |
324 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
1,068 |
| Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
167 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
490 |
| Prices and Market Imbalance Indexes in a General Equilibrium Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
182 |
| Proportional Representation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
593 |
| Refinement of the Nash Equilibrium Concept |
0 |
0 |
2 |
149 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
228 |
| Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept |
0 |
0 |
1 |
648 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1,335 |
| Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs |
1 |
1 |
4 |
339 |
2 |
2 |
38 |
706 |
| Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
194 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
786 |
| Solutions for Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
197 |
| Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
172 |
| Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
| The Past, Present, and Future of Economics: A Celebration of the 125-Year Anniversary of the JPE and of Chicago Economics |
0 |
0 |
4 |
560 |
2 |
3 |
36 |
1,047 |
| The strength of American federal democracy: lessons for global development |
1 |
1 |
1 |
101 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
171 |
| Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
378 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
1,197 |
| Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
136 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
181 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
145 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
376 |
| Value of Games in Partition Function Form |
0 |
0 |
0 |
166 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
373 |
| Values of Games Without Sidepayments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
148 |
| Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
197 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
557 |
| Viscous Population Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
753 |
| Working Paper 300 - Village Communities and Global Development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
161 |
| Total Working Papers |
5 |
12 |
69 |
20,750 |
66 |
141 |
1,115 |
56,242 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
15 |
| A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
122 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
469 |
| A Theory of Voting Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
17 |
26 |
45 |
141 |
| A dynamic microeconomic model with durable goods and adaptive expectations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
99 |
| A macroeconomic model of Russian transition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
465 |
| Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
198 |
| An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
470 |
| An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
427 |
| Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
503 |
| Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures |
0 |
1 |
2 |
243 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
1,194 |
| Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
126 |
| Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three‐way, Experimental Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
139 |
| Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
469 |
| Capitalist investment and political liberalization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
174 |
| Comments on "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I--III Harsanyi's Games with Incoplete Information" |
0 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
4 |
5 |
19 |
157 |
| Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
2 |
4 |
16 |
213 |
| Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
199 |
| Construction de l'Etat, leadership et démocratie locale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
34 |
| Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
277 |
| Decisiveness of contributors’ perceptions in elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
84 |
| Dual Reduction and Elementary Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
232 |
| Economic Effects of Constitutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
16 |
| Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
205 |
| Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
1 |
3 |
421 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
975 |
| Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
749 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1,614 |
| Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading |
2 |
5 |
9 |
1,402 |
2 |
19 |
70 |
2,708 |
| Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
256 |
| Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy |
0 |
0 |
3 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
211 |
| Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz |
8 |
8 |
8 |
61 |
8 |
8 |
18 |
201 |
| Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory |
1 |
1 |
5 |
220 |
2 |
2 |
28 |
481 |
| Game Theory and the First World War |
0 |
0 |
4 |
69 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
154 |
| Game-Theoretic Models of Politics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
165 |
| Game-theoretic Consistency and International Relations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
49 |
| Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem |
0 |
3 |
9 |
1,305 |
5 |
26 |
68 |
3,792 |
| Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems |
0 |
0 |
3 |
26 |
1 |
2 |
26 |
85 |
| Informational origins of political bias towards critical groups of voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
121 |
| John Nash's Contribution to Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
181 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
691 |
| Large Poisson Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
207 |
2 |
3 |
16 |
511 |
| Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
344 |
| Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict |
0 |
0 |
1 |
139 |
3 |
5 |
21 |
544 |
| Linking the best and worst of global trends |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
| Local agency costs of political centralization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
| Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
589 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1,180 |
| Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy |
0 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
83 |
| Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
100 |
| Multistage Games with Communication |
1 |
1 |
1 |
533 |
5 |
5 |
14 |
1,462 |
| Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1,533 |
15 |
23 |
49 |
4,928 |
| On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
105 |
| Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1,386 |
0 |
6 |
24 |
2,396 |
| Outlook for democracy and democratic institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
24 |
| Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
74 |
| Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory |
0 |
1 |
3 |
311 |
1 |
5 |
21 |
649 |
| Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
5 |
31 |
421 |
| Political Economics in the Journal of Political Economy: Six Landmark Papers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
2 |
2 |
12 |
228 |
| Population uncertainty and Poisson games |
0 |
0 |
5 |
358 |
9 |
12 |
40 |
1,127 |
| Population uncertainty in contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
264 |
| Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs |
2 |
2 |
3 |
1,325 |
5 |
6 |
34 |
2,393 |
| Rethinking the Principles of Bank Regulation: A Review of Admati and Hellwig's The Bankers' New Clothes |
0 |
0 |
4 |
117 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
488 |
| Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
242 |
| Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
107 |
| Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria |
1 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
100 |
| The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State |
1 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
4 |
5 |
14 |
75 |
| Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
138 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
359 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
273 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
247 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
590 |
| Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
175 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
670 |
| Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
164 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
387 |
| Viscous population equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
146 |
| Total Journal Articles |
16 |
29 |
90 |
13,904 |
105 |
219 |
1,055 |
38,131 |
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