Access Statistics for Yasuhiko Nakamura

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Unequal Societies 0 0 0 19 3 5 7 86
Aggressiveness of Managers in the Market with Network Effects: The Case of Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment 0 0 0 3 0 4 8 31
BARGAINING OVER MANAGERIAL DELEGATION CONTRACTS AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS 0 0 0 2 1 3 4 30
Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Differentiated Goods Case 0 0 0 7 1 4 6 42
Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Generalized Oligopolistic Case 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 24
Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Quadratic Cost Case 0 0 0 4 1 6 7 40
Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Sequential Move Case 0 0 0 17 0 4 5 102
Bargaining over managerial delegation contracts and merger incentives in an international oligopoly 0 0 0 19 0 5 8 97
Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment in a Mixed Duopoly with Relative Profit-Maximizers 0 0 0 4 1 3 3 60
Biased managers as strategic commitment: The relative profit approach 0 0 0 10 0 6 6 61
Capacity Choice in a Mixed Duopoly with Managerial Delegation 0 0 1 79 1 4 9 239
Capacity choice in a duopoly with a consumer-friendly firm and an absolute profit-maximizing firm 0 0 1 11 0 6 7 62
Choosing Price or Quantity? The Role of Delegation and Network Externalities in a Mixed Duopoly 0 0 1 4 0 4 7 27
Competition and Privatisation Policies in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly: The Pay†off†interdependence Approach 0 0 0 15 1 5 8 51
Endogenous Choice of Strategic Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with Bargaining Over Managerial Delegation Contracts 0 0 0 1 0 6 8 28
Endogenous Choice of Strategic Variables in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Respect to the Demand Functions that Firms Face 0 0 0 4 0 4 11 46
Endogenous Market Structures in the Presence of a Socially Responsible Firm 0 0 0 13 0 5 8 54
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: The Managerial Delegation Case 0 0 1 11 0 5 10 78
Endogenous choice of strategic incentives in a mixed duopoly with a new managerial delegation contract for the public firm 0 0 0 13 1 6 12 81
Endogenous market structures in a mixed oligopoly with a public firm whose managerial contract is based on welfare and bargaining over the managerial contract of a private firm 0 0 0 8 0 2 2 46
Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: price competition with managerial delegation 0 0 0 38 0 2 5 201
INTER‐REGIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH A VERTICAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT * 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 69
Mixed Oligopoly and Productivity-Improving Mergers 0 0 0 23 1 7 9 93
Price Versus Quantity in a Duopoly with a Unilateral Effect and with Bargaining over Managerial Contracts 0 0 0 2 4 7 8 43
Price versus Quantity in a Duopolistic Market with Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Contracts 0 0 0 1 0 3 3 18
Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly: The case of relative profit maximization 0 0 0 15 0 1 4 75
STRATEGIC MANAGERIAL DELEGATION IN A MIXED DUOPOLY WITH CAPACITY CHOICE: PARTIAL DELEGATION OR FULL DELEGATION 0 0 0 29 0 2 5 181
Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs 0 0 0 37 1 5 7 230
Strategic managerial delegation and cross-border mergers 0 0 0 10 1 5 9 93
The Core and Productivity-Improving Mergers in Mixed Oligopoly 0 0 0 15 3 10 13 93
WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS 0 0 0 5 0 3 4 39
Total Journal Articles 0 0 4 427 20 135 208 2,420

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04