Access Statistics for Marina Núñez

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Canonical Representation for the Assignment Game: the Kernel and the Nucleolus 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 53
A Simple Procedure to Obtain the Extreme Core Allocations of an Assignment Market 0 0 0 10 2 3 3 41
A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 69
All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 192
An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game 0 1 1 120 0 1 1 140
Assignment markets with the same core 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 210
Axiomatization of the nucl eolus of assignment games 0 0 0 17 1 1 1 28
Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 11
Bargained stable allocations in assignment markets 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 35
Core stability and core-like solutions for three-sided assignment games 0 0 0 19 0 1 2 32
Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 57
Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games 0 0 0 26 0 0 1 43
Multi-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 73
Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 14
On the dimension of the core of the assignment game 0 0 0 40 1 1 2 164
On the extreme points of the core and reduced games 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 105
One-seller assignment markets with multiunit demands 0 0 0 66 1 1 2 55
Single-valued solutions for the Bohm-Bawerk horse market game 0 0 0 69 0 0 2 375
Stable cores in information graph games 0 0 1 18 0 1 3 37
The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games 0 1 2 28 0 1 3 79
The assignment game: core bounds for mixe-pair coalitions 0 0 0 69 0 0 0 409
The extreme core allocations of the assignment game 0 0 1 126 0 1 3 514
The maximun and the addition of assigment games 0 0 0 20 0 1 2 97
Uniform-price assignment markets 0 0 0 24 0 1 1 156
Valuation Monotonicity, Fairness and Stability in Assignment Problems 0 0 0 20 0 0 2 34
Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable-set solutions in the assignment market 0 0 0 17 1 1 1 99
Total Working Papers 0 2 5 855 6 14 41 3,131

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Cooperative Bargaining Approach to the Assignment Market 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6
A geometric characterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game 0 0 1 31 0 0 2 107
A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game 0 0 0 16 1 1 5 110
A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 30
A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 149
A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 41
A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 63
An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 35
Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 20
Assignment markets with the same core 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 33
Assignment submarkets with a segment core 0 1 1 4 0 1 1 21
Comments on: Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 9
Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 40
Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games 0 0 0 6 2 2 3 32
Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 26
On extreme points of the core and reduced games 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 26
On the dimension of the core of the assignment game 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 68
One‐seller assignment markets with multi‐unit demands: Core and competitive equilibrium 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 13
Stable cores in information graph games 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 5
The Böhm–Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis 0 0 0 74 0 1 4 263
The maximum and the addition of assignment games 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 19
The nucleolus and the core-center of multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 12
Von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 83
Total Journal Articles 0 2 3 262 5 10 28 1,221

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2025-03-03