Access Statistics for Alejandro Neme

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem 0 0 0 49 1 1 4 613
AN ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE SET OF MANY-TO-MANY STABLE MATCHINGS 0 0 0 76 1 2 5 241
All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof 0 6 8 9 1 13 22 25
All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof 1 4 12 24 3 13 35 49
Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem 0 0 0 71 1 2 4 624
Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 128
Equilibrium of Repeated Games With Cost of Implementation 0 0 0 17 0 0 3 93
Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous 0 0 1 41 0 1 6 17
Little Perfection and Complexity 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 79
MAXIMAL DOMAIN OF PREFERENCES IN THE DIVISION PROBLEM 0 0 0 42 3 4 11 230
On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria 0 0 0 40 1 1 2 105
On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 28
On Exiting after Voting 0 0 0 46 3 3 9 198
On Obvious Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness 0 0 4 4 0 1 8 8
On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness 0 0 30 30 0 1 28 28
On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency 0 0 0 6 0 0 10 27
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model 0 0 1 127 0 2 9 509
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles 0 0 0 7 1 2 6 48
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles 0 0 0 1 1 2 6 27
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game 0 0 0 27 0 1 8 49
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game 0 0 0 5 1 2 10 38
Order-k Rationality 0 0 4 4 0 1 24 24
Order-k Rationality 0 0 8 8 0 0 1 1
Ordinal Relative Satisficing Behavior: Theory and Experiments 0 0 0 28 1 1 5 76
Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions 0 0 0 15 2 3 12 57
Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions 0 0 0 5 1 1 5 42
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementation 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 184
The Division Problem under Constraints 0 0 0 10 1 1 3 28
The Division Problem under Constraints 0 0 0 14 2 2 5 41
The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation 0 0 1 2 1 1 4 19
The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation 0 0 0 36 2 2 6 104
The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sales and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria 0 0 0 28 1 1 5 112
The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria 0 0 0 15 1 2 5 79
The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria 0 0 0 8 2 2 8 55
The Strength of a Little Perfection 0 0 0 42 2 2 7 248
Voting Under Constraints 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 144
Voting by Committees Under Constraints 0 0 1 58 0 1 10 243
Voting by Committees under Constraints 0 0 0 6 1 2 8 39
Voting by Committees under Constraints 0 0 0 75 0 1 5 402
Voting by Committees under Constraints 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 30
Voting by Committees with Exit 0 0 0 45 0 1 6 302
Total Working Papers 1 10 70 1,027 38 82 331 5,394

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem 0 0 0 13 0 1 1 89
A nash type equilibrium in games without transitive preferences 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 25
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings 0 0 1 57 2 12 29 221
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit 0 0 0 24 0 0 5 79
Bribe-proof rules in the division problem 0 0 0 9 0 0 7 93
Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 147
Equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 28
Little Perfection and Complexity 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 51
Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem 0 0 0 9 3 4 8 82
Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes 0 1 1 31 0 1 2 242
On Exiting After Voting 0 0 0 12 0 1 10 97
On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 30
On exiting after voting 0 0 0 2 0 1 5 62
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model 0 0 0 25 0 2 4 172
On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 2
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency 0 0 0 2 0 0 8 18
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 10
On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 5
On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 36
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles 0 0 0 13 0 1 4 56
On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 23
STABLE SOLUTIONS ON MATCHING MODELS WITH QUOTA RESTRICTION 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5
Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings 0 1 2 68 2 5 8 205
Stability and voting by committees with exit 0 0 0 8 0 0 6 66
Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 12
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules 0 0 0 33 0 2 20 194
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Implementation Costs 0 0 0 16 0 1 2 49
The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model 0 0 0 9 0 1 3 61
The Strength of a Little Perfection 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 152
The division problem under constraints 0 0 0 4 0 0 5 28
The division problem with maximal capacity constraints 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 31
The division problem with voluntary participation 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 28
The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 20
The network of concepts in written texts 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 11
Voting by committees under constraints 0 0 0 21 0 1 7 119
Voting under Constraints 0 0 0 25 0 0 4 107
Total Journal Articles 0 3 5 409 10 42 184 2,656

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Statistics updated 2020-09-04