Access Statistics for Zvika Neeman

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs 0 0 0 13 0 0 4 178
Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 68 0 0 1 268
Are Career Women Good for Marriage? 0 0 1 120 0 3 11 924
Are Working Women Good for Marriage? 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 555
CORRUPTION AND OPENNESS 0 0 0 48 0 1 5 216
Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade 0 0 0 20 0 1 2 259
Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital and Poverty 0 0 2 341 0 0 5 894
Contestable Licensing 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 197
Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 236
Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance 0 0 0 1 2 2 8 769
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 100 0 0 4 350
Corruption and Openness 0 0 1 471 1 1 5 1,247
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 226 0 0 1 671
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis 0 1 1 280 0 1 3 721
Geography, Transparency and Institutions 0 0 0 72 0 0 5 192
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 543
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 166
Herding and the Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 211
Inspection in Markets for Experience Goods 0 0 0 213 0 0 2 918
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 66 0 0 1 245
Judging Under Public Pressure 0 0 1 11 0 0 3 27
Markets Versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation 0 0 0 121 0 1 1 421
On Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 225
On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 121 0 0 3 458
Property Rights and Efficiency of Public-Good Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 50 0 0 1 547
Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 127
Rise to the Challenge or Not Give a Damn: Differential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests 0 0 0 33 0 1 2 153
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition 0 1 1 64 2 3 3 387
Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition 0 0 1 226 0 1 3 1,177
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 0 2 2 14 216
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1,082
The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 235
The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 497
The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 352
The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 686
Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State 0 0 1 60 1 1 4 183
Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State 0 0 0 144 0 1 1 348
WATER AUCTIONS WITHIN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR: CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE IN ISRAEL 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 60
Total Working Papers 0 2 9 3,068 10 23 108 16,941
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 156
Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Commonp-Beliefs 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 79
Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations 0 0 0 52 0 0 1 225
Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework 0 0 0 24 0 0 2 101
Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade 0 0 0 13 1 1 1 86
Contestable Licensing 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 194
Corruption and Openness 0 1 2 133 0 2 5 432
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis 0 0 0 65 0 1 2 295
Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy? 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 40
Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities 0 0 0 41 0 1 2 117
Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design 0 0 1 19 1 1 4 101
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids 0 0 0 44 2 2 3 126
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 17 1 1 5 148
Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 127
Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 115
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem 0 0 0 5 2 2 2 27
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 37
On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design 0 0 1 84 0 0 5 401
On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests 0 0 0 77 0 1 7 181
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 29
Robustness against inefficient manipulation 0 0 0 8 0 0 2 39
Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital 0 0 5 156 1 2 14 486
Status and Poverty 0 0 0 175 0 0 1 721
THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT 0 0 1 36 2 2 3 156
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 25 2 2 2 234
The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 777
The effectiveness of English auctions 0 1 1 40 2 3 6 140
The relevance of private information in mechanism design 0 0 4 135 0 0 16 324
Total Journal Articles 0 2 15 1,255 15 23 93 5,894

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 121
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 121

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Statistics updated 2025-08-05