Access Statistics for Zvika Neeman

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs 0 0 0 13 2 2 3 177
Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 68 0 0 1 268
Are Career Women Good for Marriage? 1 1 3 120 2 4 12 920
Are Working Women Good for Marriage? 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 555
CORRUPTION AND OPENNESS 0 0 0 48 0 1 3 213
Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 258
Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital and Poverty 0 0 5 341 0 0 6 892
Contestable Licensing 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 197
Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 235
Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 764
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 100 0 1 5 349
Corruption and Openness 0 1 2 471 1 3 6 1,245
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 226 0 1 3 671
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis 0 0 0 279 0 0 1 719
Geography, Transparency and Institutions 0 0 0 72 1 3 3 190
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 543
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 164
Herding and the Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 211
Inspection in Markets for Experience Goods 0 0 0 213 0 2 3 918
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 66 1 1 3 245
Judging Under Public Pressure 0 0 1 11 0 1 5 27
Markets Versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation 0 0 0 121 0 0 0 420
On Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 225
On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 121 1 2 2 457
Property Rights and Efficiency of Public-Good Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 50 0 0 1 547
Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 127
Rise to the Challenge or Not Give a Damn: Differential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests 0 0 0 33 0 0 2 151
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition 0 0 1 63 0 0 4 384
Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition 0 0 2 226 1 1 4 1,176
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1,081
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 214
The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 234
The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 496
The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 351
The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 686
Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State 0 0 0 144 0 0 0 347
Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State 1 1 1 60 1 2 5 181
WATER AUCTIONS WITHIN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR: CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE IN ISRAEL 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 60
Total Working Papers 2 3 15 3,066 13 29 106 16,898
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 156
Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Commonp-Beliefs 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 79
Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations 0 0 0 52 0 1 1 225
Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework 0 0 0 24 1 1 1 100
Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 85
Contestable Licensing 0 0 0 31 0 1 1 194
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 131 1 1 5 429
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis 0 0 0 65 0 0 1 294
Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy? 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 40
Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities 0 0 0 41 0 1 1 116
Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design 0 0 1 19 0 0 3 100
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids 0 0 0 44 0 1 2 124
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 2 17 0 0 5 144
Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 127
Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 115
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 36
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 25
On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 83 1 3 4 400
On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests 0 0 0 77 0 0 5 178
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 29
Robustness against inefficient manipulation 0 0 0 8 1 1 2 39
Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital 0 2 4 155 1 4 11 480
Status and Poverty 0 0 0 175 1 1 5 721
THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT 0 1 1 36 0 1 1 154
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 25 0 0 2 232
The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem 0 0 0 0 3 4 5 775
The effectiveness of English auctions 0 0 1 39 1 2 5 137
The relevance of private information in mechanism design 0 0 9 135 1 4 26 324
Total Journal Articles 0 3 18 1,250 11 26 88 5,858

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 120
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 120

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03