Access Statistics for Zvika Neeman

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs 0 0 0 13 1 5 13 191
Adversarial Selection 0 4 4 4 2 9 9 9
Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 68 1 3 10 278
Are Career Women Good for Marriage? 0 1 3 123 4 29 46 968
Are Working Women Good for Marriage? 0 0 0 61 0 3 16 571
CORRUPTION AND OPENNESS 0 0 0 48 0 2 8 223
Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade 0 0 0 20 0 2 8 266
Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital and Poverty 0 0 1 342 1 3 12 906
Contestable Licensing 0 0 0 59 0 4 11 208
Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance 0 0 0 1 0 3 8 775
Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance 0 0 0 0 1 7 11 247
Corruption and Openness 0 1 1 472 0 4 11 1,257
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 226 0 1 14 685
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 100 0 3 14 364
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis 0 0 0 280 1 2 7 728
Geography, Transparency and Institutions 0 0 0 72 0 2 12 204
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 546
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 174
Herding and the Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 220
Inspection in Markets for Experience Goods 0 0 0 213 0 2 12 930
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 1 1 67 1 3 13 258
Judging Under Public Pressure 0 0 1 12 2 3 11 38
Markets Versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation 0 0 0 121 0 7 14 435
On Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem 0 0 0 14 1 2 6 231
On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design 0 0 1 122 1 5 12 470
Property Rights and Efficiency of Public-Good Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 51 1 7 18 565
Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design 0 0 0 47 1 4 13 140
Rise to the Challenge or Not Give a Damn: Differential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests 0 0 0 33 0 8 23 176
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition 0 0 2 65 1 8 21 405
Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition 0 0 0 226 1 5 12 1,189
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 225
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 1 0 5 10 1,092
The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 3 11 507
The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 5 11 246
The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 361
The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 690
Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State 0 0 3 147 0 0 14 362
Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State 0 0 1 61 0 6 28 210
WATER AUCTIONS WITHIN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR: CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE IN ISRAEL 0 0 0 17 0 2 3 63
Total Working Papers 0 7 19 3,086 24 167 488 17,413
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 13 0 3 11 167
Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Commonp-Beliefs 0 0 0 2 0 1 5 84
Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations 0 0 0 52 0 1 5 230
Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework 0 0 0 24 0 7 14 115
Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade 0 0 0 13 0 1 4 89
Contestable Licensing 0 0 0 31 0 4 8 202
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 133 1 6 10 442
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis 0 0 0 65 0 2 5 300
Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy? 0 0 0 4 0 4 7 47
Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities 0 0 0 41 0 1 8 125
Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design 0 1 1 20 1 8 16 116
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids 0 0 0 44 0 1 8 132
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 17 0 2 13 160
Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets 0 0 2 28 0 1 6 133
Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation 0 0 0 26 0 5 18 133
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem 0 0 0 5 0 1 11 36
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem 0 0 0 1 1 2 9 45
On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 84 0 2 11 412
On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests 0 0 0 77 0 0 5 185
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment 0 0 0 3 0 2 3 32
Robustness against inefficient manipulation 0 0 0 8 0 1 8 47
Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital 1 1 2 158 1 2 17 501
Status and Poverty 0 0 1 176 0 2 8 729
THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT 0 0 0 36 0 2 11 165
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 25 1 2 8 240
The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 789
The effectiveness of English auctions 0 0 0 40 0 2 9 147
The relevance of private information in mechanism design 0 0 1 136 0 3 18 342
Total Journal Articles 1 2 7 1,262 5 72 268 6,145

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 0 0 3 16 137
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 3 16 137

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Statistics updated 2026-06-04