Access Statistics for Zvika Neeman

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs 0 0 0 13 4 4 7 182
Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 68 4 5 5 273
Are Career Women Good for Marriage? 1 1 2 121 4 8 17 933
Are Working Women Good for Marriage? 0 0 0 61 3 4 5 560
CORRUPTION AND OPENNESS 0 0 0 48 1 3 7 219
Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade 0 0 0 20 0 2 3 261
Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital and Poverty 0 1 1 342 0 2 7 899
Contestable Licensing 0 0 0 59 1 1 2 199
Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 239
Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance 0 0 0 1 1 2 9 771
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 100 6 9 11 359
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 226 1 5 7 677
Corruption and Openness 0 0 1 471 1 1 6 1,248
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis 0 0 1 280 3 4 6 725
Geography, Transparency and Institutions 0 0 0 72 4 5 9 198
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 543
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 170
Herding and the Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 213
Inspection in Markets for Experience Goods 0 0 0 213 4 4 7 923
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 66 1 5 6 250
Judging Under Public Pressure 0 0 0 11 2 4 6 32
Markets Versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation 0 0 0 121 0 2 3 423
On Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 226
On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design 1 1 1 122 1 5 7 463
Property Rights and Efficiency of Public-Good Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information 1 1 1 51 2 4 4 551
Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design 0 0 0 47 1 2 2 129
Rise to the Challenge or Not Give a Damn: Differential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests 0 0 0 33 1 5 8 159
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition 0 1 2 65 3 4 7 391
Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition 0 0 0 226 1 3 5 1,180
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 1,084
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 217
The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 237
The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 499
The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 356
The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 687
Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State 0 1 2 146 1 3 6 353
Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State 0 1 2 61 2 7 11 190
WATER AUCTIONS WITHIN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR: CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE IN ISRAEL 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 60
Total Working Papers 3 7 13 3,076 63 120 206 17,079
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 13 3 3 3 159
Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Commonp-Beliefs 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 80
Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations 0 0 0 52 1 1 3 227
Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework 0 0 0 24 0 4 7 106
Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade 0 0 0 13 1 1 2 87
Contestable Licensing 0 0 0 31 1 1 2 195
Corruption and Openness 0 0 2 133 0 1 5 433
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis 0 0 0 65 1 1 2 296
Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy? 0 0 0 4 1 2 2 42
Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities 0 0 0 41 1 3 5 120
Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design 0 0 0 19 1 2 5 105
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids 0 0 0 44 0 2 4 128
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 17 3 5 9 153
Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets 0 1 2 28 1 3 4 131
Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation 0 0 0 26 1 4 4 119
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 40
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem 0 0 0 5 2 4 6 31
On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design 0 0 1 84 1 2 7 404
On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests 0 0 0 77 0 0 3 181
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 30
Robustness against inefficient manipulation 0 0 0 8 3 5 6 44
Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital 0 0 3 156 2 5 17 493
Status and Poverty 0 0 1 176 2 2 4 724
THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT 0 0 1 36 0 1 4 157
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 25 1 1 3 235
The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem 0 0 0 0 1 4 10 781
The effectiveness of English auctions 0 0 1 40 4 4 9 144
The relevance of private information in mechanism design 0 0 0 135 1 5 9 330
Total Journal Articles 0 1 11 1,258 36 71 141 5,975

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 0 3 9 11 130
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 3 9 11 130

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Statistics updated 2026-01-08