Access Statistics for Zvika Neeman

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs 0 0 0 13 4 8 11 186
Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 68 2 7 7 275
Are Career Women Good for Marriage? 1 2 3 122 3 11 18 936
Are Working Women Good for Marriage? 0 0 0 61 3 7 8 563
CORRUPTION AND OPENNESS 0 0 0 48 1 4 7 220
Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade 0 0 0 20 2 2 5 263
Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital and Poverty 0 0 1 342 4 5 11 903
Contestable Licensing 0 0 0 59 4 5 6 203
Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 240
Corporate Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance 0 0 0 1 1 3 10 772
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 226 6 10 12 683
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 471 4 5 8 1,252
Corruption and Openness 0 0 0 100 2 10 12 361
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis 0 0 1 280 1 4 7 726
Geography, Transparency and Institutions 0 0 0 72 4 8 13 202
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 546
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids 0 0 0 0 1 4 7 171
Herding and the Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 214
Inspection in Markets for Experience Goods 0 0 0 213 5 9 10 928
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 66 4 8 10 254
Judging Under Public Pressure 0 0 0 11 2 6 7 34
Markets Versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation 0 0 0 121 4 6 7 427
On Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem 0 0 0 14 3 3 4 229
On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design 0 1 1 122 1 4 8 464
Property Rights and Efficiency of Public-Good Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information 0 1 1 51 5 7 9 556
Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design 0 0 0 47 4 6 6 133
Rise to the Challenge or Not Give a Damn: Differential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests 0 0 0 33 8 13 16 167
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition 0 0 2 65 4 7 11 395
Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition 0 0 0 226 4 6 9 1,184
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 218
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 1 3 4 6 1,087
The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 240
The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions 0 0 0 0 4 5 7 503
The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 2 5 7 358
The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 687
Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State 0 1 2 61 11 18 21 201
Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State 1 2 3 147 8 10 14 361
WATER AUCTIONS WITHIN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR: CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE IN ISRAEL 0 0 0 17 1 1 1 61
Total Working Papers 2 7 14 3,078 124 225 318 17,203
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 13 4 7 7 163
Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Commonp-Beliefs 0 0 0 2 2 3 3 82
Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations 0 0 0 52 0 1 2 227
Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework 0 0 0 24 2 5 9 108
Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade 0 0 0 13 1 2 3 88
Contestable Licensing 0 0 0 31 2 3 3 197
Corruption and Openness 0 0 2 133 3 4 8 436
Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis 0 0 0 65 2 3 4 298
Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy? 0 0 0 4 1 3 3 43
Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities 0 0 0 41 3 4 7 123
Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design 0 0 0 19 2 4 7 107
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids 0 0 0 44 3 4 7 131
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 17 1 5 10 154
Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets 0 0 2 28 1 2 5 132
Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation 0 0 0 26 8 9 12 127
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem 0 0 0 1 3 6 7 43
On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem 0 0 0 5 4 6 10 35
On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design 0 0 1 84 3 5 8 407
On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests 0 0 0 77 4 4 7 185
Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 30
Robustness against inefficient manipulation 0 0 0 8 2 5 8 46
Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital 1 1 2 157 3 6 17 496
Status and Poverty 0 0 1 176 3 5 7 727
THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT 0 0 0 36 2 2 5 159
Termination and Coordination in Partnerships 0 0 0 25 3 4 6 238
The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem 0 0 0 0 2 5 11 783
The effectiveness of English auctions 0 0 1 40 1 5 9 145
The relevance of private information in mechanism design 0 0 0 135 4 9 11 334
Total Journal Articles 1 1 9 1,259 69 122 197 6,044

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 0 0 0 0 2 9 12 132
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 2 9 12 132

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2026-02-12