| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Self-Funding Reward Mechanism for Tax Compliance |
0 |
1 |
1 |
38 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
69 |
| A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
42 |
| Altruism, Fast and Slow? Evidence from a Meta-Analysis and a New Experiment |
0 |
2 |
10 |
139 |
2 |
7 |
47 |
140 |
| Are Victims Truly Worse Off in the Presence of Bystanders? Revisiting the Bystander Effect |
0 |
0 |
10 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
147 |
| Bonus versus Penalty: How Robust Are the Effects of Contract Framing? |
0 |
1 |
2 |
60 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
127 |
| Cooperation in Small Groups: The Effect of Group Size |
0 |
1 |
2 |
28 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
129 |
| Cooperation in Small Groups: The Effect of Group Size |
0 |
1 |
1 |
127 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
193 |
| Discretionary Sanctions and Reward in the Repeated Inspection Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
152 |
| Discretionary Sanctions and Rewards in the Repeated Inspection Game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
70 |
| Does consultation improve decision making? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
115 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
192 |
| Does consultation improve decision making? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
142 |
| ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
72 |
| ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
162 |
| ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
100 |
| Endogenous Move Structure and Volunatary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
34 |
| Entry or Exit? The Effect of Voluntary Participation on Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
74 |
| Entry or Exit? The Effect of Voluntary Participation on Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
50 |
| Group Identity and Leading-by-Example |
0 |
0 |
3 |
136 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
340 |
| Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Spectators vs. Stakeholders |
0 |
1 |
4 |
91 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
68 |
| Inducing Good Behavior: Bonuses versus Fines in Inspection Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
54 |
| Inducing Good Behavior: Bonuses versus Fines in Inspection Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
168 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
561 |
| Lab Measures of Other-Regarding Preferences Can Predict Some Related On-the-Job Behavior: Evidence from a Large Scale Field Experiment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
46 |
| Lab Measures of Other-Regarding Preferences Can Predict Some Related on-the-Job Behavior: Evidence from a Large Scale Field Experiment |
0 |
0 |
3 |
93 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
84 |
| Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence |
0 |
3 |
61 |
61 |
3 |
9 |
77 |
77 |
| Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
8 |
| Measuring Preferences for Competition with Experimentally-Validated Survey Questions |
0 |
2 |
17 |
17 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
8 |
| Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions |
0 |
1 |
19 |
19 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
13 |
| Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions |
12 |
13 |
15 |
15 |
7 |
10 |
21 |
21 |
| Norm Elicitation in Within-Subject Designs: Testing for Order Effects |
0 |
1 |
7 |
28 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
64 |
| Nudging the electorate: what works and why? |
1 |
1 |
4 |
85 |
1 |
5 |
26 |
123 |
| Nudging the electorate: what works and why? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
60 |
| Observability, Social Proximity, and the Erosion of Norm Compliance |
3 |
5 |
63 |
63 |
9 |
18 |
41 |
41 |
| Observability, Social Proximity, and the Erosion of Norm Compliance |
33 |
34 |
34 |
34 |
21 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
| On the social appropriateness of discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
54 |
| On the social inappropriateness of discrimination |
0 |
0 |
2 |
36 |
2 |
6 |
25 |
73 |
| One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Plurality of Social Norms and Saving Behavior in Kenya |
0 |
3 |
48 |
48 |
1 |
9 |
32 |
32 |
| PEER EFFECTS IN PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL NORMS OR SOCIAL PREFERENCES? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
79 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
278 |
| PEER EFFECTS IN PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL NORMS OR SOCIAL PREFERENCES? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
64 |
| Pay Secrecy and effort provision |
0 |
0 |
3 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
117 |
| Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms or Social Preferences? |
0 |
0 |
4 |
323 |
0 |
4 |
17 |
642 |
| Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behaviour: Social Norms or Social Preferences? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
112 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
176 |
| Preferences for Truth-Telling |
1 |
1 |
5 |
304 |
2 |
5 |
46 |
419 |
| Preferences for Truth-Telling |
0 |
1 |
8 |
47 |
2 |
6 |
35 |
173 |
| Preferences for truth-telling |
0 |
1 |
12 |
160 |
8 |
12 |
75 |
427 |
| Promoting Cooperation: the Distribution of Reward and Punishment Power |
0 |
3 |
9 |
161 |
0 |
4 |
28 |
458 |
| Self Selection Does Not Increase Other-Regarding Preferences among Adult Laboratory Subjects, but Student Subjects May Be More Self-Regarding than Adults |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
129 |
| Self Selection Does Not Increase Other-Regarding Preferences among Adult Laboratory Subjects, but Student Subjects May Be More Self-Regarding than Adults |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
57 |
| Self Selection Does Not Increase Other-Regarding Preferences among Adult Laboratory Subjects, but Student Subjects May Be More Self-Regarding than Adults |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
42 |
| Self-Selection and Variations in the Laboratory Measurment of Other-Regarding Preferences Across Subject Pools: Evidence from One College Student and Two Adult Samples |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
174 |
| Self-Selection into Economics Experiments Is Driven by Monetary Rewards |
0 |
0 |
1 |
98 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
122 |
| Self-selection into Economics Experiments is Driven by Monetary Rewards |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
197 |
| Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
1 |
1 |
161 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
450 |
| Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
36 |
| Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
55 |
| Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
75 |
| Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
143 |
| THE IMPACT OF PAY COMPARISONS ON EFFORT BEHAVIOR |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
139 |
| THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL COMPARISONS ON RECIPROCITY |
0 |
0 |
1 |
103 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
204 |
| Team Incentives and Leadership |
0 |
0 |
4 |
61 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
170 |
| The Coordinating Power of Social Norms |
2 |
84 |
84 |
84 |
8 |
38 |
38 |
38 |
| The Coordinating Power of Social Norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| The Effect of Voluntary Participation on Cooperation |
0 |
1 |
3 |
90 |
5 |
11 |
72 |
143 |
| The Impact of Pay Comparisons on Effort Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
61 |
| The Impact of Social Camparisons of Reciprocity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
96 |
| The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
101 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
412 |
| The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
56 |
| The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
222 |
| The Importance of Peers for Compliance with Norms of Fair Sharing |
0 |
0 |
4 |
107 |
2 |
2 |
19 |
39 |
| The Importance of Peers for Compliance with Norms of Fair Sharing |
0 |
0 |
3 |
62 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
74 |
| The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing |
0 |
0 |
1 |
91 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
31 |
| Tradeoffs between Self-interest and Other-Regarding Preferences Cause Willpower Depletion |
0 |
1 |
3 |
63 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
142 |
| WHO MAKES A GOOD LEADER? COOPERATIVENESS, OPTIMISM AND LEADING-BY-EXAMPLE |
0 |
0 |
14 |
48 |
2 |
3 |
36 |
278 |
| WHO MAKES A GOOD LEADER? COOPERATIVENESS, OPTIMISM AND LEADING-BY-EXAMPLE |
0 |
2 |
2 |
188 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
552 |
| Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
344 |
| Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example |
0 |
0 |
2 |
181 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
1,174 |
| Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
69 |
| Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
195 |
| Total Working Papers |
52 |
165 |
485 |
5,369 |
100 |
257 |
1,322 |
12,318 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.