Access Statistics for Daniele Nosenzo

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Self-Funding Reward Mechanism for Tax Compliance 0 0 1 43 1 4 9 98
A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance 0 0 0 21 1 7 18 76
Altruism, Fast and Slow? Evidence from a Meta-Analysis and a New Experiment 0 0 0 145 5 8 14 190
Ambiguity induces opportunistic rule breaking and erodes social norms 2 4 11 35 4 10 43 83
Are Victims Truly Worse Off in the Presence of Bystanders? Revisiting the Bystander Effect 0 0 0 73 3 3 12 185
Bonus versus Penalty: How Robust Are the Effects of Contract Framing? 0 0 0 62 3 7 16 160
Cooperation in Small Groups: The Effect of Group Size 0 0 0 128 3 4 10 256
Cooperation in Small Groups: The Effect of Group Size 0 0 0 36 1 2 7 180
Discretionary Sanctions and Reward in the Repeated Inspection Game 0 0 0 55 4 4 11 179
Discretionary Sanctions and Rewards in the Repeated Inspection Game 0 0 0 24 0 2 8 102
Does consultation improve decision making? 0 0 0 210 0 13 19 361
ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT 0 0 0 86 1 3 8 255
Endogenous Move Structure and Volunatary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment 0 0 0 82 2 6 8 156
Entry or Exit? The Effect of Voluntary Participation on Cooperation 0 0 0 78 0 3 10 88
Entry or Exit? The Effect of Voluntary Participation on Cooperation 0 0 0 52 0 1 6 74
Equal before the (expressive power of) law? 0 0 1 22 3 6 28 80
Equal before the (expressive power of) law? 0 0 1 12 4 7 18 29
Equal before the (expressive power of) law? 0 0 1 11 4 6 22 45
Group Identity and Leading-by-Example 0 0 2 141 2 7 19 389
I Solemnly Swear I'm Up To Good: A Megastudy Investigating the Effectiveness of Honesty Oaths on Curbing Dishonesty 0 0 1 16 2 5 121 140
I Solemnly Swear I'm Up To Good: A Megastudy Investigating the Effectiveness of Honesty Oaths on Curbing Dishonesty 0 0 1 5 4 13 31 57
Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Spectators vs. Stakeholders 0 0 0 94 0 2 4 85
Inducing Good Behavior: Bonuses versus Fines in Inspection Games 0 0 1 178 3 5 12 656
Lab Measures of Other-Regarding Preferences Can Predict Some Related On-the-Job Behavior: Evidence from a Large Scale Field Experiment 0 0 1 48 3 4 8 67
Lab Measures of Other-Regarding Preferences Can Predict Some Related on-the-Job Behavior: Evidence from a Large Scale Field Experiment 0 0 0 101 3 9 18 155
Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence 0 0 0 25 4 4 21 106
Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence 0 0 0 76 3 3 15 192
Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence 0 1 6 125 2 12 37 227
Measuring Preferences for Competition with Experimentally-Validated Survey Questions 0 0 0 20 2 7 14 46
Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions 0 0 0 22 1 6 16 43
Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions 0 0 0 27 3 3 14 66
Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions 0 0 1 24 4 9 21 48
Norm Elicitation in Within-Subject Designs: Testing for Order Effects 0 0 0 32 4 5 12 100
Norm-Signalling Punishment 0 1 1 39 1 2 5 38
Norm-signalling punishment 0 0 0 126 1 2 4 19
Nudging the electorate: what works and why? 0 0 0 91 2 4 10 190
Nudging the electorate: what works and why? 0 0 0 69 1 4 14 88
Observability, Social Proximity, and the Erosion of Norm Compliance 0 0 0 98 2 3 12 197
Observability, Social Proximity, and the Erosion of Norm Compliance 0 0 1 55 1 5 15 89
On the social appropriateness of discrimination 0 0 0 37 3 4 10 81
On the social inappropriateness of discrimination 0 0 0 43 2 3 12 113
One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Plurality of Social Norms and Saving Behavior in Kenya 0 0 1 62 1 2 8 75
PEER EFFECTS IN PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL NORMS OR SOCIAL PREFERENCES? 0 0 1 98 0 4 19 437
Pay Secrecy and effort provision 0 0 0 27 3 3 13 156
Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms or Social Preferences? 0 0 1 330 1 2 14 689
Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behaviour: Social Norms or Social Preferences? 0 1 2 119 1 4 12 205
Preferences for Truth-Telling 0 0 4 58 5 7 41 281
Preferences for Truth-Telling 0 1 1 315 4 8 24 520
Preferences for truth-telling 0 0 0 184 5 11 26 554
Promoting Cooperation: the Distribution of Reward and Punishment Power 0 0 0 163 5 6 15 495
Self Selection Does Not Increase Other-Regarding Preferences among Adult Laboratory Subjects, but Student Subjects May Be More Self-Regarding than Adults 0 0 0 19 1 1 5 115
Self Selection Does Not Increase Other-Regarding Preferences among Adult Laboratory Subjects, but Student Subjects May Be More Self-Regarding than Adults 0 0 0 44 1 3 16 155
Self-Selection and Variations in the Laboratory Measurment of Other-Regarding Preferences Across Subject Pools: Evidence from One College Student and Two Adult Samples 0 0 1 43 1 2 11 203
Self-Selection into Economics Experiments Is Driven by Monetary Rewards 0 0 0 100 2 4 17 156
Self-selection into Economics Experiments is Driven by Monetary Rewards 0 0 0 75 4 4 24 253
Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 161 3 6 18 482
Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 82 0 2 9 199
Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 61 6 8 15 151
Social Proximity and the Erosion of Norm Compliance 0 0 0 87 3 7 19 106
Team Incentives and Leadership 0 0 0 68 5 5 13 208
The Coordinating Power of Social Norms 0 0 0 30 0 0 12 84
The Coordinating Power of Social Norms 0 1 3 106 2 4 25 145
The Effect of Voluntary Participation on Cooperation 0 1 1 92 6 7 18 232
The Impact of Pay Comparisons on Effort Behavior 0 0 0 69 2 2 9 227
The Impact of Social Camparisons of Reciprocity 0 0 0 113 4 6 15 336
The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity 0 0 0 99 0 2 17 313
The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity 0 0 0 102 2 4 13 448
The Importance of Peers for Compliance with Norms of Fair Sharing 0 0 0 115 2 3 11 92
The Importance of Peers for Compliance with Norms of Fair Sharing 0 0 0 62 3 3 6 87
The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing 0 0 0 94 1 8 18 57
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment 0 0 1 8 2 5 12 31
Tradeoffs between Self-interest and Other-Regarding Preferences Cause Willpower Depletion 0 0 0 65 2 4 12 173
WHO MAKES A GOOD LEADER? COOPERATIVENESS, OPTIMISM AND LEADING-BY-EXAMPLE 0 0 0 268 0 0 7 940
Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example 0 0 0 93 1 1 3 357
Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example 0 0 1 37 1 1 9 291
Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example 0 0 0 185 4 4 12 1,201
Total Working Papers 2 10 47 6,301 175 360 1,230 16,243

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance 0 0 0 3 2 2 13 25
Altruism, fast and slow? Evidence from a meta-analysis and a new experiment 0 0 1 6 6 9 34 68
Are Victims Truly Worse Off in the Presence of Bystanders? Revisiting the Bystander Effect 0 0 0 17 2 5 19 57
Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing? 0 0 0 6 2 3 20 87
Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size 0 1 1 37 2 6 13 163
Discretionary Sanctions and Rewards in the Repeated Inspection Game 0 0 0 3 3 4 14 48
Does consultation improve decision-making? 0 0 0 16 1 2 12 109
Employee incentives: Bonuses or penalties? 0 0 1 40 0 1 6 170
Encouraging Compliance: Bonuses Versus Fines in Inspection Games 0 1 1 15 1 3 8 50
Endogenous Move Structure and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment 0 0 0 30 0 3 9 101
Group identity and leading-by-example 0 0 1 60 3 3 23 221
Identifying social norms using coordination games: Spectators vs. stakeholders 0 0 2 37 1 3 9 117
Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence 0 2 2 37 2 6 17 113
Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions 0 0 2 13 3 5 22 53
Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: Testing for order effects 0 0 0 11 2 4 13 75
On the social inappropriateness of discrimination 0 0 2 25 5 9 22 132
One size does not fit all: Plurality of social norms and saving behavior in Kenya 0 0 1 3 4 7 19 37
PEER EFFECTS IN PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL NORMS OR SOCIAL PREFERENCES? 0 0 3 47 0 2 13 207
Preferences for Truth‐Telling 6 7 15 119 18 26 77 421
Promoting voter registration: the effects of low-cost interventions on behaviour and norms 0 0 0 8 0 1 7 36
Self-selection and variations in the laboratory measurement of other-regarding preferences across subject pools: evidence from one college student and two adult samples 0 0 0 21 1 1 13 121
Self-selection into laboratory experiments: pro-social motives versus monetary incentives 0 0 1 43 2 4 46 257
Sequential vs. simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 54 3 6 19 216
Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance 0 0 2 10 0 7 23 58
Team incentives and leadership 0 0 0 27 7 7 17 143
The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity 0 0 0 35 1 2 9 216
The coordinating power of social norms 0 0 5 14 5 7 23 84
The effect of voluntary participation on cooperation 0 0 0 7 4 9 22 74
The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing 0 0 3 55 4 7 26 185
WHO MAKES A GOOD LEADER? COOPERATIVENESS, OPTIMISM, AND LEADING-BY-EXAMPLE 0 0 3 81 4 5 25 443
Total Journal Articles 6 11 46 880 88 159 593 4,087

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06