Access Statistics for Daniele Nosenzo

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Self-Funding Reward Mechanism for Tax Compliance 0 0 1 43 2 4 7 96
A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance 0 0 0 21 4 8 15 73
Altruism, Fast and Slow? Evidence from a Meta-Analysis and a New Experiment 0 0 0 145 3 7 10 185
Ambiguity induces opportunistic rule breaking and erodes social norms 1 5 9 32 4 20 44 77
Are Victims Truly Worse Off in the Presence of Bystanders? Revisiting the Bystander Effect 0 0 0 73 0 5 9 182
Bonus versus Penalty: How Robust Are the Effects of Contract Framing? 0 0 0 62 1 8 10 154
Cooperation in Small Groups: The Effect of Group Size 0 0 0 36 0 3 5 178
Cooperation in Small Groups: The Effect of Group Size 0 0 0 128 0 4 6 252
Discretionary Sanctions and Reward in the Repeated Inspection Game 0 0 0 55 0 2 7 175
Discretionary Sanctions and Rewards in the Repeated Inspection Game 0 0 0 24 1 3 8 101
Does consultation improve decision making? 0 0 0 210 1 5 8 349
ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT 0 0 0 86 2 5 7 254
Endogenous Move Structure and Volunatary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment 0 0 1 82 2 4 5 152
Entry or Exit? The Effect of Voluntary Participation on Cooperation 0 0 0 52 0 3 5 73
Entry or Exit? The Effect of Voluntary Participation on Cooperation 0 0 0 78 0 3 8 85
Equal before the (expressive power of) law? 0 0 1 11 0 7 16 39
Equal before the (expressive power of) law? 0 0 1 22 3 8 28 77
Equal before the (expressive power of) law? 0 0 1 12 2 7 13 24
Group Identity and Leading-by-Example 0 1 2 141 2 11 15 384
I Solemnly Swear I'm Up To Good: A Megastudy Investigating the Effectiveness of Honesty Oaths on Curbing Dishonesty 0 1 2 16 3 9 120 138
I Solemnly Swear I'm Up To Good: A Megastudy Investigating the Effectiveness of Honesty Oaths on Curbing Dishonesty 0 0 1 5 4 10 23 48
Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Spectators vs. Stakeholders 0 0 0 94 2 2 5 85
Inducing Good Behavior: Bonuses versus Fines in Inspection Games 0 0 1 178 0 2 8 651
Lab Measures of Other-Regarding Preferences Can Predict Some Related On-the-Job Behavior: Evidence from a Large Scale Field Experiment 0 0 1 48 0 2 4 63
Lab Measures of Other-Regarding Preferences Can Predict Some Related on-the-Job Behavior: Evidence from a Large Scale Field Experiment 0 0 0 101 4 10 16 150
Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence 0 0 0 25 0 9 19 102
Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence 1 2 8 125 8 22 36 223
Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence 0 0 0 76 0 7 13 189
Measuring Preferences for Competition with Experimentally-Validated Survey Questions 0 0 0 20 2 6 9 41
Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions 0 1 1 24 2 11 15 41
Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions 0 0 0 27 0 5 11 63
Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions 0 0 0 22 2 12 12 39
Norm Elicitation in Within-Subject Designs: Testing for Order Effects 0 0 0 32 1 5 8 96
Norm-Signalling Punishment 1 1 1 39 1 3 6 37
Norm-signalling punishment 0 0 0 126 0 2 2 17
Nudging the electorate: what works and why? 0 0 0 69 3 11 14 87
Nudging the electorate: what works and why? 0 0 0 91 1 5 7 187
Observability, Social Proximity, and the Erosion of Norm Compliance 0 0 1 55 3 7 13 87
Observability, Social Proximity, and the Erosion of Norm Compliance 0 0 0 98 1 4 11 195
On the social appropriateness of discrimination 0 0 0 37 0 3 7 77
On the social inappropriateness of discrimination 0 0 0 43 0 6 9 110
One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Plurality of Social Norms and Saving Behavior in Kenya 0 0 1 62 0 3 6 73
PEER EFFECTS IN PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL NORMS OR SOCIAL PREFERENCES? 0 1 2 98 1 7 17 434
Pay Secrecy and effort provision 0 0 0 27 0 2 11 153
Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms or Social Preferences? 0 0 1 330 1 6 13 688
Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behaviour: Social Norms or Social Preferences? 1 1 2 119 1 3 9 202
Preferences for Truth-Telling 0 2 4 58 1 25 36 275
Preferences for Truth-Telling 0 0 0 314 3 10 19 515
Preferences for truth-telling 0 0 0 184 2 9 20 545
Promoting Cooperation: the Distribution of Reward and Punishment Power 0 0 0 163 1 7 10 490
Self Selection Does Not Increase Other-Regarding Preferences among Adult Laboratory Subjects, but Student Subjects May Be More Self-Regarding than Adults 0 0 0 44 0 11 14 152
Self Selection Does Not Increase Other-Regarding Preferences among Adult Laboratory Subjects, but Student Subjects May Be More Self-Regarding than Adults 0 0 0 19 0 4 4 114
Self-Selection and Variations in the Laboratory Measurment of Other-Regarding Preferences Across Subject Pools: Evidence from One College Student and Two Adult Samples 0 0 2 43 1 6 11 202
Self-Selection into Economics Experiments Is Driven by Monetary Rewards 0 0 0 100 2 7 15 154
Self-selection into Economics Experiments is Driven by Monetary Rewards 0 0 0 75 0 15 24 249
Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 161 0 8 12 476
Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 61 1 6 8 144
Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 82 0 5 7 197
Social Proximity and the Erosion of Norm Compliance 0 0 0 87 1 7 13 100
Team Incentives and Leadership 0 0 0 68 0 4 9 203
The Coordinating Power of Social Norms 1 2 3 106 1 12 23 142
The Coordinating Power of Social Norms 0 0 0 30 0 5 12 84
The Effect of Voluntary Participation on Cooperation 1 1 1 92 1 6 13 226
The Impact of Pay Comparisons on Effort Behavior 0 0 0 69 0 7 7 225
The Impact of Social Camparisons of Reciprocity 0 0 0 113 1 5 10 331
The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity 0 0 0 102 0 3 9 444
The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity 0 0 0 99 1 7 16 312
The Importance of Peers for Compliance with Norms of Fair Sharing 0 0 0 62 0 2 3 84
The Importance of Peers for Compliance with Norms of Fair Sharing 0 0 0 115 0 3 8 89
The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing 0 0 0 94 4 11 15 53
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment 0 0 1 8 0 3 9 26
Tradeoffs between Self-interest and Other-Regarding Preferences Cause Willpower Depletion 0 0 0 65 0 4 8 169
WHO MAKES A GOOD LEADER? COOPERATIVENESS, OPTIMISM AND LEADING-BY-EXAMPLE 0 0 1 268 0 3 9 940
Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example 0 0 0 185 0 6 8 1,197
Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example 0 0 1 37 0 3 8 290
Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example 0 0 1 93 0 1 3 356
Total Working Papers 6 18 52 6,297 87 496 1,013 15,970

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance 0 0 0 3 0 6 11 23
Altruism, fast and slow? Evidence from a meta-analysis and a new experiment 0 0 2 6 2 20 28 61
Are Victims Truly Worse Off in the Presence of Bystanders? Revisiting the Bystander Effect 0 0 0 17 2 14 17 54
Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing? 0 0 0 6 1 11 19 85
Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size 1 1 1 37 4 8 12 161
Discretionary Sanctions and Rewards in the Repeated Inspection Game 0 0 0 3 0 8 10 44
Does consultation improve decision-making? 0 0 0 16 0 4 10 107
Employee incentives: Bonuses or penalties? 0 0 1 40 0 2 5 169
Encouraging Compliance: Bonuses Versus Fines in Inspection Games 1 1 1 15 2 7 7 49
Endogenous Move Structure and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment 0 0 0 30 2 6 8 100
Group identity and leading-by-example 0 1 1 60 0 5 21 218
Identifying social norms using coordination games: Spectators vs. stakeholders 0 1 2 37 2 7 9 116
Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence 2 2 3 37 3 6 15 110
Measuring preferences for competition with experimentally-validated survey questions 0 1 2 13 1 9 19 49
Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: Testing for order effects 0 0 0 11 2 6 11 73
On the social inappropriateness of discrimination 0 0 2 25 3 7 16 126
One size does not fit all: Plurality of social norms and saving behavior in Kenya 0 1 1 3 2 10 15 32
PEER EFFECTS IN PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL NORMS OR SOCIAL PREFERENCES? 0 0 3 47 0 5 12 205
Preferences for Truth‐Telling 0 1 11 112 7 22 63 402
Promoting voter registration: the effects of low-cost interventions on behaviour and norms 0 0 0 8 1 2 8 36
Self-selection and variations in the laboratory measurement of other-regarding preferences across subject pools: evidence from one college student and two adult samples 0 0 0 21 0 5 12 120
Self-selection into laboratory experiments: pro-social motives versus monetary incentives 0 0 1 43 1 31 43 254
Sequential vs. simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 54 2 6 16 212
Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance 0 0 2 10 5 11 21 56
Team incentives and leadership 0 0 0 27 0 3 10 136
The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity 0 0 0 35 0 2 7 214
The coordinating power of social norms 0 0 5 14 1 6 23 78
The effect of voluntary participation on cooperation 0 0 0 7 4 8 18 69
The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing 0 1 3 55 1 6 20 179
WHO MAKES A GOOD LEADER? COOPERATIVENESS, OPTIMISM, AND LEADING-BY-EXAMPLE 0 0 4 81 1 6 25 439
Total Journal Articles 4 10 45 873 49 249 511 3,977

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04