Access Statistics for Volker Nocke

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Gap for Me: Entrepreneurs and Entry 0 0 0 151 1 3 9 402
A Gap for Me: Entrepreneurs and Entry 0 0 0 79 1 5 9 320
Advance-Purchase Discounts as a Price Discrimination Device 1 1 1 128 2 2 11 470
An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly 0 1 2 29 2 5 19 81
An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly 0 1 1 72 2 4 7 69
An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly 0 2 4 51 0 4 9 52
An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 0 0 0 316 0 3 18 1,126
An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 0 0 0 239 0 2 38 895
An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 0 0 1 480 0 1 10 1,644
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives 0 0 1 187 0 0 7 891
Cartel Stability under Capacity Constraints: The Traditional View Restored 0 0 0 81 0 0 2 575
Cartel stability under capacity constraints: the traditional view restored 0 0 0 3 0 3 9 54
Collective Brand Reputation 0 1 8 8 1 5 17 17
Collective Brand Reputation 1 3 36 36 1 5 46 46
Collusion, Mergers, and Related Antitrust Issues 1 2 25 25 1 8 37 37
Competition for Scarce Resources 0 1 2 162 2 16 138 2,071
Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers 0 1 6 71 0 1 20 132
Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers 0 1 5 19 2 3 13 29
Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers 0 2 9 15 0 3 8 23
Cross-Border Price Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions -- A Quantitative Framework for Competition Policy 0 0 0 46 0 0 4 163
Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? 0 0 0 160 0 2 9 449
Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? 0 0 0 182 0 0 6 544
Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? 0 0 0 2 1 2 14 541
Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? Second Version 0 0 1 236 0 2 9 731
Dynamic Merger Review 0 0 1 64 1 2 8 163
Dynamic Merger Review 0 0 1 106 0 0 6 194
Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships 0 0 0 49 0 0 5 78
Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships 0 0 1 63 1 4 11 88
Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships 0 0 0 16 0 0 6 42
Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships 0 0 1 36 1 1 7 115
Firm Turnover in Imperfectly Competitive Markets 0 0 2 320 1 7 26 1,461
Globalization and Endogenous Firm Scope 0 1 4 228 0 4 15 682
Globalization and Endogenous Firm Scope 0 1 1 153 2 4 9 591
Globalization and Multiproduct Firms 0 0 0 41 1 1 3 97
Globalization and Multiproduct Firms 0 0 0 52 0 0 9 111
Globalization and Multiproduct Firms 0 0 0 65 1 2 8 183
Globalization and multiproduct firms 0 0 0 83 0 1 7 159
Globalization and the Size Distribution of Multiproduct Firms 0 2 3 176 0 4 6 436
Gravity With Granularity 0 0 3 12 2 7 21 28
Gravity with Granularity 0 0 3 3 0 2 15 19
Gravity with granularity 0 0 8 8 0 2 21 21
Hyperbolic Discounting and Secondary Markets 0 0 0 152 0 0 6 703
Imperfect Competition, Market Size and Firm Turnover 0 0 1 213 0 1 7 1,191
Internal Versus External Growth in Industries With Scale Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger Policy 0 0 1 48 0 2 13 100
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger Policy 0 0 0 18 2 3 12 120
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger Policy 0 0 0 34 2 4 7 137
Internal versus external growth in industries with scale economies: A computational model of optimal merger policy 0 0 1 34 3 4 10 104
Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade 0 0 0 40 0 1 3 30
Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade 0 0 2 7 1 3 10 34
Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade 0 0 0 4 0 1 6 44
Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade 0 0 0 44 1 3 7 54
Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade 0 0 0 43 0 1 5 57
Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade 0 0 0 8 1 3 7 54
Merger policy in a quantitative model of internationaltrade 0 0 0 38 0 2 6 32
Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 0 0 0 167 1 2 5 625
Monopolisation and Industry Structure 0 0 0 193 0 0 5 626
Monopoly Pricing under Demand Uncertainty: Final Sales versus Introductory Offers 1 2 8 181 2 4 14 831
Monopoly Pricing under Demand Uncertainty: Final Sales versus Introductory ffers 1 3 6 151 1 3 13 856
Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative Games Approach 0 0 0 71 0 0 7 81
Platform Ownership 0 0 1 148 0 2 21 534
Platform Ownership 0 1 1 82 0 2 3 287
Platform Ownership 0 0 0 74 2 2 7 235
Quasi-Linear Integrability 0 0 0 12 0 1 8 41
Underinvestment and Market Structure 0 0 0 38 1 2 7 665
Underinvestment and market structure 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 21
Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers 0 0 1 40 0 1 11 175
Vertical Relations under Credit Constraints 0 0 0 19 1 1 6 124
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 0 31 0 1 5 45
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 0 8 0 0 4 71
When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime 0 0 1 52 0 0 2 67
When and how the punishment must fit the crime 0 0 0 68 1 2 4 56
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 279
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games 0 0 0 61 0 1 1 499
Total Working Papers 5 26 153 6,370 45 172 876 24,608

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Gap for Me: Entrepreneurs and Entry 0 0 5 67 1 2 13 267
A Theory of Clearance Sales 0 0 0 111 2 3 8 410
Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device 1 1 6 68 1 2 42 333
An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 0 3 22 458 6 19 74 1,631
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives 0 0 1 170 2 4 7 702
Collusion and dynamic (under-) investment in quality 0 0 2 7 0 1 4 50
Competition for scarce resources 0 0 2 24 0 1 8 174
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions vs. greenfield foreign direct investment: The role of firm heterogeneity 1 6 18 614 2 18 67 1,563
Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? 0 0 3 164 1 1 10 606
Dynamic Merger Review 0 0 6 110 2 5 39 710
Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships 0 1 3 11 1 5 19 63
Firm Turnover in Imperfectly Competitive Markets -super-1 2 2 11 212 3 5 25 606
GLOBALIZATION AND MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3
Hyperbolic discounting and secondary markets 0 0 0 37 0 0 2 159
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger Policy 0 0 1 7 3 7 46 110
International aspects of merger policy: A survey 0 0 1 7 1 3 7 58
Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade 0 2 5 6 0 5 14 22
Merger Policy with Merger Choice 1 4 6 55 3 10 27 271
Multiproduct‐Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative Games Approach 0 1 1 17 1 7 22 101
Platform Ownership 0 0 2 101 0 2 11 359
Quasi-linear integrability 0 0 0 10 2 3 7 53
Quasi-linear integrability: Addendum 0 0 1 7 0 0 1 35
VERTICAL RELATIONS UNDER CREDIT CONSTRAINTS 0 0 0 11 0 3 5 65
Vertical merger, collusion, and disruptive buyers 0 0 3 39 0 0 9 164
WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 3
Total Journal Articles 6 21 101 2,315 32 109 473 8,518

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Statistics updated 2022-01-05