| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Brexit and UK trade |
0 |
3 |
11 |
11 |
1 |
8 |
35 |
40 |
| Currency Unions, Trade, and Heterogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
96 |
| Currency Unions, Trade, and Heterogeneity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
106 |
| Currency Unions, Trade, and Heterogeneity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
94 |
| Currency unions, trade and heterogeneity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
72 |
| Currency unions, trade and heterogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
| Estimating Border Effects: The Impact of Spatial Aggregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
149 |
| Estimating Border Effects: The Impact of Spatial Aggregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
96 |
| Estimating Border Effects: The Impact of Spatial Aggregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
108 |
| Estimating border effects: the impact of spatial aggregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
| Estimating border effects: the impact of spatial aggregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
78 |
| Exchange Rates and Consumer Prices: Evidence from Brexit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
35 |
| Exchange Rates and Consumer Prices: Evidence from Brexit |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
94 |
| Exchange Rates and Consumer Prices: Evidence from Brexit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
52 |
| Exchange Rates and Consumer Prices: Evidence from Brexit |
0 |
1 |
2 |
47 |
1 |
7 |
15 |
67 |
| Exchange rates and consumer prices: evidence from Brexit |
0 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
157 |
| Exchange rates and consumer prices: evidence from Brexit |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
39 |
| Gravity Redux: Measuring International Trade Costs with Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
1 |
117 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
300 |
| Gravity Redux: Measuring International Trade Costs with Panel Data |
0 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
141 |
| Gravity Redux: Measuring International Trade Costs with Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
3 |
545 |
2 |
6 |
29 |
1,478 |
| Gravity Redux: Measuring International Trade Costs with Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
1 |
102 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
330 |
| Gravity and Heterogeneous Trade Cost Elasticities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
52 |
| Gravity and Heterogeneous Trade Cost Elasticities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
29 |
| Gravity and Heterogeneous Trade Cost Elasticities |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
29 |
| Gravity and heterogeneous trade cost elasticities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
| Gravity redux: measuring international trade costs with panel data |
0 |
0 |
2 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
227 |
| Gravity redux: measuring international trade costs with panel data |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Hedge Your Costs: Exchange Rate Risk and Endogenous Currency Invoicing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
| Hedge Your Costs: Exchange Rate Risk and Endogenous Currency Invoicing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
180 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1,040 |
| How to Grow an Invoicing Currency: Micro Evidence from Argentina |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| How to Grow an Invoicing Currency: Micro Evidence from Argentina |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
| How to grow an invoicing currency: micro evidence from Argentina |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
| Import Liberalization as Export Destruction? Evidence from the United States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
21 |
| Import Liberalization as Export Destruction? Evidence from the United States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
22 |
| Import Liberalization as Export Destruction? Evidence from the United States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
| Import Liberalization as Export Destruction? Evidence from the United States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
22 |
| Import Liberalization as Export Destruction? Evidence from the United States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
| Import liberalization as export destruction? Evidence from the United States |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
| Import liberalization as export destruction? Evidence from the United States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
| In brief...Brexit and outward investment by UK firms |
0 |
0 |
2 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
50 |
| International Trade Integration: A Disaggregated Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
234 |
| International Trade Integration: A Disaggregated Approach |
0 |
0 |
2 |
213 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
723 |
| International Trade Integration: A Disaggregated Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
| International Trade Without CES: Estimating Translog Gravity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
156 |
| International Trade and Monopolistic Competition without CES: Estimating Translog Gravity |
0 |
1 |
1 |
118 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
246 |
| International Trade without CES: Estimating Translog Gravity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
| International Trade without CES: Estimating Translog Gravity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
| International Trade without CES: Estimating Translog Gravity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
85 |
| International Trade without CES: Estimating Translog Gravity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
36 |
| International Trade without CES: Estimating Translog Gravity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
182 |
| International trade integration: a disaggregated approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
65 |
| International trade without CES: estimating translog gravity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
97 |
| Is the Iceberg Melting Less Quickly? International Trade Costs after World War II |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
83 |
| Is the Iceberg Melting Less Quickly? International Trade Costs after World War II |
0 |
0 |
5 |
375 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
1,343 |
| Is the International Border Effect Larger than the Domestic Border Effect? Evidence from U.S. Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
301 |
| Is the International Border Effect Larger than the Domestic Border Effect? Evidence from U.S. Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
200 |
| Is the International Border Effect Larger than the Domestic Border Effect? Evidence from U.S. Trade |
1 |
1 |
1 |
50 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
253 |
| Is the international border effect larger than the domestic border effect? Evidence from US trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
67 |
| Is the international border effect larger than the domestic border effect? evidence from U.S. trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
140 |
| Is the international border effect larger than the domestic border effect?: evidence from US trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
59 |
| Market Potential and Global Growth over the Long Twentieth Century |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
| Market Potential and Global Growth over the Long Twentieth Century |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
66 |
| Market Potential and Global Growth over the Long Twentieth Century |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
58 |
| Market Potential and Global Growth over the Long Twentieth Century |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
31 |
| Market potential and global growth over the long twentieth century |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
42 |
| Market potential and global growth over the long twentieth century |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
85 |
| On the Measurement of Trade Costs: Direct vs. Indirect Approaches to Quantifying Standards and Technical Regulations |
0 |
1 |
1 |
127 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
497 |
| On the Measurement of Trade Costs: Direct vs. Indirect Approaches to Quantifying Standards and Technical Regulations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
113 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
217 |
| On the measurement of trade costs: direct vs. indirect approaches to quantifying standards and technical regulations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
142 |
| TTIP: is free trade coming to the North Atlantic? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
98 |
| The Brexit Vote, Inflation and UK Living Standards |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
27 |
| The Brexit vote, inflation and U.K living standards |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
| The Economic Effects of Brexit - Evidence from the Stock Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
115 |
| The Economic Effects of Brexit - Evidence from the Stock Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
146 |
| The Economic Effects of Brexit - Evidence from the Stock Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
52 |
| The Economic E¤ects of Brexit - Evidence from the Stock Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
| The economic effects of Brexit - evidence from the stock market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| The economic effects of Brexit - evidence from the stock market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
109 |
| The economic effects of Brexit- evidence from the stock market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
73 |
| Trade Blocs and Trade Wars during the Interwar Period |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
75 |
| Trade Blocs and Trade Wars during the Interwar Period |
0 |
0 |
1 |
63 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
72 |
| Trade Blocs and Trade Wars during the Interwar Period |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
62 |
| Trade Blocs and Trade Wars during the Interwar Period |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
55 |
| Trade Booms, Trade Busts and Trade Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
129 |
| Trade Booms, Trade Busts, and Trade Costs |
0 |
1 |
1 |
174 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
350 |
| Trade Booms, Trade Busts, and Trade Costs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
88 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
321 |
| Trade Costs and the Open Macroeconomy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
421 |
| Trade Costs and the Open Macroeconomy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
| Trade Costs in the First Wave of Globalization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
266 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
973 |
| Trade Diversion and Labor Market Outcomes |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
8 |
8 |
| Trade Diversion and Labor Market Outcomes |
2 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
2 |
11 |
11 |
11 |
| Trade and Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
| Trade and Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
1 |
86 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
104 |
| Trade and Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
140 |
| Trade and Uncertainty |
0 |
1 |
2 |
83 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
246 |
| Trade and Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
142 |
| Trade and uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
| Trade blocs and trade wars during the interwar period |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Trade blocs and trade wars during the interwar period |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
| Trade blocs and trade wars during the interwar period |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
72 |
| Trade diversion and labor market outcomes |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
| Trade, Gravity and Aggregation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
42 |
| Trade, Gravity and Aggregation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
40 |
| Trade, gravity and aggregation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
| Trade, gravity and aggregation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
48 |
| Urban-Biased Structural Change |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Urban-Biased Structural Change |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
25 |
| Urban-Biased Structural Change |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
| Urban-Biased Structural Change |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
| Urban-biased structural change |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
17 |
| Urban-biased structural change |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
| Vehicle Currency Pricing and Exchange Rate Pass-Through |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
147 |
| Vehicle Currency Pricing and Exchange Rate Pass-Through |
0 |
0 |
2 |
49 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
198 |
| Vehicle currency pricing and exchange rate pass-through |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
| Vehicle currency pricing and exchange rate pass-through |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
56 |
| Voting with Their Money: Brexit and Outward Investment by UK Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
72 |
| Voting with their Money: Brexit and Outward Investment by UK Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
73 |
| Voting with their money: Brexit and outward investment by UK firms |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
| Voting with their money: Brexit and outward investment by UK firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
48 |
| Voting with their money: Brexit and outward investment by UK firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
31 |
| Voting with their money: Brexit and outward investment by UK firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
70 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? A Comprehensive District-Level Analysis |
0 |
0 |
2 |
218 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
614 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? A Comprehensive District-Level Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
200 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? A Comprehensive District-Level Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
396 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? Individual and Regional Data Combined |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
90 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? Individual and Regional Data Combined |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
7 |
11 |
93 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? Individual and Regional Data Combined |
0 |
0 |
1 |
93 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
303 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? Individual and Regional Data Combined |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
82 |
| Who voted for Brexit? A comprehensive district-Level analysis |
0 |
0 |
2 |
115 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
274 |
| Total Working Papers |
16 |
34 |
101 |
6,244 |
50 |
152 |
573 |
18,276 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Das Phänomen »Populismus«: Ursachen und Gegenrezepte |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
124 |
| Dennis Novy discussion of: Startups and employment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| ESTIMATING BORDER EFFECTS: THE IMPACT OF SPATIAL AGGREGATION |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
42 |
| Erratum to: Who voted for Brexit? A comprehensive district-level analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
| GRAVITY REDUX: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL TRADE COSTS WITH PANEL DATA |
1 |
3 |
10 |
168 |
1 |
6 |
23 |
452 |
| Gravity and Heterogeneous Trade Cost Elasticities |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
30 |
| Gravity, trade integration, and heterogeneity across industries |
0 |
2 |
11 |
249 |
2 |
11 |
29 |
637 |
| International trade without CES: Estimating translog gravity |
0 |
1 |
5 |
230 |
3 |
8 |
23 |
706 |
| Is the International Border Effect Larger than the Domestic Border Effect? Evidence from US Trade |
0 |
0 |
1 |
63 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
193 |
| Market Potential and Global Growth over the Long Twentieth Century |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
109 |
| On the measurement of trade costs: direct vs. indirect approaches to quantifying standards and technical regulations |
0 |
2 |
5 |
107 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
277 |
| THE BREXIT VOTE, INFLATION AND U.K. LIVING STANDARDS |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
1 |
4 |
24 |
54 |
| The Economic Effects of Brexit: Evidence from the Stock Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
45 |
| Trade Blocs and Trade Wars during the Interwar Period |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
48 |
| Trade Costs and the Open Macroeconomy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
138 |
| Trade Costs, 1870-2000 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
170 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
447 |
| Trade and Uncertainty |
1 |
5 |
13 |
60 |
5 |
13 |
34 |
233 |
| Trade booms, trade busts, and trade costs |
1 |
4 |
21 |
367 |
1 |
7 |
43 |
1,034 |
| Trade costs in the first wave of globalization |
0 |
1 |
2 |
116 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
503 |
| Trade, Gravity, and Aggregation |
2 |
2 |
12 |
12 |
4 |
5 |
58 |
58 |
| Vehicle Currency Pricing and Exchange Rate Pass-Through |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
47 |
| Voting with their money: Brexit and outward investment by UK firms |
0 |
2 |
3 |
36 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
207 |
| Welche Abstimmungsmuster liegen dem Brexit-Referendum zugrunde? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
35 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
| Who voted for Brexit? A comprehensive district-level analysis |
0 |
1 |
4 |
187 |
1 |
6 |
24 |
803 |
| Who voted for Brexit? Individual and regional data combined |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
308 |
| Total Journal Articles |
6 |
24 |
97 |
1,975 |
23 |
82 |
386 |
6,568 |
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