Access Statistics for Matias Nuñez

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes 0 0 1 23 0 0 2 38
A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 20
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 1 1 16 16 1 3 4 4
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 1 1 12 31 2 4 45 54
Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 1
Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games 0 0 2 27 0 0 11 25
Approval voting and the Poisson-Myerson environment 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 63
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 0 12 0 0 4 26
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 0 20 1 1 3 5
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 17
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 0 45 0 1 7 51
Beyond Outcomes: Experimental Evidence on the Value of Agreement 0 0 0 12 1 6 32 69
Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games 0 0 0 31 1 1 4 26
Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games 0 0 0 46 0 0 4 58
How proper is the dominance-solvable outcome? 0 0 0 8 0 0 5 11
Hybrid Procedures 0 0 0 28 0 1 4 54
Implementing the Median 0 1 5 31 1 2 11 35
Large Spatial Competition 0 0 1 40 0 1 8 16
Multi-Stage Voting and Sequential Elimination with Productive Players 0 0 0 19 0 0 12 50
Overstating: A tale of two cities 0 0 0 3 1 1 5 30
Pivots et Elections 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4
Pivots et Elections 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Pivots et Elections 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pivots et Elections 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 19
Preference Intensity Representation: Strategic Overstating in Large Elections 0 0 0 6 1 1 16 50
REVISITING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NO-SHOW PARADOX AND MONOTONICITY * 0 0 1 2 0 0 8 20
Reaching Consensus Through Simultaneous Bargaining 0 1 2 28 0 1 9 55
Reaching consensus through approval bargaining 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 13
Reaching consensus through approval bargaining 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Sincere Scoring Rules 0 0 1 56 0 2 6 118
The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting 0 0 0 19 1 2 9 40
The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement 1 3 7 35 1 7 22 37
The information simplicity of scoring rules 0 0 1 16 0 1 7 68
Trimming Extreme Opinions in Preference Aggregation 0 0 10 10 0 1 12 12
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations * 1 1 1 26 2 3 5 17
UNANIMOUS IMPLEMENTATION: A CASE FOR APPROVAL MECHANISMS 1 2 2 14 1 2 10 30
Total Working Papers 5 10 62 644 15 43 290 1,146

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 87
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 1 1 0 1 13 41
Condorcet Consistency of Approval Voting: a Counter Example in Large Poisson Games 0 0 0 6 0 0 4 62
Dominance solvable approval voting games 0 0 0 4 0 2 6 16
Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 49
Implementation via approval mechanisms 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 21
Pivots et élections 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 19
Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections 0 0 0 3 1 2 7 45
Reaching consensus through approval bargaining 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 18
Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 15
The informational basis of scoring rules 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 25
The strategic sincerity of Approval voting 0 0 1 3 0 1 6 32
Threshold voting leads to Type-Revelation 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 18
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations 0 0 0 1 0 1 10 13
Total Journal Articles 0 0 2 56 3 11 86 461

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Statistics updated 2020-09-04