Access Statistics for Matias Nuñez

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes 0 0 0 23 2 9 13 55
A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes 0 0 0 2 0 4 7 32
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 1 1 1 1 2 5 8 12
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 10
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 14
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 0 0 0 17 1 2 3 17
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 1 1 1 37 2 6 8 97
Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games 0 0 0 31 1 7 11 60
Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games 0 0 0 13 0 3 5 13
Approval voting and the Poisson-Myerson environment 0 0 0 23 0 3 3 70
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 15
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 0 20 0 3 5 16
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 0 45 2 10 13 79
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 0 12 1 5 10 45
Beyond Outcomes: Experimental Evidence on the Value of Agreement 0 0 0 12 0 4 6 147
Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games 0 0 0 46 0 2 9 74
Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games 0 0 1 32 0 2 6 35
Fairness vs. Simplicity in Appointment Rules 0 0 6 6 4 6 13 13
How proper is the dominance-solvable outcome? 0 1 1 9 0 1 3 21
Hybrid Procedures 0 0 0 29 0 3 7 65
Implementing the Median 0 0 0 40 2 7 9 65
Large Spatial Competition 0 0 0 40 1 4 5 21
Multi-Stage Voting and Sequential Elimination with Productive Players 0 0 0 19 3 9 13 72
On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules 0 1 1 3 0 5 7 13
Overstating: A tale of two cities 0 0 0 3 0 1 5 44
Pivots et Elections 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 10
Pivots et Elections 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
Pivots et Elections 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7
Pivots et Elections 0 0 0 3 0 1 5 29
Political Brinkmanship and Compromise 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 4
Political Brinkmanship and Compromise 0 0 2 6 0 7 10 42
Political Brinkmanship and Compromise 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 6
Political Brinkmanship and Compromise 0 0 0 1 1 6 7 48
Preference Intensity Representation: Strategic Overstating in Large Elections 0 0 0 6 0 2 4 56
Price & Choose 0 0 0 29 1 4 4 31
Price & Choose 0 0 1 14 3 15 22 33
REVISITING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NO-SHOW PARADOX AND MONOTONICITY * 0 0 0 3 0 1 4 32
Reaching Consensus Through Simultaneous Bargaining 0 0 0 36 1 6 9 79
Reaching consensus through approval bargaining 0 0 0 0 4 7 7 29
Reaching consensus through approval bargaining 0 0 0 0 2 6 7 15
Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 11
Sincere Scoring Rules 0 0 0 56 1 4 5 125
The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting 0 0 0 20 0 2 3 50
The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement 0 0 0 47 1 6 7 17
The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement 0 0 0 44 1 4 6 102
The information simplicity of scoring rules 0 0 0 17 4 6 7 82
Trimming Extreme Opinions in Preference Aggregation 0 0 0 23 3 6 8 55
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations * 0 0 0 27 0 4 6 31
Two principles for two-person social choice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNANIMOUS IMPLEMENTATION: A CASE FOR APPROVAL MECHANISMS 0 0 0 14 0 3 4 37
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting 0 0 0 0 1 5 7 7
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 10
Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 21
Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting 0 0 0 9 0 4 6 28
Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes 1 2 2 23 4 10 14 69
Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes 0 0 0 16 2 6 6 31
Who Wins and Loses under Approval Voting? An Analysis on Large Elections 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 10
Total Working Papers 3 6 16 865 54 241 381 2,218
5 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility 0 0 0 28 0 1 2 91
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 0 0 2 7 1 4 7 31
Bargaining through Approval 0 0 0 4 0 5 11 67
Condorcet Consistency of Approval Voting: a Counter Example in Large Poisson Games 0 0 0 6 0 2 3 66
Dominance solvable approval voting games 0 0 0 4 2 3 6 34
Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices 0 1 1 3 2 8 10 64
Implementation via approval mechanisms 0 0 0 3 0 2 7 40
On the implementation of the median 0 0 0 2 0 3 7 12
On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules 0 0 1 6 1 2 4 20
POLITICAL BRINKMANSHIP AND COMPROMISE 0 0 0 0 1 6 8 8
Pivots et élections 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 31
Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections 0 0 0 7 3 8 11 69
Price and Choose 0 2 6 6 3 9 27 27
Reaching consensus through approval bargaining 0 0 0 3 0 3 4 27
Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity 0 0 1 3 0 5 15 39
The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement 0 0 0 0 0 8 9 17
The informational basis of scoring rules 1 2 2 6 3 9 10 50
The strategic sincerity of Approval voting 0 0 0 4 3 5 10 54
Threshold voting leads to Type-Revelation 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 25
Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation 0 0 0 2 0 4 7 13
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations 0 0 0 6 0 4 5 33
Two Person Bargaining Mechanisms: A Laboratory Experiment 0 0 0 1 1 7 13 24
Two principles for two-person social choice 1 1 1 1 1 13 22 22
Total Journal Articles 2 6 14 104 21 117 206 864

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approval Voting in Large Electorates 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 9
Large Spatial Competition 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 5
Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 9
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 9 13 23

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04