Access Statistics for Ichiro Obara

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance 0 0 0 16 1 2 5 152
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 24 0 3 6 226
Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games 0 0 0 7 0 5 7 16
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 79 0 3 4 310
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 1 108 1 13 19 439
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 58 0 4 5 224
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 70 0 1 4 208
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 52 2 8 10 217
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies* 0 0 1 103 0 2 8 336
Endogenous Monitoring 0 0 1 85 1 9 13 374
Endogeous Monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 7 14 353
Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 7 0 1 2 33
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration 0 1 1 18 3 11 15 149
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) 0 0 0 158 0 4 7 533
Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration 0 0 0 55 0 5 12 246
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 25 1 5 8 184
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 94 1 6 8 256
Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 0 3 0 3 7 49
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 34 2 7 12 151
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 28 0 6 7 186
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) 0 0 0 8 1 2 4 103
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 61 0 5 5 276
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess 0 0 0 40 1 5 9 182
Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games 0 0 0 58 0 1 3 163
Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited 0 0 0 136 1 7 9 557
Repeated Games with General Discounting 0 0 0 42 3 10 16 70
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 37 0 3 6 168
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 25 2 7 9 112
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 21 0 5 8 79
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 17 1 4 5 78
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 19 3 6 13 146
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 46 0 5 6 318
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 15 2 6 7 188
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 1 70 1 8 9 303
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 57 1 3 5 232
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 129 0 1 3 449
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 14
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 8 0 4 7 14
Weighted Garbling 0 0 1 17 1 5 8 17
Total Working Papers 0 1 6 1,830 29 197 313 8,111

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Asymptotic value of monitoring structures in stochastic games 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 6
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 3 91 2 7 11 275
Collusion and heterogeneity of firms 0 0 1 6 0 9 12 47
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 124 0 2 3 419
Firm reputation and horizontal integration 0 0 1 109 3 10 17 458
Folk theorem with communication 0 0 0 33 1 5 10 125
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games 0 0 0 44 0 5 7 141
Mechanism design with information acquisition 0 0 0 11 3 12 19 90
Mediated Partnerships 0 0 0 46 1 8 10 199
Repeated games with general discounting 0 0 0 15 3 8 12 68
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring 0 0 0 8 1 6 11 55
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 1 32 1 9 15 219
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 63 1 7 15 195
Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication 0 0 0 0 0 6 16 16
Total Journal Articles 0 0 6 582 16 100 164 2,313

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04