Access Statistics for Ichiro Obara

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance 0 0 0 16 3 4 8 155
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 24 0 0 6 226
Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games 0 0 0 7 1 2 9 18
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 79 0 1 5 311
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 1 108 1 2 20 440
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 58 2 3 8 227
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 70 0 1 4 209
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 52 2 6 14 221
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies* 0 0 1 103 3 3 11 339
Endogenous Monitoring 0 0 1 85 4 6 18 379
Endogeous Monitoring 0 0 0 0 2 4 18 357
Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 33
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration 0 0 1 18 2 5 17 151
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) 0 0 0 158 4 4 11 537
Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration 0 0 0 55 3 3 15 249
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 25 2 3 9 186
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 94 0 1 7 256
Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 0 3 1 2 9 51
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 34 2 4 14 153
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 28 3 5 12 191
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) 0 0 0 8 2 4 7 106
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 61 1 1 6 277
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess 0 0 0 40 2 4 12 185
Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games 0 0 0 58 4 5 8 168
Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited 0 0 0 136 1 2 9 558
Repeated Games with General Discounting 0 0 0 42 4 9 21 76
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 37 0 0 6 168
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 1 1 1 22 6 6 14 85
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 25 1 4 11 114
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 17 3 4 8 81
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 46 0 0 6 318
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 15 0 2 7 188
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 19 4 10 20 153
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 1 70 2 3 11 305
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 129 4 4 6 453
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 57 2 3 7 234
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 8 6 6 12 20
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 0 4 6 13 20
Weighted Garbling 0 0 1 17 2 3 9 19
Total Working Papers 1 1 7 1,831 83 135 410 8,217

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Asymptotic value of monitoring structures in stochastic games 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 9
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 2 91 1 3 11 276
Collusion and heterogeneity of firms 0 0 1 6 1 2 14 49
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 124 0 1 4 420
Firm reputation and horizontal integration 0 0 1 109 2 9 22 464
Folk theorem with communication 0 0 0 33 1 3 11 127
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games 0 0 0 44 3 3 10 144
Mechanism design with information acquisition 0 0 0 11 4 10 26 97
Mediated Partnerships 0 0 0 46 0 1 10 199
Repeated games with general discounting 0 0 0 15 2 5 14 70
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring 0 0 0 8 0 4 14 58
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 32 6 8 21 226
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 63 3 4 17 198
Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication 0 0 0 0 3 4 20 20
Total Journal Articles 0 0 4 582 27 60 203 2,357

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06