Access Statistics for Ichiro Obara

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 134
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 211
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 79 0 0 1 293
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 106 0 0 2 405
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 192
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 205
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 46 0 1 1 203
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies* 0 0 0 102 0 0 2 316
Endogenous Monitoring 0 0 0 76 3 3 6 322
Endogeous Monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 283
Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 26
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration 0 0 1 15 0 0 2 91
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) 0 0 0 156 0 0 1 510
Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration 0 0 0 54 1 1 4 218
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 25 1 1 2 165
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 1 94 0 1 6 236
Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 26
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 34 0 0 2 130
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 27 0 1 2 161
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 88
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 258
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess 0 0 0 40 0 0 2 163
Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 148
Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited 0 0 2 135 0 1 3 539
Repeated Games with General Discounting 0 0 1 40 0 1 7 42
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 1 25 0 0 4 96
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 61
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 37 0 1 2 159
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 65
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 46 0 1 1 304
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 156
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 19 0 0 5 124
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 67 0 1 2 277
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 1 1 56 0 1 1 211
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 129 0 0 0 439
Total Working Papers 0 1 7 1,749 5 15 70 7,257

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 3 3 4 82 3 5 8 230
Collusion and heterogeneity of firms 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 11
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 123 0 1 1 400
Firm reputation and horizontal integration 0 0 1 103 0 1 5 414
Folk theorem with communication 0 0 1 32 0 1 5 97
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 122
Mechanism design with information acquisition 0 0 0 1 0 2 8 37
Mediated Partnerships 0 0 0 44 0 0 3 162
Repeated games with general discounting 1 3 6 8 2 6 17 29
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring 0 0 1 7 1 1 2 34
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 186
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 1 1 2 60 1 1 2 165
Total Journal Articles 5 7 15 531 7 20 57 1,887

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Statistics updated 2019-07-03