Access Statistics for Ichiro Obara

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance 0 0 0 16 1 1 1 148
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 24 1 1 1 221
Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games 0 0 0 7 0 1 2 10
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 1 1 108 1 4 6 424
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 79 0 0 1 306
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 70 1 1 2 206
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 58 0 0 1 219
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 207
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies* 0 0 1 103 0 0 1 329
Endogenous Monitoring 0 0 1 85 0 1 2 363
Endogeous Monitoring 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 340
Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 31
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration 0 0 0 17 2 2 11 136
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) 0 0 0 158 1 1 1 527
Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration 0 0 0 55 2 2 2 236
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 94 0 0 1 249
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 177
Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 44
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 179
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 34 1 1 1 140
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 100
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 271
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess 0 0 0 40 0 1 1 174
Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 160
Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited 0 0 0 136 0 0 2 550
Repeated Games with General Discounting 0 0 0 42 0 0 1 55
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 37 1 1 1 163
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 25 0 1 1 104
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 21 0 1 1 72
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 73
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 15 0 1 1 182
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 19 1 1 4 134
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 312
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 1 70 0 0 3 295
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 129 1 1 2 448
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 57 1 1 1 228
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 1 8 0 0 3 8
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7
Weighted Garbling 0 0 16 16 0 0 10 10
Total Working Papers 0 1 21 1,828 15 27 76 7,838

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 1 2 90 0 1 4 266
Collusion and heterogeneity of firms 0 1 2 6 0 2 4 38
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 124 1 1 1 417
Firm reputation and horizontal integration 0 0 2 109 3 3 8 447
Folk theorem with communication 0 0 0 33 0 1 3 118
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games 0 0 0 44 1 1 2 135
Mechanism design with information acquisition 0 0 3 11 1 3 7 74
Mediated Partnerships 0 0 0 46 0 1 2 190
Repeated games with general discounting 0 0 2 15 1 3 5 59
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring 0 0 0 8 0 2 2 46
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 2 32 1 1 5 206
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 63 0 0 4 183
Total Journal Articles 0 2 13 581 8 19 47 2,179

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Statistics updated 2025-09-05