Access Statistics for Ichiro Obara

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance 0 0 0 16 1 2 3 150
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 24 0 2 3 223
Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games 0 0 0 7 1 1 3 11
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 1 108 2 2 7 426
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 79 1 1 2 307
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 58 1 1 2 220
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 70 0 1 3 207
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 52 2 2 2 209
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies* 0 0 1 103 5 5 6 334
Endogenous Monitoring 0 0 1 85 1 2 4 365
Endogeous Monitoring 0 0 0 0 4 6 8 346
Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 32
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration 0 0 0 17 2 2 6 138
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) 0 0 0 158 0 2 3 529
Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration 0 0 0 55 2 5 7 241
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 25 2 2 3 179
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 94 0 1 2 250
Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 0 3 1 2 4 46
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 34 1 4 5 144
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 28 1 1 1 180
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) 0 0 0 8 0 1 3 101
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 271
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess 0 0 0 40 3 3 4 177
Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games 0 0 0 58 0 2 2 162
Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited 0 0 0 136 0 0 2 550
Repeated Games with General Discounting 0 0 0 42 5 5 6 60
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 21 1 2 3 74
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 37 1 2 3 165
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 25 1 1 2 105
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 74
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 182
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 19 3 6 10 140
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 46 1 1 1 313
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 1 70 0 0 3 295
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 129 0 0 2 448
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 57 0 1 2 229
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 8 1 2 4 10
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 9
Weighted Garbling 0 1 17 17 1 2 9 12
Total Working Papers 0 1 21 1,829 46 76 138 7,914

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 1 1 3 91 1 2 6 268
Collusion and heterogeneity of firms 0 0 1 6 0 0 3 38
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 124 0 0 1 417
Firm reputation and horizontal integration 0 0 1 109 0 1 7 448
Folk theorem with communication 0 0 0 33 1 2 5 120
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games 0 0 0 44 0 1 3 136
Mechanism design with information acquisition 0 0 1 11 2 4 9 78
Mediated Partnerships 0 0 0 46 0 1 2 191
Repeated games with general discounting 0 0 0 15 1 1 4 60
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring 0 0 0 8 2 3 5 49
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 1 32 0 4 7 210
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 63 3 5 9 188
Total Journal Articles 1 1 7 582 10 24 61 2,203

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06