Access Statistics for Ichiro Obara

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance 0 0 0 16 0 2 3 150
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 24 0 0 3 223
Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games 0 0 0 7 0 1 3 11
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 1 108 4 6 11 430
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 79 1 2 3 308
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 58 2 3 4 222
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 70 1 2 4 208
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 52 0 2 2 209
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies* 0 0 1 103 1 6 7 335
Endogenous Monitoring 0 0 1 85 3 5 7 368
Endogeous Monitoring 0 0 0 0 3 8 11 349
Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 32
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration 0 0 0 17 0 2 4 138
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) 0 0 0 158 1 3 4 530
Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration 0 0 0 55 1 6 8 242
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 25 2 4 5 181
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 94 1 2 3 251
Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 0 3 2 3 6 48
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 34 1 4 6 145
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 28 2 3 3 182
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) 0 0 0 8 0 0 3 101
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 61 1 1 1 272
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess 0 0 0 40 0 3 4 177
Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games 0 0 0 58 0 2 2 162
Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited 0 0 0 136 4 4 6 554
Repeated Games with General Discounting 0 0 0 42 3 8 9 63
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 25 1 2 3 106
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 21 1 3 4 75
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 37 1 3 4 166
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 74
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 46 2 3 3 315
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 15 1 1 2 183
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 19 1 7 11 141
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 1 70 2 2 5 297
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 129 1 1 3 449
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 57 0 1 2 229
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 0 2 4 7 11
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 8 1 3 5 11
Weighted Garbling 0 1 1 17 2 4 6 14
Total Working Papers 0 1 5 1,829 48 118 179 7,962

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Asymptotic value of monitoring structures in stochastic games 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 1 3 91 1 3 7 269
Collusion and heterogeneity of firms 0 0 1 6 4 4 7 42
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 124 0 0 1 417
Firm reputation and horizontal integration 0 0 1 109 0 1 7 448
Folk theorem with communication 0 0 0 33 0 2 5 120
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games 0 0 0 44 1 2 4 137
Mechanism design with information acquisition 0 0 0 11 4 7 12 82
Mediated Partnerships 0 0 0 46 1 1 3 192
Repeated games with general discounting 0 0 0 15 0 1 4 60
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring 0 0 0 8 3 6 8 52
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 1 32 0 4 7 210
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 63 2 7 11 190
Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication 0 0 0 0 0 7 10 10
Total Journal Articles 0 1 6 582 18 47 88 2,231

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09