Access Statistics for Ichiro Obara

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 24 1 1 1 212
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 79 0 1 2 294
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 106 2 3 5 408
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 57 0 3 3 208
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 46 0 0 1 203
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies* 0 0 0 102 1 3 5 319
Endogenous Monitoring 0 0 0 76 1 3 8 325
Endogeous Monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 287
Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 6 0 1 1 27
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration 0 0 2 16 0 1 4 93
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) 0 0 0 156 1 1 3 512
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 25 1 1 2 166
Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 27
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 27 0 0 1 161
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) 0 0 0 8 1 1 1 89
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 258
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess 0 0 0 40 0 0 2 163
Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited 0 0 1 135 1 1 3 540
Repeated Games with General Discounting 0 0 1 40 3 5 10 47
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 1 25 0 1 5 97
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 61
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 65
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 14 0 1 1 157
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 67 1 2 4 279
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 129 1 1 1 440
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 1 56 0 0 1 211
Total Working Papers 0 0 6 1,331 14 33 74 5,649

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 1 2 6 84 1 7 16 238
Collusion and heterogeneity of firms 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 15
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 123 0 2 3 402
Firm reputation and horizontal integration 0 0 1 103 1 1 6 415
Folk theorem with communication 0 0 1 32 1 3 8 100
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games 0 0 0 42 0 1 1 123
Mechanism design with information acquisition 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 38
Mediated Partnerships 0 0 0 44 1 3 4 165
Repeated games with general discounting 0 2 8 10 1 5 21 35
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring 0 1 2 8 1 2 4 36
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 29 0 4 4 190
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 2 60 3 5 8 171
Total Journal Articles 1 5 20 536 9 38 90 1,928

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Statistics updated 2019-11-03