Access Statistics for Ichiro Obara

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance 0 0 0 16 0 0 4 143
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 24 1 2 5 217
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 106 0 0 0 408
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 79 0 0 2 296
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 57 0 1 3 211
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 62 0 0 3 198
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 46 0 1 3 206
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies* 0 0 0 102 0 0 4 323
Endogenous Monitoring 0 0 2 78 0 0 7 332
Endogeous Monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 2 14 301
Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 6 1 1 2 29
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration 0 0 0 16 0 2 5 98
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) 0 0 0 156 0 1 6 518
Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration 0 0 1 55 2 3 8 227
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 94 0 1 7 246
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 25 1 2 4 170
Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 0 3 0 2 11 38
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 34 0 1 3 137
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 27 1 1 5 166
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) 0 0 0 8 1 1 6 95
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 59 0 0 4 262
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess 0 0 0 40 0 1 7 170
Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games 0 0 0 58 1 1 6 155
Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited 0 0 0 135 0 0 3 543
Repeated Games with General Discounting 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 47
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 25 0 0 2 99
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 20 0 1 2 63
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 37 1 1 2 161
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 15 0 1 4 69
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 46 0 1 6 310
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 19 0 0 2 126
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 1 15 0 3 9 166
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 1 1 68 0 3 11 290
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 56 0 0 12 223
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 129 0 1 3 443
Total Working Papers 0 1 5 1,756 9 34 175 7,486

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 1 85 1 1 7 245
Collusion and heterogeneity of firms 0 0 2 2 0 1 8 23
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 123 2 3 8 410
Firm reputation and horizontal integration 0 0 0 103 3 6 10 425
Folk theorem with communication 0 0 0 32 0 0 7 107
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games 0 0 0 42 0 0 5 128
Mechanism design with information acquisition 0 0 2 3 0 1 11 49
Mediated Partnerships 0 0 1 45 2 4 12 177
Repeated games with general discounting 0 0 0 10 0 3 6 41
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring 0 0 0 8 0 0 4 40
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 29 0 0 4 194
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 2 62 0 0 3 174
Total Journal Articles 0 0 8 544 8 19 85 2,013

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Statistics updated 2020-11-03