| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
19 |
| Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
21 |
| Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
| Accuracy in Public Law Enforcement under Political Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Act-Based Sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Advisory algorithms and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Advisory algorithms and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
37 |
| Analyse économique de l'accès au juge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
| Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
| Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules |
1 |
1 |
13 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
26 |
| Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
28 |
| Deterrence and the punishment of offenses under political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Elected versus appointed law enforcers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Elected vs appointed public law enforcers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
82 |
| Elected vs appointed public law enforcers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
| Elected vs appointed public law enforcers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Elected vs appointed public law enforcers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
95 |
| How does the probability of wrongful conviction affect the standard of proof? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
| How does the probability of wrongful conviction affect the standard of proof? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
41 |
| Identity errors and the standard of proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
| Identity mistakes and the standard of proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| Identity mistakes and the standard of proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
| L'efficacité de la dissuasion des opérations d'initiés |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Law enforcement with a democratic government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
26 |
| Law enforcement with a democratic government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
| Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
| Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
145 |
| Prediction, human decision and liability rules, CRED Working paper No 2022-06 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
| Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Presumption of innocence and deterrence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
6 |
8 |
24 |
| Presumption of innocence and deterrence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
| Public enforcement, political competition, and the timing of sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
| Public enforcement, political competition, and the timing of sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
| Public law enforcement under ambiguity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Public law enforcers and political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Public law enforcers and political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
84 |
| Public law enforcers and political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
| Real Options Theory for Law Maker |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
455 |
| Real Options Theory for Law Makers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
| Real Options Theory for Law Makers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
35 |
| Regulation of Selection Technologies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| The Choice of Titling System in Land and the Blockchain |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
| The EU legislation game: the case of asylum law |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
141 |
| The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory of Harm-Based vs. Act-Based Sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
149 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
734 |
| The impact of the number of courts on the demand for trials |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| The impact of the number of courts on the demand for trials |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
83 |
| The structure of fi nes in the light of political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
87 |
| The structure of fines in the light of political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
| The structure of fines in the light of political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Volume of litigation and number of courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
1 |
23 |
737 |
13 |
30 |
130 |
2,577 |
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