| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
2 |
2 |
13 |
33 |
| Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
35 |
| Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
11 |
| Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
| Accuracy in Public Law Enforcement under Political Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
| Act-Based Sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
| Advisory algorithms and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
13 |
| Advisory algorithms and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
57 |
| Advisory algorithms, automation bias and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
0 |
3 |
22 |
41 |
| Advisory algorithms, automation bias and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
| Analyse économique de l'accès au juge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
| Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
11 |
| Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
| Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
45 |
| Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
2 |
2 |
19 |
48 |
| Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
| Deterrence and the punishment of offenses under political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
| Elected versus appointed law enforcers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
| Elected vs appointed public law enforcers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
107 |
| Elected vs appointed public law enforcers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
95 |
| Elected vs appointed public law enforcers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
11 |
| Elected vs appointed public law enforcers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
40 |
| How does the probability of wrongful conviction affect the standard of proof? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
37 |
| How does the probability of wrongful conviction affect the standard of proof? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
56 |
| How is Digital Evidence Used in the International Criminal Court? A Theoretical and Empirical Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
| How is Digital Evidence Used in the International Criminal Court? A Theoretical and Empirical Approach |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
11 |
| How is Digital Evidence Used in the International Criminal Court? An Exploratory Analysis |
0 |
5 |
8 |
25 |
1 |
8 |
32 |
57 |
| How is Digital Evidence Used in the International Criminal Court? An Exploratory Analysis |
0 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
| Identity errors and the standard of proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
12 |
| Identity mistakes and the standard of proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
14 |
| Identity mistakes and the standard of proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
15 |
| L'efficacité de la dissuasion des opérations d'initiés |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Law enforcement with a democratic government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
| Law enforcement with a democratic government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
36 |
| More Information, Less Reliability? Technological Change and Fact-Finding in Human Rights Investigations |
0 |
7 |
7 |
7 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
5 |
| More Information, Less Reliability? Technological Change and Fact-Finding in Human Rights Investigations |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
155 |
| Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
112 |
| Prediction, human decision and liability rules, CRED Working paper No 2022-06 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
21 |
| Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
10 |
| Presumption of innocence and deterrence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
47 |
| Presumption of innocence and deterrence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
32 |
| Public enforcement, political competition, and the timing of sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
22 |
| Public enforcement, political competition, and the timing of sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
18 |
| Public law enforcement under ambiguity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
11 |
| Public law enforcers and political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
37 |
| Public law enforcers and political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
9 |
| Public law enforcers and political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
100 |
| Real Options Theory for Law Maker |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
479 |
| Real Options Theory for Law Makers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
69 |
| Real Options Theory for Law Makers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
47 |
| Regulation of Selection Technologies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
| The Choice of Titling System in Land and the Blockchain |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
24 |
| The EU legislation game: the case of asylum law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
150 |
| The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory of Harm-Based vs. Act-Based Sanctions |
0 |
1 |
2 |
151 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
744 |
| The impact of the number of courts on the demand for trials |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| The impact of the number of courts on the demand for trials |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
92 |
| The structure of fi nes in the light of political competition |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
106 |
| The structure of fines in the light of political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
20 |
| The structure of fines in the light of political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
26 |
| Volume of litigation and number of courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
| Total Working Papers |
4 |
25 |
39 |
813 |
17 |
50 |
561 |
3,233 |
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