Access Statistics for Wojciech Olszewski

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 0 3 7 208
Falsifiability 0 0 0 122 2 13 16 467
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 20 0 6 9 170
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version 0 0 0 25 0 3 8 115
Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 47 2 6 13 237
Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests 0 0 0 49 1 7 9 175
Pareto Improvements in the Contest for College Admissions 0 0 0 4 0 14 20 28
Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests 0 0 0 24 0 4 5 166
Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests 0 0 0 44 1 9 10 155
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 46 0 1 5 149
The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring 0 0 0 43 2 4 8 273
Total Working Papers 0 0 0 485 8 70 110 2,143

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence 0 0 0 71 1 6 13 353
A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem 0 0 1 119 0 6 9 453
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 180 2 12 14 585
Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods 0 0 1 31 0 5 13 110
Contracts and uncertainty 0 0 0 51 0 6 10 273
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2006) ISBN 978-0-19-530079-6 pages i-xviii and 1-645 0 1 3 108 1 4 9 313
Informal communication 0 0 2 183 0 4 12 828
Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests 0 0 0 19 0 5 10 143
Note Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter? 0 0 0 43 0 6 8 252
Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods 0 0 0 43 0 3 7 147
Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria 0 0 0 56 0 0 1 139
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring 0 0 0 139 0 9 11 339
Total Journal Articles 0 1 7 1,043 4 66 117 3,935

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04