Access Statistics for Juan Matias Ortner

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement 0 0 0 76 2 3 17 132
Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids 0 0 0 36 0 2 14 179
Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids 0 0 1 25 0 0 16 165
Delays and Partial Agreements in Multi-Issue Bargaining 0 0 1 3 0 1 13 70
Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals 0 0 4 8 1 1 19 187
Disagreement and Optimal Security Design 0 0 0 6 0 0 16 45
Disagreement and Security Design 0 0 0 17 1 2 6 44
Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure 0 0 0 13 0 0 8 63
Markets for Models 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 8
Policy Reform 0 0 0 8 0 0 11 70
Political Bargaining in a Changing World 0 0 0 45 0 1 17 293
Scoring and Cartel Discipline in Procurement Auctions 0 0 0 16 0 3 14 28
Scoring and Cartel Discipline in Procurement Auctions 0 1 1 8 0 2 15 18
Screening Adaptive Cartels 0 0 0 5 0 1 14 32
Screening Adaptive Cartels 0 0 0 13 1 3 16 21
Screening Adaptive Cartels 0 0 0 12 0 0 16 35
The Value of Privacy in Cartels: An Analysis of the Inner Workings of a Bidding Ring 0 0 0 13 0 1 11 67
Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach 0 0 0 13 0 0 11 27
Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach 0 0 0 14 0 1 19 60
Total Working Papers 0 1 7 331 5 22 261 1,544
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining 0 0 1 10 1 2 11 55
A theory of political gridlock 0 0 0 9 1 1 15 69
Bargaining with evolving private information 0 0 0 1 0 1 19 27
Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement 0 1 10 51 0 4 37 208
Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining 0 1 1 3 0 3 14 70
Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals 0 0 0 7 0 1 11 57
Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs 0 0 0 18 1 1 8 68
Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion, and Crime 0 1 2 36 1 5 21 224
Mediated Collusion 0 0 2 5 0 0 16 33
Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining 0 0 0 9 0 1 7 65
Paths to the Frontier 0 0 0 1 0 2 11 27
Progressive Learning 0 0 0 4 0 0 9 64
Regulating Collusion 0 0 3 3 0 2 20 26
Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions 0 0 1 15 0 4 27 73
The Value of Privacy in Cartels: An Analysis of the Inner Workings of a Bidding Ring 1 1 1 1 2 6 9 9
Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach 2 3 5 25 2 6 45 129
Total Journal Articles 3 7 26 198 8 39 280 1,204

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-10-11