| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Course in Game Theory |
1 |
3 |
31 |
1,311 |
1 |
9 |
92 |
2,005 |
| A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates |
2 |
2 |
4 |
507 |
3 |
4 |
34 |
1,545 |
| Are Large Firms More Powerful Than Small Ones? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
120 |
| Bargaining and Markets |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,124 |
2 |
3 |
46 |
1,978 |
| Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
168 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
483 |
| Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
266 |
| Comment on a passage in "Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective" by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
39 |
| Cost benefit analysis vs. referenda |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
361 |
| Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
236 |
| Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
94 |
| Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,232 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
5,137 |
| Games with Procedurally Rational Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
176 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
440 |
| Games with Procedurally Rational Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
588 |
| Information aggregation with costly reporting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
56 |
| Meetings with costly participation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
655 |
| NONCOOPERATIVE MODELS OF BARGAINING |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
22 |
761 |
| Noncooperative Models of Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
142 |
| PARTY FORMATION INCOLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
185 |
| Party formation in collective decision-making |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
95 |
| Party formation in single-issue politics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
158 |
2 |
3 |
16 |
934 |
| Party formation in single-issue politics [revised] |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
221 |
| Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules and Majority Rule: A Generalization of May’s Theorem to Many Alternatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
44 |
| Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
35 |
| Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
12 |
26 |
| Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: a generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
116 |
| Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
171 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
391 |
| Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
268 |
| Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
120 |
| Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
65 |
| Sequential entry into electoral competition when the possibility of ties is limited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
25 |
| Strategic and extensive games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
266 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
684 |
| Total Working Papers |
3 |
5 |
43 |
5,748 |
20 |
37 |
509 |
18,115 |
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