| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| 6. Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action |
1 |
6 |
12 |
50 |
2 |
10 |
24 |
114 |
| A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 |
3 |
9 |
33 |
157 |
11 |
31 |
131 |
428 |
| A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
16 |
4 |
13 |
43 |
62 |
| A Grammar of Institutions |
1 |
3 |
8 |
15 |
4 |
11 |
32 |
50 |
| A Polycentric Approach For Coping With Climate Change |
0 |
1 |
17 |
209 |
0 |
5 |
50 |
523 |
| A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries |
0 |
0 |
5 |
61 |
4 |
8 |
21 |
168 |
| AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON DEMOCRATIC DILEMMAS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
111 |
| An Agenda for the Study of Institutions |
0 |
1 |
8 |
59 |
4 |
6 |
34 |
124 |
| An agenda for the study of institutions |
0 |
3 |
39 |
146 |
14 |
31 |
121 |
398 |
| Analyzing collective action |
0 |
2 |
10 |
217 |
4 |
11 |
38 |
540 |
| Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective |
1 |
3 |
17 |
275 |
1 |
9 |
48 |
698 |
| Analyzing the dynamic complexity of development interventions: lessons from an irrigation experiment in Nepal |
0 |
0 |
2 |
115 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
257 |
| Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems |
6 |
11 |
46 |
933 |
24 |
48 |
174 |
2,233 |
| Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (Excerpt) |
4 |
4 |
6 |
31 |
5 |
9 |
14 |
94 |
| Beyond the tragedy of the Commons |
2 |
4 |
15 |
264 |
5 |
9 |
33 |
528 |
| Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis |
1 |
1 |
5 |
251 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
435 |
| Coevolving Relationships between Political Science and Economics |
0 |
0 |
4 |
72 |
3 |
7 |
14 |
344 |
| Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms |
1 |
3 |
16 |
1,469 |
11 |
23 |
100 |
4,187 |
| Collective Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in Resource Use in India and Nepal |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
13 |
| Collective Action. By Hardin Russell. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 248. $24.00, cloth; $9.00, paper.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
14 |
| Community and the Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems |
0 |
1 |
7 |
44 |
1 |
5 |
15 |
83 |
| Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play |
0 |
0 |
2 |
94 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
447 |
| Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work |
0 |
1 |
5 |
268 |
1 |
7 |
36 |
608 |
| Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible |
1 |
3 |
16 |
32 |
7 |
19 |
62 |
102 |
| Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change |
2 |
3 |
7 |
155 |
4 |
10 |
25 |
273 |
| Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development |
7 |
14 |
30 |
286 |
16 |
35 |
96 |
842 |
| Deliberation, learning, and institutional change: the evolution of institutions in judicial settings |
0 |
0 |
2 |
74 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
185 |
| Development betrayed. The end of progress and a coevolutionary revisioning of the future: Richard B. Norgaard. Routledge, London. Hardback [UK pound]40.00, ISBN 0415 06861 4, Paperback [UK pound]12.99, ISBN 0 415 0682 2 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
155 |
3 |
7 |
34 |
441 |
| Dilemma games: game parameters and matching protocols |
0 |
0 |
1 |
81 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
353 |
| Do institutions for collective action evolve? |
1 |
6 |
19 |
149 |
7 |
14 |
45 |
286 |
| Dépasser le dilemme du Samaritain dans l'aide au développement. Overcoming the Samaritan's Dilemma in Development Aid |
0 |
1 |
4 |
22 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
77 |
| Façonner des outils d’analyse pour étudier le changement institutionnel |
0 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
52 |
| Fifteen Years of Empirical Research on Collective Action in Natural Resource Management: Struggling to Build Large-N Databases Based on Qualitative Research |
0 |
0 |
4 |
166 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
393 |
| Generalizing the core design principles for the efficacy of groups |
5 |
8 |
19 |
120 |
13 |
35 |
82 |
345 |
| Graham R. Marshall, Economics for Collaborative Environmental Management: Renegotiating the Commons, Earthscan;, London (2005) ISBN: 1844070956171, 184 pp |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
210 |
| Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action |
0 |
0 |
1 |
133 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
341 |
| How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action |
0 |
1 |
10 |
21 |
2 |
5 |
21 |
44 |
| Human-ecosystem interactions: a dynamic integrated model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
222 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
692 |
| INSTITUTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT |
0 |
0 |
3 |
185 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
376 |
| In Memoriam |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
| In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action |
0 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
107 |
| Institutional Capacity And The Resolution Of A Commons Dilemma |
0 |
1 |
5 |
112 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
282 |
| Institutions and Common-Pool Resources |
0 |
1 |
2 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
94 |
| La reglas que no se hace cumplir son mera palabrería |
0 |
0 |
5 |
101 |
2 |
5 |
19 |
203 |
| Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science. By Norman Uphoff. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 448p. $34.50 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
11 |
| Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development |
0 |
1 |
5 |
48 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
110 |
| Local Enforcement and Better Forests |
0 |
0 |
1 |
115 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
398 |
| Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
| Modeling the Criminal Justice System. Edited by Nagel Stuart S.. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977. Pp. 319. $17.50, cloth; $7.50, paper.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
| Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales? |
2 |
3 |
11 |
138 |
4 |
7 |
24 |
334 |
| New Horizons in Institutional Analysis Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe. By Ellen M. Immergut. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 336p. $49.95. Institutions and Social Conflict. By Jack Knight. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 234p. $59.95 cloth, $17.95 paper. Governments at Work: Canadian Parliamentary Federalism and Its Public Policy Effects. By Mark Sproule-Jones. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. 291p. $45.00 cloth, $18.95 paper. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Edited by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 257p. $54.95 cloth, $18.95 paper. Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Edited by R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman. Washington: Brookings, 1993. 498p. $36.95 cloth, $16.95 paper |
0 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
11 |
| On the meaning and measurement of output and efficiency in the provision of urban police services |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
167 |
| Organizational economics: applications to metropolitan governance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
133 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
201 |
| Ostrom and Ostrom on the Quest for Meaning in Public Choice |
0 |
0 |
4 |
122 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
485 |
| Panarchy: understanding transformations in human and natural systems: Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling (Eds.), Island Press, Washington, DC, 2002, ISBN: 1559638575, 450 pp |
5 |
20 |
39 |
565 |
14 |
43 |
110 |
1,475 |
| Par-delà les marchés et les États. La gouvernance polycentrique des systèmes économiques complexes |
1 |
2 |
4 |
26 |
1 |
5 |
16 |
87 |
| Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play |
0 |
0 |
5 |
244 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
553 |
| Privatizing Public Lands. By Lehmann Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 248p. $45.00 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
| Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis |
4 |
8 |
33 |
293 |
17 |
36 |
132 |
1,073 |
| Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas |
0 |
1 |
7 |
41 |
2 |
5 |
20 |
142 |
| RECIPROCITY, TRUST, AND THE SENSE OF CONTROL |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
31 |
| Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity |
2 |
3 |
15 |
23 |
5 |
12 |
38 |
59 |
| Reflections on "Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation" |
0 |
0 |
1 |
118 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
283 |
| Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence |
0 |
1 |
10 |
309 |
2 |
6 |
25 |
695 |
| Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries |
0 |
1 |
2 |
63 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
171 |
| Response to Comments by Anthony Scott and Gary Libecap |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
| Response to Zakir Husain and Rabindra Bhattacharya's "Common pool resources and contextual factors: Evolution of a fishermen's cooperative in Calcutta" |
0 |
1 |
2 |
65 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
264 |
| Revising theory in light of experimental findings |
2 |
10 |
17 |
199 |
3 |
17 |
35 |
380 |
| Rules and Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
25 |
256 |
| Scale misperceptions and the spatial dynamics of a social-ecological system |
0 |
1 |
2 |
53 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
181 |
| Self-organization and Social Capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
383 |
| Some postulated effects of learning on constitutional behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
25 |
| TURFS in the lab: Institutional Innovation in Real-Time Dynamic Spatial Commons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
| Tenure alone is not sufficient: monitoring is essential |
0 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
37 |
| The Comparative Study of Public Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
| The Comparative Study of Public Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
40 |
| The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal |
0 |
1 |
6 |
214 |
1 |
8 |
19 |
624 |
| The Dynamics of Rules: Change in Written Organizational Codes. By James G. March, Martin Schulz, and Xueguang Zhou. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 228p. $55.00 cloth, $24.95 paper |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
| The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems |
2 |
5 |
15 |
33 |
5 |
11 |
36 |
76 |
| The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global change: a survey |
1 |
6 |
16 |
268 |
2 |
13 |
43 |
781 |
| The evolution of norms within institutions: comments on Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich's |
0 |
0 |
1 |
109 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
216 |
| The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
208 |
| The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources |
0 |
1 |
5 |
142 |
1 |
3 |
20 |
329 |
| Titles, Conflict, and Land Use: The Development of Property Rights and Land Reform on the Brazilian Amazon Frontier. By Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap, and Bernardo Mueller. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. Pp. xiv, 227. $49.50 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
54 |
| Traditions et évolutions dans l’étude des communs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
| Trust in Private and Common Property Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
460 |
| What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons |
0 |
2 |
4 |
133 |
2 |
6 |
15 |
357 |
| ¿Qué traen las personas al juego? Experimentos de campo sobre la cooperación en los recursos de uso común |
0 |
0 |
3 |
190 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
1,267 |
| ¿Teoría económica, ciencia política, teoría social? Lo que yo hago podría llamarse economía política o estudio de los dilemas sociales |
0 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
51 |
| Total Journal Articles |
59 |
175 |
651 |
10,862 |
267 |
676 |
2,225 |
30,546 |
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