| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| 6. Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action |
0 |
4 |
9 |
44 |
2 |
7 |
19 |
104 |
| A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 |
0 |
8 |
29 |
148 |
7 |
25 |
118 |
397 |
| A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
11 |
1 |
7 |
38 |
49 |
| A Grammar of Institutions |
0 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
1 |
11 |
28 |
39 |
| A Polycentric Approach For Coping With Climate Change |
0 |
5 |
19 |
208 |
4 |
14 |
51 |
518 |
| A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries |
0 |
0 |
7 |
61 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
160 |
| AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON DEMOCRATIC DILEMMAS |
0 |
0 |
2 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
110 |
| An Agenda for the Study of Institutions |
2 |
4 |
13 |
58 |
3 |
10 |
40 |
118 |
| An agenda for the study of institutions |
6 |
14 |
46 |
143 |
11 |
28 |
131 |
367 |
| Analyzing collective action |
1 |
1 |
9 |
215 |
1 |
3 |
32 |
529 |
| Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective |
1 |
6 |
21 |
272 |
2 |
13 |
55 |
689 |
| Analyzing the dynamic complexity of development interventions: lessons from an irrigation experiment in Nepal |
0 |
2 |
3 |
115 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
254 |
| Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems |
2 |
5 |
58 |
922 |
9 |
26 |
181 |
2,185 |
| Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (Excerpt) |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
85 |
| Beyond the tragedy of the Commons |
3 |
5 |
12 |
260 |
7 |
11 |
28 |
519 |
| Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis |
1 |
1 |
6 |
250 |
2 |
2 |
12 |
432 |
| Coevolving Relationships between Political Science and Economics |
2 |
3 |
6 |
72 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
337 |
| Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms |
0 |
3 |
19 |
1,466 |
7 |
28 |
91 |
4,164 |
| Collective Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in Resource Use in India and Nepal |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
11 |
| Collective Action. By Hardin Russell. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 248. $24.00, cloth; $9.00, paper.) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
12 |
| Community and the Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems |
1 |
3 |
10 |
43 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
78 |
| Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play |
0 |
1 |
4 |
94 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
444 |
| Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work |
2 |
2 |
4 |
267 |
7 |
19 |
31 |
601 |
| Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible |
2 |
5 |
16 |
29 |
2 |
18 |
50 |
83 |
| Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change |
0 |
1 |
6 |
152 |
0 |
3 |
19 |
263 |
| Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development |
5 |
7 |
23 |
272 |
11 |
19 |
79 |
807 |
| Deliberation, learning, and institutional change: the evolution of institutions in judicial settings |
0 |
0 |
2 |
74 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
183 |
| Development betrayed. The end of progress and a coevolutionary revisioning of the future: Richard B. Norgaard. Routledge, London. Hardback [UK pound]40.00, ISBN 0415 06861 4, Paperback [UK pound]12.99, ISBN 0 415 0682 2 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
152 |
1 |
5 |
39 |
434 |
| Dilemma games: game parameters and matching protocols |
0 |
0 |
1 |
81 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
350 |
| Do institutions for collective action evolve? |
2 |
5 |
19 |
143 |
4 |
12 |
41 |
272 |
| Dépasser le dilemme du Samaritain dans l'aide au développement. Overcoming the Samaritan's Dilemma in Development Aid |
0 |
2 |
3 |
21 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
74 |
| Façonner des outils d’analyse pour étudier le changement institutionnel |
1 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
47 |
| Fifteen Years of Empirical Research on Collective Action in Natural Resource Management: Struggling to Build Large-N Databases Based on Qualitative Research |
1 |
1 |
5 |
166 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
390 |
| Generalizing the core design principles for the efficacy of groups |
2 |
6 |
18 |
112 |
12 |
30 |
62 |
310 |
| Graham R. Marshall, Economics for Collaborative Environmental Management: Renegotiating the Commons, Earthscan;, London (2005) ISBN: 1844070956171, 184 pp |
0 |
0 |
1 |
64 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
206 |
| Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action |
0 |
0 |
1 |
133 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
339 |
| How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action |
1 |
2 |
11 |
20 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
39 |
| Human-ecosystem interactions: a dynamic integrated model |
0 |
0 |
3 |
222 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
689 |
| INSTITUTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT |
0 |
0 |
5 |
185 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
374 |
| In Memoriam |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
| In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
105 |
| Institutional Capacity And The Resolution Of A Commons Dilemma |
0 |
1 |
5 |
111 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
279 |
| Institutions and Common-Pool Resources |
0 |
0 |
2 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
93 |
| La reglas que no se hace cumplir son mera palabrería |
0 |
1 |
6 |
101 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
198 |
| Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science. By Norman Uphoff. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 448p. $34.50 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
| Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development |
1 |
1 |
4 |
47 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
108 |
| Local Enforcement and Better Forests |
0 |
1 |
3 |
115 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
396 |
| Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
| Modeling the Criminal Justice System. Edited by Nagel Stuart S.. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977. Pp. 319. $17.50, cloth; $7.50, paper.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
| Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales? |
2 |
2 |
10 |
135 |
2 |
5 |
22 |
327 |
| New Horizons in Institutional Analysis Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe. By Ellen M. Immergut. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 336p. $49.95. Institutions and Social Conflict. By Jack Knight. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 234p. $59.95 cloth, $17.95 paper. Governments at Work: Canadian Parliamentary Federalism and Its Public Policy Effects. By Mark Sproule-Jones. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. 291p. $45.00 cloth, $18.95 paper. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Edited by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 257p. $54.95 cloth, $18.95 paper. Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Edited by R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman. Washington: Brookings, 1993. 498p. $36.95 cloth, $16.95 paper |
1 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
| On the meaning and measurement of output and efficiency in the provision of urban police services |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
166 |
| Organizational economics: applications to metropolitan governance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
133 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
201 |
| Ostrom and Ostrom on the Quest for Meaning in Public Choice |
0 |
0 |
5 |
122 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
484 |
| Panarchy: understanding transformations in human and natural systems: Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling (Eds.), Island Press, Washington, DC, 2002, ISBN: 1559638575, 450 pp |
3 |
4 |
24 |
545 |
13 |
25 |
85 |
1,432 |
| Par-delà les marchés et les États. La gouvernance polycentrique des systèmes économiques complexes |
1 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
82 |
| Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play |
1 |
3 |
6 |
244 |
3 |
7 |
17 |
549 |
| Privatizing Public Lands. By Lehmann Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 248p. $45.00 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
| Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis |
1 |
8 |
29 |
285 |
9 |
41 |
112 |
1,037 |
| Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas |
2 |
2 |
7 |
40 |
3 |
6 |
18 |
137 |
| RECIPROCITY, TRUST, AND THE SENSE OF CONTROL |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
29 |
| Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity |
1 |
3 |
14 |
20 |
5 |
12 |
30 |
47 |
| Reflections on "Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation" |
0 |
0 |
1 |
118 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
280 |
| Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence |
0 |
1 |
13 |
308 |
0 |
4 |
25 |
689 |
| Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
169 |
| Response to Comments by Anthony Scott and Gary Libecap |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
| Response to Zakir Husain and Rabindra Bhattacharya's "Common pool resources and contextual factors: Evolution of a fishermen's cooperative in Calcutta" |
0 |
0 |
1 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
258 |
| Revising theory in light of experimental findings |
0 |
2 |
9 |
189 |
3 |
6 |
21 |
363 |
| Rules and Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
19 |
249 |
| Scale misperceptions and the spatial dynamics of a social-ecological system |
0 |
0 |
1 |
52 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
177 |
| Self-organization and Social Capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
379 |
| Some postulated effects of learning on constitutional behavior |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
23 |
| TURFS in the lab: Institutional Innovation in Real-Time Dynamic Spatial Commons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| Tenure alone is not sufficient: monitoring is essential |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
34 |
| The Comparative Study of Public Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
16 |
| The Comparative Study of Public Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
38 |
| The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal |
0 |
1 |
8 |
213 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
616 |
| The Dynamics of Rules: Change in Written Organizational Codes. By James G. March, Martin Schulz, and Xueguang Zhou. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 228p. $55.00 cloth, $24.95 paper |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
| The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems |
1 |
6 |
15 |
28 |
2 |
10 |
32 |
65 |
| The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global change: a survey |
2 |
6 |
13 |
262 |
7 |
16 |
35 |
768 |
| The evolution of norms within institutions: comments on Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich's |
0 |
0 |
3 |
109 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
214 |
| The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources |
0 |
0 |
2 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
205 |
| The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources |
0 |
0 |
7 |
141 |
1 |
3 |
23 |
326 |
| Titles, Conflict, and Land Use: The Development of Property Rights and Land Reform on the Brazilian Amazon Frontier. By Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap, and Bernardo Mueller. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. Pp. xiv, 227. $49.50 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
51 |
| Traditions et évolutions dans l’étude des communs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
| Trust in Private and Common Property Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
457 |
| What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons |
0 |
0 |
4 |
131 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
351 |
| ¿Qué traen las personas al juego? Experimentos de campo sobre la cooperación en los recursos de uso común |
1 |
1 |
5 |
190 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
1,264 |
| ¿Teoría económica, ciencia política, teoría social? Lo que yo hago podría llamarse economía política o estudio de los dilemas sociales |
0 |
0 |
4 |
18 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
46 |
| Total Journal Articles |
52 |
149 |
662 |
10,687 |
168 |
511 |
1,998 |
29,870 |
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