Access Statistics for Per Baltzer Overgaard

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand 0 0 0 152 0 1 2 624
Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand 0 0 0 98 1 1 2 425
Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case 0 0 0 2 4 7 15 995
Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly 0 1 2 54 0 6 9 189
Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly 0 0 2 153 0 3 9 333
Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly 0 4 7 117 1 9 20 290
Look How Little I’m Advertising! 0 3 4 102 0 4 10 267
MARKET TRANSPARENCY AND COMPETITION POLICY 0 2 7 502 0 6 16 1,713
Market Transparency and Competition Policy 0 0 5 231 0 4 17 647
Market Transparency: A Mixed Blessing? 1 7 21 294 1 17 43 844
Modest Advertising Signals Strength 0 1 2 110 0 3 6 304
On the nature of advertising and its role as a signal of quality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 859
Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions 0 0 0 67 0 3 5 337
Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions 0 0 0 30 0 2 6 177
Prices as Signals of Quality in Duopoly 0 0 6 209 0 0 10 574
Signaling and rent extraction vis contract proposals in franchising 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 164
Signalling to Competing Retailers: Receiver Discretion and Adverse Selection 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 129
Temporary Partnerships as an Information Transmission Mechanism: Foreign Investment in Emerging Markets 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 157
Temporary partnerships as an information transmission mechanism 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 19
Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 238
Upstream Pricing and Advertising Signal Downstream Demand 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 229
Will the high-quality producer please stand up?: A model of duopoly signaling 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 228
Total Working Papers 1 18 56 2,123 8 76 186 9,742

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short-term players 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 24
Advertising and pricing to deter or accommodate entry when demand is unknown: Comment 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 107
Asymmetric adjustment in symmetric duopoly 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 46
Buy-out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi-unit demands 0 0 1 35 0 0 1 175
Equilibrium effects of potential entry when prices signal quality 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 42
Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case 3 5 14 230 9 14 46 542
Market Transparency and Competition Policy 0 0 0 0 3 15 41 253
Modest Advertising Signals Strength 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 288
Partnerships, Buy-Out Options and Investment in Emerging Markets 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 114
Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions 0 1 1 30 0 2 3 128
Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders 0 0 1 156 0 2 5 540
Price as a signal of quality: A discussion of equilibrium concepts in signalling games 0 0 3 69 0 0 3 150
Receiver discretion in signalling models: Information transmission to competing retailers 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 42
The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 11
Upstream Pricing and Advertising Signal Downstream Demand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 359
Upstream Pricingand Advertising Signal Downstream Demand 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6
Total Journal Articles 4 7 21 608 13 36 106 2,827

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2019-07-03