Access Statistics for Per Baltzer Overgaard

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand 0 0 0 98 0 7 7 443
Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand 0 0 0 152 0 2 6 634
Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case 0 0 0 2 2 9 18 1,096
Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly 0 0 0 58 1 4 6 219
Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly 0 0 0 154 1 5 5 353
Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly 0 0 0 123 5 11 13 340
Look How Little I’m Advertising! 0 0 0 103 1 2 6 292
MARKET TRANSPARENCY AND COMPETITION POLICY 0 0 1 520 0 6 10 1,800
Market Transparency and Competition Policy 0 0 0 240 2 5 9 693
Market Transparency: A Mixed Blessing? 0 0 3 336 2 3 20 991
Modest Advertising Signals Strength 0 0 0 110 1 3 3 322
On the nature of advertising and its role as a signal of quality 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 871
Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions 0 0 0 30 0 2 3 193
Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions 0 0 0 68 0 6 6 358
Prices as Signals of Quality in Duopoly 0 0 2 218 0 2 9 601
Signaling and rent extraction vis contract proposals in franchising 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 172
Signalling to Competing Retailers: Receiver Discretion and Adverse Selection 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 145
Temporary Partnerships as an Information Transmission Mechanism: Foreign Investment in Emerging Markets 0 0 0 1 0 2 5 167
Temporary partnerships as an information transmission mechanism 0 0 0 1 1 3 3 33
Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 256
Upstream Pricing and Advertising Signal Downstream Demand 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 243
Will the high-quality producer please stand up?: A model of duopoly signaling 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 246
Total Working Papers 0 0 6 2,214 18 91 153 10,468

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short-term players 0 0 0 3 1 6 8 35
Advertising and pricing to deter or accommodate entry when demand is unknown: Comment 0 0 0 30 0 3 5 120
Asymmetric adjustment in symmetric duopoly 0 0 0 11 0 2 4 55
Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands 0 0 0 36 1 3 5 196
Equilibrium effects of potential entry when prices signal quality 0 0 0 12 0 4 6 54
Market Transparency and Competition Policy 0 0 0 0 3 7 12 330
Modest Advertising Signals Strength 0 0 0 0 3 11 12 313
Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions 0 0 0 30 0 4 8 148
Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders 0 0 1 163 0 8 13 576
Price as a signal of quality: A discussion of equilibrium concepts in signalling games 0 0 1 73 0 2 7 167
Receiver discretion in signalling models: Information transmission to competing retailers 0 0 0 8 0 5 7 55
The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources 0 0 0 5 2 6 7 34
Upstream Pricing and Advertising Signal Downstream Demand 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 370
Upstream Pricingand Advertising Signal Downstream Demand 0 0 0 1 1 5 9 20
Total Journal Articles 0 0 2 372 12 69 108 2,473

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04