Access Statistics for Jorge Oviedo

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets 0 0 0 53 4 5 13 257
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets 0 0 0 37 2 2 10 246
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets 0 0 1 62 3 6 17 280
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets 0 0 0 182 5 6 22 622
A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market 0 0 1 3 1 1 4 8
AN ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE SET OF MANY-TO-MANY STABLE MATCHINGS 0 0 0 76 0 1 5 246
Core Many-To-One Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods 0 0 0 62 4 7 16 251
Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-point Methods 0 0 0 210 5 8 13 535
Core and Stability Notions in Many-to-one Matching Markets with Indifferences 0 0 0 10 3 5 16 39
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences 0 0 0 11 3 5 11 37
Counting Steps for Re-Stabilization in a Labor Matching Market 0 0 0 0 3 3 11 14
Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 10
Cycles to Compute the Full Set of Many-to-many Stable Matchings 0 0 0 6 1 2 8 21
Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings 0 0 0 4 3 4 9 16
Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 8
General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model 0 0 0 13 2 2 8 14
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching market 0 0 0 10 2 3 15 38
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 8 4 8 22 39
Marriage market with indifferences: A linear programming approach 1 1 1 11 2 4 9 38
Nash Implementation in a many-to-one Matching Market 0 0 0 11 3 6 14 34
Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market 0 0 0 12 0 2 7 19
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model 0 0 1 128 3 3 9 524
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles 0 0 0 7 2 3 11 61
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles 0 0 0 1 1 2 6 38
On the many-to-one strongly stable fractional matching set 0 0 0 14 6 8 17 53
On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings 0 0 0 6 1 2 10 23
Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models 0 0 0 14 2 2 7 21
The Lattice of Envy-Free Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts 0 0 0 4 0 4 13 23
The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts 0 0 0 6 1 3 9 23
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings 0 0 0 6 1 2 4 22
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings 0 0 0 3 2 2 9 20
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings 0 0 0 5 3 4 9 31
Total Working Papers 1 1 4 979 73 117 339 3,611

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A characterization of strongly stable fractional matchings 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 26
A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 126 2 4 25 478
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings 0 0 0 58 1 1 6 256
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences 0 0 1 2 1 3 15 23
Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods 0 0 1 61 1 3 12 238
Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings 0 0 0 1 3 6 12 17
Evolutionary Game Theory: A Generalization of the ESS Definition 0 0 0 13 1 4 16 76
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 1 5 11 18 26
Lexicographic optimality in the multiple objective linear programming: The nucleolar solution 0 0 0 68 3 6 10 167
Modelo de planificación balanceado y modelo de asignación 0 0 1 24 3 3 10 473
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model 0 0 0 27 1 2 4 190
On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles 0 0 0 3 1 4 7 48
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles 0 0 0 14 1 7 12 74
On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings 0 0 0 4 4 4 11 20
Optimal values and strategies for a particular case of two-person games 0 0 0 1 3 5 8 34
Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
SHAPLEY VALUE IN A MODEL OF INFORMATION TRANSFERAL 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 14
STABLE SOLUTIONS ON MATCHING MODELS WITH QUOTA RESTRICTION 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 18
Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings 0 0 0 73 1 5 14 239
The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model 0 0 0 9 4 5 12 92
The core of a further m-sided assignment game 0 0 0 10 6 6 12 40
The core of a repeated n-person cooperative game 0 0 0 29 2 5 8 109
The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts 0 0 0 0 3 5 8 13
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings 0 0 0 1 1 3 8 15
The value of information in a cooperative environment 0 0 2 20 3 7 15 140
Total Journal Articles 0 0 5 547 51 104 256 2,827

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06