Access Statistics for Jorge Oviedo

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets 0 0 0 49 2 6 8 215
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets 0 0 0 37 0 0 2 227
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets 0 0 0 181 1 2 5 583
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets 0 0 0 59 2 2 5 249
AN ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE SET OF MANY-TO-MANY STABLE MATCHINGS 0 0 0 76 0 0 0 236
Core Many-To-One Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods 0 2 2 56 3 8 12 210
Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-point Methods 0 0 0 201 4 5 9 485
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model 1 1 1 127 1 3 4 503
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles 0 0 0 7 1 2 4 44
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 22
Total Working Papers 1 3 3 794 14 29 51 2,774

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets 1 1 4 122 3 9 19 401
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings 0 0 0 56 0 1 3 193
Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods 0 0 1 55 3 4 10 199
Lexicographic optimality in the multiple objective linear programming: The nucleolar solution 0 0 0 63 0 0 1 134
Modelo de planificación balanceado y modelo de asignación 0 0 0 23 0 3 7 446
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model 0 0 0 25 0 1 4 168
On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles 0 0 1 3 0 1 3 34
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles 0 0 0 13 0 2 4 52
Optimal values and strategies for a particular case of two-person games 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 23
SHAPLEY VALUE IN A MODEL OF INFORMATION TRANSFERAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
STABLE SOLUTIONS ON MATCHING MODELS WITH QUOTA RESTRICTION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings 0 0 1 66 0 1 3 197
The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model 0 0 0 9 1 1 4 59
The core of a further m-sided assignment game 0 0 0 9 0 0 5 25
The core of a repeated n-person cooperative game 0 0 0 23 1 1 21 82
The value of information in a cooperative environment 0 0 0 18 0 2 3 123
Workshop: Cooperation, Matching and Collective Goods 0 0 0 6 1 1 3 23
Total Journal Articles 1 1 7 492 9 27 90 2,162

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Statistics updated 2019-11-03