Access Statistics for Alessandro Pavan

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Soft" Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 0 0 0 2 1 3 12 31
(In)efficiency in Information Acquisition and Aggregation through Prices 0 0 1 8 1 2 9 35
A Rational Theory of "Irrational Exuberance" 0 0 0 76 0 0 10 305
Attention, Coordination, and Bounded Recall 0 0 0 33 2 3 7 125
Beauty Contests and "Irrational Exuberance": A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 0 38 4 4 11 143
Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 0 20 4 4 12 92
Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 0 105 4 12 22 454
Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 162 0 3 11 570
Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 76 4 9 32 320
Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design 0 0 0 40 2 4 15 123
Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks: on the Possibility of Predictions in a Global Game with Multiple Equilibria 0 0 0 116 3 4 11 362
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 43 2 7 16 94
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 1 5 10 102
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 4 5 15 65
Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks 0 0 0 50 3 9 25 244
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 3 2 3 11 66
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes 0 0 0 45 2 2 5 77
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 21 2 3 13 125
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 11 1 4 10 82
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure 0 0 0 285 7 14 29 849
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure 0 1 1 41 3 11 18 181
Efficiency and Welfare with Complementarities and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 39 2 6 12 255
Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design 0 0 0 62 1 1 3 89
Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design: the Independent-Shock Approach 0 0 0 36 4 7 9 103
Information Acquisition and Welfare 0 0 0 84 2 3 7 187
Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change 0 0 0 109 3 4 13 514
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 0 31 1 4 16 156
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 52
Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design" 0 0 0 7 1 6 13 98
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle 2 2 3 30 6 7 17 51
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 16
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 0 0 2 21 3 4 12 32
Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms 0 0 0 6 0 1 11 30
Learning in a Repeated Global Game of Regime Change and the Dynamics of Crisis 0 0 0 1 2 2 10 171
Long Term Contracting in a Changing World 0 0 0 6 4 6 10 72
Long-Term Contracting in a Changing World 0 0 0 52 4 5 9 150
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 0 0 0 33 3 4 11 148
Many-to-Many Matching Design and Price Discrimination 0 0 0 12 2 2 8 68
Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination 0 0 1 34 2 3 20 86
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 32 2 3 21 173
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 40 1 5 16 407
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 85 4 6 11 352
On the Dynamics of Information, Coordination and Regime Change 0 0 0 96 1 2 8 342
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 100 1 2 9 368
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 36 5 7 14 180
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 20 0 2 5 158
On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency 0 0 0 7 1 4 9 62
Optimal Taxation and Occupational Choice: The Redistributive Role of Production Inefficiencies 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 49
Persuasion in Global Games with Application to Stress Testing 0 0 2 19 3 5 14 56
Platform Competition under Dispersed Information 0 0 1 65 1 1 17 125
Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information 0 0 0 91 4 11 24 133
Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information 0 0 0 33 5 7 17 80
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 0 2 3 16 92
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 65 0 0 14 301
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 37 3 3 8 201
Preparing for the Worst But Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion 0 0 0 9 4 7 19 51
Price Customization and Targeting in Matching Markets 0 0 0 41 1 2 5 115
Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets 0 0 0 83 1 2 5 108
Price customization and targeting in matching markets 0 0 0 0 2 3 11 11
Revenue Equivalence, Profit Maximization, and Information Disclosure in Dynamic Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 54
Robust Predictions in Global Games with Multiple Equilibria: Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks 0 0 0 39 5 7 14 152
Selection-Free Predictions in Global Games with Endogenous Information and Multiple Equilibria 0 0 0 13 0 1 15 90
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 0 1 12 2 4 8 81
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 0 0 36 3 5 7 142
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 0 1 53 4 4 11 231
Sequential Contracts and Information Transmission Between Principals 0 0 0 102 4 4 7 298
Sequential Learning with Endogenous Consideration Sets 0 0 0 5 2 2 6 24
Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 1 275 3 9 22 833
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 0 58 1 3 12 277
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 0 12 6 8 23 110
Soft Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 0 1 2 7 1 2 10 40
Subsidies to Technology Adoption when Firms'Information is Endogenous 0 1 3 14 5 8 14 33
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform- Price Auctions 0 0 0 174 1 3 10 633
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions 0 0 0 29 2 3 12 232
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition on Uniform-Price Auctions 0 0 0 8 1 2 9 90
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 16 5 5 11 121
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 96 3 4 11 520
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 85 1 4 9 281
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 0 25 3 5 10 100
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 0 73 4 6 14 296
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 1 2 9 87 9 27 174 347
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 0 2 10 80 2 13 166 304
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 0 0 10 35 4 13 58 178
Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects 0 0 0 0 3 7 21 39
Wall Street and Silicon Valley: A Delicate Interaction 0 0 0 90 9 10 16 437
Total Working Papers 3 9 48 4,053 219 418 1,425 16,030

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Soft" Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 0 0 0 10 2 2 13 67
Adversarial coordination and public information design 0 0 0 4 1 5 19 27
Attention, coordination, and bounded recall 0 0 1 1 6 14 29 29
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 3 4 12 143
Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks 0 0 1 284 2 5 21 791
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach 0 0 0 13 3 4 13 118
Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach 0 0 1 10 2 3 9 63
Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information 0 1 2 243 1 5 22 830
Information Acquisition and Welfare 0 0 2 43 4 7 26 210
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 0 33 3 9 24 157
Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction 0 0 0 70 6 24 50 246
Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design 0 0 0 36 1 4 17 170
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 0 0 0 57 4 4 17 430
Many-to-many matching and price discrimination 0 0 0 12 3 4 14 80
Matching auctions 0 0 0 5 1 1 5 17
Monopoly with resale 0 0 0 19 2 4 12 97
On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting 0 0 1 98 3 4 13 268
On the use of menus in sequential common agency 0 0 0 8 0 2 17 107
Pandora's Auctions: Dynamic Matching with Unknown Preferences 0 0 0 8 0 0 16 130
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 14 0 3 12 97
Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion 0 0 1 2 3 5 26 57
Price customization and targeting in matching markets 0 0 4 7 1 2 17 33
Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria 0 0 1 35 8 10 31 212
Sequential contracting with multiple principals 0 0 0 43 2 8 17 174
Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 392 4 11 27 932
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 1 67 3 8 15 321
Taxation under Learning by Doing 0 0 1 19 1 2 14 112
Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions 0 1 1 36 5 21 34 204
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 141 4 20 33 547
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 0 20 2 7 16 112
Wall Street and Silicon Valley: A Delicate Interaction 0 0 0 9 3 3 45 85
Total Journal Articles 0 2 17 1,755 83 205 636 6,866
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Statistics updated 2026-05-06