Access Statistics for Alessandro Pavan

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Soft" Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 0 0 0 2 5 8 10 28
(In)efficiency in Information Acquisition and Aggregation through Prices 0 0 1 8 3 5 9 33
A Rational Theory of "Irrational Exuberance" 0 0 0 76 3 5 11 305
Attention, Coordination, and Bounded Recall 0 0 0 33 2 4 6 122
Beauty Contests and "Irrational Exuberance": A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 0 38 2 6 10 139
Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 0 105 7 10 10 442
Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 0 20 3 6 8 88
Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 76 18 21 25 311
Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 162 3 7 8 567
Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design 0 0 0 40 8 10 11 119
Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks: on the Possibility of Predictions in a Global Game with Multiple Equilibria 0 0 0 116 4 6 8 358
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 43 6 9 10 87
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 5 9 10 60
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 2 4 5 97
Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks 0 0 1 50 7 15 17 235
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 3 5 8 8 63
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes 0 0 1 45 2 3 4 75
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 11 2 6 6 78
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 21 5 9 11 122
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure 0 0 1 285 7 12 16 835
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure 0 0 0 40 6 6 7 170
Efficiency and Welfare with Complementarities and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 39 2 3 7 249
Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design 0 0 0 62 1 1 2 88
Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design: the Independent-Shock Approach 0 0 0 36 2 2 2 96
Information Acquisition and Welfare 0 0 0 84 1 2 4 184
Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change 0 0 0 109 5 9 9 510
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 0 31 3 9 12 152
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 50
Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design" 0 0 0 7 4 7 9 92
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle 0 0 1 28 2 5 11 44
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 0 0 2 21 1 6 8 28
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 4 4 9 15
Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms 0 0 0 6 4 5 11 29
Learning in a Repeated Global Game of Regime Change and the Dynamics of Crisis 0 0 0 1 4 6 9 169
Long Term Contracting in a Changing World 0 0 0 6 1 4 4 66
Long-Term Contracting in a Changing World 0 0 0 52 2 4 4 145
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 0 0 0 33 5 6 8 144
Many-to-Many Matching Design and Price Discrimination 0 0 0 12 3 5 6 66
Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination 0 0 1 34 8 11 17 83
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 32 7 18 18 170
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 85 1 5 6 346
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 40 1 8 11 402
On the Dynamics of Information, Coordination and Regime Change 0 0 0 96 6 6 6 340
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 36 4 6 7 173
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 20 3 3 4 156
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 100 3 6 7 366
On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency 0 0 0 7 3 5 6 58
Optimal Taxation and Occupational Choice: The Redistributive Role of Production Inefficiencies 0 0 0 0 3 5 5 47
Persuasion in Global Games with Application to Stress Testing 0 0 2 19 5 7 11 51
Platform Competition under Dispersed Information 0 1 1 65 5 14 16 124
Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information 0 0 0 91 6 9 13 122
Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information 0 0 0 33 6 8 10 73
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 37 2 3 5 198
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 0 8 13 13 89
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 65 5 10 14 301
Preparing for the Worst But Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion 0 0 0 9 8 10 12 44
Price Customization and Targeting in Matching Markets 0 0 0 41 1 1 4 113
Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets 0 0 0 83 0 2 3 106
Price customization and targeting in matching markets 0 0 0 0 6 7 8 8
Revenue Equivalence, Profit Maximization, and Information Disclosure in Dynamic Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 51
Robust Predictions in Global Games with Multiple Equilibria: Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks 0 0 0 39 4 7 9 145
Selection-Free Predictions in Global Games with Endogenous Information and Multiple Equilibria 0 0 0 13 7 14 14 89
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 0 1 12 2 2 4 77
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 0 0 36 2 2 2 137
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 0 1 53 3 6 7 227
Sequential Contracts and Information Transmission Between Principals 0 0 0 102 1 3 3 294
Sequential Learning with Endogenous Consideration Sets 0 0 0 5 1 2 5 22
Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 1 275 2 6 16 824
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 0 12 10 15 15 102
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 0 58 3 7 10 274
Soft Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 0 0 2 6 5 6 9 38
Subsidies to Technology Adoption when Firms'Information is Endogenous 0 0 3 13 0 3 8 25
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform- Price Auctions 0 0 0 174 2 3 8 630
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions 0 0 0 29 5 9 10 229
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition on Uniform-Price Auctions 0 0 0 8 4 5 8 88
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 85 1 4 5 277
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 16 3 6 7 116
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 96 3 5 7 516
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 1 25 0 4 6 95
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 0 73 5 6 8 290
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 1 2 13 78 37 142 160 291
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 1 3 10 85 45 119 155 320
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 0 2 12 35 7 25 48 165
Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects 0 0 0 0 2 10 16 32
Wall Street and Silicon Valley: A Delicate Interaction 0 0 0 90 5 5 9 427
Total Working Papers 2 8 55 4,044 400 826 1,078 15,612

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Soft" Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 0 0 1 10 4 9 14 65
Adversarial coordination and public information design 0 0 1 4 4 6 18 22
Attention, coordination, and bounded recall 0 0 1 1 5 7 15 15
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 2 4 9 139
Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks 1 1 1 284 6 14 17 786
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach 0 0 0 13 4 6 10 114
Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach 0 1 2 10 2 5 7 60
Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information 0 0 3 242 5 12 20 825
Information Acquisition and Welfare 0 0 2 43 4 8 21 203
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 2 33 4 8 21 148
Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction 0 0 0 70 17 20 26 222
Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design 0 0 0 36 7 9 17 166
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 0 0 0 57 7 9 14 426
Many-to-many matching and price discrimination 0 0 0 12 5 7 11 76
Matching auctions 0 0 0 5 2 3 4 16
Monopoly with resale 0 0 0 19 2 7 9 93
On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting 0 0 1 98 1 5 9 264
On the use of menus in sequential common agency 0 0 0 8 7 11 16 105
Pandora's Auctions: Dynamic Matching with Unknown Preferences 0 0 0 8 1 10 16 130
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 14 4 4 9 94
Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion 1 1 1 2 4 14 25 52
Price customization and targeting in matching markets 1 2 4 7 4 7 19 31
Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria 0 1 1 35 3 15 23 202
Sequential contracting with multiple principals 0 0 0 43 4 6 10 166
Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 392 5 10 16 921
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 1 67 3 5 8 313
Taxation under Learning by Doing 0 0 1 19 6 8 13 110
Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions 0 0 0 35 8 13 14 183
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 141 3 9 16 527
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 0 20 7 8 9 105
Wall Street and Silicon Valley: A Delicate Interaction 0 0 1 9 17 36 44 82
Total Journal Articles 3 6 23 1,753 157 295 480 6,661
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Statistics updated 2026-02-12