Access Statistics for Alessandro Pavan

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Soft" Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 0 0 0 2 1 8 10 29
(In)efficiency in Information Acquisition and Aggregation through Prices 0 0 1 8 0 4 7 33
A Rational Theory of "Irrational Exuberance" 0 0 0 76 0 4 10 305
Attention, Coordination, and Bounded Recall 0 0 0 33 1 5 7 123
Beauty Contests and "Irrational Exuberance": A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 0 38 0 6 7 139
Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 0 105 6 14 16 448
Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 0 20 0 6 8 88
Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 162 0 5 8 567
Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 76 2 21 26 313
Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design 0 0 0 40 1 9 12 120
Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks: on the Possibility of Predictions in a Global Game with Multiple Equilibria 0 0 0 116 0 6 8 358
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 43 3 12 13 90
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 2 4 7 99
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 0 8 10 60
Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks 0 0 1 50 2 13 19 237
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 3 1 9 9 64
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes 0 0 1 45 0 2 4 75
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 11 1 4 7 79
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 21 0 6 11 122
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure 1 1 1 41 4 10 11 174
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure 0 0 1 285 6 16 22 841
Efficiency and Welfare with Complementarities and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 39 2 5 9 251
Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design 0 0 0 62 0 1 2 88
Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design: the Independent-Shock Approach 0 0 0 36 2 4 4 98
Information Acquisition and Welfare 0 0 0 84 0 2 4 184
Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change 0 0 0 109 0 8 9 510
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 51
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 0 31 1 8 13 153
Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design" 0 0 0 7 5 9 13 97
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle 0 0 1 28 0 3 11 44
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 0 0 2 21 1 4 9 29
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 15
Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms 0 0 0 6 1 5 12 30
Learning in a Repeated Global Game of Regime Change and the Dynamics of Crisis 0 0 0 1 0 6 8 169
Long Term Contracting in a Changing World 0 0 0 6 0 3 4 66
Long-Term Contracting in a Changing World 0 0 0 52 1 5 5 146
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 0 0 0 33 0 6 7 144
Many-to-Many Matching Design and Price Discrimination 0 0 0 12 0 5 6 66
Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination 0 0 1 34 1 9 18 84
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 85 2 4 8 348
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 40 3 5 14 405
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 32 1 15 19 171
On the Dynamics of Information, Coordination and Regime Change 0 0 0 96 1 7 7 341
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 100 1 6 8 367
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 20 1 4 4 157
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 36 1 6 8 174
On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency 0 0 0 7 1 5 6 59
Optimal Taxation and Occupational Choice: The Redistributive Role of Production Inefficiencies 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 47
Persuasion in Global Games with Application to Stress Testing 0 0 2 19 1 8 11 52
Platform Competition under Dispersed Information 0 1 1 65 0 12 16 124
Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information 0 0 0 91 4 11 17 126
Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information 0 0 0 33 1 9 11 74
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 65 0 7 14 301
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 37 0 3 5 198
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 0 1 13 14 90
Preparing for the Worst But Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion 0 0 0 9 2 12 14 46
Price Customization and Targeting in Matching Markets 0 0 0 41 1 2 5 114
Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets 0 0 0 83 0 0 3 106
Price customization and targeting in matching markets 0 0 0 0 1 8 9 9
Revenue Equivalence, Profit Maximization, and Information Disclosure in Dynamic Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 2 4 4 53
Robust Predictions in Global Games with Multiple Equilibria: Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks 0 0 0 39 2 8 10 147
Selection-Free Predictions in Global Games with Endogenous Information and Multiple Equilibria 0 0 0 13 0 12 14 89
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 0 0 36 1 3 3 138
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 0 1 53 0 6 7 227
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 0 1 12 2 4 6 79
Sequential Contracts and Information Transmission Between Principals 0 0 0 102 0 2 3 294
Sequential Learning with Endogenous Consideration Sets 0 0 0 5 0 2 5 22
Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 1 275 2 8 18 826
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 0 58 0 4 9 274
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 0 12 1 11 16 103
Soft Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 1 1 2 7 1 7 9 39
Subsidies to Technology Adoption when Firms'Information is Endogenous 1 1 4 14 3 3 10 28
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform- Price Auctions 0 0 0 174 1 4 8 631
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions 0 0 0 29 1 8 10 230
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition on Uniform-Price Auctions 0 0 0 8 0 4 7 88
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 85 1 4 6 278
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 16 0 3 6 116
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 96 1 6 8 517
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 1 25 2 4 8 97
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 0 73 1 6 9 291
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 1 2 14 79 2 135 161 293
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 1 2 10 86 9 121 159 329
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 0 2 10 35 2 22 47 167
Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects 0 0 0 0 1 5 15 33
Wall Street and Silicon Valley: A Delicate Interaction 0 0 0 90 1 6 8 428
Total Working Papers 5 10 56 4,049 103 803 1,144 15,715

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Soft" Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 0 0 0 10 0 6 12 65
Adversarial coordination and public information design 0 0 1 4 3 7 19 25
Attention, coordination, and bounded recall 0 0 1 1 5 12 20 20
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 0 3 9 139
Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks 0 1 1 284 1 12 17 787
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach 0 0 0 13 0 6 10 114
Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach 0 1 2 10 1 4 8 61
Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information 0 0 3 242 2 12 21 827
Information Acquisition and Welfare 0 0 2 43 2 8 23 205
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 2 33 4 12 23 152
Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction 0 0 0 70 13 33 39 235
Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design 0 0 0 36 0 8 16 166
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 0 0 0 57 0 8 13 426
Many-to-many matching and price discrimination 0 0 0 12 0 5 11 76
Matching auctions 0 0 0 5 0 3 4 16
Monopoly with resale 0 0 0 19 1 7 9 94
On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting 0 0 1 98 0 2 9 264
On the use of menus in sequential common agency 0 0 0 8 1 12 17 106
Pandora's Auctions: Dynamic Matching with Unknown Preferences 0 0 0 8 0 9 16 130
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 14 3 7 12 97
Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion 0 1 1 2 0 14 22 52
Price customization and targeting in matching markets 0 2 4 7 1 7 19 32
Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria 0 0 1 35 1 8 24 203
Sequential contracting with multiple principals 0 0 0 43 4 9 14 170
Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 392 3 11 19 924
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 1 67 3 8 11 316
Taxation under Learning by Doing 0 0 1 19 0 8 13 110
Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions 0 0 0 35 14 25 27 197
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 141 12 17 26 539
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 0 20 4 11 13 109
Wall Street and Silicon Valley: A Delicate Interaction 0 0 0 9 0 35 43 82
Total Journal Articles 0 5 21 1,753 78 329 539 6,739
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Statistics updated 2026-03-04