Access Statistics for Alessandro Pavan

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Soft" Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 19
(In)efficiency in Information Acquisition and Aggregation through Prices 1 1 2 8 1 1 8 27
A Rational Theory of "Irrational Exuberance" 0 0 0 76 1 1 2 296
Attention, Coordination, and Bounded Recall 0 0 0 33 0 0 3 118
Beauty Contests and "Irrational Exuberance": A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 0 38 0 0 3 132
Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 1 20 0 2 4 82
Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach 0 0 0 105 0 0 0 432
Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 76 1 1 3 289
Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 162 0 0 1 559
Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 108
Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks: on the Possibility of Predictions in a Global Game with Multiple Equilibria 0 0 0 116 0 0 1 351
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 0 1 1 51
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 43 0 0 1 78
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 0 1 1 93
Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks 0 0 1 50 0 0 5 219
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 55
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes 0 0 1 45 0 0 2 72
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 72
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 21 0 0 2 112
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure 0 0 0 40 1 1 3 164
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure 0 0 1 285 0 0 4 821
Efficiency and Welfare with Complementarities and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 39 0 2 6 245
Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design 0 0 0 62 0 0 1 87
Infinite-Horizon Mechanism Design: the Independent-Shock Approach 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 94
Information Acquisition and Welfare 0 0 1 84 0 1 4 181
Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change 0 0 0 109 0 0 3 501
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 0 31 1 1 1 141
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 46
Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design" 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 85
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, and the Revelation Principle 0 0 1 27 0 1 4 35
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 1 1 2 20 1 1 2 21
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 9
Keeping the agents in the dark: private disclosures in competing mechanisms 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 21
Learning in a Repeated Global Game of Regime Change and the Dynamics of Crisis 0 0 0 1 1 2 5 163
Long Term Contracting in a Changing World 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 62
Long-Term Contracting in a Changing World 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 141
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 0 0 0 33 1 1 2 138
Many-to-Many Matching Design and Price Discrimination 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 60
Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination 0 0 0 33 3 3 3 69
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 85 0 0 2 341
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 40 0 0 1 391
Monopoly with Resale 0 0 0 32 0 0 1 152
On the Dynamics of Information, Coordination and Regime Change 0 0 0 96 0 0 0 334
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 100 0 1 2 360
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 153
On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting 0 0 0 36 1 1 1 167
On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 53
Optimal Taxation and Occupational Choice: The Redistributive Role of Production Inefficiencies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42
Persuasion in Global Games with Application to Stress Testing 0 0 2 18 0 0 6 43
Platform Competition under Dispersed Information 0 0 0 64 0 1 1 109
Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information 0 0 0 33 1 1 2 64
Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information 0 0 0 91 2 3 4 113
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 193
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 65 1 2 2 289
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76
Preparing for the Worst But Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion 0 0 0 9 1 1 3 33
Price Customization and Targeting in Matching Markets 0 0 0 41 1 1 5 112
Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets 0 0 0 83 0 1 2 104
Price customization and targeting in matching markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue Equivalence, Profit Maximization, and Information Disclosure in Dynamic Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49
Robust Predictions in Global Games with Multiple Equilibria: Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks 0 0 0 39 0 0 2 138
Selection-Free Predictions in Global Games with Endogenous Information and Multiple Equilibria 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 75
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 1 2 53 0 1 2 221
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 1 1 12 0 1 1 74
Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 135
Sequential Contracts and Information Transmission Between Principals 0 0 0 102 0 0 0 291
Sequential Learning with Endogenous Consideration Sets 0 0 0 5 1 2 3 20
Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 1 275 1 2 16 814
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 0 58 0 0 1 265
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 87
Soft Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 1 1 2 6 1 1 3 31
Subsidies to Technology Adoption when Firms'Information is Endogenous 0 0 1 11 0 0 4 19
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform- Price Auctions 0 0 1 174 0 1 5 625
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 220
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition on Uniform-Price Auctions 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 82
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 96 0 0 1 509
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 85 0 0 0 272
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 110
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 0 73 0 1 1 283
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 1 25 0 1 2 91
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 2 3 5 28 4 11 17 131
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 0 1 8 79 0 10 32 186
Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects 2 5 15 75 4 7 39 145
Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 20
Wall Street and Silicon Valley: A Delicate Interaction 0 0 0 90 1 1 7 422
Total Working Papers 7 14 49 4,021 31 76 273 14,693

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Soft" Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment 0 0 1 10 0 0 4 55
Adversarial coordination and public information design 0 0 4 4 3 4 12 12
Attention, coordination, and bounded recall 0 1 1 1 6 7 7 7
Differential Taxation and Occupational Choice 0 0 0 16 0 3 5 134
Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks 0 0 0 283 0 1 3 771
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach 0 0 0 13 1 2 4 107
Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach 0 0 2 9 0 0 5 55
Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information 0 1 4 242 0 4 12 812
Information Acquisition and Welfare 0 1 3 43 0 9 15 194
Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets 0 0 3 33 2 6 23 139
Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction 0 0 0 70 2 3 5 199
Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design 0 0 0 36 1 2 9 157
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 0 0 0 57 0 3 7 416
Many-to-many matching and price discrimination 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 66
Matching auctions 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 12
Monopoly with resale 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 85
On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting 0 0 0 97 0 0 0 255
On the use of menus in sequential common agency 0 0 0 8 1 3 5 93
Pandora's Auctions: Dynamic Matching with Unknown Preferences 0 0 0 8 0 3 3 117
Policy with Dispersed Information 0 0 1 14 1 3 7 89
Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion 0 0 0 1 2 5 20 36
Price customization and targeting in matching markets 0 1 3 4 1 3 19 20
Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria 0 0 0 34 0 0 4 183
Sequential contracting with multiple principals 0 0 0 43 0 1 2 158
Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps 0 0 0 392 0 3 5 908
Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications 0 0 2 66 0 0 3 306
Taxation under Learning by Doing 0 0 0 18 1 3 6 101
Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 170
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities 0 0 0 141 0 0 6 515
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games 0 0 0 20 0 1 1 97
Wall Street and Silicon Valley: A Delicate Interaction 0 0 1 9 2 4 8 45
Total Journal Articles 0 4 25 1,743 23 73 205 6,314
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Statistics updated 2025-09-05