Access Statistics for Arsen Palestini

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Class of Best-Response Potential Games 0 0 0 57 0 5 7 144
A Stochastic Optimal Control Model of Pollution Abatement 0 0 0 78 7 12 16 247
A multi-factor inequality approach to a transfer scheme: the case of Common Agricultural Policy 0 0 0 29 3 7 10 91
Allocation of risk capital in a cost cooperative game induced by a modified Expected Shortfall 0 0 0 26 0 2 5 45
CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities 0 0 0 101 6 8 11 191
CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities 0 0 0 101 0 4 6 95
Closed form solutions to generalized logistic-type nonautonomous systems 0 0 0 7 0 8 9 61
Cost of Inequality, the Uniform Rule and Cooperative Games 0 0 0 59 1 1 4 118
Dynamic Advertising with Spillovers: Cartel vs Competitive Fringe 0 0 0 9 0 4 6 42
Government Spending Under Non-Separability: a Theoretical Analysis 0 0 0 23 1 6 7 84
Hamiltonian Potential Functions for Differential Games 1 1 2 22 2 7 9 84
Hamiltonian potential functions for differential games 0 0 0 70 0 5 6 162
On Lie point symmetries in differential games 0 0 0 26 0 3 5 95
On the Feedback Solutions of Differential Oligopoly Games with Hyperbolic Demand Curve and Capacity Accumulation 0 0 1 47 0 8 11 125
On the Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: Cournot vs Bertrand 0 0 0 101 4 11 15 140
On the Time Consistency of Equilibria in Additively Separable Differential Games 0 0 0 35 0 8 9 79
On the feedback solution of a differential oligopoly game with capacity adjustment 0 0 0 46 1 3 7 105
On the non-neutrality of profit taxation in a Cournot oligopoly with environmental effects 0 0 0 32 0 4 15 105
Open Innovation in a Dynamic Cournot Duopoly 0 0 0 87 4 33 35 163
Open Innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly 0 0 0 69 0 1 4 161
Quality, Distance and Trade: a Strategic Approach 0 0 0 30 2 11 12 102
Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game 0 0 0 95 2 5 5 249
The Incentive to Invest in Environmental-Friendly Technologies: Dynamics Makes a Difference 0 0 0 44 0 3 3 88
The Incentive to Invest in Environmental-Friendly Technologies: Dynamics Makes a Difference 0 1 1 32 5 7 11 139
The Socially Responsible Choice in a Duopolistic Market: a Dynamic Model of "Ethical Product" Differentiation 0 0 0 42 1 4 9 178
Total Working Papers 1 2 4 1,268 39 170 237 3,093

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Bayesian potential game to illustrate heterogeneity in cost/benefit characteristics 0 0 0 5 3 6 8 63
A graph-based approach to inequality assessment 0 0 0 5 2 3 5 42
Government spending under non-separability: a theoretical analysis 0 0 0 19 2 7 9 79
Multifactorial Decomposition of Inequality: The Case of CAP 0 0 0 14 3 4 6 46
On the Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: Cournot vs Bertrand 0 0 0 18 1 5 6 101
On the feedback solutions of differential oligopoly games with hyperbolic demand curve and capacity accumulation 0 0 1 12 0 3 7 52
Open Innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly 0 0 0 14 0 5 9 76
Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game 0 0 0 18 0 5 8 104
The socially responsible choice in a duopolistic market: A dynamic model of “ethical product” differentiation 0 0 2 30 2 10 19 144
What determines volunteer work? On the effects of adverse selection and intrinsic motivation 0 0 1 24 0 4 14 90
Total Journal Articles 0 0 4 159 13 52 91 797

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04