Access Statistics for Michael Peters

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Competitive Distribution of Auctions 0 0 1 88 4 4 11 498
A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 65 0 0 3 209
A REVELATION PRINCIPLE FOR COMPETING MECHANISMS 0 0 0 289 2 3 14 1,107
An Ascending Double Auction 0 0 0 147 2 2 13 562
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle 0 0 1 356 2 4 18 1,209
Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 54 3 3 9 95
Competing Pre-marital Investments 0 0 0 109 2 3 14 561
Competing Premarital Investment 0 0 1 96 5 6 21 545
Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment 0 0 0 61 1 4 9 414
Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices 0 0 1 202 6 10 33 1,084
Definable and Contractible Contracts 0 0 0 36 3 4 11 197
Dynamic Monopoly Power When Search is Costly 0 0 0 32 0 1 10 261
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism 0 1 1 70 3 4 16 174
Innis Lecture: Hedonic Equilibrium 0 0 0 106 0 1 4 339
Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 0 1 188 2 4 22 555
Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 0 3 211 4 6 20 646
Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations 0 0 0 72 2 4 18 365
Internet auctions with many traders 0 0 0 91 2 3 14 333
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch 0 0 0 47 1 2 16 333
Matching by Luck or Search? Empirical Evidence from the Executive Labor Market 0 0 0 32 2 3 6 95
Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency 0 0 0 199 3 4 10 1,038
Non-cooperative foundations of hedonic equilibrium 0 0 0 38 2 5 13 185
On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts 0 0 0 127 0 1 12 765
On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts 0 0 0 49 1 1 8 375
On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 75 4 4 10 187
Other Regarding Preferences: Outcomes, Intentions, or Interdependence 0 0 0 99 2 3 19 281
Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents 0 0 0 53 2 3 14 246
Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design 0 0 0 43 2 5 21 137
SELF-SELECTION WITH RENEGOTIATION 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 216
Self-Selection with Renegotiation 0 0 0 0 5 5 10 112
Surplus Extraction and Competition 0 0 0 104 4 5 10 484
Technical Appendix to Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 0 0 29 2 3 8 156
The Pre-Marital Investment Game 0 0 0 122 2 5 13 690
The Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum 0 0 0 39 4 4 13 182
Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium 0 0 0 30 0 0 13 215
Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search 0 0 0 75 0 0 11 270
Total Working Papers 0 1 9 3,434 80 120 475 15,121

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 140 1 1 14 377
A folk theorem for competing mechanisms 0 0 0 36 1 2 8 158
An ascending double auction 0 0 0 14 2 4 11 70
Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility 0 0 0 314 1 1 10 994
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle 0 0 0 0 2 2 10 568
Competing Premarital Investments 0 0 0 222 1 5 19 854
Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices 0 0 2 167 1 1 10 500
Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment 0 0 0 78 1 1 5 436
Decentralized Markets and Endogenous Institutions 0 0 0 8 3 3 14 246
Definable and Contractible Contracts 0 0 2 20 1 1 14 295
Equilibrium Mechanisms in a Decentralized Market 0 0 0 39 3 4 8 177
Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism 0 0 0 24 1 19 28 110
Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109] 0 0 0 11 2 5 11 63
Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States 0 0 0 168 2 2 23 1,482
Imperfectly Enforceable Labour Contracts 0 0 0 6 1 3 5 181
Incentive-Consistent Matching Processes for Problems with ex Ante Pricing 0 0 0 14 2 2 7 72
Innis Lecture: Hedonic equilibrium 0 0 0 66 0 0 6 198
Internet auctions with many traders 0 0 1 120 2 2 13 336
Labour contracts in a stock market economy 0 0 0 6 3 3 8 34
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search 0 0 0 63 3 3 12 200
Market Equilibrium and the Resolution of Uncertainty 0 0 0 17 1 2 7 182
Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency 0 0 0 80 4 5 17 278
Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search 0 0 0 67 0 1 14 234
On the Efficiency of Ex Ante and Ex Post Pricing Institutions 0 0 0 0 6 6 12 196
Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents 0 0 0 11 4 4 15 75
Research and development with publicly observable outcomes 0 0 0 11 3 3 6 117
Restrictions on Price Advertising 0 0 1 38 1 1 10 201
Sequential Selling Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 279
The pre-marital investment game 1 1 1 39 4 4 13 163
Total Journal Articles 1 1 7 1,779 57 91 335 9,076

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Statistics updated 2026-11-12