Access Statistics for Michael Peters

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Competitive Distribution of Auctions 0 1 1 88 0 1 7 494
A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 65 0 0 3 209
A REVELATION PRINCIPLE FOR COMPETING MECHANISMS 0 0 0 289 0 1 12 1,105
An Ascending Double Auction 0 0 0 147 0 0 12 560
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle 0 0 1 356 0 2 20 1,207
Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 54 0 0 10 92
Competing Pre-marital Investments 0 0 0 109 1 1 17 559
Competing Premarital Investment 0 1 1 96 1 2 21 540
Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment 0 0 0 61 1 3 8 413
Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices 0 1 1 202 0 5 27 1,078
Definable and Contractible Contracts 0 0 0 36 0 1 8 194
Dynamic Monopoly Power When Search is Costly 0 0 0 32 1 1 12 261
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism 1 1 1 70 1 2 14 171
Innis Lecture: Hedonic Equilibrium 0 0 0 106 1 1 4 339
Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 0 3 211 0 2 17 642
Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 0 1 188 1 2 21 553
Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations 0 0 0 72 0 2 18 363
Internet auctions with many traders 0 0 0 91 0 1 13 331
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch 0 0 0 47 0 1 17 332
Matching by Luck or Search? Empirical Evidence from the Executive Labor Market 0 0 0 32 0 1 5 93
Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency 0 0 0 199 1 1 8 1,035
Non-cooperative foundations of hedonic equilibrium 0 0 0 38 3 3 12 183
On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts 0 0 0 49 0 0 10 374
On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts 0 0 0 127 0 2 12 765
On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 75 0 0 6 183
Other Regarding Preferences: Outcomes, Intentions, or Interdependence 0 0 0 99 1 1 18 279
Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents 0 0 0 53 1 1 14 244
Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design 0 0 0 43 1 6 19 135
SELF-SELECTION WITH RENEGOTIATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 215
Self-Selection with Renegotiation 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 107
Surplus Extraction and Competition 0 0 0 104 0 1 6 480
Technical Appendix to Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 0 0 29 1 1 7 154
The Pre-Marital Investment Game 0 0 0 122 1 3 12 688
The Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum 0 0 0 39 0 0 10 178
Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium 0 0 0 30 0 0 17 215
Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search 0 0 0 75 0 1 13 270
Total Working Papers 1 4 9 3,434 16 49 442 15,041

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 140 0 0 13 376
A folk theorem for competing mechanisms 0 0 0 36 0 1 10 157
An ascending double auction 0 0 0 14 1 2 9 68
Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility 0 0 0 314 0 1 10 993
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 566
Competing Premarital Investments 0 0 0 222 2 5 19 853
Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices 0 1 3 167 0 2 11 499
Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment 0 0 0 78 0 0 5 435
Decentralized Markets and Endogenous Institutions 0 0 0 8 0 0 11 243
Definable and Contractible Contracts 0 0 2 20 0 0 14 294
Equilibrium Mechanisms in a Decentralized Market 0 0 0 39 1 1 6 174
Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism 0 0 0 24 0 19 27 109
Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109] 0 0 0 11 2 3 9 61
Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States 0 0 0 168 0 1 21 1,480
Imperfectly Enforceable Labour Contracts 0 0 0 6 1 2 4 180
Incentive-Consistent Matching Processes for Problems with ex Ante Pricing 0 0 0 14 0 0 5 70
Innis Lecture: Hedonic equilibrium 0 0 0 66 0 0 6 198
Internet auctions with many traders 0 0 1 120 0 0 11 334
Labour contracts in a stock market economy 0 0 0 6 0 0 5 31
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search 0 0 0 63 0 0 11 197
Market Equilibrium and the Resolution of Uncertainty 0 0 0 17 0 1 6 181
Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency 0 0 0 80 0 1 13 274
Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search 0 0 0 67 1 1 14 234
On the Efficiency of Ex Ante and Ex Post Pricing Institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 190
Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents 0 0 0 11 0 1 14 71
Research and development with publicly observable outcomes 0 0 0 11 0 0 4 114
Restrictions on Price Advertising 0 0 1 38 0 1 9 200
Sequential Selling Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 278
The pre-marital investment game 0 0 0 38 0 0 10 159
Total Journal Articles 0 1 7 1,778 8 42 296 9,019

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Statistics updated 2026-10-11