Access Statistics for Michael Peters

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Competitive Distribution of Auctions 0 0 0 87 0 2 8 493
A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 65 0 0 4 209
A REVELATION PRINCIPLE FOR COMPETING MECHANISMS 0 0 0 289 0 5 14 1,104
An Ascending Double Auction 0 0 0 147 0 3 12 560
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle 0 0 1 356 0 3 21 1,205
Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 54 0 1 10 92
Competing Pre-marital Investments 0 0 0 109 1 4 16 558
Competing Premarital Investment 0 0 0 95 0 2 19 538
Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment 0 0 0 61 1 5 6 410
Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices 0 0 0 201 1 10 23 1,073
Definable and Contractible Contracts 0 0 0 36 0 2 7 193
Dynamic Monopoly Power When Search is Costly 0 0 0 32 0 3 12 260
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism 0 0 0 69 0 3 13 169
Innis Lecture: Hedonic Equilibrium 0 0 0 106 0 0 3 338
Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 1 1 188 1 6 19 551
Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 2 3 211 0 3 17 640
Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations 0 0 0 72 0 8 17 361
Internet auctions with many traders 0 0 0 91 0 4 12 330
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch 0 0 1 47 0 6 17 331
Matching by Luck or Search? Empirical Evidence from the Executive Labor Market 0 0 1 32 0 0 5 92
Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency 0 0 0 199 1 3 7 1,034
Non-cooperative foundations of hedonic equilibrium 0 0 0 38 0 2 10 180
On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts 0 0 0 127 1 4 10 763
On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts 0 0 0 49 0 2 10 374
On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 75 0 4 6 183
Other Regarding Preferences: Outcomes, Intentions, or Interdependence 0 0 0 99 0 1 19 278
Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents 0 0 0 53 0 5 13 243
Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design 0 0 0 43 0 2 13 129
SELF-SELECTION WITH RENEGOTIATION 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 215
Self-Selection with Renegotiation 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 107
Surplus Extraction and Competition 0 0 0 104 0 1 6 479
Technical Appendix to Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 0 0 29 0 1 6 153
The Pre-Marital Investment Game 0 0 0 122 0 3 9 685
The Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum 0 0 0 39 0 2 10 178
Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium 0 0 0 30 2 4 18 215
Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search 0 0 1 75 1 2 13 269
Total Working Papers 0 3 8 3,430 9 110 417 14,992

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 140 0 2 16 376
A folk theorem for competing mechanisms 0 0 0 36 0 1 11 156
An ascending double auction 0 0 0 14 0 1 7 66
Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility 0 0 1 314 0 2 11 992
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 566
Competing Premarital Investments 0 0 0 222 0 3 15 848
Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices 0 0 2 166 0 2 9 497
Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment 0 0 0 78 0 1 5 435
Decentralized Markets and Endogenous Institutions 0 0 0 8 0 3 14 243
Definable and Contractible Contracts 0 0 2 20 0 4 17 294
Equilibrium Mechanisms in a Decentralized Market 0 0 0 39 0 0 6 173
Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism 0 0 0 24 0 3 9 90
Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109] 0 0 0 11 0 2 7 58
Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States 0 0 0 168 1 10 22 1,479
Imperfectly Enforceable Labour Contracts 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 178
Incentive-Consistent Matching Processes for Problems with ex Ante Pricing 0 0 0 14 0 0 6 70
Innis Lecture: Hedonic equilibrium 0 0 0 66 0 1 6 198
Internet auctions with many traders 0 1 2 120 0 5 14 334
Labour contracts in a stock market economy 0 0 0 6 0 1 5 31
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search 0 0 0 63 0 0 12 197
Market Equilibrium and the Resolution of Uncertainty 0 0 0 17 0 1 6 180
Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency 0 0 0 80 0 1 12 273
Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search 0 0 0 67 1 6 14 233
On the Efficiency of Ex Ante and Ex Post Pricing Institutions 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 190
Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents 0 0 0 11 0 3 14 70
Research and development with publicly observable outcomes 0 0 0 11 0 1 4 114
Restrictions on Price Advertising 0 1 1 38 0 1 11 199
Sequential Selling Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 278
The pre-marital investment game 0 0 0 38 0 3 10 159
Total Journal Articles 0 2 8 1,777 2 60 286 8,977

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Statistics updated 2026-07-10