Access Statistics for Michael Peters

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Competitive Distribution of Auctions 0 0 0 87 0 4 6 491
A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 65 0 3 6 209
A REVELATION PRINCIPLE FOR COMPETING MECHANISMS 0 0 0 289 0 6 9 1,099
An Ascending Double Auction 0 0 0 147 2 7 9 557
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle 0 1 1 356 0 9 19 1,200
Competing Mechanisms 0 0 0 54 0 3 8 89
Competing Pre-marital Investments 0 0 0 109 0 7 12 554
Competing Premarital Investment 0 0 0 95 2 10 16 535
Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment 0 0 0 61 0 0 1 405
Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices 0 0 1 201 2 10 15 1,063
Definable and Contractible Contracts 0 0 0 36 1 4 6 191
Dynamic Monopoly Power When Search is Costly 0 0 0 32 1 4 9 257
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism 0 0 0 69 0 5 9 165
Innis Lecture: Hedonic Equilibrium 0 0 0 106 1 3 3 338
Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 0 1 209 1 6 14 635
Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 0 0 187 0 12 14 545
Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations 0 0 0 72 0 4 8 352
Internet auctions with many traders 0 0 0 91 0 3 6 324
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch 0 0 1 47 1 5 11 325
Matching by Luck or Search? Empirical Evidence from the Executive Labor Market 0 0 1 32 0 1 4 91
Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency 0 0 0 199 0 1 4 1,031
Non-cooperative foundations of hedonic equilibrium 0 0 0 38 1 4 8 177
On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts 0 0 0 127 1 5 6 759
On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts 0 0 0 49 0 2 6 369
On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games 0 0 0 75 1 2 2 179
Other Regarding Preferences: Outcomes, Intentions, or Interdependence 0 0 0 99 3 11 15 274
Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents 0 0 0 53 1 4 6 236
Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design 0 0 0 43 2 11 11 127
SELF-SELECTION WITH RENEGOTIATION 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 212
Self-Selection with Renegotiation 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 105
Surplus Extraction and Competition 0 0 0 104 0 3 5 478
Technical Appendix to Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 0 0 29 1 3 4 151
The Pre-Marital Investment Game 0 0 0 122 1 2 6 682
The Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum 0 0 0 39 0 6 8 176
Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium 0 0 0 30 0 7 15 211
Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search 0 0 2 75 0 4 13 266
Total Working Papers 0 1 7 3,427 22 178 301 14,858

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms 0 0 1 140 3 8 15 372
A folk theorem for competing mechanisms 0 0 0 36 0 4 12 155
An ascending double auction 0 0 0 14 2 5 5 64
Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility 0 0 1 314 0 4 8 989
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 565
Competing Premarital Investments 0 0 0 222 0 8 13 845
Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices 0 0 2 166 1 2 7 494
Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment 0 0 0 78 0 3 4 434
Decentralized Markets and Endogenous Institutions 0 0 0 8 2 6 9 238
Definable and Contractible Contracts 0 1 3 20 0 7 14 290
Equilibrium Mechanisms in a Decentralized Market 0 0 0 39 0 4 6 173
Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism 0 0 0 24 1 4 6 87
Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109] 0 0 0 11 0 3 6 56
Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States 0 0 0 168 1 5 11 1,468
Imperfectly Enforceable Labour Contracts 0 0 0 6 0 1 1 177
Incentive-Consistent Matching Processes for Problems with ex Ante Pricing 0 0 0 14 0 4 5 69
Innis Lecture: Hedonic equilibrium 0 0 0 66 0 0 2 194
Internet auctions with many traders 0 0 2 119 0 4 9 328
Labour contracts in a stock market economy 0 0 0 6 2 4 4 30
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search 0 0 0 63 3 5 10 195
Market Equilibrium and the Resolution of Uncertainty 0 0 0 17 0 4 5 179
Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency 0 0 0 80 1 10 11 272
Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search 0 0 1 67 1 6 8 226
On the Efficiency of Ex Ante and Ex Post Pricing Institutions 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 188
Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents 0 0 0 11 0 6 10 66
Research and development with publicly observable outcomes 0 0 0 11 0 2 3 113
Restrictions on Price Advertising 0 0 1 37 0 6 11 197
Sequential Selling Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 277
The pre-marital investment game 0 0 0 38 1 4 8 156
Total Journal Articles 0 1 11 1,775 18 131 221 8,897

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04