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12 months |
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Last month |
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12 months |
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A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure |
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0 |
0 |
109 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
387 |
A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3,292 |
Agency Theory Meets Matching Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
145 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
151 |
An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
242 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,035 |
An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
62 |
An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
594 |
An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
29 |
Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
88 |
Auditing Cost Overrun Claims |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
571 |
Auditing with Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
328 |
Auditing with Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
221 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
442 |
BIDDING FOR THE SURPLUS: A NON-COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO THE SHAPLEY VALUE |
0 |
0 |
1 |
225 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
563 |
Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
472 |
Bidding for the Surplus: a Non-Cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value. ation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
448 |
Capital Misallocation and Secular Stagnation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
42 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
56 |
Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazad Environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
485 |
Codes of Best Practice in Competitive Markets for Managers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
373 |
Codes of Best Practice in Competitive Markets for Managers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
73 |
Comparative Statics in the Multiple-Partners Assignment Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
64 |
Constrained-Optimal Tradewise-Stable Outcomes in the One-Sided Assignment Game: A Solution Concept Weaker than the Core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
51 |
Cooperative Outcomes Through Non-Cooperative Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
660 |
Designing Contracts for University Spin-offs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
143 |
Discrimination in a new model of contests with two-sided asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
154 |
Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
Double risque moral et délégation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
Double risque moral et délégation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
550 |
EXTENSIONS OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR ENVIRONMENTS WITH EXTERNALITIES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
Early Individual Stakeholders, First Venture Capital Investment, and Exit in the UK Startup Ecosystem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
188 |
Efficient Bidding with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
332 |
Efficient Bidding with Externalitites |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
39 |
Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
69 |
Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
60 |
Endogeneizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
518 |
Endogeneizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
210 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
655 |
Endogeneous Matching in University-Industry Collaboration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
81 |
Endogeneous matching in university-industry collaboration: Theory and empirical evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
111 |
Endogenizing Know-How Flows Through the Nature of R&D Investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
321 |
Endogenizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
388 |
Endogenous Matching in University-Industry Collaboration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
171 |
Equilibrium Limited Liability Contracts in a Landlord-Tenant Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
127 |
Evaluation in Research Funding Agencies: Are Structurally Diverse Teams Biased Against? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
74 |
Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
241 |
Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
Extensions of the Shapley value for Environments with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
Firms' Innovation Strategy under the Shadow of Analyst Coverage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
107 |
Firms' Innovation Strategy under the Shadow of Analyst Coverage |
0 |
0 |
2 |
88 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
155 |
Forming Efficient Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
873 |
Forming Efficient Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
Funding Academic Research: Grant Application, Partnership, Award, and Output |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
46 |
Funding academic research: grant application, partnership, award, and output |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
57 |
Goal-Oriented Agents in a Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
25 |
Goal-oriented agents in a market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
Goal-oriented agents in a market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
18 |
Goal-oriented agents in a market |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
110 |
Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a Three-agent Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
62 |
Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
398 |
In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
452 |
Incentives in University Technology Transfers |
0 |
1 |
1 |
110 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
133 |
Incentives in University Technology Transfers |
0 |
1 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
89 |
Innovation Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
134 |
Innovation Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
Instability in the Labour Market for Researchers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
185 |
Institutional Blockholders and Corporate Innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
25 |
Investment, Duration, and Exit Strategies for Corporate and Independent Venture Capital-backed Start-ups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
265 |
Investment, Duration, and Exit Strategies for Corporate and Independent Venture Capital-backed Start-ups |
0 |
0 |
2 |
62 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
207 |
Key Success Drivers in Public Research Grants: Funding the Seeds of Radical Innovation in Academia? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
121 |
Key success drivers in public research grants: Funding the seeds of radical innovation in academia? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
78 |
Licensing of University Inventions: The Role of a Technology Transfer Office |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
273 |
Moral Hazard with Several Agents: The Gains From Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
655 |
Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions |
0 |
1 |
1 |
43 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
141 |
Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
96 |
On Subsidizing R&D |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
176 |
Optimal Auditing when Some Individuals are Tax-return Exempt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
471 |
Optimal Coexistence of Long-Term and Short-Term Contracts in Labor Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
81 |
Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
127 |
Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
260 |
Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firm's Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
157 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
676 |
Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms’ Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
294 |
Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
186 |
Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
116 |
Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
260 |
Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
POLÍTICAS DE INSPECCIÓN ÓPTIMAS Y CUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
106 |
Private versus Social Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
60 |
Private versus Social Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
Private versus Social Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
86 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
154 |
Research Output from University-Industry Collaborative Projects |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
99 |
Research output from university-industry collaborative projects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
207 |
Sequential Creation of Surplus and the Shapley Value |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
13 |
Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
56 |
Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
174 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
491 |
Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
303 |
Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
165 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
1,067 |
Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
339 |
Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
77 |
Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
158 |
Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
405 |
Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
Similar-to-me Effects in the Grant Application Process: Applicants, Panelists, and the Likelihood of Obtaining Funds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
Similar-to-me effects in the grant application process: Applicants, panelists, and the likelihood of obtaining funds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
29 |
Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
36 |
Smooth multibidding mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
119 |
Spatial Competition in the Banking System: Localization, Cross Subsidies and the Regulation of Deposit Rates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
901 |
TWO FOLK MANIPULABILITY THEOREMS IN THE GENERAL ONE-TO-TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS WITH MONEY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
The Equilibrium-Value Convergence for the Multiple-Partners Game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
The Outcome of Competitive Equilibrium Rules In Buyer-seller Markets When the Agents Play Strategically |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
The Principal-Agent Matching Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
557 |
The Principal-Agent Matching Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
456 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1,266 |
The Proportional Ordinal Shapley Solution for Pure Exchange Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
The Role of Information in Licensing Contract Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
751 |
The principal-agent matching market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
78 |
VALUES FOR ENVIRONMENTS WITH EXTERNALITIES – THE AVERAGE APPROACH |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
Value-Free Reductions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
Values for Environments with Externalities - The Average Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
38 |
Values for Environments with Externalities – The Average Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
Total Working Papers |
0 |
6 |
22 |
5,829 |
34 |
88 |
278 |
30,249 |