| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3,292 |
| A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
109 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
386 |
| Agency Theory Meets Matching Theory |
0 |
1 |
1 |
145 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
150 |
| An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
242 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,035 |
| An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
| An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
594 |
| An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
| Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
86 |
| Auditing Cost Overrun Claims |
0 |
0 |
1 |
87 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
571 |
| Auditing with Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
221 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
439 |
| Auditing with Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
327 |
| BIDDING FOR THE SURPLUS: A NON-COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO THE SHAPLEY VALUE |
0 |
0 |
1 |
224 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
562 |
| Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
472 |
| Bidding for the Surplus: a Non-Cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value. ation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
445 |
| Capital Misallocation and Secular Stagnation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
52 |
| Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazad Environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
485 |
| Codes of Best Practice in Competitive Markets for Managers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
373 |
| Codes of Best Practice in Competitive Markets for Managers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
| Comparative Statics in the Multiple-Partners Assignment Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
62 |
| Constrained-Optimal Tradewise-Stable Outcomes in the One-Sided Assignment Game: A Solution Concept Weaker than the Core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
50 |
| Cooperative Outcomes Through Non-Cooperative Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
660 |
| Designing Contracts for University Spin-offs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
139 |
| Discrimination in a new model of contests with two-sided asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
44 |
| Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
| Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
| Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
154 |
| Double risque moral et délégation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
547 |
| Double risque moral et délégation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
| EXTENSIONS OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR ENVIRONMENTS WITH EXTERNALITIES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
43 |
| Early Individual Stakeholders, First Venture Capital Investment, and Exit in the UK Startup Ecosystem |
0 |
1 |
1 |
47 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
186 |
| Efficient Bidding with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
332 |
| Efficient Bidding with Externalitites |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
| Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
| Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
102 |
| Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
64 |
| Endogeneizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
210 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
654 |
| Endogeneizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
517 |
| Endogeneous Matching in University-Industry Collaboration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
80 |
| Endogeneous matching in university-industry collaboration: Theory and empirical evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
109 |
| Endogenizing Know-How Flows Through the Nature of R&D Investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
321 |
| Endogenizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
388 |
| Endogenous Matching in University-Industry Collaboration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
168 |
| Equilibrium Limited Liability Contracts in a Landlord-Tenant Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
| Evaluation in Research Funding Agencies: Are Structurally Diverse Teams Biased Against? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
72 |
| Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
| Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
239 |
| Extensions of the Shapley value for Environments with Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
| Firms' Innovation Strategy under the Shadow of Analyst Coverage |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
104 |
| Firms’ Innovation Strategy under the Shadow of Analyst Coverage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
147 |
| Forming Efficient Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
872 |
| Forming Efficient Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
34 |
| Funding Academic Research: Grant Application, Partnership, Award, and Output |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
44 |
| Funding academic research: grant application, partnership, award, and output |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
56 |
| Goal-Oriented Agents in a Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
| Goal-oriented agents in a market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
| Goal-oriented agents in a market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
| Goal-oriented agents in a market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
| Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
105 |
| Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a Three-agent Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
| Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
398 |
| In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
451 |
| Incentives in University Technology Transfers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
88 |
| Incentives in University Technology Transfers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
109 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
131 |
| Innovation Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
| Innovation Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
133 |
| Instability in the Labour Market for Researchers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
183 |
| Institutional Blockholders and Corporate Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
| Investment, Duration, and Exit Strategies for Corporate and Independent Venture Capital-backed Start-ups |
0 |
0 |
3 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
201 |
| Investment, Duration, and Exit Strategies for Corporate and Independent Venture Capital-backed Start-ups |
0 |
0 |
2 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
263 |
| Key Success Drivers in Public Research Grants: Funding the Seeds of Radical Innovation in Academia? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
118 |
| Key success drivers in public research grants: Funding the seeds of radical innovation in academia? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
76 |
| Licensing of University Inventions: The Role of a Technology Transfer Office |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
273 |
| Moral Hazard with Several Agents: The Gains From Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
655 |
| Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
136 |
| Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
95 |
| On Subsidizing R&D |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
176 |
| Optimal Auditing when Some Individuals are Tax-return Exempt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
471 |
| Optimal Coexistence of Long-Term and Short-Term Contracts in Labor Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
81 |
| Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
259 |
| Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
127 |
| Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
157 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
675 |
| Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms’ Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
294 |
| Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firm’s Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
42 |
| Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
186 |
| Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
116 |
| Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
| Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
259 |
| POLÍTICAS DE INSPECCIÓN ÓPTIMAS Y CUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
| Private versus Social Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
| Private versus Social Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
86 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
151 |
| Private versus Social Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
58 |
| Research Output from University-Industry Collaborative Projects |
0 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
98 |
| Research output from university-industry collaborative projects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
205 |
| Sequential Creation of Surplus and the Shapley Value |
0 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
9 |
| Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
56 |
| Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
174 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
491 |
| Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
301 |
| Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
165 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1,063 |
| Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
336 |
| Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
76 |
| Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
157 |
| Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
| Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
405 |
| Similar-to-me Effects in the Grant Application Process: Applicants, Panelists, and the Likelihood of Obtaining Funds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
| Similar-to-me effects in the grant application process: Applicants, panelists, and the likelihood of obtaining funds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
28 |
| Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
| Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
| Smooth multibidding mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
118 |
| Spatial Competition in the Banking System: Localization, Cross Subsidies and the Regulation of Deposit Rates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
901 |
| TWO FOLK MANIPULABILITY THEOREMS IN THE GENERAL ONE-TO-TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS WITH MONEY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
| The Equilibrium-Value Convergence for the Multiple-Partners Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
| The Outcome of Competitive Equilibrium Rules In Buyer-seller Markets When the Agents Play Strategically |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
| The Principal-Agent Matching Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
556 |
| The Principal-Agent Matching Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
456 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1,264 |
| The Proportional Ordinal Shapley Solution for Pure Exchange Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
| The Role of Information in Licensing Contract Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
749 |
| The principal-agent matching market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
| Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
| VALUES FOR ENVIRONMENTS WITH EXTERNALITIES – THE AVERAGE APPROACH |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Value-Free Reductions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| Values for Environments with Externalities - The Average Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
| Values for Environments with Externalities – The Average Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
4 |
25 |
5,817 |
35 |
68 |
199 |
30,128 |
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