Access Statistics for David Perez-Castrillo

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure 0 1 1 109 1 2 5 377
A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure 0 0 0 0 15 55 312 3,200
An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments 0 0 0 11 1 4 5 48
An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments 0 0 0 241 1 1 1 1,026
An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version) 0 0 1 126 2 4 5 585
An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version) 0 0 0 1 3 7 8 14
Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel 0 2 20 20 2 4 42 42
Auditing Cost Overrun Claims 0 0 0 86 0 3 5 558
Auditing with Signals 0 0 1 15 1 2 8 300
Auditing with Signals 0 0 1 221 2 2 8 414
BIDDING FOR THE SURPLUS: A NON-COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO THE SHAPLEY VALUE 0 0 0 223 0 3 4 543
Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments 0 0 0 79 0 0 0 455
Bidding for the Surplus: a Non-Cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value. ation 0 0 0 0 1 5 9 416
Capital Misallocation and Secular Stagnation 0 1 36 36 0 3 23 23
Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazad Environment 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 468
Codes of Best Practice in Competitive Markets for Managers 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 55
Codes of Best Practice in Competitive Markets for Managers 0 0 0 82 1 1 9 342
Comparative Statics in the Multiple-Partners Assignment Game 0 0 4 26 2 7 21 39
Conflict-free and Pareto-optimal Allocations in the One-sided Assignment Game: A Solution Concept Weaker than the Core 1 2 24 24 1 7 15 15
Cooperative Outcomes Through Non-Cooperative Games 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 643
Designing Contracts for University Spin-offs 0 1 1 31 1 5 9 108
Discrimination in a new model of contests with two-sided asymmetric information 1 1 4 40 2 2 7 31
Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities 0 0 0 6 1 3 5 93
Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities 0 0 0 46 1 3 5 143
Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 30
Double risque moral et délégation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 520
Double risque moral et délégation 0 1 1 6 0 2 3 51
EXTENSIONS OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR ENVIRONMENTS WITH EXTERNALITIES 0 0 1 11 0 3 11 29
Efficient Bidding with Externalities 0 0 1 117 0 0 1 325
Efficient Bidding with Externalitites 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 31
Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 15 0 1 2 49
Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 3 1 3 3 47
Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 22 0 1 2 89
Endogeneizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments 0 0 0 140 0 3 6 495
Endogeneizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments 0 0 0 210 2 3 7 639
Endogeneous Matching in University-Industry Collaboration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK 0 1 1 10 0 1 2 66
Endogeneous matching in university-industry collaboration: Theory and empirical evidence from the UK 0 0 1 37 1 2 8 84
Endogenizing Know-How Flows Through the Nature of R&D Investments 0 0 0 65 2 4 10 296
Endogenizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments 0 0 0 81 0 1 7 359
Endogenous Matching in University-Industry Collaboration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK 0 0 2 77 0 1 3 141
Equilibrium Limited Liability Contracts in a Landlord-Tenant Market 0 0 1 11 0 2 3 109
Evaluation in Research Funding Agencies: Are Structurally Diverse Teams Biased Against? 0 1 1 57 1 3 10 50
Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 19
Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism 0 0 0 60 0 0 0 230
Extensions of the Shapley value for Environments with Externalities 0 0 1 23 1 3 14 35
Firms' Innovation Strategy under the Shadow of Analyst Coverage 0 3 9 43 1 9 34 65
Firms’ Innovation Strategy under the Shadow of Analyst Coverage 1 4 28 63 5 15 52 71
Forming Efficient Networks 0 0 0 101 0 4 4 859
Forming Efficient Networks 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 18
Funding Academic Research: Grant Application, Partnership, Award, and Output 0 1 14 14 3 7 14 14
Funding academic research: grant application, partnership, award, and output 1 1 5 5 3 6 16 16
Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 87
Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a Three-agent Economy 0 0 0 6 2 2 2 53
Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy 0 0 0 106 1 2 4 387
In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach 0 0 0 96 0 0 0 443
Incentives in University Technology Transfers 0 0 0 108 0 1 1 109
Incentives in University Technology Transfers 0 0 0 19 0 2 6 65
Innovation Contests 0 0 0 59 3 5 8 103
Innovation Contests 0 0 0 13 1 2 5 55
Instability in the Labour Market for Researchers 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 175
Investment, Duration, and Exit Strategies for Corporate and Independent Venture Capital-backed Start-ups 0 0 2 64 1 3 8 232
Investment, Duration, and Exit Strategies for Corporate and Independent Venture Capital-backed Start-ups 0 0 1 48 1 5 10 148
Key Success Drivers in Public Research Grants: Funding the Seeds of Radical Innovation in Academia? 0 0 0 5 2 9 25 66
Key success drivers in public research grants: Funding the seeds of radical innovation in academia? 0 1 3 40 2 4 12 51
Licensing of University Inventions: The Role of a Technology Transfer Office 0 0 0 59 0 2 17 224
Moral Hazard with Several Agents: The Gains From Cooperation 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 647
Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions 0 0 1 9 4 7 11 38
Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions 0 4 7 27 4 16 36 83
On Subsidizing R&D 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 174
Optimal Auditing when Some Individuals are Tax-return Exempt 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 462
Optimal Coexistence of Long-Term and Short-Term Contracts in Labor Markets 0 0 0 21 0 1 4 65
Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets 0 0 1 24 1 3 9 229
Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets 0 0 0 40 0 1 3 110
Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firm's Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 27
Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes 0 0 2 157 0 2 5 663
Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms’ Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes 0 0 1 60 1 1 2 284
Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random 0 0 0 28 1 2 5 182
Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random 0 0 0 27 0 1 1 108
Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28
Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random 0 0 0 62 0 0 1 252
POLÍTICAS DE INSPECCIÓN ÓPTIMAS Y CUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL 0 0 0 14 1 4 6 99
Private versus Social Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation 0 0 2 40 0 1 8 31
Private versus Social Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation 0 0 0 2 1 3 9 25
Private versus Social Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation 0 0 1 82 3 5 15 121
Research Output from University-Industry Collaborative Projects 0 0 0 15 1 1 3 90
Research output from university-industry collaborative projects 0 0 0 30 1 3 6 192
Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements 0 1 1 174 0 2 2 482
Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 43
Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting 0 0 0 94 2 4 5 292
Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution 0 0 0 165 1 4 7 1,044
Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution 0 0 0 42 1 3 7 300
Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues 0 0 0 57 3 7 12 132
Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues 0 0 0 23 0 4 8 64
Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities 0 0 0 119 1 2 2 398
Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 37
Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 27
Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms 0 0 0 14 1 2 5 68
Smooth multibidding mechanisms 0 0 0 28 0 0 3 108
Spatial Competition in the Banking System: Localization, Cross Subsidies and the Regulation of Deposit Rates 0 0 0 0 1 4 13 876
TWO FOLK MANIPULABILITY THEOREMS IN THE GENERAL ONE-TO-TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS WITH MONEY 0 0 0 14 0 1 5 62
The Outcome of Competitive Equilibrium Rules In Buyer-seller Markets When the Agents Play Strategically 0 0 1 12 1 1 9 44
The Principal-Agent Matching Market 0 0 1 454 0 1 5 1,251
The Principal-Agent Matching Market 0 0 1 148 3 3 12 542
The Role of Information in Licensing Contract Design 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 731
The principal-agent matching market 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 16
Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money 0 0 0 38 0 0 1 65
VALUES FOR ENVIRONMENTS WITH EXTERNALITIES – THE AVERAGE APPROACH 0 0 0 26 1 3 4 18
Values for Environments with Externalities - The Average Approach 0 0 0 7 1 3 4 22
Values for Environments with Externalities - The Average Approach 0 0 0 26 2 3 7 26
Total Working Papers 4 26 185 5,337 113 352 1,102 27,431

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games 0 0 0 0 1 6 17 672
A Selling Mechanism 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 6
A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure 0 0 0 57 1 2 5 277
An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 122
Auditing cost overrun claims 0 0 0 32 0 0 1 238
Bidding for the Surplus: A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value 0 0 2 81 0 3 15 238
Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments 0 0 0 13 2 3 6 89
Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazard Environment 0 0 3 90 0 1 7 315
Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach 0 0 0 75 0 1 9 267
Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism 0 0 0 25 0 1 1 74
Codes of Best Practice in competitive markets for managers 0 0 0 15 1 1 3 75
Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts 0 0 1 11 0 0 4 52
Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game 0 1 1 1 0 5 8 8
Contrats de licences et asymétrie d'information 0 0 4 8 2 4 9 21
Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games 0 0 1 87 1 1 4 168
DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY 0 0 3 6 0 0 6 17
Designing Contracts for University Spin-offs 0 0 0 66 0 1 2 192
Disclosure of know-how in research joint ventures 0 0 0 47 1 3 5 126
Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities 0 0 0 6 1 6 8 45
Efficient bidding with externalities 0 0 0 17 1 2 4 87
Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information 0 0 0 9 1 1 1 85
Endogenizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments 0 0 2 67 1 5 17 256
Evaluation in research funding agencies: Are structurally diverse teams biased against? 0 1 1 1 3 6 6 6
Firms’ innovation strategy under the shadow of analyst coverage 3 4 15 15 4 13 45 45
Forming efficient networks 0 0 2 11 1 2 6 58
Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations 2 4 5 63 40 108 211 648
Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 181
Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 28
Incentives in university technology transfers 0 0 0 38 1 1 3 118
Instability in the labor market for researchers 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 14
Investment, Duration, and Exit Strategies for Corporate and Independent Venture Capital-Backed Start-Ups 0 0 1 8 2 4 16 49
La structure industrielle dans une course au brevet avec coûts fixes et coûts variables 0 0 0 8 0 0 4 119
Le rôle de la délégation dans une relation d'agence 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 25
Licensing of university inventions: The role of a technology transfer office 0 0 2 130 1 3 22 343
Moral hazard and cooperation 0 0 4 49 0 0 4 114
Moral hazard with several agents: The gains from cooperation 0 0 0 200 1 1 1 348
On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer–seller markets 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 22
Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Income 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 294
Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes 0 0 1 73 0 1 5 221
Optimal inspection policy and income-tax compliance 0 0 0 78 4 4 8 230
Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random 1 1 1 7 1 1 4 48
Optimal tax auditing when some individuals need not file 0 0 0 10 0 1 1 37
Private versus social incentives for pharmaceutical innovation 0 0 0 4 1 5 11 33
Research Output From University–Industry Collaborative Projects 0 0 2 3 0 0 3 20
Sequential Formation of Coalitions Through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 97
Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues 0 0 0 2 1 3 10 37
Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities 0 0 2 53 0 0 4 128
Smooth multibidding mechanisms 0 0 0 9 1 2 3 46
Spatial competition in the banking system: Localization, cross subsidies and the regulation of deposit rates 3 6 11 501 3 6 24 885
Tax Amnesties in a Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion 0 1 3 121 0 1 4 306
The Principal-Agent Matching Market 0 0 2 107 2 2 5 346
The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer–seller markets when the agents play strategically 0 0 1 2 0 2 7 20
The role of information in licensing contract design 0 0 2 200 2 3 11 573
Values for environments with externalities – The average approach 0 0 1 1 0 1 6 6
Total Journal Articles 9 18 74 2,479 82 219 565 8,875

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts 0 0 0 0 8 20 65 1,273
An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts 0 0 0 0 19 38 169 2,023
Total Books 0 0 0 0 27 58 234 3,296

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions 0 1 7 7 5 11 24 24
Total Chapters 0 1 7 7 5 11 24 24

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Statistics updated 2019-10-05