Access Statistics for Bezalel Peleg

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Continuous Double Implementation of the Constrained Walras Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 169
A Formal Approach to Nash´s Program 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 118
A formal approach to Nash's program 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 90
A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games 0 0 0 34 0 0 1 124
A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 31
An axiomatisation of Nash equilibria in economic situations 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 10
Automata, Matching and Foraging Behavior of Bees 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 381
Automata, matching and foraging behavior of bees 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Automata, matching and foraging behavior of bees 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 14
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 23
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 28
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 18
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 18
Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 80
Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games 0 0 0 115 0 1 1 472
Bargaining Sets of Voting Games 0 0 0 103 0 0 1 426
Binary Effectivity Rules 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 447
Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered 0 0 1 3 1 1 3 31
Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 46
Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust 0 0 1 16 0 0 4 174
Complete Characterization of Acceptable Game Forms by Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 84 0 0 1 472
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 90
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 39
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 0 1 42 0 0 1 229
Consistent Voting Systems Revisited: Computation and Axiomatic Characterization 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 41
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters 0 0 0 53 1 1 1 151
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters 0 0 0 73 1 1 1 252
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences 0 0 0 65 0 0 0 175
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 93
Double Implementation of the Lindahl Equilibrium by a Continuous Mechanism 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 477
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 38
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 23
Implementation by Mediated Equilibrium 0 0 0 52 0 0 1 121
Judgements aggregation by a sequential majority procedure 0 0 0 19 0 0 2 23
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games 0 0 0 49 1 1 3 315
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 80
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games 0 0 0 22 0 0 1 130
Mediators Enable Truthful Voting 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 60
Mediators Enable Truthful Voting 0 0 0 38 0 0 1 120
Michael Maschler: In Memoriam 0 0 0 104 0 0 1 320
Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 56
Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models 0 0 0 45 0 0 1 182
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models 0 0 0 125 0 0 2 423
Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 83
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games 0 0 0 43 0 0 2 38
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 34
On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 191
On Ring Formation in Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
On Ring Formation in Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 189
On Ring Formation in Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 163
On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 78 0 0 0 329
On the Impact of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 128
On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 199
On the effect of risk aversion in bimatrix games 0 0 0 29 0 0 2 134
On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 53
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 13
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
Partial Equilibrium in Pure Exchange Economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 40
Partial equilibrium in pure exchange economies 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 42
Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization 0 0 1 226 0 0 2 731
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 49
Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 33
STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 353
Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong Equilibrium 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 35
Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium 0 0 0 17 0 0 2 28
Sequential aggregation judgments: Logical derivation of relevance relation 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 26
Sequential aggregation of judgments 0 0 0 20 0 1 3 48
Single peakedness and coalition proofness 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 54
Stable Voting Procedures for Committees in Economic Environments 0 0 0 53 0 0 1 275
The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 227
The Dutta-Ray Solution on the Class of Convex Games: A Generalization and Monotonicity Properties 0 0 1 130 0 1 2 447
The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 35
The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries 0 0 1 23 0 0 1 85
The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation 0 0 0 13 0 0 3 84
The consistency principle for games in strategic form 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 20
The consistency principle for games in strategic form 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
The consistency principle for games in strategic form 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 53
The dummy paradox of the bargaining set 0 0 0 29 0 0 3 128
The kernel of homogeneous games with steps 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 10
The positive prekernel of a cooperative game 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 43
When will the fittest survive? -An indirect evolutionary analysis- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 108
When will the fittest survive?: an indirect evolutionary analysis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
When will the fittest survive?: an indirect evolutionary analysis 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 28
Total Working Papers 0 0 6 2,224 5 12 81 11,241
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Price Characterization of Efficient Random Variables 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 52
A Weakly Maximal Golden-Rule Program for a Multi-Sector Economy 0 0 0 6 1 1 3 56
A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 27
A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case 0 0 1 31 0 0 2 69
A note on Gale's example 0 1 4 118 0 1 4 274
A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set 0 0 1 508 0 0 4 767
A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 75
A theory of coalition formation in committees 0 0 0 45 0 0 1 131
Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition - proof 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 57
An Axiomatization of Nash Equilibria in Economic Situations 0 0 0 18 0 1 1 62
An Axiomatization of the Walras Correspondence in Infinite Dimensional Spaces 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 128
An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments 0 0 1 73 0 0 5 150
An inductive method for constructing mimmal balanced collections of finite sets 0 0 2 11 0 0 5 39
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 59
Binary effectivity rules 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 40
Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 26
Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 4
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts 0 1 4 1,314 0 2 12 2,501
Consistent Voting Systems 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 182
Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 63
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 57
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 67
Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory 0 0 8 149 0 1 10 336
Correlated equilibria of games with many players 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 135
Co‐evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust 0 0 1 39 0 0 2 162
Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules 0 0 0 32 1 1 1 124
Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 60
Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights 0 0 0 78 0 0 1 397
Efficiency Analysis for Multivariate Distributions 0 1 2 29 0 2 3 86
Efficiency prices in an infinite-dimensional space 0 0 0 15 0 0 2 58
Efficient random variables 0 0 0 13 0 0 4 49
Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 42
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 21
Implementation by mediated equilibrium 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 39
Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 18
Lexicographic composition of simple games 0 0 0 13 0 1 1 94
Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games 0 0 0 28 1 1 2 78
Markets with Countably Many Commodities 0 0 0 38 0 0 2 141
Minimal of consitent solutions for strategic games,in paticular for potential games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 209
Minimality of Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games, in Particular for Potential Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 117
My joint work with Michael Maschler 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 51
Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 78
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models 0 0 0 21 0 1 1 121
Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 1,096
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 25
On Optimal Consumption Plans in a Multi-sector Economy 0 0 1 20 0 0 1 61
On ring formation in auctions 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 103
On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing 0 1 1 122 0 2 6 395
On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 360
On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse: A Correction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 165
On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 52
On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person NTU games 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 31
On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 113
On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 333
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 35
Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization 0 0 0 11 0 1 2 52
Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 156
Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 33
Short-rune stable matchings between bees and flowers 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 48
Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness 0 0 0 68 0 0 0 345
Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments 0 0 0 9 0 1 3 62
THE DUTTA-RAY SOLUTION ON THE CLASS OF CONVEX GAMES: A GENERALIZATION AND MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 11
THE POSITIVE PREKERNEL OF A COOPERATIVE GAME 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 9
The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 222
The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 316
The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 60
The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games 0 0 0 72 0 0 0 169
The modified golden rule of a multi-sector economy 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 135
Utility Functions for Partially Ordered Topological Spaces 0 1 1 88 0 1 3 236
Utility functions of money for clear games 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 234
original papers: Constitutional implementation 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 170
Total Journal Articles 0 5 28 3,585 7 25 111 12,333
5 registered items for which data could not be found

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 492
Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 79
Strategic Social Choice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Total Books 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 584

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Optimal Development in a Multi-sector Nonconvex Economy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
A Solution to the Problem of Mass Elections 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Acceptable representations 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 18
Axiomatizations of the core 0 0 0 81 0 0 1 301
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6
Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 13
Discussion of Dutta’s Paper 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Feasible elimination procedures 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees 0 0 0 219 0 0 2 695
Introduction to Part I 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4
Introduction to Part II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Nash consistent representation through lottery models 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Nash consistent representations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
On Perfectly Coalition-proof Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
On the continuity of representations of constitutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Strongly consistent representations 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Total Chapters 0 0 0 300 0 0 22 1,067

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Statistics updated 2025-07-04