Access Statistics for Bezalel Peleg

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Continuous Double Implementation of the Constrained Walras Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 172
A Formal Approach to Nash´s Program 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 119
A formal approach to Nash's program 0 0 0 10 1 3 4 93
A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games 0 0 0 34 1 2 2 126
A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 33
An axiomatisation of Nash equilibria in economic situations 0 0 0 14 0 1 1 11
Automata, Matching and Foraging Behavior of Bees 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 385
Automata, matching and foraging behavior of bees 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Automata, matching and foraging behavior of bees 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 14
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 7
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 31
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 25
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 21
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 5
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 19
Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games 0 0 1 116 2 4 8 479
Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games 0 0 1 45 0 1 3 83
Bargaining Sets of Voting Games 0 0 1 104 1 2 4 429
Binary Effectivity Rules 0 0 0 45 0 2 3 450
Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered 0 0 0 3 1 2 3 33
Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered 0 0 0 17 1 1 2 47
Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust 0 0 1 16 1 4 8 178
Complete Characterization of Acceptable Game Forms by Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 84 2 2 3 475
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 0 0 2 2 6 6 45
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 0 0 42 2 5 7 236
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 0 0 14 1 1 2 92
Consistent Voting Systems Revisited: Computation and Axiomatic Characterization 0 0 0 16 1 1 1 42
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters 0 0 0 53 0 1 2 152
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters 0 0 0 73 1 1 3 254
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 93
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences 0 0 0 65 1 4 4 179
Double Implementation of the Lindahl Equilibrium by a Continuous Mechanism 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 479
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization 0 0 0 28 3 4 5 42
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization 0 0 0 4 3 5 6 28
Implementation by Mediated Equilibrium 0 0 0 52 1 2 2 123
Judgements aggregation by a sequential majority procedure 0 0 0 19 2 3 3 26
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games 0 0 0 49 1 2 5 317
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games 0 0 0 22 2 3 3 133
Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games 0 0 0 19 1 6 6 86
Mediators Enable Truthful Voting 0 0 0 38 2 6 7 126
Mediators Enable Truthful Voting 0 0 0 6 2 3 3 63
Michael Maschler: In Memoriam 0 0 1 105 1 4 6 325
Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 56
Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models 0 0 0 45 4 5 7 188
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models 0 0 0 125 0 1 1 424
Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions 0 0 0 1 1 2 7 86
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games 0 0 0 43 1 2 4 40
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games 0 0 0 39 0 0 3 37
On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 1 1 29 1 5 6 197
On Ring Formation in Auctions 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 192
On Ring Formation in Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 24
On Ring Formation in Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 78 0 1 1 330
On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions 0 0 0 31 0 2 2 165
On the Impact of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 0 0 0 24 1 5 6 134
On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set 0 0 0 34 1 2 4 203
On the effect of risk aversion in bimatrix games 0 0 0 29 0 1 2 135
On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives 0 0 0 15 2 2 3 55
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 16
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 51
Partial Equilibrium in Pure Exchange Economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 40
Partial equilibrium in pure exchange economies 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 44
Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization 0 0 0 226 4 5 6 736
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 50
Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey 0 0 0 28 0 0 2 35
STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES 0 0 0 0 8 13 13 366
Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong Equilibrium 0 0 0 21 2 2 2 37
Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium 0 0 0 17 1 2 2 30
Sequential aggregation judgments: Logical derivation of relevance relation 0 0 0 12 1 2 2 28
Sequential aggregation of judgments 0 0 0 20 1 3 4 51
Single peakedness and coalition proofness 0 0 0 2 2 4 6 59
Stable Voting Procedures for Committees in Economic Environments 0 0 0 53 1 3 4 278
The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 229
The Dutta-Ray Solution on the Class of Convex Games: A Generalization and Monotonicity Properties 0 0 0 130 2 5 7 453
The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 36
The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries 0 1 1 24 1 3 4 89
The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation 0 0 0 13 1 1 4 86
The consistency principle for games in strategic form 0 0 0 2 38 38 38 58
The consistency principle for games in strategic form 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 10
The consistency principle for games in strategic form 0 0 0 3 2 5 5 58
The dummy paradox of the bargaining set 0 0 0 29 0 0 4 130
The kernel of homogeneous games with steps 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 6
The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 12
The positive prekernel of a cooperative game 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 44
When will the fittest survive? -An indirect evolutionary analysis- 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 110
When will the fittest survive?: an indirect evolutionary analysis 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 30
When will the fittest survive?: an indirect evolutionary analysis 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 6
Total Working Papers 0 2 7 2,230 130 241 330 11,524
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Price Characterization of Efficient Random Variables 0 1 1 11 0 1 2 54
A Weakly Maximal Golden-Rule Program for a Multi-Sector Economy 0 0 0 6 1 3 7 60
A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium 0 0 0 5 0 2 4 30
A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case 0 0 0 31 3 4 6 75
A note on Gale's example 1 1 2 119 4 5 8 281
A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set 0 0 0 508 0 2 5 771
A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution 0 0 0 27 2 2 5 80
A theory of coalition formation in committees 0 0 2 47 0 0 3 134
Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition - proof 0 0 0 10 0 2 3 60
An Axiomatization of Nash Equilibria in Economic Situations 0 0 1 19 0 2 6 67
An Axiomatization of the Walras Correspondence in Infinite Dimensional Spaces 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 130
An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments 0 1 1 74 1 4 7 154
An inductive method for constructing mimmal balanced collections of finite sets 1 1 2 12 2 6 10 47
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies 0 0 0 13 2 3 5 64
Binary effectivity rules 0 0 1 9 0 1 4 44
Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered 0 0 0 4 1 1 4 29
Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust 0 0 0 2 2 3 4 8
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts 0 0 1 1,314 4 8 11 2,509
Consistent Voting Systems 0 0 0 47 2 4 4 186
Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 64
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters 0 0 0 15 2 4 4 61
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences 0 0 0 4 2 3 5 72
Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory 0 0 5 149 1 1 8 338
Correlated equilibria of games with many players 0 0 1 38 1 2 3 138
Co‐evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust 0 0 1 39 1 3 5 165
Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules 0 0 0 32 2 3 5 128
Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism 0 0 0 12 0 3 4 63
Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights 0 0 0 78 1 1 1 398
Efficiency Analysis for Multivariate Distributions 0 0 1 29 2 4 7 91
Efficiency prices in an infinite-dimensional space 0 0 0 15 0 1 3 60
Efficient random variables 0 0 0 13 1 1 4 50
Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury 0 0 0 15 0 1 2 43
Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization 0 0 0 2 1 2 3 23
Implementation by mediated equilibrium 0 0 0 11 0 1 2 41
Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure 0 0 0 1 0 4 6 23
Lexicographic composition of simple games 0 0 0 13 0 0 4 97
Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games 0 0 0 28 2 3 5 81
Markets with Countably Many Commodities 0 0 0 38 2 3 5 144
Minimal of consitent solutions for strategic games,in paticular for potential games 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 213
Minimality of Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games, in Particular for Potential Games 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 119
My joint work with Michael Maschler 0 0 0 6 1 1 3 52
Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox 0 0 0 16 2 4 5 83
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models 0 0 0 21 0 1 3 123
Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions 0 0 0 26 1 3 3 1,099
On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 26
On Optimal Consumption Plans in a Multi-sector Economy 0 0 0 20 1 3 3 64
On ring formation in auctions 0 0 0 35 1 3 3 106
On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing 0 0 1 122 0 5 9 400
On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse 0 0 0 1 3 5 7 367
On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse: A Correction 0 0 0 0 3 5 6 171
On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 52
On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person NTU games 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 33
On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set 0 0 0 13 0 0 2 115
On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game 0 0 0 39 1 2 2 335
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information 0 0 0 5 1 3 4 39
Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization 0 0 0 11 1 2 4 55
Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization 0 0 0 48 0 1 2 158
Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey 0 0 0 6 0 3 4 37
Short-rune stable matchings between bees and flowers 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 49
Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness 0 0 0 68 0 1 1 346
Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments 0 0 0 9 2 2 8 67
THE DUTTA-RAY SOLUTION ON THE CLASS OF CONVEX GAMES: A GENERALIZATION AND MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 13
THE POSITIVE PREKERNEL OF A COOPERATIVE GAME 0 0 0 0 5 7 9 16
The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms 0 0 0 0 3 5 10 230
The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 316
The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation 0 0 0 10 1 1 5 64
The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games 0 0 0 72 1 1 1 170
The modified golden rule of a multi-sector economy 0 0 0 40 1 3 3 138
Utility Functions for Partially Ordered Topological Spaces 0 0 1 88 0 2 5 239
Utility functions of money for clear games 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5
When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis 0 0 0 59 1 2 4 238
original papers: Constitutional implementation 0 0 0 32 0 1 1 171
Total Journal Articles 2 4 21 3,594 80 173 301 12,572
5 registered items for which data could not be found

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 495
Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games 0 0 0 0 1 4 11 86
Strategic Social Choice 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 15
Total Books 0 0 0 0 4 9 18 596

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Optimal Development in a Multi-sector Nonconvex Economy 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2
A Solution to the Problem of Mass Elections 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 4
Acceptable representations 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 19
Axiomatizations of the core 0 1 1 82 1 3 3 304
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 8
Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 15
Discussion of Dutta’s Paper 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 13
Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Feasible elimination procedures 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 5
Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees 0 0 1 220 1 6 10 704
Introduction to Part I 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5
Introduction to Part II 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 11
Nash consistent representation through lottery models 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Nash consistent representations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
On Perfectly Coalition-proof Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 7
On the continuity of representations of constitutions 0 0 0 0 3 5 6 7
Strongly consistent representations 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
The Kernel of Homogeneous Games with Steps 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Chapters 0 1 2 302 10 35 55 1,111

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09