| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Naïve Approach to Bidding |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
72 |
| A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions |
0 |
0 |
3 |
25 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
64 |
| An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for the British 3G / UMTS Auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
249 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1,029 |
| An evolutionary analysis of bidding behaviour in fair division games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
27 |
| An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
60 |
| Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions |
1 |
1 |
1 |
73 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
155 |
| Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
252 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,050 |
| Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: An indirect evolutionary analysis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
67 |
| Bidding at Sequential First-Price Auctions with(out) Supply Uncertainty: A Laboratory Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
166 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
624 |
| Bidding at Sequential First-Price Auctions with(out) Supply Uncertainty: a Laboratory Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
55 |
| Competition with Forward Contracts: A Laboratory Analysis Motivated by Electricity Market Design |
0 |
0 |
2 |
422 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1,357 |
| Competition with Forward Contracts: A Laboratory Analysis Motivated by Electricity Market Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
279 |
| Competitions with Forward Contracts: A Laboratory Analysis Motivated by Electricity Market Design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
78 |
| Counter Intuitive Learning: An Exploratory Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
48 |
| Counter Intuitive Learning: An Exploratory Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
74 |
| Counter intuitive learning: An exploratory study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
34 |
| Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
| Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
| Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
66 |
| Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
154 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
690 |
| Exploration vs Exploitation, Impulse Balance Equilibrium and a specification test for the El Farol bar problem |
0 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
87 |
| Exploration vs exploitation, impulse balance equilibrium, and a specification test for the El Farol bar problem |
0 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
48 |
| Loss aversion and learning to bid |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
370 |
| Loss aversion and learning to bid |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
46 |
| More Money vs More Certainty? Behaviour in Stochastic Alternating-Offer Experiments |
0 |
0 |
9 |
122 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
158 |
| Observational and Reinforcement Pattern-learning: An Exploratory Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
114 |
| Observational and reinforcement pattern-learning: An exploratory study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
28 |
| On the Impact of Low-Balling: Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
951 |
| Organisational structure, communication and group ethics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
495 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
3,401 |
| Organisational structure, communication and group ethics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
121 |
| Sequential Auctions with Supply Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
545 |
| Structural Analysis of First-Price Auction Data: Insights from the Laboratory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
45 |
| Structural Analysis of First-Price Auction Data: Insights from the Laboratory |
1 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
69 |
| Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
235 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,118 |
| The Spanish Auction for Government Securities: A Laboratory Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
430 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
4 |
29 |
2,765 |
14 |
31 |
196 |
13,398 |
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