| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
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3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Anticipating the Financial Crisis: Evidence from Insider Trading in Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
| Anticipating the Financial Crisis: Evidence from Insider Trading in Banks |
0 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
96 |
| Anticipating the Financial Crisis: Evidence from Insider Trading in Banks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
111 |
| Anticipating the financial crisis: Evidence from insider trading in banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
209 |
| Bank risk-taking, securitization, supervision and low interest rates: Evidence from the euro area and the U.S. lending standards |
2 |
2 |
3 |
287 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
786 |
| Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking: Big Data Evidence from 15 Credit Registers |
0 |
1 |
2 |
69 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
140 |
| Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking: Big Data Evidence from 15 Credit Registers |
0 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
104 |
| Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking: Big Data Evidence from 15 Credit Registers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
54 |
| Banking supervision, monetary policy and risk-taking: Big data evidence from 15 credit registers |
0 |
0 |
2 |
53 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
113 |
| Banking supervision, monetary policy and risk-taking: big data evidence from 15 credit registers |
1 |
1 |
1 |
94 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
153 |
| Banks’ Equity Stakes in Firms: A Blessing or Curse in Credit Markets? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Banks’ Equity Stakes in Firms: A Blessing or Curse in Credit Markets? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
| Banks’ equity stakes in firms: A blessing or curse in credit markets? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
28 |
| Borrower versus Ban Channels in Lending: Experimental- and Administrative-Based Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
| Borrower versus bank channels in lending: Experimental- and administrative-based evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
| Burning Money? Government Lending in a Credit Crunch |
0 |
1 |
2 |
71 |
2 |
6 |
12 |
291 |
| Burning Money? Government Lending in a Credit Crunch |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
74 |
| Burning Money? Government Lending in a Credit Crunch |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
| Burning Money? Government Lending in a Credit Crunch |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
98 |
| Burning money? Government lending in a credit crunch |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
169 |
| Capital Controls, Corporate Debt and Real Effects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
23 |
| Capital Controls, Corporate Debt and Real Effects: Evidence from Boom and Crisis Times |
1 |
2 |
5 |
33 |
2 |
6 |
21 |
64 |
| Capital Controls, Domestic Macroprudential Policy and the Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
4 |
107 |
2 |
3 |
22 |
274 |
| Capital Controls, Domestic Macroprudential Policy and the Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
35 |
| Capital Controls, Domestic Macroprudential Policy and the Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
26 |
| Capital Flows and the International Credit Channel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
130 |
| Capital Flows and the International Credit Channel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
199 |
| Capital controls, corporate debt and real effects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
34 |
| Capital controls, domestic macroprudential policy and the bank lending channel of monetary policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
32 |
| Capital flows and the international credit channel |
0 |
1 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
101 |
| Carbon Emissions and the Bank-Lending Channel |
0 |
1 |
8 |
30 |
1 |
4 |
48 |
112 |
| Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions |
0 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
87 |
| Combating corruption in international business transactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
239 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,108 |
| Countercyclical Liquidity Policy and Credit Cycles: Evidence from Macroprudential and Monetary Policy in Brazil |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
| Countercyclical Liquidity Policy and Credit Cycles: Evidence from Macroprudential and Monetary Policy in Brazil |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
| Countercyclical Liquidity Policy and Credit Cycles: evidence from macroprudential and monetary policy in Brazil |
0 |
0 |
3 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
56 |
| Countercyclical liquidity policy and credit cycles: Evidence from macroprudential and monetary policy in Brazil |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
36 |
| Countercyclical liquidity policy and credit cycles: Evidence from macroprudential and monetary policy in Brazil |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
38 |
| Credit Demand versus Supply Channels: Experimental- and Administrative-Based Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
39 |
| Credit Supply versus Demand: Bank and Firm Balance-Sheet Channels in Good and Crisis Times |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
| Credit Supply versus Demand: Bank and Firm Balance-Sheet Channels in Good and Crisis Times |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Credit Supply versus Demand: Bank and Firm Balance-Sheet Channels in Good and Crisis Times |
0 |
0 |
0 |
128 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
404 |
| Credit Supply: Identifying Balance-Sheet Channels with Loan Applications and Granted Loans |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
190 |
| Credit demand versus supply channels: Experimental- and administrative-based evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
| Credit demand versus supply channels: Experimental- and administrative-based evidence |
0 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
| Credit demand vs. supply channels: Experimental- and administrative-based evidence |
0 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
49 |
| Credit demand vs. supply channels: Experimental- and administrative-based evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
27 |
| Credit supply - Identifying balance-sheet channels with loan applications and granted loans |
0 |
0 |
3 |
141 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
462 |
| Credit supply and monetary policy: Identifying the bank balance-sheet channel with loan applications |
5 |
7 |
19 |
40 |
5 |
12 |
36 |
153 |
| Credit supply: identifying balance-sheet channels with loan applications and granted loans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
162 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
498 |
| Cross-Border Liquidity, Relationships and Monetary Policy: Evidence from the Euro Area Interbank Crisis |
0 |
0 |
2 |
97 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
213 |
| Cross-border liquidity, relationships and monetary policy: Evidence from the Euro area interbank crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
6 |
7 |
21 |
464 |
| Do Demand or Supply Factors Drive Bank Credit, in Good and Crisis Times? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
161 |
| Do Demand or Supply Factors Drive Bank Credit, in Good and Crisis Times? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
| Do demand or supply factors drive bank credit,in good and crisis times? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
133 |
| Double Bank Runs and Liquidity Risk Management |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
126 |
| Double Bank Runs and Liquidity Risk Management |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
179 |
| Double bank runs and liquidity risk management |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
134 |
| Double bank runs and liquidity risk management |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
19 |
| Evidence on the impact of monetary policy on bank credit risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
73 |
| Expansionary Austerity: Reallocating Credit Amid Fiscal Consolidation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
78 |
| Expansionary Austerity: Reallocating Credit Amid Fiscal Consolidation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
23 |
| Expansionary Austerity: Reallocating Credit Amid Fiscal Consolidation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
| Expansionary Yet Different: Credit Supply and Real Effects of Negative Interest Rate Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
68 |
| Expansionary Yet Different: Credit Supply and Real Effects of Negative Interest Rate Policy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
59 |
| Expansionary Yet Different: Credit Supply and Real Effects of Negative Interest Rate Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
110 |
| Expansionary yet different: credit supply and real effects of negative interest rate policy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
69 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
184 |
| Financial Development and Monetary Policy: Loan Applications, Rates, and Real Effects |
0 |
0 |
1 |
112 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
234 |
| Financial Integration and Business Cycle Synchronization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
192 |
1 |
7 |
18 |
624 |
| Financial Regulation, Financial Globalization and the Synchronization of Economic Activity |
0 |
1 |
1 |
191 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
614 |
| Financial Regulation, Integration and Synchronization of Economic Activity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
174 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
496 |
| Financial crises and political radicalization: How failing banks paved Hitler's path to power |
0 |
0 |
4 |
156 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
308 |
| Financial crises and political radicalization: How failing banks paved Hitler's path to power |
2 |
2 |
4 |
80 |
3 |
3 |
35 |
231 |
| Financial regulation, financial globalization and the synchronization of economic activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
246 |
| Forward Looking Loan Provisions: Credit Supply and Risk-Taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
| Forward Looking Loan Provisions: Credit Supply and Risk-Taking |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
| Forward Looking Loan Provisions: Credit Supply and Risk-Taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
37 |
| Forward Looking Loan Provisions: Credit Supply and Risk-Taking |
0 |
3 |
10 |
109 |
0 |
6 |
15 |
190 |
| Forward Looking Loan Provisions: Credit Supply and Risk-taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
52 |
| Forward looking loan provisions: Credit supply and risk-taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
| Forward looking loan provisions: Credit supply and risk-taking |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
| Forward looking loan provisions: Credit supply and risk-taking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
43 |
| From Finance to Fascism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
54 |
| From Finance to Fascism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
52 |
| From Finance to Fascism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
175 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
463 |
| From finance to fascism |
0 |
0 |
3 |
129 |
4 |
4 |
12 |
209 |
| From finance to fascism: The real effect of Germany's 1931 banking crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
5 |
13 |
48 |
196 |
| Global Financial Cycle, Household Credit, and Macroprudential Policies |
0 |
0 |
6 |
84 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
214 |
| Global Liquidity and Impairment of Local Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
73 |
| Global Liquidity and Impairment of Local Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
| Global Liquidity and Impairment of Local Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
39 |
| Global Liquidity and the Impairment of Local Monetary Policy Transmission |
0 |
2 |
10 |
130 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
299 |
| Global financial cycle, household credit, and macroprudential policies |
1 |
1 |
5 |
49 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
105 |
| Global liquidity and impairment of local monetary policy |
0 |
0 |
2 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
85 |
| Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
290 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
918 |
| Hazardous times for monetary policy: What do twenty-three million bank loans say about the effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking? |
1 |
1 |
5 |
851 |
5 |
11 |
38 |
2,529 |
| Hazardous times for monetary policy: what do twenty-three million bank loans say about the effects on credit risk-taking? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
| Hedger of Last Resort: Evidence from Brazil on FX Interventions, Local Credit and Global Financial Cycles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
37 |
| Hedger of Last Resort: Evidence from Brazilian FX Interventions, Local Credit and Global Financial Cycles |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
169 |
| Hedger of Last Resort: Evidence from Brazilian FX Interventions, Local Credit and Global Financial Cycles |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
53 |
| Hedger of Last Resort: Evidence from Brazilian FX Interventions, Local Credit, and Global Financial Cycles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
59 |
| Hedger of Last Resort: evidence from Brazilian FX interventions, local credit, and global financial cycles |
1 |
2 |
2 |
28 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
96 |
| Hedger of last resort: Evidence from Brazilian FX interventions, local credit, and global financial cycles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
69 |
| Hedger of last resort: evidence from Brazilian FX interventions, local credit, and global financial cycles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
31 |
| Heterogeneous transmission mechanism: monetary policy and financial fragility in the euro area |
2 |
2 |
6 |
196 |
2 |
4 |
16 |
428 |
| Household Credit, Global Financial Cycle, and Macroprudential Policies: Credit Register Evidence from an Emerging Country |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
43 |
| Household Credit, Global Financial Cycle, and Macroprudential Policies: Credit Register Evidence from an Emerging Country |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
131 |
| Household Leverage and Mental Health Fragility |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
18 |
| Interbank Liquidity Crunch and the Firm Credit Crunch: Evidence from the 2007-2009 Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
261 |
| Interbank contagion at work: evidence from a natural experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
512 |
| Interbank liquidity crunch and the firm credit crunch: Evidence from the 2007-2009 crisis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
197 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
535 |
| International Financial Integration, Crises and Monetary Policy: Cross-Border Interbank Lending During the Euro Crises |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
126 |
| International financial integration, crises and monetary policy: evidence from the Euro area interbank crises |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
50 |
| International financial integration, crises and monetary policy: evidence from the Euro area interbank crises |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
143 |
| International financial integration, crises, and monetary policy: evidence from the euro area interbank crises |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
92 |
| Local Versus Aggregate Lending Channels: The Effects Of Securitization On Corporate Credit Supply In Spain |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
223 |
| Local versus aggregate lending channels: the effects of securitization on corporate credit supply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
283 |
| Local versus aggregate lending channels: the effects of securitization on corporate credit supply in Spain |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
73 |
| Loose monetary policy and excessive credit and liquidity risk-taking by banks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
63 |
| Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
| Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments |
1 |
1 |
1 |
38 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
167 |
| Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments |
0 |
0 |
4 |
177 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
442 |
| Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Macroprudential Policy, Mortgage Cycles and Distributional Effects: Evidence from the UK |
0 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
38 |
| Macroprudential Policy, Mortgage Cycles and Distributional Effects: Evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| Macroprudential Policy, Mortgage Cycles and Distributional Effects: Evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
77 |
| Macroprudential and Monetary Policy: Loan-Level Evidence from Reserve Requirements |
0 |
0 |
2 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
86 |
| Macroprudential and Monetary Policy: Loan-Level Evidence from Reserve Requirements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
| Macroprudential and monetary policy: Loan-level evidence from reserve requirements |
0 |
0 |
1 |
96 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
276 |
| Macroprudential and monetary policy: loan-level evidence from reserve requirements |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
23 |
| Macroprudential policy and credit supply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
| Macroprudential policy, countercyclical bank capital buffers and credit supply: Evidence from the Spanish dynamic provisioning experiments |
1 |
1 |
9 |
450 |
2 |
5 |
25 |
1,442 |
| Macroprudential policy, countercyclical bank capital buffers and credit supply: Evidence from the Spanish dynamic provisioning experiments |
0 |
1 |
4 |
79 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
305 |
| Macroprudential policy, mortgage cycles and distributional effects: Evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
60 |
| Macroprudential policy, mortgage cycles and distributional effects: Evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
3 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
100 |
| Media Capture by Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
| Media Capture by Banks |
1 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
80 |
| Media capture by banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
| Monetary Conditions and Banks' Behaviour in the Czech Republic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
209 |
| Monetary Policy and Bank Profitability in a Low Interest Rate Environment |
0 |
0 |
5 |
167 |
0 |
3 |
34 |
663 |
| Monetary Policy and Bank Profitability in a Low Interest Rate Environment |
0 |
1 |
1 |
46 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
202 |
| Monetary Policy and Inequality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
72 |
| Monetary Policy and Inequality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
50 |
| Monetary Policy and Inequality |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
81 |
| Monetary Policy and Inequality |
1 |
2 |
5 |
36 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
57 |
| Monetary Policy at Work: Security and Credit Application Registers Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
67 |
| Monetary Policy at Work: Security and Credit Application Registers Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
144 |
| Monetary Policy in a Developing Country: Loan Applications and Real Effects |
0 |
0 |
2 |
93 |
3 |
3 |
23 |
266 |
| Monetary Policy in a Developing Country: Loan Applications and Real Effects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
104 |
| Monetary Policy in a Developing Country: Loan applications and Real effects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
| Monetary Policy, Inflation, and Crises: New Evidence from History and Administrative Data |
1 |
3 |
11 |
75 |
2 |
8 |
31 |
78 |
| Monetary Policy, Labor Income Redistribution and the Credit Channel: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee and Credit Registe |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
25 |
| Monetary Policy, Labor Income Redistribution and the Credit Channel: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee and Credit Registers |
0 |
1 |
6 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
33 |
| Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking, and Pricing: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
| Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking, and Pricing: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment |
0 |
1 |
1 |
89 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
331 |
| Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Complementarities: Evidence from European Credit Registers |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
44 |
| Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Complementarities: Evidence from European Credit Registers |
0 |
1 |
2 |
35 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
65 |
| Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Complementarities: evidence from European credit registers |
0 |
2 |
7 |
58 |
0 |
7 |
21 |
167 |
| Monetary and macroprudential policy complementarities: Evidence from European credit registers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
62 |
| Monetary and macroprudential policy complementarities: evidence from European credit registers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
5 |
5 |
18 |
178 |
| Monetary conditions and banks' behaviour in the Czech Republic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
| Monetary policy and bank lending in developing countries: loan applications, rates, and real effects |
0 |
0 |
2 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
45 |
| Monetary policy and bank profitability in a low interest rate environment |
0 |
1 |
8 |
176 |
2 |
5 |
29 |
548 |
| Monetary policy and bank profitability in a low interest rate environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
173 |
| Monetary policy and inequality |
0 |
0 |
12 |
207 |
3 |
7 |
36 |
578 |
| Monetary policy at work: Security and credit application registers evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
127 |
| Monetary policy at work: Security and credit application registers evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
188 |
| Monetary policy, inflation, and crises: New evidence from history and administrative data |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
17 |
| Monetary policy, inflation, and crises: New evidence from history and administrative data |
0 |
0 |
4 |
24 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
29 |
| Monetary policy, labor income redistribution and the credit channel: Evidence from matched employer-employee and credit registers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
25 |
| Monetary policy, macroprudential policy and banking stability: evidence from the euro area |
0 |
1 |
3 |
159 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
319 |
| Monetary policy, risk-taking and pricing: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
90 |
| Negative Monetary Policy Rates and Portfolio Rebalancing: Evidence from Credit Register Data |
0 |
0 |
2 |
87 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
273 |
| Negative Monetary Policy Rates and Systemic Banks’ Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Euro Area Securities Register |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
73 |
| Negative Monetary Policy Rates and Systemic Banks’ Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Euro Area Securities Register |
0 |
0 |
1 |
104 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
275 |
| Negative Monetary Policy Rates and Systemic Banks’ Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Euro Area Securities Register |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
50 |
| Negative monetary policy rates and systemic banks' risk-taking: Evidence from the euro area securities register |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
64 |
| Negative monetary policy rates and systemic banks’ risk-taking: Evidence from the Euro area securities register |
1 |
1 |
1 |
48 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
109 |
| Negative monetary policy rates and systemic banks’ risk-taking: evidence from the euro area securities register |
1 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
108 |
| Nonbank Lenders as Global Shock Absorbers: Evidence from US Monetary Policy Spillovers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
12 |
| Nonbank lenders as global shock absorbers: evidence from US monetary policy spillovers |
0 |
0 |
3 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
38 |
| Nonbanks, Banks, and Monetary Policy: U.S. Loan-Level Evidence since the 1990s |
0 |
1 |
1 |
50 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
98 |
| Nonbanks, Banks, and Monetary Policy: U.S. Loan-Level Evidence since the 1990s |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
23 |
| Nonbanks, Banks, and Monetary Policy: U.S. Loan-Level Evidence since the 1990s |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
| Nonbanks, Banks, and Monetary Policy: U.S. Loan-Level Evidence since the 1990s |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
44 |
| Nonbanks, banks, and monetary policy: U.S. loan-level evidence since the 1990s |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
59 |
| Political Connections: Evidence From Insider Trading Around TARP |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
94 |
| Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
124 |
| Production and Financial Networks in Interplay: Crisis Evidence from Supplier-Customer and Credit Registers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
10 |
| Production and Financial Networks in Interplay: Crisis Evidence from Supplier-Customer and Credit Registers |
1 |
2 |
3 |
39 |
1 |
6 |
17 |
127 |
| Production and financial networks in interplay: Crisis evidence from supplier-customer and credit registers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
| Production and financial networks in interplay: Crisis evidence from supplier-customer and credit registers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
94 |
| Production and financial networks in interplay: Crisis evidence from supplier-customer and credit registers |
1 |
1 |
3 |
58 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
116 |
| Public Guarantees and Private Banks’ Incentives: Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis |
0 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
1 |
8 |
109 |
128 |
| Public Guarantees, Relationship Lending and Bank Credit: Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis |
0 |
1 |
5 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
55 |
| Public guarantees, private banks’ incentives, and corporate outcomes: evidence from the COVID-19 crisis |
1 |
3 |
30 |
30 |
4 |
10 |
70 |
70 |
| Quantitative Easing, Investment, and Safe Assets: The Corporate-Bond Lending Channel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
42 |
| Quantitative Easing, Investment, and Safe Assets: The Corporate-Bond Lending Channel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
44 |
| Quantitative easing, investment, and safe assets: the corporate-bond lending channel |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
123 |
| Risk Mitigating versus Risk Shifting: Evidence from Banks Security Trading in Crises |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
23 |
| Risk Mitigating versus Risk Shifting: Evidence from Banks Security Trading in Crises |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
24 |
| Risk mitigating versus risk shifting: Evidence from banks security trading in crises |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
58 |
| Risk mitigating versus risk shifting: evidence from banks security trading in crises |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
45 |
| Screening and Loan Origination Time: Lending Standards, Loan Defaults and Bank Failures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
22 |
| Screening and Loan Origination Time: Lending Standards, Loan Defaults and Bank Failures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
27 |
| Screening and loan origination time: Lending standards, loan defaults and bank failures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
30 |
| Screening and loan origination time: lending standards, loan defaults and bank failures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
59 |
| Screening and loan origination time: lending standards, loan defaults and bank failures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
92 |
| Securities Trading by Banks and Credit Supply: Micro-Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
129 |
| Securities Trading by Banks and Credit Supply: Micro-Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
111 |
| Securities trading by banks and credit supply: Micro-evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
110 |
| Securities trading by banks and credit supply: Micro-evidence from the crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
| Securities trading by banks and credit supply: Micro-evidence from the crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
40 |
| Securities trading by banks and credit supply: Micro-evidence from the crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
62 |
| Shocks Abroad, Pain at Home? Bank-firm Level Evidence on the International Transmission of Financial Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
| Shocks Abroad, Pain at Home? Bank-firm Level Evidence on the International Transmission of Financial Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
| Shocks Abroad, Pain at Home? Bank-firm Level Evidence on the International Transmission of Financial Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
| Shocks abroad, pain at home? Bank-firm level evidence on the international transmission of financial shocks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
39 |
| Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Exercise |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
| Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Review |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
| Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Review |
0 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
30 |
| Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Review |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
| Stressed banks? Evidence from the largest-ever supervisory review |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
112 |
| Stressed banks? Evidence from the largest-ever supervisory review |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
73 |
| Supranational policies to overcome the crisis / Políticas supranacionales para superar la crisis / Polítiques supranacionals per superar la crisi |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
| Systemic Risk and Monetary Policy: The Haircut Gap Channel of the Lender of Last Resort |
0 |
1 |
9 |
21 |
2 |
6 |
34 |
78 |
| Take It to the Limit? The Effects of Household Leverage Caps |
0 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
| Take It to the Limit? The Effects of Household Leverage Caps |
0 |
0 |
5 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
171 |
| Take It to the limit? The effects of household leverage caps |
0 |
1 |
3 |
34 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
92 |
| Take it to the Limit? The Effects of Household Leverage Caps |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
79 |
| The Impact of REACTIVA on the Real Economy and on Bank Risk-Taking |
0 |
2 |
10 |
22 |
1 |
5 |
31 |
59 |
| The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply, Reach-for-Yield, and Real Effects |
0 |
0 |
1 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
114 |
| The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply, Reach-for-Yield, and Real Effects |
0 |
0 |
1 |
128 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
315 |
| The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply, Reach-for-Yield, and Real Effects |
0 |
0 |
1 |
136 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
296 |
| The Real Effects of the Bank Lending Channel |
1 |
2 |
3 |
67 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
170 |
| The Real Estate and Credit Bubble: Evidence from Spain |
0 |
0 |
1 |
55 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
134 |
| The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
192 |
| The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
120 |
| The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
334 |
| The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
| The Role of Collateral in Borrowing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
59 |
| The euro area Bank Lending Survey matters: empirical evidence for credit and output growth |
1 |
1 |
9 |
279 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
807 |
| The international bank lending channel of monetary policy rates and QE: Credit supply, reach-for-yield, and real effects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
61 |
| The international bank lending channel of monetary policy rates and QE: Credit supply, reach-for-yield, and real effects |
0 |
1 |
2 |
42 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
85 |
| The international bank lending channel of monetary policy rates and quantitative easing: credit supply, reach-for-yield, and real effects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
162 |
| The real effects of the bank lending channel |
0 |
0 |
2 |
42 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
156 |
| The real estate and credit bubble: Evidence from Spain |
0 |
0 |
1 |
88 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
257 |
| The rise of shadow banking: evidence from capital regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
117 |
| Trusting the bankers: A new look at the credit channel of monetary policy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
42 |
| Trusting the bankers: a new look at the credit channel of monetary policy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
289 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
764 |
| What Lies Beneath the Euro's Effect on Financial Integration: Currency Risk, Legal Harmonization, or Trade? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
388 |
| What Lies Beneath the Euro's Effect on Financial Integration? Currency Risk, Legal Harmonization, or Trade? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
204 |
| What lies beneath the euro's effect on financial integration? Currency risk, legal harmonization, or trade? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
69 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
243 |
| Who Truly Bears (Bank) Taxes? Evidence from Only Shifting Statutory Incidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
40 |
| Who Truly Bears (Bank) Taxes? Evidence from Only Shifting Statutory Incidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
| Who Truly Bears (Bank) Taxes? Evidence from Only Shifting Statutory Incidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
27 |
| Who truly bears (bank) taxes? Evidence from only shifting statutory incidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
| Who truly bears (bank) taxes? Evidence from only shifting statutory incidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
25 |
| Who truly bears (bank) taxes? Evidence from only shifting statutory incidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| “In the short run blasé, In the long run risqué” On the effects of monetary policy on bank credit risk-taking in the short versus long run |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
| Total Working Papers |
28 |
78 |
381 |
13,321 |
175 |
421 |
1,815 |
38,796 |
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