Access Statistics for Jorge Peña

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Cooperative Dilemmas with Binary Actions and Multiple Players 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3
Cooperative dilemmas with binary actions and multiple players 0 0 0 21 0 2 2 14
Dividing labour in social microorganisms: coordinated or random specialisation? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Do institutions evolve like material technologies ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Do institutions evolve like material technologies? 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 4
Do institutions evolve like material technologies? 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 8
Do institutions evolve like material technologies? 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 10
Eusociality through conflict dissolution 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
Eusociality through conflict dissolution via maternal reproductive specialization 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 21
Evolution of environmentally mediated social interactions under isolation by distance 0 0 0 6 1 2 4 8
Evolution of environmentally mediated social interactions under isolation by distance 0 0 0 15 1 2 6 25
Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games 0 0 0 52 1 2 2 303
Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game 0 0 0 13 1 2 2 27
Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Group size effects in social evolution 0 0 0 77 3 4 5 69
Nash equilibria are extremely unstable in most games under the utility-taking gradient dynamics 0 0 7 7 0 2 15 15
Nash equilibria are extremely unstable in most games under the utility-taking gradient dynamics 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Relatedness and synergies of kind and scale in the evolution of helping 0 0 0 34 1 1 2 39
The evolution of egg trading in simultaneous hermaphrodites 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 21
The evolution of egg trading in simultaneous hermaphrodites 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29
The evolution of environmentally mediated social interactions and posthumous spite under isolation by distance 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
The shirker’s dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
The shirker’s dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups 0 0 0 26 0 0 3 14
The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 21
The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information 0 0 0 38 0 0 1 30
The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information 0 0 0 22 0 1 3 26
Total Working Papers 0 0 9 323 13 24 64 716

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bipartite Graphs as Models of Population Structures in Evolutionary Multiplayer Games 0 0 0 2 1 1 4 9
Cooperative Dilemmas with Binary Actions and Multiple Players 0 0 1 2 1 2 9 11
Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 9
Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game 0 0 0 7 0 0 4 36
The evolution of environmentally mediated social interactions and posthumous spite under isolation by distance 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
The evolution of mechanisms to produce phenotypic heterogeneity in microorganisms 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4
The influence of tie strength on evolutionary games on networks: An empirical investigation 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 16
The shirker’s dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 29
Total Journal Articles 0 0 2 23 5 8 26 118

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Statistics updated 2025-11-08