Access Statistics for Carolyn Pitchik

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Economic Theory of Leadership Turnover 0 0 0 244 2 4 4 1,755
An Experimental Test of a Theory of Markets With Asymetric Information 0 0 0 39 1 1 5 119
Are Large Firms More Powerful Than Small Ones? 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 112
Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions 0 0 0 78 0 2 4 169
Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 3 5 6 186
Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information 0 0 1 149 0 2 5 470
Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 66 1 3 3 183
Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity 0 0 0 50 3 4 4 259
Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem 0 0 0 68 0 0 1 230
Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 90
Equilibria of a Two-Person Non-Zero Sum Noisy Game of Timing 0 0 0 61 2 2 3 213
Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition 0 1 3 1,231 3 6 18 5,120
Internal and External Regulation of Markets with Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 182
Irreversible, Unobservable, Costly Investment in the Presence of Rivals 0 0 0 35 0 2 4 240
Perfect Equilibria in Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 52 1 5 6 148
Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly 0 0 0 171 2 7 8 386
Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry 0 0 0 6 3 3 3 115
Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry 0 0 0 49 3 3 4 257
Regulating Markets With Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 27 1 1 3 107
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 59 1 2 3 449
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 34 0 0 3 244
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 18 1 2 5 176
The "Big Link" Hypothesis in Markets With Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 82
Total Working Papers 0 1 4 2,491 27 54 96 11,292

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An economic theory of leadership turnover 0 0 0 60 3 4 5 267
Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information 0 0 0 55 0 0 3 197
Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity 0 0 0 117 3 3 4 407
Commitment, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence 0 0 0 30 0 0 2 61
Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition 0 0 0 1,188 1 3 8 4,415
Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission 0 3 3 178 1 7 10 444
Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission: Correction 0 0 0 3 2 4 6 218
Information Transmission in Regulated Markets 0 0 0 29 3 5 6 177
Irreversible, Unobservable, Costly Investment in the Presence of Rivals 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 207
Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 58 2 3 8 182
Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly 0 0 0 420 2 5 9 828
Profit-sharing in a collusive industry 0 0 0 15 1 1 4 89
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 18 2 7 12 210
The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model 0 0 1 99 3 5 9 283
Total Journal Articles 0 3 4 2,272 25 49 88 7,985

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09