Access Statistics for Salvatore Piccolo

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 76 1 5 14 303
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 52
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7
A Note on Free Entry under Uncertainty: on the Role of Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 27 0 4 12 123
A Note on the Value of Residual Claimancy with Competing Vertical Hierarchies 0 0 1 40 0 4 11 119
Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 0 39 0 4 17 135
Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 1 1 27 0 6 13 159
Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 1 19 0 3 14 125
Accomplice-Witnesses, Organized Crime and Corruption: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 3 153 2 4 29 672
Colluding through Suppliers 0 0 0 63 0 4 9 249
Collusive Effects of Vertical Restraints under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 131 1 4 11 512
Communicating Vertical Hierarchies: the Adverse Selection Case 0 0 0 35 0 4 14 167
Competitive Markets with Endogenous Health Risks 0 0 0 71 1 1 5 320
Competitive Markets with Endogenous Health Risks 0 0 0 12 1 2 14 165
Competitive Pressure, Incentives and Managerial Rewards 0 0 0 124 0 5 15 679
Competitive occupational choices with endogenous health risks 0 0 0 24 2 2 6 119
Consumer Loss Aversion, Product Experimentation and Implicit Collusion 0 1 1 99 0 5 25 198
Contracting with Endogenous Entry 0 0 0 65 0 6 16 125
Corruption, Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law 0 0 0 60 2 7 37 301
Criminal Networks, Market Externalities and Optimal Leniency 0 0 0 49 0 4 19 185
Debt, Managers and Cartels 0 0 0 127 0 2 9 280
Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers 0 0 1 48 0 2 14 251
Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers 0 0 0 70 1 2 86 268
Deceptive advertising with rational buyers 0 0 0 110 0 3 9 130
Delegated Sales, Agency Costs and the Competitive Effects of List Price 0 0 1 42 1 7 20 137
Delegation and R&D Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 0 0 0 2 13 197
Delegation and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy 0 0 0 82 1 5 16 407
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 20
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 16
Does Direct Connect Benefit Travelers? 0 0 0 32 1 3 16 110
Entry and Product Variety with Competing Supply Chains 0 0 1 102 0 3 23 186
Exclusive Territories and Manufacturers’ Collusion 0 0 1 88 0 4 11 227
Fighting Mobile Crime 0 0 0 18 0 5 13 55
Fighting Mobile Crime 0 0 0 16 0 7 17 81
Fighting Mobile Crime 0 0 0 37 1 8 17 136
Fighting Mobile Crime 0 0 0 26 0 1 7 63
Information Acquisition and Financial Advice 0 1 2 91 0 3 17 234
Information Sharing between Vertical Hierarchies 0 0 0 61 2 6 17 253
M&A Advisory and the Merger Review Process 0 0 0 70 1 7 14 129
Managerial Compensations and Information Sharing under Moral Hazard: Is Transparency Good? 0 0 0 49 0 7 17 179
Marginal Deterrence at Work 0 0 0 40 0 3 20 284
Marginal Deterrence at Work 0 0 1 9 4 5 11 45
Marginal Deterrence at Work 0 0 0 12 2 6 16 55
Merchant Guilds, Taxation and Social Capital 0 0 0 29 0 4 14 65
Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing 0 0 0 188 0 1 28 971
Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing 0 0 1 240 1 2 31 730
Non-Exclusive Financial Advice 0 1 1 49 1 3 17 204
On the Dark Side of Political Stability 0 0 0 17 1 9 27 95
On the Private and Social Value of Consumer Data in Vertically-Integrated Platform Markets 0 0 0 60 1 3 12 109
On the Risk of Using a Firm-Level Approach to Identify Relevant Markets 0 1 1 56 0 6 16 138
Optimal Accomplice-Witnesses Regulation under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 34 1 7 11 165
Optimal Contracting with Altruism and Reciprocity 0 0 0 76 0 1 3 133
Optimal Leniency and the Organization Design of Group Delinquency 0 0 0 51 1 5 13 121
Optimal Pricing, Private Information and Search For an Outside Offer 0 0 0 6 0 3 7 40
Optimal Pricing, Private Information and Search for an Outside Offer 0 0 0 10 0 4 12 34
Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Endogenous Proposal Rights 0 0 0 14 0 3 6 44
Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law 0 0 0 28 2 7 24 73
Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law 0 0 0 27 0 2 15 90
Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics 0 1 5 58 1 5 16 88
Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics 0 0 0 91 1 7 25 266
Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics 0 0 1 97 0 4 14 251
Resale Price Maintenance under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 171 1 4 13 660
Self-Preferencing in Markets with Vertically-Integrated Gatekeeper Platforms 0 1 2 167 2 9 25 441
Selling Information to Competitive Firms 0 0 0 79 1 2 17 190
Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Optimal Striking Rules 0 0 0 42 1 3 22 162
The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment 0 0 1 106 0 5 14 502
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts 0 0 0 0 1 2 11 32
The Value of Transparency in Dynamic Contracting with Entry 0 0 0 79 0 2 11 153
The Value of Transparency in Multidivisional Firms 0 0 1 15 0 3 14 84
Transparency and Product Differentiation with Competing Vertical Hierarchies 0 0 0 53 0 5 11 152
Two is Company, N is a Crowd? Merchant Guilds and Social Capital 0 0 0 86 0 1 7 100
Two is Company, N is a Crowd? Merchant Guilds and Social Capital 0 0 0 56 0 1 15 198
Two is Company, N is a Crowd? Merchant Guilds and Social Capital 0 0 0 78 0 5 18 114
Two is Company, N is a Crowd? Merchant Guilds and Social Capital 0 0 0 50 0 3 11 287
Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure 0 0 0 90 0 6 13 210
Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure 0 0 0 29 0 3 20 50
Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure 0 0 0 6 0 0 9 25
Vertical Price Restraints and Free Entry Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 44 0 6 13 106
Vertical Restraints under Asymmetric Information: On the Role of Participation Constraints 0 0 0 222 0 4 16 860
Vertical Separation with Private Contracts 0 0 0 43 0 1 8 143
When Prohibiting Platform Parity Agreements Harms Consumers 0 0 0 68 1 5 20 218
Total Working Papers 0 7 29 4,859 41 316 1,273 16,762
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on free entry under uncertainty: The role of asymmetric information 0 0 0 18 0 1 7 110
Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 3 21 2 3 15 103
COMPETITIVE MARKETS WITH ENDOGENOUS HEALTH RISKS 0 0 0 11 0 1 10 104
Colluding through suppliers 0 0 1 31 0 1 6 120
Consumer loss aversion, product experimentation and tacit collusion 0 0 1 12 1 4 17 95
Contracting with endogenous entry 0 0 0 6 1 3 17 51
Corruption, organized crime and the bright side of subversion of law 0 0 2 10 4 8 27 164
Criminal mobility, fugitives, and extradition rules 0 0 2 10 1 8 20 57
Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers 0 1 3 22 0 9 22 92
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R & D Spending: Evidence From I taly 0 0 0 23 0 3 14 102
Does direct connect benefit travellers? 0 0 0 8 0 2 10 36
Endogenous residual claimancy by vertical hierarchies 0 0 0 10 0 0 8 60
Entry and Product Variety with Competing Supply Chains 0 0 0 14 0 4 13 73
Exclusive Territories and Manufacturers' Collusion 0 0 0 15 0 2 10 64
How limiting deceptive practices harms consumers 0 0 0 21 2 5 17 103
Information sharing between vertical hierarchies 0 0 0 9 2 4 9 65
Marginal deterrence at work 0 0 0 5 4 6 30 172
Merchant guilds, taxation and social capital 0 0 0 13 3 5 27 122
Multiple Bank Lending, Creditor Rights, and Information Sharing 0 0 0 48 1 5 23 246
Non-Exclusive Financial Advice 0 0 0 5 0 3 12 54
Optimal contracting with altruism and reciprocity 0 0 0 6 0 2 11 81
Optimal leniency and the organization design of group crime 0 0 1 6 0 2 13 50
Organised Crime, Insider Information and Optimal Leniency 0 0 0 6 0 1 5 37
Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics 0 1 3 58 0 8 31 281
Product Differentiation by Competing Vertical Hierarchies 0 0 0 8 2 2 19 62
Product market competition and organizational slack under profit-target contracts 0 0 0 56 0 2 10 259
Resale price maintenance under asymmetric information 0 0 0 52 0 0 10 176
Selling information to competitive firms 0 0 0 10 0 7 14 70
Should vertically integrated platforms be mandated to share information with their rivals? 0 1 4 17 0 1 19 60
Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Optimal Striking Rules 0 0 0 3 0 3 14 42
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts 0 0 0 51 0 0 9 222
The value of transparency in multidivisional firms 0 0 1 9 0 1 14 75
Una nota sui problemi di selezione avversa nei mercati oligopolistici 0 0 0 7 0 3 5 38
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: ON THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS* 0 0 0 39 0 1 6 214
Vertical Separation with Private Contracts 0 0 0 17 0 2 11 115
When prohibiting wholesale price-parity agreements may harm consumers 0 0 1 10 1 3 15 50
“When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?”: New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete 0 0 0 0 0 4 14 97
Total Journal Articles 0 3 22 667 24 119 534 3,922

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Statistics updated 2026-06-04