Access Statistics for Salvatore Piccolo

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 76 0 6 9 298
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 7
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete 0 0 0 0 1 7 12 52
A Note on Free Entry under Uncertainty: on the Role of Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 27 0 4 8 119
A Note on the Value of Residual Claimancy with Competing Vertical Hierarchies 1 1 1 40 1 6 9 115
Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 1 19 0 7 14 122
Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 0 39 3 7 13 131
Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 0 26 1 6 7 153
Accomplice-Witnesses, Organized Crime and Corruption: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 3 153 2 13 25 668
Colluding through Suppliers 0 0 0 63 1 4 6 245
Collusive Effects of Vertical Restraints under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 131 1 5 7 508
Communicating Vertical Hierarchies: the Adverse Selection Case 0 0 0 35 1 3 10 163
Competitive Markets with Endogenous Health Risks 0 0 0 12 3 9 12 163
Competitive Markets with Endogenous Health Risks 0 0 1 71 0 3 5 319
Competitive Pressure, Incentives and Managerial Rewards 0 0 0 124 0 5 10 674
Competitive occupational choices with endogenous health risks 0 0 0 24 0 2 4 117
Consumer Loss Aversion, Product Experimentation and Implicit Collusion 0 0 0 98 3 17 21 193
Contracting with Endogenous Entry 0 0 0 65 0 7 11 119
Corruption, Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law 0 0 0 60 1 11 37 294
Criminal Networks, Market Externalities and Optimal Leniency 0 0 0 49 3 7 15 181
Debt, Managers and Cartels 0 0 1 127 1 5 9 278
Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers 0 0 0 70 1 82 86 266
Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers 0 0 1 48 0 8 12 249
Deceptive advertising with rational buyers 0 0 0 110 1 2 6 127
Delegated Sales, Agency Costs and the Competitive Effects of List Price 0 0 1 42 2 4 13 130
Delegation and R&D Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 0 0 0 4 11 195
Delegation and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy 0 0 0 82 1 7 20 402
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 13
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 18
Does Direct Connect Benefit Travelers? 0 0 0 32 2 9 13 107
Entry and Product Variety with Competing Supply Chains 0 0 1 102 7 13 20 183
Exclusive Territories and Manufacturers’ Collusion 1 1 2 88 1 7 9 223
Fighting Mobile Crime 0 0 0 26 0 4 7 62
Fighting Mobile Crime 0 0 0 18 1 8 8 50
Fighting Mobile Crime 0 0 0 16 3 8 11 74
Fighting Mobile Crime 0 0 0 37 0 4 9 128
Information Acquisition and Financial Advice 0 0 2 90 0 10 17 231
Information Sharing between Vertical Hierarchies 0 0 0 61 3 8 11 247
M&A Advisory and the Merger Review Process 0 0 0 70 4 6 7 122
Managerial Compensations and Information Sharing under Moral Hazard: Is Transparency Good? 0 0 0 49 0 9 10 172
Marginal Deterrence at Work 0 0 0 12 1 7 10 49
Marginal Deterrence at Work 1 1 1 9 1 4 7 40
Marginal Deterrence at Work 0 0 0 40 1 9 18 281
Merchant Guilds, Taxation and Social Capital 0 0 0 29 1 8 11 61
Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing 0 0 2 240 3 15 34 728
Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing 0 0 0 188 8 25 27 970
Non-Exclusive Financial Advice 0 0 0 48 4 10 15 201
On the Dark Side of Political Stability 0 0 0 17 1 12 19 86
On the Private and Social Value of Consumer Data in Vertically-Integrated Platform Markets 0 0 0 60 0 5 10 106
On the Risk of Using a Firm-Level Approach to Identify Relevant Markets 0 0 1 55 0 8 12 132
Optimal Accomplice-Witnesses Regulation under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 34 0 4 4 158
Optimal Contracting with Altruism and Reciprocity 0 0 0 76 2 2 4 132
Optimal Leniency and the Organization Design of Group Delinquency 0 0 0 51 1 5 8 116
Optimal Pricing, Private Information and Search For an Outside Offer 0 0 0 6 0 2 4 37
Optimal Pricing, Private Information and Search for an Outside Offer 0 0 0 10 1 7 8 30
Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Endogenous Proposal Rights 0 0 0 14 0 3 3 41
Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law 0 0 0 28 2 10 17 66
Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law 0 0 0 27 3 9 15 88
Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics 0 0 1 97 0 7 10 247
Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics 1 2 4 57 4 7 13 83
Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics 0 0 2 91 2 11 24 259
Resale Price Maintenance under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 171 3 5 9 656
Self-Preferencing in Markets with Vertically-Integrated Gatekeeper Platforms 0 1 2 166 9 12 17 432
Selling Information to Competitive Firms 0 0 1 79 0 11 17 188
Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Optimal Striking Rules 0 0 0 42 4 12 24 159
The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment 0 0 2 106 1 5 10 497
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts 0 0 0 0 2 7 9 30
The Value of Transparency in Dynamic Contracting with Entry 0 0 0 79 2 8 10 151
The Value of Transparency in Multidivisional Firms 0 0 1 15 0 6 12 81
Transparency and Product Differentiation with Competing Vertical Hierarchies 0 0 0 53 0 6 6 147
Two is Company, N is a Crowd? Merchant Guilds and Social Capital 0 0 1 78 0 7 15 109
Two is Company, N is a Crowd? Merchant Guilds and Social Capital 0 0 0 86 0 4 6 99
Two is Company, N is a Crowd? Merchant Guilds and Social Capital 0 0 0 50 2 7 9 284
Two is Company, N is a Crowd? Merchant Guilds and Social Capital 0 0 1 56 2 9 18 197
Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure 0 0 0 6 0 5 9 25
Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure 0 0 0 29 4 14 17 47
Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure 0 0 0 90 1 2 7 204
Vertical Price Restraints and Free Entry Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 44 0 5 7 100
Vertical Restraints under Asymmetric Information: On the Role of Participation Constraints 0 0 0 222 1 5 14 856
Vertical Separation with Private Contracts 0 0 0 43 0 5 7 142
When Prohibiting Platform Parity Agreements Harms Consumers 0 0 0 68 1 8 16 213
Total Working Papers 4 6 35 4,852 115 649 1,040 16,446
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on free entry under uncertainty: The role of asymmetric information 0 0 0 18 0 3 6 109
Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy 0 0 3 21 1 6 12 100
COMPETITIVE MARKETS WITH ENDOGENOUS HEALTH RISKS 0 0 1 11 4 8 10 103
Colluding through suppliers 0 0 2 31 0 1 6 119
Consumer loss aversion, product experimentation and tacit collusion 0 0 1 12 3 10 15 91
Contracting with endogenous entry 0 0 0 6 8 13 15 48
Corruption, organized crime and the bright side of subversion of law 0 0 2 10 4 9 23 156
Criminal mobility, fugitives, and extradition rules 0 0 2 10 0 7 13 49
Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers 0 1 2 21 3 8 14 83
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R & D Spending: Evidence From I taly 0 0 0 23 1 6 12 99
Does direct connect benefit travellers? 0 0 0 8 0 4 8 34
Endogenous residual claimancy by vertical hierarchies 0 0 0 10 0 4 9 60
Entry and Product Variety with Competing Supply Chains 0 0 0 14 3 7 9 69
Exclusive Territories and Manufacturers' Collusion 0 0 0 15 0 4 8 62
How limiting deceptive practices harms consumers 0 0 0 21 3 10 12 98
Information sharing between vertical hierarchies 0 0 0 9 0 2 5 61
Marginal deterrence at work 0 0 0 5 2 15 24 166
Merchant guilds, taxation and social capital 0 0 1 13 3 12 24 117
Multiple Bank Lending, Creditor Rights, and Information Sharing 0 0 0 48 2 12 18 241
Non-Exclusive Financial Advice 0 0 0 5 0 8 9 51
Optimal contracting with altruism and reciprocity 0 0 0 6 0 7 10 79
Optimal leniency and the organization design of group crime 0 0 1 6 0 5 11 48
Organised Crime, Insider Information and Optimal Leniency 0 0 0 6 0 1 4 36
Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics 0 0 2 57 0 8 26 273
Product Differentiation by Competing Vertical Hierarchies 0 0 0 8 3 9 18 60
Product market competition and organizational slack under profit-target contracts 0 0 0 56 1 5 9 257
Resale price maintenance under asymmetric information 0 0 0 52 1 5 10 176
Selling information to competitive firms 0 0 0 10 0 1 7 63
Should vertically integrated platforms be mandated to share information with their rivals? 0 0 3 16 4 8 18 59
Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Optimal Striking Rules 0 0 0 3 2 7 13 39
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts 0 0 0 51 1 5 9 222
The value of transparency in multidivisional firms 0 0 1 9 1 6 13 74
Una nota sui problemi di selezione avversa nei mercati oligopolistici 0 0 2 7 0 1 4 35
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: ON THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS* 0 0 0 39 0 3 7 213
Vertical Separation with Private Contracts 0 0 0 17 0 4 9 113
When prohibiting wholesale price-parity agreements may harm consumers 1 1 1 10 4 11 13 47
“When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?”: New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete 0 0 0 0 1 6 10 93
Total Journal Articles 1 2 24 664 55 241 443 3,803

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04