Access Statistics for Sougata Poddar

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Advance Production, Inventory, and Asymmetric Cournot-Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 309
Capacity and Entry Deterrence under Asymmetric Information on Demand 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 136
Capacity and Entry Deterrence under Demand Uncertainty 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 177
Capacity and entry deterrence under asymmetric information on demand 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 71
Capacity and entry deterrence under demand uncertainty 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 29
Capacity, Entry and Demand Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 512
Demand Fluctuations and Capacity Utilization under Duopoly 0 0 0 14 1 6 6 468
Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly 0 0 0 5 1 3 4 23
Does Reliable Pirated Product Lead to More Piracy? 0 0 0 96 4 4 6 189
Does the Nature of Piracy and Competition Matter? 0 0 0 63 0 2 3 180
Efficiency of Joint Enterprises with Internal Bargaining 0 0 0 25 0 2 3 126
Games of Timing: State-of-Art Research on Strategic Investment 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 443
Innovation and copyright infringement: The Case of Commercial Piracy and End-user Piracy 0 0 0 104 2 3 7 233
Mixed oligopoly and the choice of capacity 0 0 1 33 1 2 4 210
Music Product as a Durable Good and Online Piracy 0 0 0 8 3 6 6 855
Network Externality and Software Piracy 0 0 0 36 1 3 5 95
Network Structure and Entry in the Deregulated Airline Industry 1 1 1 46 1 1 3 149
Network Structure and Entry, in the Deregulated Airline Industry 0 0 0 8 1 3 3 1,366
Patent Licensing in Spatial Models 0 0 0 115 2 3 5 132
Patent licensing in spatial competition: Does pre-innovation cost asymmetry matter? 0 0 1 72 1 2 5 199
Price versus Quantity Competition with Cost Sharing 0 1 1 62 1 3 3 216
Product Differentiation, Entry and Undercut-Proof Equilibrium 0 0 0 9 2 2 4 402
RJV in Product Innovation and the Form of Market Competition 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 498
RJVs and Price Collusion under Endogenous Product Differentiation 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 416
RJVs and Price Collusione under Endogenous Product Differentiation 0 1 1 51 4 7 7 178
RJVs and Price collusion Under Endogenous Product Differentiation 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 439
RJVs in Product Innovation and Cartel Stability 0 0 0 84 1 4 4 229
RJVs in Product Innovation and Cartel Stability 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 182
Standardization and the Stability of Collusion 0 0 1 103 0 3 5 199
Standardization and the Stability of Collusion 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 177
Standardization and the stability of collusion 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 21
Strategic Advance Production 0 0 0 4 4 5 7 76
Strategic Advance Production Without Stackelberg Leadership 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 270
Strategic Choice of Network Externality 0 0 0 51 2 2 6 100
Strategic Inventories in Two-period Oligopoly 0 0 0 1 2 2 5 546
The Choice of Capacity in Mixed Duopoly under Demand Uncertainty 0 0 0 20 2 5 6 154
Uncertainty, Entry Deterrence and Excess Capacity 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 739
‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus Selling by an outside innovator 0 0 0 49 3 5 9 52
Total Working Papers 1 3 6 1,079 48 96 142 10,796
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Accommodation or deterrence in the face of commercial piracy: the impact of intellectual property rights protection 0 0 0 28 2 3 4 90
Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly 0 0 0 289 0 0 0 1,045
EDITORIAL 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 20
ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY AND PRIVATE DUOPOLY –‘CAPACITY‐THEN‐QUANTITY’ GAME: THE LINEAR DEMAND CASE* 0 0 0 16 2 3 3 111
Exclusive and non-exclusive licensing with shelving 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 11
FIRM OWNERSHIP, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND WELFARE* 0 0 0 40 2 3 3 150
Impact of Network Externality on End-User Piracy: Revisited 0 0 0 12 2 3 3 70
Limiting End-user Piracy - The Role of Private and Public Anti-Piracy Measure 0 0 0 12 2 2 4 66
Mixed oligopoly and the choice of capacity 0 0 0 53 3 6 7 184
On Patent Licensing in Spatial Competition 0 0 0 79 1 5 7 293
Optimal patent licensing—Two or three‐part tariff 0 0 1 4 0 4 6 11
Patent Licensing and Strategic Shelving 0 0 2 2 2 7 16 16
Patent Licensing from a High‐Cost Firm to a Low‐Cost Firm 0 0 0 39 3 7 10 157
Patent licensing in spatial models 0 0 0 8 1 2 5 50
Price versus Quantity Revisited 0 0 0 15 1 1 1 59
Pro-competitive horizontal merger with cost reducing investments and network externalities 0 0 1 1 5 9 13 13
Product Innovation and Stability of Collusion 0 0 1 70 1 2 5 191
Product differentiation, demand expansion and the welfare effects of cross‐ownership 0 0 1 1 3 5 8 8
Research joint ventures, product differentiation, and price collusion 0 0 0 80 1 1 1 261
Standardization and the stability of collusion 0 0 1 37 1 2 3 137
Strategic Choice of Network Externality and Its Impact on Digital Piracy 0 0 0 20 0 0 3 86
Strategic choice in durable goods market when firms move simultaneously 0 0 0 37 6 13 37 197
THE CHOICE OF CAPACITY IN MIXED DUOPOLY UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY* 0 0 0 34 0 1 2 110
Technology licensing and innovation—A correction on two-part tariff analysis 0 0 0 16 1 1 1 45
Technology selling and innovation with bargaining 0 0 0 4 1 3 3 25
Technology transfer in spatial competition when licensees are asymmetric 0 0 1 2 1 2 5 20
The strategic benefit from advance production 0 0 0 14 0 4 4 81
USM-AUT International Conference on Sustainable Economic Development: Policies and Strategies An introduction to the special issue 0 0 0 11 0 0 2 43
‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus selling by an outside innovator 0 0 2 12 2 3 10 52
Total Journal Articles 0 0 10 939 44 93 171 3,602

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Chapter 3 On Patent Licensing 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Chapter 7 Efficiency of Joint Enterprises with Internal Bargaining 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 6
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 7

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09