Access Statistics for Dina D. Pomeranz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Distortion by Audit: Evidence from Public Procurement 0 3 6 34 0 8 16 114
Distortion by Audit: Evidence from Public Procurement 0 2 2 61 0 6 17 209
Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement 0 0 1 33 0 3 10 123
Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 116
Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement 0 0 0 33 0 0 2 77
Ghosting the Tax Authority: Fake Firms and Tax Fraud 0 0 1 28 1 3 9 45
Ghosting the Tax Authority: Fake Firms and Tax Fraud 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
How Large is the Impact of Trade on Inequality? A New Factor Content of Trade Approach 0 0 2 130 0 0 5 286
International Trade and Earnings Inequality: A New Factor Content Approach 0 0 3 32 0 0 12 133
International Trade and Earnings Inequality: A New Factor Content Approach 0 0 1 18 1 1 17 58
International Trade and Earnings Inequality: A New Factor Content Approach 1 1 2 6 1 1 7 28
Misallocation in Firm Production: A Nonparametric Analysis Using Procurement Lotteries 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 7
Misallocation in Firm Production: A Nonparametric Analysis Using Procurement Lotteries 0 0 0 11 0 1 5 15
No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax 2 4 11 109 2 9 31 346
Saving More to Borrow Less: Experimental Evidence from Access to Formal Savings Accounts in Chile 0 1 3 72 0 1 9 163
Saving More to Borrow Less: Experimental Evidence from Access to Formal Savings Accounts in Chile 0 0 0 80 0 0 6 169
Taking State-Capacity Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities 0 0 1 46 0 0 5 127
The Race Between Tax Enforcement and Tax Planning: Evidence From a Natural Experiment in Chile 0 0 0 14 0 0 8 51
The Race Between Tax Enforcement and Tax Planning: Evidence From a Natural Experiment in Chile 0 0 1 5 0 1 5 17
The Race between Tax Enforcement and Tax Planning: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Chile 0 0 1 14 2 2 9 21
Under-Savers Anonymous: Evidence on Self-Help Groups and Peer Pressure as a Savings Commitment Device 0 0 0 65 1 1 7 289
Under-Savers Anonymous: Evidence on Self-Help Groups and Peer Pressure as a Savings Commitment Device 0 0 0 72 1 1 5 405
Total Working Papers 3 11 35 936 9 39 187 2,801

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Challenges of Monitoring Tax Compliance by Multinational Firms: Evidence from Chile 0 0 0 5 1 1 1 38
Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement 0 1 3 44 1 4 17 241
Impact Evaluation Methods in Public Economics 0 0 2 37 0 0 6 96
Imports, Exports, and Earnings Inequality: Measures of Exposure and Estimates of Incidence 0 1 3 29 3 8 31 125
No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax 2 3 10 82 3 6 22 380
Saving more in groups: Field experimental evidence from Chile 1 1 8 85 3 6 67 424
Taking State-Capacity Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities 1 2 11 44 1 7 33 127
Total Journal Articles 4 8 37 326 12 32 177 1,431

Software Item File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
RDDSGA: Stata module to conduct subgroup analysis for regression discontinuity designs 2 6 14 206 14 24 79 1,395
Total Software Items 2 6 14 206 14 24 79 1,395

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03