Access Statistics for Martin Pollrich

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation 0 0 0 11 0 3 17 33
An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation 0 0 0 7 0 2 9 57
Auctions with Signaling Bidders: Optimal Design and Information Disclosure 1 1 1 7 2 3 19 28
Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement 0 0 0 32 0 0 12 52
Informational Opacity and Honest Certification 0 0 0 14 2 5 11 62
Informational opacity and honest certication 0 0 0 51 3 3 22 130
Informational opacity and honest certification 0 0 0 37 1 1 12 85
Mediated Audits 0 0 1 23 1 1 16 121
Mediated Audits 0 0 0 46 1 2 15 179
On the (Ir)Relevance of Fee Structures in Certification 0 0 0 4 1 1 5 11
Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders 0 0 1 17 1 2 13 50
Optimal auctions with signaling bidders 0 0 0 13 0 0 8 20
Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation 0 0 0 38 0 0 13 59
Sequential procurement with limited commitment 0 0 0 16 1 2 15 62
Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 17
Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations 0 0 0 34 0 1 14 57
The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment - Preliminary and Incomplete Version - 0 0 0 80 0 0 11 223
The irrelevance of fee structures for certification 2 2 3 21 3 4 14 33
Unobservable investments, limited commitment, and the curse of firm relocation 0 0 0 12 0 1 14 68
Total Working Papers 3 3 6 463 17 32 249 1,347

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure 0 0 0 2 0 0 27 31
Gütesiegel: zu detaillierte Angaben können die Funktionsfähigkeit der Zertifikate schmälern 0 0 0 11 0 1 8 76
Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification 0 0 1 8 1 3 12 73
Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement 0 0 1 5 2 3 19 45
Information design in sequential procurement 0 0 0 8 2 2 6 25
Mediated audits 0 0 0 3 0 0 9 43
Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations 0 0 0 2 0 1 10 36
The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification 0 0 0 2 0 1 12 22
Total Journal Articles 0 0 2 41 5 11 103 351

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Statistics updated 2026-10-11