Access Statistics for Marek Pycia

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities 0 0 0 39 0 0 16 211
A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design 0 0 0 53 0 3 13 109
A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design 0 0 0 25 0 2 14 79
Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design 0 0 0 1 0 1 11 17
Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design 0 0 1 42 0 2 18 77
Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources 0 0 0 13 0 0 7 22
Arrovian Efficiency in Allocation of Discrete Resources 0 0 1 77 0 2 25 194
Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid 0 1 3 32 2 4 24 114
Decomposing Random Mechanisms 0 0 1 37 1 4 21 128
Design of Divisible Good Auctions 0 0 0 0 12 13 24 123
Double Auctions and Transaction Costs 0 0 0 6 0 0 4 11
Double Auctions: A Unified Treatment 0 0 0 2 0 0 8 12
Efficient Bilateral Trade 0 0 2 6 0 1 11 23
Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources 0 0 1 5 0 2 10 24
Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources 0 0 0 5 0 2 13 36
Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources 0 0 0 287 0 2 31 818
Information Choice: Cost over Content 0 0 2 7 0 0 8 28
Large vs. Continuum Assignment Economies: Efficiency and Envy-Freeness 0 1 1 9 0 3 16 112
Markets and transaction costs 0 0 0 15 0 0 12 33
Matching with Externalities 0 0 0 64 0 2 18 137
Matching with externalities 0 0 0 20 1 1 23 56
Mechanism Design with Information Leakage 0 0 26 26 0 0 21 21
Non-bossiness and First-Price Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 11
Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms in General Environments 0 0 2 2 0 1 18 18
On market prices in double auctions 0 0 0 10 0 1 16 28
Ordinal Simplicity and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design 0 0 1 2 0 1 9 11
Towards a Resolution of the Privacy Paradox 0 0 1 5 0 0 8 18
Total Working Papers 0 2 42 790 16 47 406 2,471

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities 0 0 0 16 0 1 13 133
A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design 0 0 1 7 1 2 27 59
Decomposing random mechanisms 1 1 1 6 3 5 26 71
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions 0 1 2 44 1 4 34 378
Dynamic inconsistency and self-control: a planner-doer interpretation 0 0 0 118 1 2 10 378
Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources 0 0 1 5 1 1 19 43
Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources 0 0 1 7 1 2 21 79
Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms 0 0 0 8 0 0 21 96
Matching with Externalities 0 0 2 3 1 2 24 40
Median stable matchings in two-sided markets 0 0 0 8 1 2 12 68
Ordinal Simplicity in Discrete Mechanism Design 0 0 2 2 0 1 12 12
Outside Options and the Failure of the Coase Conjecture 0 0 2 19 0 2 14 161
Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources 0 0 0 1 2 2 14 18
Quantile Stable Mechanisms 0 0 0 5 1 2 9 25
Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation 0 0 1 14 0 1 9 149
Total Journal Articles 1 2 13 263 13 29 265 1,710

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Statistics updated 2026-08-07