Access Statistics for Antonio Quesada

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A short step between democracy and dictatorship 0 0 0 29 0 3 10 105
Allocation by coercion 0 0 0 11 0 1 7 59
Allocation of objects with conditional property rights 0 0 0 14 0 2 8 96
Axiomatics for the Hirsch research output index 0 0 0 10 0 4 10 72
Competitive markets and “as if” methodology 0 0 0 111 1 6 6 446
Decision by majority and the right to vote 0 0 0 15 1 4 9 65
Merging discrete measurements 0 0 0 45 0 0 6 330
Networks and market laws 0 0 0 82 0 2 5 253
Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity 0 0 1 10 1 3 9 47
Parallel proofs of Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 0 0 0 106 0 0 3 503
Trade, expropriation and allocation 0 0 0 24 1 4 6 170
Total Working Papers 0 0 1 457 4 29 79 2,146

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
(100-200/m)% veto power 0 0 0 8 0 5 6 81
1 dictator=2 voters 0 0 0 21 2 3 6 120
A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles 0 0 0 43 1 1 4 252
A positional version of Arrow's theorem 0 0 0 15 1 2 5 63
A short step between democracy and dictatorship 0 0 0 9 0 6 11 79
Abstention as an escape from Arrow's theorem 0 0 0 21 0 4 6 113
Another impossibility result for normal form games 0 0 0 3 0 2 3 26
Axiomatics for the Hirsch index and the Egghe index 0 0 0 6 1 1 4 54
Belief system foundations of backward induction 0 0 0 14 1 7 10 73
Dictatorial voting operators 0 0 0 3 0 2 4 55
Elasticity and revenue: a reappraisal 0 2 5 18 0 10 24 76
From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction 0 0 0 2 1 4 6 21
From social choice functions to dictatorial social welfare functions 0 0 0 10 5 10 20 86
Further characterizations of the Hirsch index 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 13
Hierarchical allocation 0 0 0 14 0 2 4 69
Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions 0 0 0 14 0 1 4 110
Merging discrete evaluations 0 0 0 2 0 2 4 35
Monotonicity + efficiency + continuity = majority 0 0 1 5 0 4 10 47
Monotonicity and the Hirsch index 0 0 0 5 1 2 6 39
More axiomatics for the Hirsch index 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 17
More on independent decisiveness and Arrow's theorem 0 0 0 32 1 4 4 180
Negative results in the theory of games with lexicographic utilities 0 0 1 6 0 2 3 42
On expressing maximum information in extensive games 0 0 0 8 0 3 5 74
On the existence of self-enforcing equilibria 0 0 0 72 1 3 6 532
Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity 0 0 0 7 0 1 5 51
Positional independence in preference aggregation 0 0 0 7 0 7 8 71
Power of Enforcement and Dictatorship 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 47
Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem 0 0 0 21 0 2 6 242
Selling a vote 0 0 1 22 0 2 6 99
Taking alleged dictatorship more seriously: Rejoinder to Fried 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 42
The Majority Rule with Arbitrators 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 16
The majority rule with a chairman 0 0 0 4 0 6 9 44
The normal form is not sufficient 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 26
To Majority through the Search for Unanimity 0 0 0 5 0 3 3 22
Two axioms for the majority rule 0 0 0 14 0 0 4 65
Unanimous, reducible, anonymous social choice 0 0 0 14 1 5 7 110
Unconcerned groups and the majority rule 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 61
Up/Downward Preference Aggregation 0 0 1 4 0 3 10 41
Total Journal Articles 0 2 9 456 16 115 233 3,194

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Statistics updated 2026-04-09