Access Statistics for Indrajit Ray

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Market Games 0 0 0 36 0 1 8 85
A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Strategic Market Games 0 0 0 19 1 5 16 28
A Difficulty in Characterising Mixed Nash Equilibria in a Strategic Market Game 0 0 16 16 0 2 17 17
A Difficulty in Characterising Mixed Nash Equilibria in a Strategic Market Game 0 0 0 14 1 4 22 28
A Remark on the Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form 0 0 0 1 0 2 6 426
An experimental study of a continuous Japanese-English auction for the wallet game 0 0 21 21 0 4 17 17
An experimental study of a continuous Japanese-English auction for the wallet game 0 0 14 14 1 5 12 12
Buying and Selling in Strategic Market Games 0 0 0 337 1 4 10 3,880
Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition 0 0 0 14 1 3 6 334
Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game 0 0 0 53 1 5 14 65
Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game 0 0 0 105 1 7 18 201
Coarse correlated Equilibria in Linear Duopoly Games 0 0 0 37 1 3 13 98
Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game 0 0 0 47 0 2 9 93
Coarse correlation and coordination in a game 0 0 1 82 0 2 11 191
Coordination by Sunspots: Letter is Mightier than Colour 1 1 20 20 2 4 15 15
Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria 0 0 0 58 1 9 19 204
Deriving Correlated Equilibrium as the Stable Standard of behavior of a Social Situation: A Note 0 0 0 4 0 5 10 39
Do we need to listen to all stakeholders?: communicating in a coordination game with private information 0 0 0 22 1 5 14 168
Efficiency in Correlated Equilibrium 0 0 1 7 0 1 8 160
Efficiency in correlated equilibrium 0 0 0 2 0 2 6 31
Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game 0 0 0 26 0 5 14 98
Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games 0 0 2 22 0 4 19 75
Following Recommendations from Public and Private Correlation Devices in a Game of Chicken 0 0 1 5 0 1 23 28
Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences 0 0 0 473 0 3 15 1,547
Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game 0 1 1 29 0 2 9 88
Improving Nash by Coarse Correlation 0 0 0 69 1 10 17 103
Information Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Game with Two-Sided Private Information 0 0 0 17 1 4 14 56
Information Transmission Under Privacy Concerns 0 0 5 5 1 3 17 17
Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information 0 0 0 71 1 2 7 177
Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Game with Two-Sided Private Information 0 0 0 37 1 5 19 107
Mixed Strategies in Strategic Market Games 0 0 0 0 1 3 7 156
Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions 0 0 0 27 0 4 7 133
Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions 0 0 0 63 1 5 15 409
Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions 0 0 0 31 0 8 24 194
Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions 0 0 0 26 0 3 9 195
Nash vs. Coarse Correlation 0 0 0 18 1 3 8 131
Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games 0 0 0 1 0 5 11 25
Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games 0 0 0 2 0 0 10 35
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games 0 0 0 82 0 5 10 505
Partition Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game 0 0 0 25 0 6 13 61
Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game 0 0 1 174 1 4 12 568
Sunspots, Correlation And Competition 0 0 0 32 0 2 10 139
Sunspots, Correlation and Competition 0 0 0 1 0 4 14 16
Transparency is Overrated: Communicating in a Coordination Game with Private Information 0 0 0 61 0 4 29 174
Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information 0 0 0 33 3 8 16 125
“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots 0 0 1 7 0 1 13 13
Total Working Papers 1 2 84 2,246 24 179 613 11,267

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions 0 0 0 24 0 3 13 125
A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels 0 0 0 1 0 5 22 41
Buying and selling in strategic market games 0 0 0 38 1 2 15 169
Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition 0 0 0 68 0 2 11 212
Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games 0 0 1 7 0 7 14 62
Consistency, dummy and independence of irrelevant strategies for strategic games 0 0 1 14 1 3 9 128
Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior 0 0 0 57 0 5 9 503
Efficiency in correlated equilibrium 0 0 0 41 0 2 11 128
Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification 0 0 0 69 2 4 10 324
Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game 0 0 0 0 0 3 12 16
Game Theory via Revealed Preferences 0 0 0 96 1 15 25 305
Improving Nash by coarse correlation 0 1 1 35 3 6 16 137
Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information 0 0 1 3 0 7 13 17
Nash versus coarse correlation 0 0 0 8 0 4 15 54
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games 0 0 0 7 0 8 19 70
On games with identical equilibrium payoffs 0 0 0 40 0 2 10 135
Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 13
Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game 0 0 0 0 1 8 22 26
Slot allocation: A model of competition between firms when consumers are procedurally rational 0 0 0 30 0 1 4 175
Sunspots, correlation and competition 0 0 0 15 0 2 13 99
“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots 0 0 0 1 0 7 19 25
Total Journal Articles 0 1 4 554 9 100 292 2,764

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Statistics updated 2026-06-04