Access Statistics for Alexander Rasch

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Business models in commercial media markets: Bargaining, advertising, and mixing 0 0 0 29 0 3 7 66
Collusion by Algorithm: The Role of Unobserved Actions 0 0 1 17 1 5 14 38
Collusion by algorithm: The role of unobserved actions 0 0 2 33 0 6 13 46
Combinable products, price discrimination, and collusion 0 0 1 19 0 3 12 34
Complex pricing and consumer-side attention 0 0 0 22 1 2 9 38
Complex pricing and consumer-side transparency 0 0 0 50 0 1 16 95
Consumer salience and quality provision in (un)regulated public service markets 0 0 0 10 0 1 11 33
Drip pricing and its regulation: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 32 2 9 28 103
Drip pricing and its regulation: Experimental evidence 0 0 3 57 3 8 25 176
Horizontal mergers, cost savings, and network effects 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 17
Injunctions against false advertising 0 0 0 29 2 6 15 39
Injunctions against false advertising 0 0 0 35 2 3 13 77
Internal decision-making rules and collusion 0 0 0 2 0 5 9 34
Opportunism Problems of Colluding Manufacturers 0 0 0 17 0 0 5 78
Piracy in a two-sided software market 0 0 0 115 0 2 13 400
Preferences and Decision Support in Competitive Bidding 0 0 0 19 2 3 14 40
Preferences and decision support in competitive bidding 0 0 0 10 1 4 14 47
Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 106 0 1 11 172
Price-sensitive demand and market entry 0 0 0 48 0 2 9 178
Private information, price discrimination, and collusion 0 0 0 90 1 5 14 76
Product liability and reasonable product use 0 0 1 21 0 2 20 44
Second Opinions in Markets for Expert Services: Experimental Evidence 0 0 2 42 0 2 14 183
The Influence of Product Liability on Vertical Product Differentiation 0 0 0 8 2 6 14 103
The Role of Diagnostic Ability in Markets for Expert Services 0 0 0 7 1 3 13 37
The impact of piracy on prominent and non-prominent software developers 0 0 0 66 4 7 14 141
The influence of product liability on vertical product differentiation 0 0 0 37 0 1 9 121
The role of diagnostic ability in markets for expert services 0 0 0 14 0 8 26 78
The scope for collusion under different pricing schemes 0 0 0 60 0 5 17 83
What drives fraud in a credence goods market? Evidence from a field study 0 0 1 30 2 3 15 137
What drives fraud in a credence goods market? Evidence from a field study 0 0 0 24 0 5 15 244
Total Working Papers 0 0 11 1,049 24 112 413 2,958

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on mergers and relocation 0 0 0 13 0 1 8 99
Bargaining and inequity aversion: On the efficiency of the double auction 0 0 0 18 0 0 5 83
Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation 0 0 0 9 0 7 15 94
Collusion under different pricing schemes 0 0 0 6 0 3 9 29
Combinable products, price discrimination, and collusion 0 0 0 0 0 3 12 14
Compatibility, network effects, and collusion 0 0 0 69 0 3 13 214
Complex pricing and consumer-side attention 0 0 2 4 0 5 20 23
Consumer salience and quality provision in (un)regulated public service markets 0 1 2 2 0 3 10 14
Content provision and compatibility in a platform market 0 0 0 27 0 4 9 94
Customer-side transparency, elastic demand, and tacit collusion under differentiation 0 1 2 30 0 3 13 166
Demand forecasting, signal precision, and collusion with hidden actions 0 0 3 9 0 2 22 36
Die Deregulierung von Berufszugangsbeschränkungen und die Corona-Krise 0 0 0 2 1 2 8 16
Drip pricing and its regulation: Experimental evidence 0 1 5 45 2 17 41 193
Exposing false advertising 0 0 0 8 0 4 10 55
Horizontal mergers, cost savings, and network effects 0 0 0 4 0 3 13 26
How mergers affect innovation: Theory and evidence 0 2 14 338 2 14 58 1,012
Imperfect information, algorithmic price discrimination, and collusion 0 2 2 10 0 6 23 62
Internal decision-making rules and collusion 0 0 0 25 0 4 14 208
On the strictly descending multi-unit auction 0 0 0 21 0 4 17 106
Piracy in a two-sided software market 0 0 0 35 0 5 19 206
Platform competition with partial multihoming under differentiation: a note 0 1 3 81 1 8 21 286
Pre-auction or post-auction qualification? 0 0 1 5 0 3 11 51
Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 58 1 4 15 181
Price-sensitive demand and market entry 0 0 0 2 0 6 16 33
Product Liability and Reasonable Product Use 0 0 1 1 3 3 10 11
Product Liability in Markets for Vertically Differentiated Products 0 0 0 10 0 0 3 36
Second Opinions and Diagnostic Uncertainty in Expert Markets 0 0 3 23 0 0 13 68
Second opinions in markets for expert services: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 33 2 8 19 127
The impact of piracy on prominent and non-prominent software developers 0 0 0 5 0 4 12 30
What Drives Fraud in a Credence Goods Market? – Evidence from a Field Study 0 0 0 11 0 5 13 46
Why product liability may lower product safety 0 0 1 16 0 4 12 88
Wie verändert Trump II den Verbraucherschutz in den USA – und was sind die Folgen? 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 4
Total Journal Articles 0 8 39 920 12 139 488 3,711

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctions and competition policy 0 0 0 26 0 2 5 51
Total Chapters 0 0 0 26 0 2 5 51

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-06-04