Access Statistics for Shiran Rachmilevitch

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Behavioral Arrow Theorem 0 0 0 6 6 11 14 42
Bribing in First-Price Auctions: Corrigendum 0 0 0 40 2 7 10 54
Bribing in second-price auctions 0 0 0 10 3 7 9 70
Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions 0 0 0 41 4 9 12 92
Fairness in Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution 0 0 0 43 1 6 8 92
Fairness, Efficiency, and the Nash Bargaining Solution 0 0 0 77 3 5 7 254
Gradual Negotiations and Proportional Solutions 0 0 0 13 1 3 3 79
Infinite horizon allocation with consumption-dependent utility 0 0 0 3 4 9 13 46
Punishing greediness in Divide-the-dollar games 0 0 0 19 1 11 15 51
Repeated bargaining 0 0 0 24 2 6 7 22
The Nash Bargaining Solution and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons 0 0 0 49 2 3 7 99
Total Working Papers 0 0 0 325 29 77 105 901

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A characterization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity 0 0 0 24 1 3 6 73
A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution 0 0 0 7 2 3 6 42
Approximate equilibria in strongly symmetric games 0 0 0 6 2 3 4 30
Axiomatizations of the equal-loss and weighted equal-loss bargaining solutions 0 0 1 8 2 7 13 42
Bribing in first-price auctions 0 0 0 15 4 12 17 99
Bribing in second-price auctions 0 0 0 11 1 7 12 74
Cooperative bargaining: Independence and monotonicity imply disagreement 0 0 0 6 1 4 8 49
Disagreement point axioms and the egalitarian bargaining solution 0 0 0 31 1 6 8 113
Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions 0 0 0 12 0 6 9 68
First-best collusion without communication 0 0 0 10 3 6 10 66
Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality 0 0 0 2 3 8 10 33
Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games 0 0 0 6 2 3 5 43
Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution 0 0 0 5 0 5 9 45
Social objectives in general equilibrium 0 0 0 4 1 8 11 43
The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian 0 0 0 15 3 10 16 74
Weighted randomized dictatorship and the asymmetric Nash solution 0 0 0 5 1 5 7 41
Total Journal Articles 0 0 1 167 27 96 151 935

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04