Access Statistics for Philip J. Reny

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma 0 0 0 3 0 0 9 759
A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem without Closure under Suprema 0 0 0 60 0 0 4 736
A general solution to king Solomon's dilemma 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 13
A general solution to king Solomon's dilemma 0 0 1 15 0 0 5 75
An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism: Imperfect Information without Common Priors 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 12
An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism: Imperfect Information without Common Priors 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 24
Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information 0 0 1 39 0 0 8 103
Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 240
How To Count Citations If You Must 0 0 0 1 0 1 18 49
How To Count Citations If You Must 0 0 0 49 1 1 18 178
How To Count Citations If You Must 0 0 0 32 0 1 11 125
Implementation of Reduced Form Mechanisms: A Simple Approach and a New Characterization 0 0 0 28 0 1 14 70
Implementation of Reduced Form Mechanisms: A Simple Approach and a New Characterization 0 0 0 9 0 1 19 72
Local Payoff Security and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games 0 0 0 13 0 0 5 57
Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations 0 0 0 45 0 0 14 67
Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations 0 0 0 54 1 2 13 123
On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games 0 0 0 56 0 1 14 150
On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games 0 0 0 165 2 3 6 334
On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games 0 0 0 62 0 0 7 150
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions 0 0 0 135 0 1 28 406
Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views 0 0 0 177 0 0 8 623
The Better Half of Selling Separately 0 0 0 0 1 2 10 13
The Better Half of Selling Separately 0 0 0 6 0 2 9 47
The Partenered Core of a Game With Side Payments 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 232
The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments 0 0 0 36 0 1 16 120
The Past, Present, and Future of Economics: A Celebration of the 125-Year Anniversary of the JPE and of Chicago Economics 0 0 4 560 1 4 36 1,048
Why Sex? and Why Only in Pairs? 0 0 0 44 0 1 15 145
Why Sex? and Why Only in Pairs? 0 0 1 45 0 0 10 268
Why Sex? and Why Only in Pairs? 0 0 0 2 0 1 8 37
Total Working Papers 0 0 7 1,638 7 24 343 6,276

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
2004 World Congress Special Issue 0 0 0 10 0 1 6 51
A Characterization of Rationalizable Consumer Behavior 0 0 0 18 0 1 6 108
A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma 0 0 0 141 0 22 28 427
A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers 0 1 3 182 0 1 17 353
A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core 0 0 1 192 0 1 10 432
A canonical game—75 years in the making—showing the equivalence of matrix games and linear programming 0 0 1 3 0 0 16 26
A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem 0 0 5 209 1 4 27 532
A simple proof of the nonconcavifiability of functions with linear not-all-parallel contour sets 0 0 0 12 0 0 8 46
A simple proof of the sufficiency of Dilmé’s power-sequence test for Kreps-Wilson consistency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 16 0 1 6 48
An Efficient Auction 0 0 0 103 1 2 7 509
An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction 0 0 0 114 0 0 12 341
An extension of the KKMS theorem 0 0 0 26 0 0 8 145
An improved bound for the Shapley–Folkman theorem 0 0 0 16 0 0 12 51
Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach 3 3 7 532 4 8 32 1,244
Assignment Problems 0 0 0 12 1 3 6 82
Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria 0 0 0 167 1 2 8 638
Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information 1 1 1 86 1 2 9 284
Correlated Information and Mechanism Design 0 0 7 465 0 2 31 1,329
Corrigendum to “On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games” 0 0 0 11 1 1 8 47
Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market 0 0 0 23 0 2 5 138
Efficient Matching in the School Choice Problem 0 0 1 40 0 2 14 142
Equilibrium Existence in First‐Price Auctions With Private Values 0 0 4 4 1 2 15 15
Equilibrium in discontinuous games without complete or transitive preferences 0 0 0 8 1 2 10 56
Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal‐Agent Problems 1 2 3 10 1 2 9 61
Existence of subgame perfect equilibrium with public randomization: A short proof 0 0 0 29 0 0 10 111
Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction 0 0 0 133 0 0 13 465
How to Count Citations If You Must 0 0 1 73 0 1 24 660
Implementation of reduced form mechanisms: a simple approach and a new characterization 0 0 1 7 0 2 18 46
Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees 0 0 1 85 0 0 8 310
Introduction to the symposium on discontinuous games 0 0 0 2 0 0 9 32
Matching to share risk 0 0 0 14 0 1 9 108
Maximal revenue with multiple goods: nonmonotonicity and other observations 0 0 0 14 0 0 22 94
Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games 1 2 2 13 1 3 10 62
Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games 0 1 1 27 0 4 16 110
On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 384
On the Existence of Monotone Pure‐Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games 0 0 0 0 2 4 12 134
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions 0 0 0 52 1 4 24 321
On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games 0 0 0 2 2 7 28 2,162
On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games 0 0 1 212 2 4 11 418
On two methods for solving and estimating linear simultaneous equations under rational expectations 0 0 0 10 0 0 5 58
Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions 0 0 0 17 0 0 9 74
Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games 0 0 0 9 0 0 6 150
Rationality in Extensive-Form Games 0 0 0 112 0 0 6 323
Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views 0 0 0 46 0 0 13 152
Strategic approximations of discontinuous games 0 0 0 3 0 1 5 60
Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games 0 0 0 139 0 0 8 468
Tax incidence under imperfect competition: Comment 0 3 4 68 0 3 17 271
The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000. Vol. 1, 720 pp; Vol. 2, 672 pp 0 1 4 134 1 3 13 351
The Deterrent Effect of Cable System Clustering on Overbuilders: An Economic Analysis of Behrend v. Comcast 0 0 0 22 0 0 18 149
The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization 0 0 1 160 1 4 12 809
The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments 0 0 0 23 0 0 7 146
The partnered core of a game with side payments 0 0 0 2 0 1 15 46
The role of excess capacity in determining market power in natural gas transportation markets 0 0 0 49 0 0 9 158
Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium 0 0 0 223 1 2 12 608
Why Sex? And why only in Pairs? 0 0 0 15 0 1 13 414
Total Journal Articles 6 14 49 4,095 24 107 702 16,759

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Philip J. Reny on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 0 0 0 0 0 19 22 26
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 19 22 26

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Statistics updated 2026-10-11