Access Statistics for Ludovic Renou

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Afriat's Theorem and Samuelson's `Eternal Darkness' 0 0 0 64 2 2 5 154
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 1 21 0 0 3 112
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 0 60 1 1 4 191
Ambiguity revealed 0 0 1 137 3 4 5 234
Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Beliefs about Beliefs and Endogenous Formation of a Multi-lender Coalition in a Costly State Verification Model 0 0 0 49 0 0 3 299
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 28 0 0 2 178
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 26 2 4 5 158
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 33 3 3 3 146
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 0 5 6 9 29
Cognitive abilities and behavior in strategic-form games.* 0 0 0 100 1 7 8 239
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 0 10 0 1 1 27
Comparing Experiments in Discounted Problems 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 5
Comparing experiments in discounted problems 0 0 1 1 2 4 7 7
Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
Contracting over Persistent Information 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 11
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 1 15 1 1 3 34
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 0 0 16 2 2 4 27
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 0 1 2 0 1 3 9
Debt Contracts with ex-ante and ex-post Asymmetric Information: An Example 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 121
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 155 0 2 2 520
Dynamic Choice and Common Learning 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2
Dynamic Choices and Common Learning 0 1 1 3 0 2 4 12
From Ordients to Optimization: Substitution Effects without Differentiability 0 0 0 28 1 1 2 158
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 111
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 49 3 4 5 189
Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus at the Laboratory 0 0 0 102 4 4 6 500
Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium 0 0 0 35 1 2 4 172
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 100 4 6 6 370
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 26 4 4 4 160
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 22
Information Design in Multi-stage Games 0 0 0 11 0 0 4 22
Information design in multi-stage games 0 0 0 124 2 2 7 260
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks 0 0 0 100 2 3 3 218
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 65 1 3 5 153
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 14
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 0 120 0 0 2 445
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 1 142 0 2 4 1,024
More Strategies, More Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 7 1 1 5 98
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 188 1 3 5 473
On the Efficiency of Large Resale Networks 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3
Optimal debt contracts and diversity of opinions: an extreme case of bunching 0 0 0 55 0 0 2 237
Partnerships 0 0 0 66 0 1 2 205
Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication 1 2 2 53 1 2 5 12
Public Persuasion 0 1 4 59 2 8 21 141
Public Persuasion 0 0 0 19 3 3 6 38
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 0 1 3 104 0 1 4 271
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 0 1 4 67 2 4 8 191
Robust communication on networks 0 0 1 24 2 3 7 36
Statistical Discrimination and the Distribution of Wages 0 1 4 7 0 4 12 25
Supermodular Social Games 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 56
Supermodular social games 0 0 0 174 0 1 2 731
Which Wage Distributions are Consistent with Statistical Discrimination? 0 0 0 4 3 3 3 11
Which wage distributions are consistent with statistical discrimination? 1 1 3 77 3 5 10 196
Total Working Papers 2 8 28 2,594 65 118 235 9,108

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Didactic Example of Linear (Multidimensional) Screening Contracts 0 0 0 15 1 2 4 105
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 55 0 0 1 287
Afriat’s Theorem and Samuelson’s ‘Eternal Darkness’ 0 1 1 56 1 2 10 170
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments 0 0 1 10 0 0 2 50
Bilateral Trading in Networks 0 0 1 27 5 5 14 151
Bilateral commitment 0 0 0 21 3 6 7 145
Commitment games 0 1 2 212 4 9 20 3,332
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 9
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 20
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 43 1 1 1 243
Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in costly state verification models 0 0 0 6 1 1 1 35
Financial architecture: the role of higher order beliefs 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 23
Group Formation and Governance 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 66
Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium 0 0 0 30 3 3 6 196
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium 0 0 1 24 0 0 4 134
Information design in multi-stage games 0 0 0 1 4 4 8 19
Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games 0 0 0 11 1 3 4 63
Logical omniscience at the laboratory 0 0 0 24 1 2 4 69
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 0 0 0 3 1 2 6 35
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 0 0 0 12 1 1 1 74
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 24 5 12 15 174
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 2 45 1 3 6 216
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 41 1 3 3 136
Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models 0 0 0 28 2 4 4 151
Ordients: Optimization and comparative statics without utility functions 0 0 0 13 0 0 2 88
Repeated Nash implementation 0 0 0 4 4 6 8 47
Revealed Preferences over Risk and Uncertainty 0 2 9 194 6 13 40 688
Secure message transmission on directed networks 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 51
Total Journal Articles 0 4 17 907 49 88 183 6,777

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06