Access Statistics for Ludovic Renou

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 25
Afriat's Theorem and Samuelson's `Eternal Darkness' 0 0 0 64 2 4 7 156
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 1 21 2 2 5 114
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 0 60 2 3 6 193
Ambiguity revealed 0 0 1 137 1 5 6 235
Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Beliefs about Beliefs and Endogenous Formation of a Multi-lender Coalition in a Costly State Verification Model 0 0 0 49 1 1 4 300
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 28 0 0 2 178
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 0 3 9 12 32
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 26 3 6 8 161
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 33 0 3 3 146
Cognitive abilities and behavior in strategic-form games.* 1 1 1 101 3 9 10 242
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 27
Comparing Experiments in Discounted Problems 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 6
Comparing experiments in discounted problems 0 0 1 1 0 3 6 7
Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 25
Contracting over Persistent Information 0 0 0 2 2 3 5 13
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 1 15 0 1 3 34
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 0 1 2 1 1 4 10
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 0 0 16 1 3 4 28
Debt Contracts with ex-ante and ex-post Asymmetric Information: An Example 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 121
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 155 1 2 3 521
Dynamic Choice and Common Learning 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 3
Dynamic Choices and Common Learning 1 2 2 4 2 3 6 14
From Ordients to Optimization: Substitution Effects without Differentiability 0 0 0 28 1 2 3 159
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 49 0 4 5 189
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 35 2 2 2 113
Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus at the Laboratory 0 0 0 102 3 7 9 503
Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium 0 0 0 35 2 4 6 174
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 24
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 100 0 6 6 370
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 26 2 6 6 162
Information Design in Multi-stage Games 0 0 0 11 1 1 5 23
Information design in multi-stage games 0 0 0 124 2 4 8 262
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks 0 0 0 100 2 4 5 220
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 16
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 65 0 2 5 153
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 0 120 2 2 4 447
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 1 142 2 4 6 1,026
More Strategies, More Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 7 0 1 5 98
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 188 3 6 8 476
On the Efficiency of Large Resale Networks 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3
Optimal debt contracts and diversity of opinions: an extreme case of bunching 0 0 0 55 0 0 2 237
Partnerships 0 0 0 66 1 1 3 206
Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication 1 3 3 54 2 4 7 14
Public Persuasion 0 0 0 19 0 3 6 38
Public Persuasion 0 1 4 59 1 8 22 142
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 2 3 5 106 3 4 7 274
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 0 1 4 67 2 6 10 193
Robust communication on networks 0 0 1 24 4 6 11 40
Statistical Discrimination and the Distribution of Wages 0 1 2 7 2 3 10 27
Supermodular Social Games 0 0 0 4 1 2 3 57
Supermodular social games 0 0 0 174 2 3 4 733
Which Wage Distributions are Consistent with Statistical Discrimination? 0 0 0 4 0 3 3 11
Which wage distributions are consistent with statistical discrimination? 0 1 3 77 2 7 12 198
Total Working Papers 5 13 31 2,599 75 176 302 9,183

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Didactic Example of Linear (Multidimensional) Screening Contracts 0 0 0 15 1 3 5 106
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 55 2 2 3 289
Afriat’s Theorem and Samuelson’s ‘Eternal Darkness’ 1 1 2 57 4 5 13 174
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments 0 0 1 10 0 0 2 50
Bilateral Trading in Networks 0 0 1 27 1 6 15 152
Bilateral commitment 0 0 0 21 1 7 8 146
Commitment games 0 1 2 212 3 12 20 3,335
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 0 1 2 3 5 11
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 0 4 2 3 4 22
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 43 0 1 1 243
Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in costly state verification models 0 0 0 6 2 3 3 37
Financial architecture: the role of higher order beliefs 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 23
Group Formation and Governance 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 67
Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium 0 0 0 30 1 4 7 197
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium 0 0 1 24 1 1 5 135
Information design in multi-stage games 0 0 0 1 2 6 10 21
Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games 0 0 0 11 2 4 6 65
Logical omniscience at the laboratory 0 0 0 24 5 7 8 74
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 1 1 1 4 3 5 9 38
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 0 0 0 12 1 2 2 75
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 24 4 13 19 178
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 2 45 1 4 7 217
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 41 2 5 5 138
Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models 0 0 0 28 1 4 5 152
Ordients: Optimization and comparative statics without utility functions 0 0 0 13 2 2 4 90
Repeated Nash implementation 0 0 0 4 0 5 8 47
Revealed Preferences over Risk and Uncertainty 0 1 9 194 3 12 41 691
Secure message transmission on directed networks 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 51
Total Journal Articles 2 4 19 909 47 124 223 6,824

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2026-01-09