Access Statistics for Ludovic Renou

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 30
Afriat's Theorem and Samuelson's `Eternal Darkness' 0 0 0 64 1 9 13 163
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 0 60 3 8 12 199
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 1 21 1 6 8 118
Ambiguity revealed 0 0 1 137 0 3 8 237
Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments 0 0 0 0 3 6 6 10
Beliefs about Beliefs and Endogenous Formation of a Multi-lender Coalition in a Costly State Verification Model 0 0 0 49 0 1 4 300
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 33 3 5 8 151
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 28 4 8 10 186
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 0 2 7 14 36
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 26 0 14 18 172
Cognitive abilities and behavior in strategic-form games.* 0 1 1 101 0 6 13 245
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 0 10 0 3 4 30
Comparing Experiments in Discounted Problems 0 1 1 1 0 3 8 8
Comparing experiments in discounted problems 0 0 1 1 1 3 8 10
Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 28
Contracting over Persistent Information 0 0 0 2 1 7 9 18
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 0 15 0 2 4 36
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 0 1 2 0 3 6 12
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 0 0 16 2 4 7 31
Debt Contracts with ex-ante and ex-post Asymmetric Information: An Example 0 0 0 25 0 2 3 123
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 155 0 3 5 523
Dynamic Choice and Common Learning 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 6
Dynamic Choices and Common Learning 0 1 2 4 0 2 5 14
From Ordients to Optimization: Substitution Effects without Differentiability 0 0 0 28 0 3 4 161
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 35 0 5 5 116
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 49 2 4 9 193
Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus at the Laboratory 0 0 0 102 1 8 13 508
Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium 0 0 0 35 2 13 17 185
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 26 0 7 11 167
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 100 1 4 10 374
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 2 3 8 10 30
Information Design in Multi-stage Games 0 0 0 11 0 5 9 27
Information design in multi-stage games 0 0 0 124 2 8 12 268
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks 0 0 0 100 3 7 10 225
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 65 0 4 9 157
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 0 2 8 11 22
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 0 120 5 11 13 456
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 1 142 2 5 9 1,029
More Strategies, More Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 7 0 0 5 98
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 188 0 8 12 481
On the Efficiency of Large Resale Networks 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 7
Optimal debt contracts and diversity of opinions: an extreme case of bunching 0 0 0 55 1 4 5 241
Partnerships 0 0 0 66 0 3 5 208
Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication 0 1 3 54 1 6 9 18
Public Persuasion 0 0 0 19 1 5 11 43
Public Persuasion 0 1 5 60 1 4 25 145
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 0 0 4 67 1 10 18 201
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 0 3 6 107 0 8 12 279
Robust communication on networks 0 0 1 24 5 14 21 50
Statistical Discrimination and the Distribution of Wages 0 1 3 8 0 7 15 32
Supermodular Social Games 0 0 0 4 0 4 5 60
Supermodular social games 0 0 0 174 1 5 6 736
Which Wage Distributions are Consistent with Statistical Discrimination? 0 0 0 4 0 2 5 13
Which wage distributions are consistent with statistical discrimination? 0 0 2 77 2 9 18 205
Total Working Papers 0 9 33 2,603 59 313 520 9,421

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Didactic Example of Linear (Multidimensional) Screening Contracts 0 0 0 15 1 3 6 108
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 55 0 6 7 293
Afriat’s Theorem and Samuelson’s ‘Eternal Darkness’ 0 1 2 57 0 10 15 180
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments 0 0 0 10 1 7 8 57
Bilateral Trading in Networks 0 0 1 27 0 2 15 153
Bilateral commitment 0 0 0 21 3 7 14 152
Commitment games 0 0 2 212 1 9 25 3,341
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 12
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 0 4 2 7 9 27
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 43 0 3 4 246
Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in costly state verification models 0 0 0 6 0 7 8 42
Financial architecture: the role of higher order beliefs 0 0 0 2 0 4 5 27
Group Formation and Governance 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 68
Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium 0 0 0 30 0 9 15 205
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium 0 0 1 24 0 5 9 139
Information design in multi-stage games 0 1 1 2 1 8 16 27
Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games 0 0 0 11 1 6 9 69
Logical omniscience at the laboratory 0 0 0 24 1 10 13 79
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 0 1 1 4 0 6 12 41
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 0 0 0 12 2 5 6 79
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 24 1 7 21 181
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 2 45 0 8 14 224
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 41 1 6 9 142
Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models 0 0 0 28 1 8 12 159
Ordients: Optimization and comparative statics without utility functions 0 0 0 13 0 6 8 94
Repeated Nash implementation 0 0 0 4 0 3 11 50
Revealed Preferences over Risk and Uncertainty 1 2 9 196 4 11 44 699
Secure message transmission on directed networks 0 0 0 1 1 8 9 59
Total Journal Articles 1 5 19 912 21 176 335 6,953

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-03-04