Access Statistics for Ludovic Renou

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Afriat's Theorem and Samuelson's `Eternal Darkness' 0 0 0 64 0 0 3 152
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 0 60 0 1 3 190
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 1 21 0 1 3 112
Ambiguity revealed 0 1 1 137 0 1 2 230
Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Beliefs about Beliefs and Endogenous Formation of a Multi-lender Coalition in a Costly State Verification Model 0 0 0 49 0 0 3 299
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 26 1 1 3 155
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 28 0 2 2 178
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 23
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 143
Cognitive abilities and behavior in strategic-form games.* 0 0 1 100 1 1 3 233
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 27
Comparing Experiments in Discounted Problems 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 5
Comparing experiments in discounted problems 0 1 1 1 1 2 4 4
Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
Contracting over Persistent Information 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 10
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 1 15 0 0 2 33
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 25
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 1 1 2 1 3 3 9
Debt Contracts with ex-ante and ex-post Asymmetric Information: An Example 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 121
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 155 1 1 1 519
Dynamic Choice and Common Learning 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dynamic Choices and Common Learning 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 11
From Ordients to Optimization: Substitution Effects without Differentiability 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 157
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 49 0 1 1 185
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 111
Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus at the Laboratory 0 0 0 102 0 1 3 496
Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium 0 0 0 35 0 1 2 170
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 22
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 156
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 364
Information Design in Multi-stage Games 0 0 0 11 0 3 4 22
Information design in multi-stage games 0 0 0 124 0 0 7 258
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks 0 0 0 100 1 1 1 216
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 1 65 1 3 7 151
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 13
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 0 120 0 1 2 445
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 1 142 0 0 2 1,022
More Strategies, More Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 7 0 1 4 97
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 188 0 1 2 470
On the Efficiency of Large Resale Networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Optimal debt contracts and diversity of opinions: an extreme case of bunching 0 0 0 55 0 1 2 237
Partnerships 0 0 0 66 1 2 2 205
Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication 0 0 51 51 0 1 10 10
Public Persuasion 0 0 0 19 0 1 4 35
Public Persuasion 0 1 3 58 1 9 14 134
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 0 0 2 103 0 1 4 270
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 0 1 3 66 0 2 4 187
Robust communication on networks 0 0 1 24 1 1 5 34
Statistical Discrimination and the Distribution of Wages 0 0 5 6 3 4 16 24
Supermodular Social Games 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 55
Supermodular social games 0 0 0 174 0 0 1 730
Which Wage Distributions are Consistent with Statistical Discrimination? 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 8
Which wage distributions are consistent with statistical discrimination? 0 0 2 76 0 0 7 191
Total Working Papers 0 5 75 2,586 17 57 161 9,007

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Didactic Example of Linear (Multidimensional) Screening Contracts 0 0 0 15 0 0 2 103
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 55 0 1 1 287
Afriat’s Theorem and Samuelson’s ‘Eternal Darkness’ 1 1 1 56 1 3 12 169
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments 0 0 1 10 0 1 2 50
Bilateral Trading in Networks 0 0 1 27 0 3 10 146
Bilateral commitment 0 0 0 21 0 1 1 139
Commitment games 0 1 2 211 0 5 14 3,323
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 8
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 19
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 242
Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in costly state verification models 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 34
Financial architecture: the role of higher order beliefs 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 22
Group Formation and Governance 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 63
Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium 0 0 0 30 0 2 3 193
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium 0 0 1 24 0 1 4 134
Information design in multi-stage games 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 15
Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games 0 0 0 11 1 1 2 61
Logical omniscience at the laboratory 0 0 0 24 0 0 2 67
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 0 0 0 3 0 2 4 33
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 73
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 24 3 3 7 165
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 1 2 45 0 1 3 213
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 133
Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models 0 0 0 28 1 1 1 148
Ordients: Optimization and comparative statics without utility functions 0 0 0 13 0 1 2 88
Repeated Nash implementation 0 0 0 4 1 3 3 42
Revealed Preferences over Risk and Uncertainty 1 3 8 193 4 10 41 679
Secure message transmission on directed networks 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 51
Total Journal Articles 2 6 16 905 11 44 127 6,700

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Statistics updated 2025-10-06