Access Statistics for Ludovic Renou

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 31
Afriat's Theorem and Samuelson's `Eternal Darkness' 0 0 0 64 0 1 16 168
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 0 60 0 1 16 205
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 0 21 0 2 12 123
Ambiguity revealed 0 0 1 137 1 2 13 242
Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 12
Beliefs about Beliefs and Endogenous Formation of a Multi-lender Coalition in a Costly State Verification Model 0 0 0 49 0 0 2 301
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 26 0 0 22 176
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 33 0 0 12 155
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 0 1 1 19 41
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 28 0 0 15 191
Cognitive abilities and behavior in strategic-form games.* 0 0 1 101 0 0 16 248
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 1 11 0 3 8 34
Comparing Experiments in Discounted Problems 0 0 1 1 0 0 6 9
Comparing experiments in discounted problems 0 0 0 1 0 0 11 14
Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 30
Contracting over Persistent Information 0 0 0 2 0 0 9 19
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 0 15 1 2 7 40
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 0 0 16 0 0 6 31
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 0 0 2 0 0 8 16
Debt Contracts with ex-ante and ex-post Asymmetric Information: An Example 0 0 0 25 0 0 10 131
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 155 0 0 8 526
Dynamic Choice and Common Learning 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8
Dynamic Choices and Common Learning 0 0 2 4 0 0 6 16
From Ordients to Optimization: Substitution Effects without Differentiability 0 0 0 28 1 1 9 166
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 35 0 0 6 117
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 49 1 2 14 198
Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus at the Laboratory 0 0 0 102 0 3 19 514
Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium 0 0 0 35 0 1 17 187
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 2 0 0 13 34
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 100 0 0 12 376
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 26 0 1 15 171
Information Design in Multi-stage Games 0 0 0 11 1 1 12 32
Information design in multi-stage games 0 0 0 124 0 3 15 273
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks 0 0 0 100 0 0 11 226
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 65 0 3 13 163
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 25
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 0 120 0 0 15 459
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 0 142 0 1 16 1,038
More Strategies, More Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 98
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 188 1 2 18 487
On the Efficiency of Large Resale Networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 15
Optimal debt contracts and diversity of opinions: an extreme case of bunching 0 0 0 55 0 0 8 244
Partnerships 0 0 0 66 0 1 6 210
Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication 0 0 3 54 1 1 20 29
Public Persuasion 0 0 0 19 0 0 10 44
Public Persuasion 0 0 3 60 0 0 18 146
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 0 0 3 68 1 2 23 208
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 0 0 7 110 1 1 17 287
Robust communication on networks 0 0 0 24 0 2 21 54
Statistical Discrimination and the Distribution of Wages 0 0 2 8 0 1 19 40
Supermodular Social Games 0 0 0 4 0 0 6 61
Supermodular social games 0 0 0 174 0 1 8 738
Which Wage Distributions are Consistent with Statistical Discrimination? 0 0 1 5 0 1 12 20
Which wage distributions are consistent with statistical discrimination? 0 0 1 77 0 0 22 213
Total Working Papers 0 0 26 2,609 10 40 673 9,640

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Didactic Example of Linear (Multidimensional) Screening Contracts 0 0 0 15 0 2 13 116
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 55 0 0 12 298
Afriat’s Theorem and Samuelson’s ‘Eternal Darkness’ 0 0 2 57 0 2 16 184
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments 0 0 0 10 0 0 12 62
Bilateral Trading in Networks 0 0 0 27 0 0 8 154
Bilateral commitment 0 0 0 21 0 2 24 163
Commitment games 0 1 2 213 1 6 34 3,356
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 0 1 1 2 7 15
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 0 4 0 2 13 32
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 43 0 0 8 250
Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in costly state verification models 0 0 0 6 0 1 11 45
Financial architecture: the role of higher order beliefs 0 0 0 2 1 2 10 32
Group Formation and Governance 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 72
Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium 0 0 0 30 1 2 20 212
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium 0 0 0 24 0 0 8 141
Information design in multi-stage games 0 0 1 2 0 2 20 34
Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games 0 0 0 11 0 0 9 69
Logical omniscience at the laboratory 0 0 0 24 0 0 14 81
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 0 0 0 12 0 0 6 79
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 0 0 1 4 1 1 12 44
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 24 0 3 25 187
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 0 45 1 1 17 230
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 41 0 1 12 145
Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models 0 0 0 28 0 0 16 163
Ordients: Optimization and comparative statics without utility functions 0 0 0 13 0 1 10 98
Repeated Nash implementation 0 0 0 4 0 1 14 54
Revealed Preferences over Risk and Uncertainty 0 5 12 203 2 17 51 723
Secure message transmission on directed networks 0 0 0 1 0 1 12 63
Total Journal Articles 0 6 18 920 9 50 424 7,102

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Statistics updated 2026-08-07