Access Statistics for Ludovic Renou

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Afriat's Theorem and Samuelson's `Eternal Darkness' 0 0 0 64 0 2 4 152
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 1 21 0 0 2 111
Ambiguity Revealed 0 0 0 60 1 1 2 189
Ambiguity revealed 0 0 0 136 0 0 1 229
Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Beliefs about Beliefs and Endogenous Formation of a Multi-lender Coalition in a Costly State Verification Model 0 0 0 49 0 3 3 299
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 176
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 143
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 26 0 0 2 154
Bilateral Commitment 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 22
Cognitive abilities and behavior in strategic-form games.* 0 0 1 100 0 0 3 232
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 26
Comparing Experiments in Discounted Problems 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2
Comparing experiments in discounted problems 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
Contracting over Persistent Information 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 9
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 1 15 0 1 2 33
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 25
Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 6
Debt Contracts with ex-ante and ex-post Asymmetric Information: An Example 0 0 0 25 0 1 1 121
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 155 0 0 0 518
Dynamic Choice and Common Learning 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dynamic Choices and Common Learning 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 10
From Ordients to Optimization: Substitution Effects without Differentiability 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 157
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 111
Group formation and governance 0 0 0 49 0 0 1 184
Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus at the Laboratory 0 0 3 102 0 0 7 495
Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 169
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 20
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 156
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 364
Information Design in Multi-stage Games 0 0 0 11 0 1 1 19
Information design in multi-stage games 0 0 0 124 0 1 7 258
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks 0 0 0 100 0 0 1 215
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 13
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 1 65 0 0 4 148
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 1 142 0 0 2 1,022
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 0 120 0 0 1 444
More Strategies, More Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 7 0 0 3 96
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 188 0 0 1 469
On the Efficiency of Large Resale Networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Optimal debt contracts and diversity of opinions: an extreme case of bunching 0 0 0 55 0 0 1 236
Partnerships 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 203
Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication 0 0 51 51 0 0 9 9
Public Persuasion 0 2 2 57 0 5 6 125
Public Persuasion 0 0 0 19 0 2 3 34
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 0 2 3 103 0 2 5 269
Revealed preferences over risk and uncertainty 0 2 4 65 0 2 7 185
Robust communication on networks 1 1 1 24 2 2 4 33
Statistical Discrimination and the Distribution of Wages 0 1 5 6 1 3 17 20
Supermodular Social Games 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 55
Supermodular social games 0 0 0 174 0 0 1 730
Which Wage Distributions are Consistent with Statistical Discrimination? 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 8
Which wage distributions are consistent with statistical discrimination? 0 1 3 76 1 2 11 191
Total Working Papers 1 9 77 2,581 6 32 133 8,950

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Didactic Example of Linear (Multidimensional) Screening Contracts 0 0 0 15 1 1 2 103
A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 286
Afriat’s Theorem and Samuelson’s ‘Eternal Darkness’ 0 0 2 55 1 1 11 166
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments 0 0 1 10 0 0 2 49
Bilateral Trading in Networks 1 1 1 27 2 3 7 143
Bilateral commitment 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 138
Commitment games 0 0 1 210 0 2 9 3,318
Communication on networks and strong reliability 0 0 1 1 0 0 8 8
Contracting over persistent information 0 0 1 4 0 0 6 18
Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 242
Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in costly state verification models 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 34
Financial architecture: the role of higher order beliefs 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 22
Group Formation and Governance 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 62
Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 191
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium 0 1 1 24 0 3 5 133
Information design in multi-stage games 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 12
Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games 0 0 1 11 0 0 2 60
Logical omniscience at the laboratory 0 0 0 24 0 1 3 67
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 73
Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 31
Mechanism design and communication networks 0 0 0 24 1 2 5 162
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty 0 0 1 44 1 1 2 212
More strategies, more Nash equilibria 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 133
Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 147
Ordients: Optimization and comparative statics without utility functions 0 0 0 13 0 1 2 87
Repeated Nash implementation 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 39
Revealed Preferences over Risk and Uncertainty 0 1 9 190 5 9 42 669
Secure message transmission on directed networks 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 51
Total Journal Articles 1 3 19 899 11 27 116 6,656

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Statistics updated 2025-07-04