Access Statistics for Alessandro Riboni

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Collective Versus Individual Decisionmaking: A Case Study of the Bank of Israel Law 0 0 0 63 3 4 4 175
Deliberation in Committees: Theory and Evidence from the FOMC 0 0 0 41 2 2 3 167
Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions 0 0 0 109 1 4 5 228
Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions 0 1 1 10 1 2 4 57
Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions 0 0 0 7 1 1 2 56
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior 0 0 0 26 0 1 2 53
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior 0 0 0 33 0 0 1 37
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 55
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 36
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 37
Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution in Legislatures 1 1 1 4 1 3 3 29
Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution in Legislatures 0 0 0 64 2 2 4 205
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips 0 0 0 15 3 5 8 38
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips 0 0 1 27 2 3 7 96
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips 0 0 3 46 2 3 12 168
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips 0 0 1 16 1 2 5 60
Legal Efficiency and Consistency 0 0 1 37 2 3 8 166
Legal Efficiency and Consistency 0 0 1 18 7 9 13 140
Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 0 0 0 87 2 3 5 314
Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 0 0 0 49 0 0 1 155
Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 97
Membership Turnover and Policy Disagreement at the FOMC 0 1 1 1 3 6 6 6
Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority? 0 0 0 30 0 1 2 115
Monetary Policy by Committee:Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority? 0 0 0 116 0 0 4 325
Nation-Building, Nationalism and Wars 0 0 0 114 1 5 6 133
Nation-Building, Nationalism, and Wars 0 2 2 12 1 4 6 45
Nation-Building, Nationalism, and Wars 0 0 0 83 3 5 8 170
Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees 0 0 0 25 2 2 3 107
Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 54
Spending Biased Legislators - Discipline Through Disagreement 0 0 0 44 0 1 1 166
Statute Law or Case Law? 0 0 0 34 1 2 3 427
Statute Law or Case Law? 0 0 0 5 2 5 9 125
Statute Law or Case Law? 0 0 0 100 2 6 10 3,803
Statute Law or Case Law? 0 0 0 144 1 4 7 2,812
Statute law or case law? 0 0 0 5 2 2 5 102
Sticky Spending, Sequestration, and Government Debt 0 2 4 11 0 5 17 36
The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee 0 0 0 58 1 1 4 178
The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee 0 0 0 126 2 3 3 363
The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee 0 0 0 3 1 2 4 61
The Power of the Federal Reserve Chair 1 1 3 28 1 3 11 69
The Power of the Federal Reserve Chair 0 0 2 24 0 0 4 60
Unequal societies, Unequal Terms of Trade and Trade Policy 0 0 0 10 0 2 5 42
What Motivates Leaders to Invest in Nation-Building? 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 4
What Motivates Leaders to Invest in Nation-Building? 0 0 0 12 1 1 3 26
What Motivates Leaders to Invest in Nation-Building? 0 0 1 28 0 0 3 25
Why Stare Decisis? 0 0 0 32 1 4 4 324
Why Stare Decisis? 0 0 0 23 0 0 2 148
Total Working Papers 2 8 22 1,744 59 116 227 12,095

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
COMMITTEES AS SUBSTITUTES FOR COMMITMENT 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 91
Collective versus individual Decision-Making: A case study of the Bank of Israel Law 0 0 0 18 2 2 4 144
Dissent in monetary policy decisions 0 0 0 81 3 4 13 233
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour 0 0 0 3 2 3 6 58
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips 0 0 2 4 2 4 13 39
Ideology and endogenous constitutions 0 0 1 8 1 4 6 45
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, INNOVATION, AND GROWTH 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 12
Legal efficiency and consistency 0 0 1 19 1 2 17 141
Mind-changes at the FOMC 0 0 0 7 0 5 6 30
Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority? 0 0 1 111 1 2 10 444
Nation-building, nationalism, and $$\hbox {wars}^*$$ wars ∗ 0 0 3 37 7 9 23 188
Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees 0 0 0 81 0 1 2 238
Spending-Biased Legislators: Discipline Through Disagreement 0 0 2 19 4 4 11 211
Sticky Spending, Sequestration, and Government Debt 0 1 5 13 2 7 29 50
THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIR 0 0 2 7 1 1 11 27
The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee 0 0 0 55 1 3 5 180
The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee 0 0 0 3 1 1 5 15
Why Stare Decisis? 0 0 0 53 0 0 2 443
Total Journal Articles 0 1 17 527 29 54 166 2,589

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Central banking and monetary policy: Which will be the post-crisis new normal? Abstract: Central Bankers are currently facing big challenges in designing and implementing monetary policy, as well as with safeguarding financial stability, with the world economy still in the process of digesting the legacy of the crisis. The crisis has changed central banking in many ways: by shifting the focus of monetary policy from fighting too high inflation towards fighting too low inflation; by prompting new ‘experimental’ non-conventional measures, which risk to cause large, long-lasting market distortions and imbalances and which also have more far-reaching distributional consequences than ‘normal, conventional’ monetary policy; and by broadening central banks’ responsibilities particularly in the direction of safeguarding banking stability and financial stability at large. This raises several questions for the future: How long will ultra-easy monetary policies last? What are post-crisis growth trajectories, and how will the natural rate of interest rates evolve? How could an exit from ultra-easy monetary policy and a return towards higher nominal interest rates be eventually managed smoothly? Does ultra-easy monetary policy itself affect the economy in a lasting and structural way? Is the pre-crisis economic paradigm governing monetary policy still valid? If not, in what ways should it be adjusted? Are there any reasonable and practical alternatives? Against this background and given the larger post-crisis range of central banks’ responsibilities: is the current institutionalset-up governing central banks and their relationship to government, Parliament and the financial system still appropriate? What adaptations might be considered? Would they bring an improvement or, on the contrary, a set-back to the unsuccessful policy approaches of the 1960s and 1970s? 0 1 1 31 0 4 6 152
The SSM at 1 0 1 2 25 1 4 10 139
Total Books 0 2 3 56 1 8 16 291

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2025-12-06