Access Statistics for Alessandro Riboni

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Backlash and Culture Wars: A Political Economy Model 0 1 1 1 3 5 5 5
Collective Versus Individual Decisionmaking: A Case Study of the Bank of Israel Law 0 0 0 63 1 1 34 206
Deliberation and Policy Outcomes: Evidence from the Textual Analysis of FOMC Transcripts 0 1 2 2 4 9 11 11
Deliberation and Policy Outcomes: Evidence from the Textual Analysis of FOMC Transcripts * 0 1 4 4 2 5 19 19
Deliberation in Committees: Theory and Evidence from the FOMC 0 0 1 42 1 2 15 180
Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions 0 1 1 110 0 1 17 244
Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions 0 1 1 11 1 3 15 71
Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions 0 1 1 8 1 3 18 73
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior 0 0 0 6 1 3 8 43
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior 0 0 0 33 1 10 18 55
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior 0 0 0 6 2 3 9 64
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior 0 0 0 26 5 5 8 61
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 44
Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution in Legislatures 1 1 2 5 1 2 8 36
Dynamic Bargaining over Redistribution in Legislatures 0 0 0 64 3 5 18 221
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips 0 0 2 48 0 1 20 186
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips 0 0 0 27 2 4 21 115
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips 0 0 0 15 2 2 14 49
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips 0 0 0 16 1 2 15 74
Legal Efficiency and Consistency 0 0 0 37 2 3 21 185
Legal Efficiency and Consistency 1 1 2 20 3 6 23 156
Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 0 0 0 49 2 2 13 168
Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 0 0 0 87 2 4 17 329
Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 0 0 1 10 0 0 15 112
Membership Turnover and Policy Disagreement at the FOMC 0 1 4 5 1 3 16 19
Membership Turnover and Policy Disagreement at the FOMC 0 0 0 0 1 5 5 5
Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority? 0 0 0 30 2 2 6 121
Monetary Policy by Committee:Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority? 0 0 0 116 1 2 43 368
Nation-Building, Nationalism and Wars 0 0 3 117 0 1 17 149
Nation-Building, Nationalism, and Wars 0 0 1 84 1 5 25 192
Nation-Building, Nationalism, and Wars 0 0 1 13 3 5 26 70
Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees 0 0 1 26 0 0 11 116
Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees 0 0 0 3 1 1 6 60
Spending Biased Legislators - Discipline Through Disagreement 0 0 1 45 0 2 13 179
Statute Law or Case Law? 0 0 0 100 3 3 29 3,830
Statute Law or Case Law? 1 1 1 145 2 2 12 2,823
Statute Law or Case Law? 0 0 1 35 3 4 18 444
Statute Law or Case Law? 0 0 0 5 3 9 48 171
Statute law or case law? 0 0 0 5 2 2 12 112
Sticky Spending, Sequestration, and Government Debt 1 2 3 14 3 5 16 52
The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee 0 0 0 3 2 2 12 72
The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee 0 0 0 126 1 2 14 375
The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee 0 0 0 58 1 1 9 186
The Power of the Federal Reserve Chair 0 0 3 30 0 2 36 104
The Power of the Federal Reserve Chair 0 0 0 24 1 1 12 72
Unequal societies, Unequal Terms of Trade and Trade Policy 0 0 0 10 2 2 5 47
What Motivates Leaders to Invest in Nation-Building? 0 0 1 29 2 2 7 32
What Motivates Leaders to Invest in Nation-Building? 0 0 0 0 1 1 14 16
What Motivates Leaders to Invest in Nation-Building? 0 0 0 12 1 1 10 35
Why Stare Decisis? 0 0 0 23 3 5 23 171
Why Stare Decisis? 0 0 0 32 1 1 13 336
Total Working Papers 4 12 38 1,780 81 154 828 12,864


Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
COMMITTEES AS SUBSTITUTES FOR COMMITMENT 0 0 0 6 3 3 9 100
Collective versus individual Decision-Making: A case study of the Bank of Israel Law 0 0 0 18 1 1 12 154
Dissent in monetary policy decisions 0 2 3 84 2 11 34 264
Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour 0 0 0 3 0 3 9 65
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips 0 0 1 5 3 5 23 60
Ideology and endogenous constitutions 0 1 1 9 2 4 7 51
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, INNOVATION, AND GROWTH 0 0 0 2 2 2 10 21
Legal efficiency and consistency 0 0 1 20 2 4 20 160
Mind-changes at the FOMC 0 0 0 7 1 2 12 42
Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority? 0 1 4 115 4 7 24 467
Nation-building, nationalism, and $$\hbox {wars}^*$$ wars ∗ 1 2 11 48 5 8 59 240
Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees 0 0 0 81 1 2 13 251
Spending-Biased Legislators: Discipline Through Disagreement 0 0 1 20 0 1 22 229
Sticky Spending, Sequestration, and Government Debt 0 0 3 16 2 2 18 66
THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIR 0 0 3 10 4 5 62 88
The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee 0 0 0 55 1 1 8 187
The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee 0 0 0 3 1 2 8 22
Why Stare Decisis? 0 1 1 54 0 2 17 460
Total Journal Articles 1 7 29 556 34 65 367 2,927


Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Central banking and monetary policy: Which will be the post-crisis new normal? Abstract: Central Bankers are currently facing big challenges in designing and implementing monetary policy, as well as with safeguarding financial stability, with the world economy still in the process of digesting the legacy of the crisis. The crisis has changed central banking in many ways: by shifting the focus of monetary policy from fighting too high inflation towards fighting too low inflation; by prompting new ‘experimental’ non-conventional measures, which risk to cause large, long-lasting market distortions and imbalances and which also have more far-reaching distributional consequences than ‘normal, conventional’ monetary policy; and by broadening central banks’ responsibilities particularly in the direction of safeguarding banking stability and financial stability at large. This raises several questions for the future: How long will ultra-easy monetary policies last? What are post-crisis growth trajectories, and how will the natural rate of interest rates evolve? How could an exit from ultra-easy monetary policy and a return towards higher nominal interest rates be eventually managed smoothly? Does ultra-easy monetary policy itself affect the economy in a lasting and structural way? Is the pre-crisis economic paradigm governing monetary policy still valid? If not, in what ways should it be adjusted? Are there any reasonable and practical alternatives? Against this background and given the larger post-crisis range of central banks’ responsibilities: is the current institutionalset-up governing central banks and their relationship to government, Parliament and the financial system still appropriate? What adaptations might be considered? Would they bring an improvement or, on the contrary, a set-back to the unsuccessful policy approaches of the 1960s and 1970s? 0 0 0 31 5 5 17 169
The SSM at 1 0 0 0 25 4 4 14 152
Total Books 0 0 0 56 9 9 31 321


Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
What motivates leaders to invest in nation building? 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2


Statistics updated 2026-11-12