Access Statistics for Antonio Romero Medina

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Sex-equal" Stable matching 0 0 0 1 1 3 9 103
(Group) Strategy-proofness and stability in many-to many marching markets 0 0 0 50 1 3 10 119
- SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM 0 0 0 12 2 2 10 133
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 0 0 46 6 8 14 141
A methodology to measure hospital quality using physicians' choices over training vacancies 0 0 0 107 3 4 7 994
Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets 0 0 0 10 2 2 5 59
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 16 2 2 7 96
Boosting scientific research: evidence from a public program 0 0 0 19 1 4 10 212
COALITON FORMATION AND STABILITY 0 0 0 44 0 3 7 196
Can We Measure Hospital Quality from Physicians' Choices? 0 1 1 77 0 1 11 328
Centralized Course Allocation 1 1 1 149 2 4 14 880
Centralized Course Allocation 1 1 1 11 5 6 11 37
Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities 0 1 10 32 2 3 23 72
Converging to Efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program Experience 0 0 0 9 2 2 10 200
Converging to efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program experience 0 0 0 25 1 2 9 231
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 25 3 4 10 100
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 54 2 2 8 289
Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 67 2 4 9 205
Games of capacities: a (close) look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 41 1 6 13 205
Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 26 4 7 9 111
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 1 37 2 7 19 190
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 123 3 3 10 480
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 36 3 3 6 506
Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations 0 0 0 20 0 2 7 114
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 24
Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets 0 0 0 25 1 2 7 83
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 64 5 5 14 221
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 1 1 1 42 67
On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems 0 0 0 54 2 4 11 148
Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy 0 0 0 35 3 4 8 307
Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem 0 0 0 27 4 5 12 123
School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics 0 0 0 41 1 4 11 102
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 5 2 5 18 46
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 1 3 0 2 8 45
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 0 11 1 2 9 95
Stability in one-sided matching markets 0 0 0 16 1 2 8 88
Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation 0 0 1 1 3 4 13 19
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 0 2 305 1 2 9 62
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 0 0 94 1 4 8 256
Students' assessment of higher education in Spain 0 0 0 53 1 3 4 321
Students’ Assessment of Higher Education in Spain 0 0 0 54 2 3 10 225
Students’ assessment of higher education in Spain 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 7
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 150 1 1 9 575
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 34 2 5 19 514
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 0 79 3 3 8 195
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 75 3 4 15 247
Understanding preference formation in a matching market 0 0 1 46 0 3 14 241
Wage expectations for higher education students in Spain 0 1 1 68 1 6 14 285
Total Working Papers 2 5 20 2,278 90 163 532 10,297

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 0 1 2 3 4 11 12
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 51 3 3 17 777
BOOSTING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC PROGRAM 0 0 0 29 3 4 10 305
CAN WE INFER HOSPITAL QUALITY FROM MEDICAL GRADUATES’ RESIDENCY CHOICES? 0 0 0 44 3 4 11 729
Coalition Formation and Stability 0 0 0 104 0 2 8 872
Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets 0 0 1 62 7 9 14 806
Fair student placement 0 0 0 63 0 4 12 797
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 0 73 1 2 12 819
Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations 0 0 2 85 1 2 10 980
Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market 0 0 0 120 2 2 11 1,245
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 67 1 1 7 877
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 40 0 3 8 323
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 64 2 2 10 793
Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations 0 0 0 49 1 3 14 731
School choice with transferable student characteristics 0 0 0 4 2 3 15 26
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 94 3 3 9 882
Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems 0 0 3 144 2 5 19 1,392
Stability in coalition formation games 0 0 0 187 1 3 9 1,262
Strategic priority-based course allocation 0 0 1 2 6 10 25 34
Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence 0 0 1 8 2 2 5 30
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 4 7 3 3 20 29
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 0 45 3 3 8 710
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 2 5 7 15 32
Wage Expectations for Higher Education Students in Spain 0 0 0 44 1 2 6 754
`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings 0 0 0 65 4 4 13 838
Total Journal Articles 0 0 13 1,455 59 90 299 16,055

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06