Access Statistics for Antonio Romero Medina

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Sex-equal" Stable matching 0 0 0 1 0 2 10 104
(Group) Strategy-proofness and stability in many-to many marching markets 0 0 0 50 1 2 11 120
- SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM 0 0 0 12 1 3 11 134
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 0 0 46 1 7 15 142
A methodology to measure hospital quality using physicians' choices over training vacancies 0 0 0 107 0 4 8 995
Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets 0 0 0 10 0 2 5 59
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 16 0 3 8 97
Boosting scientific research: evidence from a public program 0 0 0 19 0 1 10 212
COALITON FORMATION AND STABILITY 0 0 0 44 1 1 7 197
Can We Measure Hospital Quality from Physicians' Choices? 0 0 1 77 0 1 11 329
Centralized Course Allocation 0 1 1 149 1 4 16 882
Centralized Course Allocation 0 1 1 11 0 5 11 37
Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities 0 0 3 32 0 2 12 72
Converging to Efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program Experience 0 0 0 9 0 2 10 200
Converging to efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program experience 0 0 0 25 1 3 11 233
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 54 0 2 8 289
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 25 0 3 10 100
Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 67 0 2 8 205
Games of capacities: a (close) look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 41 0 1 13 205
Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 26 0 5 10 112
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 1 37 2 4 21 192
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 36 0 4 7 507
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 123 0 3 9 480
Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations 0 0 0 20 0 1 5 115
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 24
Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets 0 0 0 25 0 2 8 84
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 64 0 7 14 223
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 1 0 1 42 67
On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems 0 0 0 54 0 2 11 148
Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy 0 0 0 35 1 4 9 308
Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem 0 0 0 27 0 4 12 123
School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics 0 0 0 41 0 2 12 103
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 5 0 2 18 46
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 0 3 1 2 9 47
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 0 11 0 1 9 95
Stability in one-sided matching markets 0 0 0 16 0 3 10 90
Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation 0 0 1 1 3 6 15 22
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 0 2 305 0 1 9 62
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 0 0 94 1 3 10 258
Students' assessment of higher education in Spain 0 1 1 54 0 3 6 323
Students’ Assessment of Higher Education in Spain 0 0 0 54 0 2 10 225
Students’ assessment of higher education in Spain 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 8
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 150 0 1 8 575
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 34 0 3 20 515
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 0 79 0 3 8 195
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 75 0 4 14 248
Understanding preference formation in a matching market 0 0 0 46 0 0 13 241
Wage expectations for higher education students in Spain 0 0 1 68 1 2 15 286
Total Working Papers 0 3 12 2,279 15 127 542 10,334

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 0 1 2 0 4 12 13
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 51 0 5 19 779
BOOSTING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC PROGRAM 0 0 0 29 0 4 11 306
CAN WE INFER HOSPITAL QUALITY FROM MEDICAL GRADUATES’ RESIDENCY CHOICES? 0 0 0 44 0 3 11 729
Coalition Formation and Stability 0 0 0 104 1 2 8 874
Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets 0 0 1 62 0 8 14 807
Fair student placement 0 0 0 63 0 0 12 797
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 0 73 0 2 13 820
Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations 0 0 0 85 1 2 8 981
Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market 0 0 0 120 1 3 10 1,246
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 67 0 1 7 877
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 40 0 2 10 325
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 64 0 2 9 793
Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations 0 0 0 49 0 2 14 732
School choice with transferable student characteristics 0 0 0 4 0 2 15 26
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 94 0 3 9 882
Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems 0 0 1 144 0 4 19 1,394
Stability in coalition formation games 1 2 2 189 1 3 10 1,264
Strategic priority-based course allocation 0 0 1 2 1 7 24 35
Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence 0 0 0 8 1 4 6 32
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 1 7 0 4 18 30
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 0 45 0 5 10 712
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 2 1 8 18 35
Wage Expectations for Higher Education Students in Spain 0 0 0 44 1 2 7 755
`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings 0 0 0 65 1 6 15 840
Total Journal Articles 1 2 7 1,457 9 88 309 16,084

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Statistics updated 2026-07-10