Access Statistics for Antonio Romero Medina

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Sex-equal" Stable matching 0 0 0 1 1 4 5 99
(Group) Strategy-proofness and stability in many-to many marching markets 0 0 1 50 0 0 4 110
- SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM 0 0 0 12 2 3 6 128
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 0 0 46 3 4 6 131
A methodology to measure hospital quality using physicians' choices over training vacancies 0 0 0 107 1 1 1 988
Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets 0 0 0 10 1 1 1 55
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 89
Boosting scientific research: evidence from a public program 0 0 0 19 1 2 4 204
COALITON FORMATION AND STABILITY 0 0 0 44 0 0 2 190
Can We Measure Hospital Quality from Physicians' Choices? 0 0 0 76 1 5 7 323
Centralized Course Allocation 0 0 1 10 0 1 2 27
Centralized Course Allocation 0 0 0 148 2 3 9 869
Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities 0 2 18 31 0 2 30 63
Converging to Efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program Experience 0 0 0 9 1 2 2 192
Converging to efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program experience 0 0 0 25 1 2 3 224
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 54 3 3 9 284
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 25 0 2 4 93
Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 1 67 1 1 5 200
Games of capacities: a (close) look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 41 3 3 4 195
Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 26 1 1 2 104
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 0 36 1 4 5 176
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 36 1 1 3 501
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 123 1 1 3 472
Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations 0 0 0 20 0 0 6 110
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 19
Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 76
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 1 64 1 2 9 212
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 1 1 3 3 28
On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems 0 0 0 54 0 0 2 137
Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy 0 0 0 35 0 1 1 300
Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem 0 0 0 27 2 4 5 115
School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics 0 0 0 41 2 2 5 95
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 5 1 3 5 32
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 1 3 2 2 4 40
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 0 11 1 4 6 90
Stability in one-sided matching markets 0 0 0 16 0 1 2 81
Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation 0 1 1 1 0 2 11 11
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 1 1 304 1 4 6 57
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 0 0 94 0 1 2 249
Students' assessment of higher education in Spain 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 317
Students’ Assessment of Higher Education in Spain 0 0 0 54 0 1 3 217
Students’ assessment of higher education in Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 34 1 3 6 498
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 150 2 3 4 570
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 2 79 1 2 6 189
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 2 75 5 6 13 240
Understanding preference formation in a matching market 0 0 1 46 1 4 5 232
Wage expectations for higher education students in Spain 0 0 0 67 1 2 2 273
Total Working Papers 0 4 30 2,271 48 97 226 9,906

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 5
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 51 2 4 13 769
BOOSTING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC PROGRAM 0 0 0 29 0 2 3 297
CAN WE INFER HOSPITAL QUALITY FROM MEDICAL GRADUATES’ RESIDENCY CHOICES? 0 0 0 44 0 0 2 718
Coalition Formation and Stability 0 0 0 104 1 3 9 870
Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets 0 0 0 61 0 0 4 794
Fair student placement 0 0 0 63 2 3 8 789
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 0 73 3 4 8 813
Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations 0 0 2 85 0 1 8 974
Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market 0 0 1 120 2 2 13 1,240
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 67 2 2 6 872
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 315
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 64 3 4 10 789
Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations 0 0 0 49 3 3 10 722
School choice with transferable student characteristics 0 0 0 4 4 8 11 20
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 94 1 3 7 877
Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems 0 1 4 144 0 7 19 1,382
Stability in coalition formation games 0 0 1 187 1 2 10 1,256
Strategic priority-based course allocation 1 1 1 2 2 5 14 16
Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence 0 0 1 8 1 1 2 27
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 1 4 7 2 7 11 19
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 0 45 2 3 6 706
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 1 2 2 2 4 19
Wage Expectations for Higher Education Students in Spain 0 0 0 44 0 2 4 750
`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings 0 0 0 65 0 6 11 831
Total Journal Articles 1 3 16 1,454 35 77 197 15,870

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06