Access Statistics for Antonio Romero Medina

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Sex-equal" Stable matching 0 0 0 1 1 3 8 102
(Group) Strategy-proofness and stability in many-to many marching markets 0 0 0 50 0 6 9 118
- SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM 0 0 0 12 0 2 8 131
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 0 0 46 0 4 8 135
A methodology to measure hospital quality using physicians' choices over training vacancies 0 0 0 107 1 3 4 991
Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets 0 0 0 10 0 0 3 57
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 16 0 3 5 94
Boosting scientific research: evidence from a public program 0 0 0 19 3 5 10 211
COALITON FORMATION AND STABILITY 0 0 0 44 1 6 7 196
Can We Measure Hospital Quality from Physicians' Choices? 1 1 1 77 1 3 12 328
Centralized Course Allocation 0 0 0 10 0 4 6 32
Centralized Course Allocation 0 0 0 148 0 9 12 878
Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities 0 1 13 32 0 7 27 70
Converging to Efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program Experience 0 0 0 9 0 5 8 198
Converging to efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program experience 0 0 0 25 0 5 8 230
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 54 0 2 7 287
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 25 0 4 7 97
Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 67 2 3 7 203
Games of capacities: a (close) look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 41 1 8 12 204
Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 26 0 3 5 107
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 1 1 37 0 12 17 188
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 36 0 2 3 503
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 123 0 3 7 477
Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations 0 0 0 20 1 3 7 114
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 24
Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets 0 0 0 25 0 5 7 82
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 64 0 4 9 216
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 1 0 1 41 66
On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems 0 0 0 54 0 6 9 146
Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy 0 0 0 35 1 4 5 304
Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem 0 0 0 27 0 4 8 119
School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics 0 0 0 41 1 6 10 101
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 5 3 9 16 44
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 0 11 1 2 8 94
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 1 3 0 2 8 45
Stability in one-sided matching markets 0 0 0 16 1 4 7 87
Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation 0 0 1 1 0 5 10 16
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 0 0 94 0 6 7 255
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 0 2 305 0 2 8 61
Students' assessment of higher education in Spain 0 0 0 53 0 2 3 320
Students’ Assessment of Higher Education in Spain 0 0 0 54 0 5 8 223
Students’ assessment of higher education in Spain 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 6
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 34 0 10 17 512
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 150 0 3 8 574
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 1 79 0 2 6 192
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 75 1 3 12 244
Understanding preference formation in a matching market 0 0 1 46 1 7 14 241
Wage expectations for higher education students in Spain 0 1 1 68 0 10 13 284
Total Working Papers 1 4 22 2,276 20 214 453 10,207

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 0 1 2 1 4 8 9
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 51 0 4 14 774
BOOSTING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC PROGRAM 0 0 0 29 0 3 7 302
CAN WE INFER HOSPITAL QUALITY FROM MEDICAL GRADUATES’ RESIDENCY CHOICES? 0 0 0 44 0 7 8 726
Coalition Formation and Stability 0 0 0 104 2 2 8 872
Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets 0 1 1 62 0 4 7 799
Fair student placement 0 0 0 63 2 8 12 797
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 0 73 1 4 11 818
Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations 0 0 2 85 0 4 9 979
Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market 0 0 0 120 0 2 10 1,243
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 67 0 3 6 876
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 40 1 8 8 323
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 64 0 2 8 791
Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations 0 0 0 49 2 6 13 730
School choice with transferable student characteristics 0 0 0 4 0 3 13 24
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 94 0 1 6 879
Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems 0 0 3 144 2 6 18 1,390
Stability in coalition formation games 0 0 0 187 1 5 9 1,261
Strategic priority-based course allocation 0 0 1 2 1 10 20 28
Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence 0 0 1 8 0 1 3 28
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 4 7 0 4 17 26
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 0 45 0 1 5 707
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 2 0 7 10 27
Wage Expectations for Higher Education Students in Spain 0 0 0 44 0 2 5 753
`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings 0 0 0 65 0 3 10 834
Total Journal Articles 0 1 13 1,455 13 104 245 15,996

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-04-09