Access Statistics for Agnieszka Rusinowska

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks 0 0 0 9 0 0 12 18
A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks 0 0 0 26 0 1 15 42
A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks 0 0 0 23 0 20 33 70
A Model of Influence Based on Aggregation Function 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 17
A Model of Influence Based on Aggregation Function 0 0 0 17 0 2 10 28
A Model of Influence Based on Aggregation Function 0 0 0 8 0 1 7 21
A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 22
A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 19
A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 17
A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 28
A Relation-algebraic Approach to Simple Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 41
A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics 0 0 0 2 1 3 32 47
A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics 0 0 0 0 1 3 20 36
A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 24
A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics 0 1 2 19 0 6 23 58
A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics 0 0 0 4 0 3 15 30
A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics 0 0 0 2 0 1 11 34
A consensus model of political decision-making 0 0 0 42 0 0 12 310
A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities 0 0 0 1 0 1 11 24
A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 17
A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities 0 0 0 14 1 2 11 59
A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities 0 0 0 21 0 1 5 15
A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities 0 0 0 20 0 1 11 24
A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities 0 0 0 16 0 2 10 46
A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities 0 0 0 39 0 3 14 87
A dynamic analysis of criminal networks 0 0 0 5 0 2 17 20
A dynamic analysis of criminal networks 0 0 1 15 0 1 16 28
A dynamic analysis of criminal networks 0 0 0 15 1 1 57 68
A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents 0 0 0 2 0 1 6 20
A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents 0 0 0 3 0 0 14 61
A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents 0 0 0 6 0 0 16 28
A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents 0 0 0 2 0 1 11 28
A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents 0 0 0 19 1 1 18 77
A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 15
A model of influence based on aggregation functions 0 0 0 25 0 1 7 87
A model of influence based on aggregation functions 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 23
A model of influence based on aggregation functions 0 0 0 49 0 0 12 89
A model of influence in a social network 0 0 0 112 0 1 6 245
A model of influence in a social network 0 0 0 168 0 1 9 150
A model of influence in a social network 0 0 0 16 0 1 9 28
A model of influence in a social network 0 0 0 168 0 1 10 302
A model of influence in a social network 0 0 0 0 0 1 16 30
A model of influence with a continuum of actions 0 0 0 28 0 0 15 180
A model of influence with a continuum of actions 0 0 0 34 1 1 13 66
A model of influence with a continuum of actions 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 14
A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions 0 0 0 0 1 2 19 37
A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions 0 0 0 24 0 0 9 83
A model of influence with a continuum of actions 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 16
A model of influence with a continuum of actions 0 0 0 4 1 1 12 53
A relation-algebraic approach to simple games 0 0 0 14 0 1 11 54
A relation-algebraic approach to simple games 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 15
A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 13
A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations 0 0 0 22 0 0 4 74
A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations 0 0 0 1 0 2 8 38
A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 17
A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations 0 0 0 28 0 1 9 163
A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 14
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Coalition Formation 0 0 0 19 0 0 4 62
An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes 0 0 0 35 0 1 35 93
An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes 0 0 0 38 0 1 11 50
An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 15
An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes 0 0 0 14 0 0 11 32
An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes 0 0 0 28 0 3 13 19
An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes 0 0 0 20 0 1 15 32
An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time 0 0 0 16 0 0 12 36
An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time 0 0 0 13 0 1 10 67
An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 16
An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 15
An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time 0 0 0 15 0 0 4 321
An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8
Anonymous Social Influence 0 0 0 2 0 1 12 37
Anonymous social influence 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 23
Anonymous social influence 0 0 0 33 0 0 7 19
Anonymous social influence 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 27
Anonymous social influence 0 0 0 6 0 1 29 105
Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation 0 1 2 8 1 2 16 54
Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation 0 0 0 97 0 2 11 421
Applying Relation Algebra and RelView to Measures in a Social Network 0 0 2 78 0 1 12 254
Applying Relation Algebra and RelView to Measures in aSocial Network 0 0 0 6 0 1 10 61
Applying relational algebra and RelView to coalition formation 0 0 0 4 0 0 19 80
Applying relational algebra and RelView to measures in a social network 0 0 0 0 0 1 92 103
Applying relational algebra and RelView to measures in a social network 0 0 0 32 0 0 9 71
Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies 0 0 1 7 0 2 11 18
Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies 0 0 1 17 0 2 8 37
Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies 0 0 1 22 2 2 14 47
Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 10
Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 21
Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10
Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 12
Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp 0 0 0 11 0 0 9 63
Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 8
Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility 0 0 0 40 0 2 11 214
Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 11
Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility 0 0 0 12 0 1 11 85
Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility 0 0 0 10 0 2 6 13
Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility 0 0 0 13 0 0 6 38
Collective Decision Making: Views from Social Choice and Game Theory 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 23
Collective Decision Making: Views from Social Choice and Game Theory 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 66
Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting 0 0 0 6 0 1 9 15
Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting 0 18 18 18 0 4 4 4
Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting 0 0 1 8 0 2 13 17
Competing for Influence in Networks through Strategic Targeting 0 0 0 10 0 3 13 22
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks 0 0 0 19 0 0 7 21
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 18
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks 0 0 0 24 0 1 1 25
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks 0 0 0 35 0 0 11 57
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 15
Computational Social Choice Using Relation Algebra and RelView 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 13
Computations on Simple Games using REL VIEW 0 0 0 13 0 2 9 45
Computations on Simple Games using REL VIEW 0 0 0 12 0 1 13 78
Computations on Simple Games using REL VIEW 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 12
Computations on Simple Games using RelView 0 0 0 26 0 0 7 48
Computations on Simple Games using RelView 0 0 0 0 1 4 8 18
Computing Tournament Solutions using Relation Algebra and REL VIEW 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 9
Computing Tournament Solutions using Relation Algebra and REL VIEW 0 0 0 12 0 1 15 100
Computing Tournament Solutions using Relation Algebra and REL VIEW 0 0 0 5 0 2 7 35
Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView 0 0 0 4 0 2 11 24
Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 21
Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 12
Consensus reaching in committees 0 0 0 16 0 1 8 88
Degree Centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility and Externalities in Networks 0 0 1 11 0 2 14 26
Degree centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks 0 0 0 9 0 0 4 9
Degree centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks 0 0 0 7 0 1 12 24
Degree centrality, von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 6
Degree centrality, von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6
Determining influential models 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 16
Determining influential models 0 0 0 24 1 2 7 43
Determining influential models 0 0 0 33 0 0 13 60
Determining models of influence 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 13
Determining models of influence 0 0 0 30 0 2 11 25
Determining models of influence 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 19
Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games 0 0 0 49 0 0 7 96
Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 12
Diffusion in countably infinite networks 0 0 0 4 1 1 3 52
Diffusion in countably infinite networks 0 0 0 9 0 0 7 15
Diffusion in countably infinite networks 0 0 0 7 0 1 9 42
Diffusion in large networks 0 0 0 28 0 1 12 18
Diffusion in large networks 0 0 0 10 0 1 11 15
Diffusion in large networks 0 0 0 13 0 1 5 9
Dynamic Network Formation with Farsighted Players and Limited Capacities 0 0 12 12 1 3 19 19
Dynamic network formation with farsighted players and limited capacities 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 2
Dynamic network formation with farsighted players and limited capacities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dynamic network formation with farsighted players and limited capacities 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7
Effects of opening national markets on the intensity competition (theoretical approach) 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 11
Effects of opening national markets on the intensity competition (theoretical approach) 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Efficiency versus fairness in link recommendation algorithms 0 0 2 12 0 0 13 31
Formation of international environmental agreements and payoff allocation 0 0 11 11 0 0 20 20
Holdout threats during wage bargaining 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 9
Holdout threats during wage bargaining 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10
Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 17
Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining 0 0 0 5 0 0 11 52
Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 11
Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 17 0 1 8 36
Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 23
Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 9
Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 11
Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 16 0 1 8 18
Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 20
Influence Indices 0 0 0 16 0 0 5 37
Influence Indices 0 0 0 5 0 0 8 43
Influence Indices 0 0 0 37 0 2 10 173
Influence functions, followers and command games 0 0 0 15 0 0 17 57
Influence functions, followers and command games 0 0 0 5 0 0 10 70
Influence functions, followers and command games 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 18
Influence functions, followers and command games 0 0 0 13 0 1 15 77
Influence functions, followers and command games 0 0 0 0 1 1 35 47
Influence functions, followers and command games 0 0 0 7 0 0 7 113
Influence functions, followers and command games 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 20
Influence functions, followers and command games 0 0 0 14 0 0 10 140
Influence in social networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 11
Influence in social networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 10
Influence in social networks 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 26
Influence in social networks 0 0 0 0 2 2 10 26
Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations 0 0 0 21 0 1 9 55
Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations 0 0 0 25 0 0 8 25
Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations 0 0 1 17 0 1 22 111
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 6 0 1 4 40
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 45 0 1 9 55
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 9
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 11 0 1 14 113
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 18 0 1 13 97
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence 0 0 1 30 0 2 10 127
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 36 0 0 9 31
Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 41
Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 24
Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 26
Ingratiation in the lab 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 12
Ingratiation in the lab 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 17
Ingratiation in the lab 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 29
Ingratiation in the lab 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 20
Ingratiation in the lab 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8
Ingratiation in the lab 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 27
Ingratiation in the lab 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9
Ingratiation in the lab 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 13
Ingratiation: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 20 0 1 8 18
Ingratiation: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 13 1 1 12 102
Iterating influence between players in a social network 0 0 0 37 0 0 8 103
Iterating influence between players in a social network 0 0 0 0 1 2 9 19
Iterating influence between players in a social network 0 0 0 34 1 2 13 47
Lattices in social networks with influence 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 13
Lattices in social networks with influence 0 0 0 32 0 0 7 19
Lattices in social networks with influence 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 15
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders 0 0 0 33 0 0 5 16
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 12
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders 0 0 0 10 0 1 7 23
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization 0 0 0 20 0 3 11 60
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization 0 0 0 12 0 0 9 91
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 16
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization 0 0 0 8 0 0 12 70
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 24
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties 0 0 0 26 0 1 8 92
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties 0 0 0 40 0 2 11 176
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Properties of the Qualified Majority Case 0 0 0 35 0 1 13 165
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Properties of the Qualified Majority Case 0 0 0 28 0 0 7 107
Measuring influence among players with an ordered set of possible actions 0 0 0 2 0 0 11 41
Measuring influence among players with an ordered set of possible actions 0 0 0 20 0 0 13 98
Measuring influence among players with an ordered set of possible actions 0 0 0 10 0 0 6 31
Measuring influence in command games 0 0 0 21 0 1 20 68
Measuring influence in command games 0 0 0 17 0 0 12 65
Measuring influence in command games 0 0 0 1 0 0 10 20
Measuring influence in command games 0 0 0 19 0 1 13 126
Measuring influence in command games 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 8
Measuring influence in command games 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 28
Measuring influence in command games 0 0 0 1 0 1 9 62
Measuring influence in command games 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 49
Modifying the Hoede-Bakker index to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices 0 0 0 13 0 1 12 84
Modifying the Hoede-Bakker index to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices 0 0 0 10 0 0 12 40
Negotiating a stable government - an application of bargaining theory to a coalition formation model 0 0 0 15 1 2 8 74
Network-based allocation of responsibility for GHG emissions 0 0 0 4 0 0 10 15
Network-based allocation of responsibility for GHG emissions 0 0 0 2 0 2 12 20
Network-based allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Network-based allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 10
Network-based allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 8
On Different Ranking Methods 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 10
On Different Ranking Methods 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 8
On Different Ranking Methods 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6
On Some Procedures of Forming a Multi-partner Alliance 0 0 0 17 0 0 9 77
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 11
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 12 0 0 6 31
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 15 0 0 7 56
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 0 0 2 28 39
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 12
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 11 1 2 11 23
On some procedures of forming a multi partner alliance 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 25
On some properties of the Hoede-Bakker index 0 0 0 4 0 1 6 48
On the design of public debate in social networks 1 1 1 8 1 1 5 9
On the design of public debate in social networks 0 0 0 14 0 0 7 21
On the design of public debate in social networks 0 0 0 16 0 0 6 13
On the design of public debate in social networks 0 0 0 8 0 0 7 12
On the design of public debate in social networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 15
On the design of public debate in social networks 0 0 0 28 1 1 12 61
On the not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 17
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinion 0 0 0 0 0 2 114 121
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions 0 0 0 40 0 2 38 124
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 38
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions 0 0 0 17 0 1 13 52
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions 0 0 0 8 0 3 8 17
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 20
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 16
Ordered Weighted Averaging in Social Networks 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 16
Ordered Weighted Averaging in Social Networks 0 0 0 91 0 1 15 124
Ordered Weighted Averaging in Social Networks 0 0 0 34 0 1 11 51
Power in plurality games 1 1 2 16 1 1 18 44
Power in plurality games 0 0 0 14 0 1 12 18
Power in plurality voting games 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 6
Power in plurality voting games 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
Power in plurality voting games 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 7
Social networks: Prestige, centrality, and influence (Invited paper) 0 0 0 1 1 1 10 26
Social networks: Prestige, centrality, and influence (Invited paper) 0 0 0 95 0 2 11 189
Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 12
Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 9
Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 12
Strategic influence in social networks 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 16
Strategic influence in social networks 0 0 0 16 0 1 11 49
Strategic influence in social networks 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 26
Strategic influence in social networks 0 0 0 85 1 2 19 179
Strategic influence in social networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 102
Strategic influence in social networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 46
The Degree Measure as Utility Function over Positions in Networks 0 0 0 55 0 0 11 89
The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 29
The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks 0 0 0 12 0 0 8 22
The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks 0 0 0 2 1 3 12 33
The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks 0 0 0 5 0 0 13 49
The Hoede-Bakker index modified to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices 0 0 0 16 0 0 6 48
The Hoede-Bakker index modified to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices 0 0 0 1 0 2 8 40
The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 10
The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs 0 0 1 2 0 1 11 13
The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 9
The degree measure as utility function over positions in networks 0 0 0 56 0 0 14 90
The degree measure as utility function over positions in networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 21
The degree measure as utility function over positions in networks 0 0 0 11 0 0 4 38
The degree ratio ranking method for directed graphs 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 21
The degree ratio ranking method for directed graphs 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 17
The degree ratio ranking method for directed graphs 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 12
The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index 0 0 0 23 0 1 7 143
The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index 0 0 0 6 0 0 9 64
The role of policy flexibility and party strength in coalition formation - an analysis of Dutch elections 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 17
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions 0 0 0 4 0 0 15 37
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions 0 0 0 17 0 1 6 14
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions 0 0 0 9 1 4 12 92
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions 0 0 0 6 0 1 6 51
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 9
Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 25
Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision 1 1 1 11 2 2 7 84
When Social Networks Polarize: On the Number of Clusters in the Hegselmann-Krause Model 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 10
When Social Networks Polarize: On the Number of Clusters in the Hegselmann-Krause Model 0 0 6 6 0 0 14 14
When social networks polarize: On the number of clusters in the Hegselmann-Krause model 0 0 10 10 0 1 16 16
When social networks polarize: On the number of clusters in the Hegselmann–Krause model 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
When social networks polarize: On the number of clusters in the Hegselmann–Krause model 0 4 4 4 0 9 9 9
When social networks polarize: On the number of clusters in the Hegselmann–Krause model 0 6 6 6 0 3 3 3
Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies 0 0 0 26 0 0 12 36
Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies 0 0 0 7 1 2 7 20
Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies 0 0 0 7 0 0 7 24
Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies 0 0 0 31 0 2 7 67
Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies 0 0 0 5 0 0 7 25
Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies 0 0 0 3 0 0 7 20
Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies 0 0 0 2 0 1 5 15
k -additive upper approximation of TU-games 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 9
k -additive upper approximation of TU-games 0 0 0 9 1 3 9 28
k -additive upper approximation of TU-games 0 0 0 0 1 2 11 19
Total Working Papers 4 34 90 3,863 40 287 3,305 14,488
21 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Degree-Distance-Based Connections Model with Negative and Positive Externalities 0 0 0 3 0 0 14 31
A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics 0 0 0 6 1 3 28 59
A consensus model of political decision-making 0 0 0 0 0 1 21 46
A dynamic analysis of criminal networks 0 0 2 3 1 2 22 28
A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents 0 0 0 5 0 1 20 92
A model of influence based on aggregation functions 0 0 0 14 0 1 16 73
A model of influence in a social network 0 0 0 37 0 0 12 194
A model of influence with a continuum of actions 0 0 0 5 0 0 9 58
A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions 0 0 1 11 1 3 18 81
A new model of coalition formation 0 0 0 61 1 1 7 188
A relation-algebraic approach to simple games 0 0 0 3 0 0 6 42
An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes 0 0 0 5 0 1 14 50
An interdisciplinary approach to coalition formation 0 0 0 4 0 0 7 40
Anonymous social influence 0 0 0 11 0 2 14 84
Applying relation algebra and RelView to measures in a social network 0 0 0 3 0 0 11 37
Applying relational algebra and RelView to coalition formation 0 0 0 3 0 2 3 43
BARGAINING MODEL WITH SEQUENCES OF DISCOUNT RATES AND BARGAINING COSTS 0 0 0 5 0 1 12 33
Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public‐good economies 0 0 0 0 1 1 17 34
Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 24
Coalition Formation: The Role of Procedure and Policy Flexibility 0 0 0 2 0 0 16 25
Competing for influence in networks through strategic targeting 0 1 1 1 2 3 3 3
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks 0 0 0 7 0 1 8 32
Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 33
Consensus reaching in committees 0 0 0 11 0 1 13 69
Degree centrality, von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks 0 0 0 1 1 2 12 18
Determining models of influence 0 0 0 1 0 0 17 42
Diffusion in large networks 0 0 0 1 1 1 15 23
Dynamic network formation with farsighted players and limited capacities 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 5
Editorial: Contributions to game theory and social choice 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 20
Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 5 0 1 5 38
Influence functions, followers and command games 0 0 0 9 0 0 14 111
Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations 0 0 0 11 0 1 17 51
Ingratiation: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 17 1 3 10 115
Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Michel Grabisch 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8
Lattices in Social Networks with Influence 0 0 0 3 1 1 9 37
Measuring influence in command games 0 0 0 4 0 0 36 95
Measuring power and satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders: an axiomatization 0 0 0 3 1 1 6 42
Negotiating a Stable Government: An Application of Bargaining Theory to a Coalition Formation Model 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 13
Network-based allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2
On Some Procedures of Forming a Multipartner Alliance 0 0 0 15 1 8 14 105
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time 0 0 0 3 0 1 8 22
On the Design of Public Debate in Social Networks 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 13
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions 0 0 0 3 1 1 9 39
Paradoxes of Voting Power in Dutch Politics 0 0 0 32 0 1 13 163
Power in plurality voting games 0 0 0 0 1 3 10 10
REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN VIEW OF JEALOUS OR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOR OF PLAYERS 0 0 0 2 0 0 10 16
Subgame perfect equilibria in model with bargaining costs varying in time 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 18
The Hoede–Bakker Index Modified to the Shapley–Shubik and Holler–Packel Indices 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs 0 0 1 1 0 0 8 14
The degree ratio ranking method for directed graphs 0 0 0 6 1 2 20 58
Using MACBETH to determine utilities of governments to parties in coalition formation 0 0 0 2 1 1 12 36
When social networks polarize: On the number of clusters in the Hegselmann–Krause model 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 20
Total Journal Articles 0 1 5 322 18 59 608 2,542

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