| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
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3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks |
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9 |
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6 |
9 |
15 |
| A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks |
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25 |
2 |
7 |
15 |
38 |
| A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks |
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26 |
1 |
6 |
12 |
39 |
| A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks |
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23 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
46 |
| A Model of Influence Based on Aggregation Function |
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1 |
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6 |
16 |
| A Model of Influence Based on Aggregation Function |
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3 |
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23 |
| A Model of Influence Based on Aggregation Function |
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8 |
1 |
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18 |
| A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study |
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13 |
| A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study |
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25 |
| A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study |
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16 |
| A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study |
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3 |
6 |
15 |
| A Relation-algebraic Approach to Simple Games |
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0 |
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9 |
14 |
38 |
| A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics |
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4 |
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4 |
13 |
26 |
| A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics |
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17 |
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9 |
15 |
47 |
| A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics |
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10 |
22 |
25 |
39 |
| A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics |
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1 |
4 |
9 |
30 |
| A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics |
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2 |
6 |
13 |
29 |
| A Survey on Nonstrategic Models of Opinion Dynamics |
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8 |
12 |
21 |
| A consensus model of political decision-making |
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0 |
42 |
3 |
8 |
9 |
306 |
| A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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16 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
43 |
| A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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20 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
19 |
| A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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21 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
| A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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1 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
21 |
| A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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0 |
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39 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
80 |
| A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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14 |
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5 |
6 |
54 |
| A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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2 |
6 |
6 |
13 |
| A dynamic analysis of criminal networks |
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2 |
15 |
3 |
5 |
13 |
23 |
| A dynamic analysis of criminal networks |
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5 |
2 |
9 |
11 |
14 |
| A dynamic analysis of criminal networks |
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3 |
15 |
2 |
48 |
57 |
64 |
| A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents |
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2 |
4 |
14 |
| A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents |
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19 |
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5 |
13 |
72 |
| A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents |
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2 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
19 |
| A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents |
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0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
57 |
| A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents |
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0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
25 |
| A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents |
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0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
24 |
| A model of influence based on aggregation functions |
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0 |
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4 |
9 |
19 |
| A model of influence based on aggregation functions |
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0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
6 |
6 |
83 |
| A model of influence based on aggregation functions |
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0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
85 |
| A model of influence in a social network |
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0 |
0 |
16 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
25 |
| A model of influence in a social network |
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0 |
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168 |
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5 |
6 |
147 |
| A model of influence in a social network |
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0 |
0 |
168 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
297 |
| A model of influence in a social network |
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112 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
242 |
| A model of influence in a social network |
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4 |
14 |
27 |
| A model of influence with a continuum of actions |
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11 |
| A model of influence with a continuum of actions |
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34 |
2 |
8 |
10 |
63 |
| A model of influence with a continuum of actions |
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28 |
2 |
7 |
9 |
174 |
| A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions |
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11 |
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31 |
| A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions |
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24 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
82 |
| A model of influence with a continuum of actions |
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4 |
0 |
8 |
12 |
52 |
| A model of influence with a continuum of actions |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
11 |
| A relation-algebraic approach to simple games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
11 |
| A relation-algebraic approach to simple games |
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0 |
0 |
14 |
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3 |
9 |
50 |
| A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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5 |
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14 |
| A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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6 |
12 |
| A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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11 |
| A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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28 |
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4 |
6 |
160 |
| A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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22 |
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3 |
5 |
74 |
| A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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1 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
34 |
| An Interdisciplinary Approach to Coalition Formation |
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19 |
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2 |
3 |
61 |
| An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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0 |
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28 |
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5 |
7 |
13 |
| An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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0 |
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38 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
46 |
| An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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0 |
0 |
35 |
3 |
23 |
26 |
83 |
| An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
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2 |
4 |
15 |
| An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
9 |
11 |
28 |
| An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
8 |
9 |
29 |
| An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
| An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
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0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
31 |
| An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
63 |
| An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
13 |
| An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
321 |
| An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Anonymous Social Influence |
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0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
33 |
| Anonymous social influence |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
21 |
| Anonymous social influence |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
26 |
| Anonymous social influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
19 |
| Anonymous social influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
17 |
25 |
101 |
| Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation |
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1 |
1 |
7 |
2 |
11 |
13 |
51 |
| Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation |
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0 |
0 |
97 |
2 |
7 |
8 |
418 |
| Applying Relation Algebra and RelView to Measures in a Social Network |
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0 |
2 |
78 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
252 |
| Applying Relation Algebra and RelView to Measures in aSocial Network |
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0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
59 |
| Applying relational algebra and RelView to coalition formation |
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0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
19 |
19 |
80 |
| Applying relational algebra and RelView to measures in a social network |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
87 |
91 |
100 |
| Applying relational algebra and RelView to measures in a social network |
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0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
70 |
| Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies |
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0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
12 |
| Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
33 |
| Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies |
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0 |
1 |
22 |
0 |
7 |
13 |
45 |
| Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
| Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
| Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
19 |
| Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
| Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
12 |
| Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
63 |
| Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
| Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
7 |
11 |
83 |
| Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
209 |
| Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
37 |
| Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
| Collective Decision Making: Views from Social Choice and Game Theory |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
23 |
| Collective Decision Making: Views from Social Choice and Game Theory |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
66 |
| Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting |
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0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
7 |
10 |
14 |
| Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
| Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
12 |
| Competing for Influence in Networks through Strategic Targeting |
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0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
7 |
9 |
18 |
| Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
| Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
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0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
21 |
| Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
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0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
| Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
| Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
15 |
| Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
53 |
| Computational Social Choice Using Relation Algebra and RelView |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
12 |
| Computations on Simple Games using REL VIEW |
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0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
41 |
| Computations on Simple Games using REL VIEW |
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0 |
0 |
12 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
75 |
| Computations on Simple Games using REL VIEW |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
10 |
| Computations on Simple Games using RelView |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
14 |
| Computations on Simple Games using RelView |
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0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
47 |
| Computing Tournament Solutions using Relation Algebra and REL VIEW |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
| Computing Tournament Solutions using Relation Algebra and REL VIEW |
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0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
33 |
| Computing Tournament Solutions using Relation Algebra and REL VIEW |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
6 |
8 |
11 |
96 |
| Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
| Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
21 |
| Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView |
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0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
20 |
| Consensus reaching in committees |
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0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
83 |
| Degree Centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility and Externalities in Networks |
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0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
20 |
| Degree Centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility and Externalities in Networks |
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1 |
1 |
11 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
19 |
| Degree Centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility and Externalities in Networks |
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0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
36 |
| Degree centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks |
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0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
| Degree centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks |
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0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
8 |
11 |
22 |
| Degree centrality, von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
| Degree centrality, von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
5 |
| Determining influential models |
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0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
41 |
| Determining influential models |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
| Determining influential models |
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0 |
0 |
33 |
5 |
9 |
13 |
58 |
| Determining models of influence |
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0 |
0 |
30 |
2 |
9 |
9 |
23 |
| Determining models of influence |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
12 |
| Determining models of influence |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
18 |
| Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
9 |
| Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
94 |
| Diffusion in countably infinite networks |
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0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
15 |
| Diffusion in countably infinite networks |
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0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
50 |
| Diffusion in countably infinite networks |
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0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
39 |
| Diffusion in large networks |
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0 |
0 |
10 |
2 |
7 |
10 |
13 |
| Diffusion in large networks |
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0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
| Diffusion in large networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
7 |
10 |
15 |
| Dynamic Network Formation with Farsighted Players and Limited Capacities |
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1 |
12 |
12 |
0 |
9 |
13 |
13 |
| Effects of opening national markets on the intensity competition (theoretical approach) |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
| Effects of opening national markets on the intensity competition (theoretical approach) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Efficiency versus fairness in link recommendation algorithms |
0 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
0 |
6 |
17 |
29 |
| Formation of international environmental agreements and payoff allocation |
0 |
1 |
11 |
11 |
0 |
5 |
15 |
15 |
| Holdout threats during wage bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
| Holdout threats during wage bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
| Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
| Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
48 |
| Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
| Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
23 |
| Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
| Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
35 |
| Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
16 |
| Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
19 |
| Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
| Influence Indices |
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0 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
166 |
| Influence Indices |
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0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
39 |
| Influence Indices |
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0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
37 |
| Influence functions, followers and command games |
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0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
138 |
| Influence functions, followers and command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
74 |
| Influence functions, followers and command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
19 |
| Influence functions, followers and command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
4 |
14 |
16 |
56 |
| Influence functions, followers and command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
7 |
10 |
68 |
| Influence functions, followers and command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
33 |
43 |
| Influence functions, followers and command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
| Influence functions, followers and command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
110 |
| Influence in social networks |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
| Influence in social networks |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
21 |
| Influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
| Influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
22 |
| Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations |
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0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
22 |
| Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
52 |
| Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations |
1 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
2 |
13 |
17 |
105 |
| Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
38 |
| Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
91 |
| Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
25 |
| Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
123 |
| Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
107 |
| Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
51 |
| Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
23 |
| Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
38 |
| Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
7 |
21 |
| Ingratiation in the lab |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
| Ingratiation in the lab |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
| Ingratiation in the lab |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
| Ingratiation in the lab |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| Ingratiation in the lab |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
| Ingratiation in the lab |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
| Ingratiation in the lab |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
25 |
| Ingratiation in the lab |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
22 |
| Ingratiation: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
100 |
| Ingratiation: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
16 |
| Iterating influence between players in a social network |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
100 |
| Iterating influence between players in a social network |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
16 |
| Iterating influence between players in a social network |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
39 |
| Lattices in social networks with influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
| Lattices in social networks with influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
14 |
| Lattices in social networks with influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
18 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
16 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
22 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
9 |
11 |
69 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
86 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
57 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
10 |
21 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
91 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
170 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Properties of the Qualified Majority Case |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
160 |
| Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Properties of the Qualified Majority Case |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
104 |
| Measuring influence among players with an ordered set of possible actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
34 |
| Measuring influence among players with an ordered set of possible actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
10 |
10 |
95 |
| Measuring influence among players with an ordered set of possible actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
30 |
| Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
| Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
49 |
| Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
26 |
| Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
20 |
| Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
122 |
| Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
59 |
| Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
62 |
| Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
13 |
17 |
65 |
| Modifying the Hoede-Bakker index to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
78 |
| Modifying the Hoede-Bakker index to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
36 |
| Negotiating a stable government - an application of bargaining theory to a coalition formation model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
70 |
| Network-based allocation of responsibility for GHG emissions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
13 |
| Network-based allocation of responsibility for GHG emissions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
| Network-based allocation of responsibility for GHG emissions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
2 |
7 |
7 |
28 |
| Network-based allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
9 |
| Network-based allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Network-based allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
6 |
| On Different Ranking Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
| On Different Ranking Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
| On Different Ranking Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
8 |
| On Some Procedures of Forming a Multi-partner Alliance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
76 |
| On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
29 |
| On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
11 |
| On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
| On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
55 |
| On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
24 |
34 |
| On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
18 |
| On some procedures of forming a multi partner alliance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
23 |
| On some properties of the Hoede-Bakker index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
47 |
| On the design of public debate in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
12 |
| On the design of public debate in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
8 |
11 |
59 |
| On the design of public debate in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
| On the design of public debate in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
| On the design of public debate in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
17 |
| On the design of public debate in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
11 |
| On the not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
15 |
| Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
101 |
106 |
112 |
| Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
4 |
7 |
7 |
46 |
| Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
16 |
| Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
18 |
| Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
28 |
32 |
118 |
| Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
14 |
| Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
11 |
36 |
| Ordered Weighted Averaging in Social Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
3 |
9 |
12 |
121 |
| Ordered Weighted Averaging in Social Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
| Ordered Weighted Averaging in Social Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
8 |
9 |
48 |
| Power in plurality games |
0 |
0 |
13 |
14 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
13 |
| Power in plurality games |
0 |
1 |
5 |
15 |
2 |
9 |
26 |
38 |
| Power in plurality voting games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Power in plurality voting games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Power in plurality voting games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
| Social networks: Prestige, centrality, and influence (Invited paper) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
24 |
| Social networks: Prestige, centrality, and influence (Invited paper) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
181 |
| Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
8 |
11 |
| Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
| Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
9 |
| Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
1 |
9 |
13 |
172 |
| Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
6 |
45 |
| Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
| Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
79 |
88 |
100 |
| Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
46 |
| Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
21 |
| The Degree Measure as Utility Function over Positions in Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
88 |
| The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
7 |
12 |
48 |
| The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
19 |
| The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
28 |
| The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
28 |
| The Hoede-Bakker index modified to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
46 |
| The Hoede-Bakker index modified to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
37 |
| The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
10 |
| The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
| The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
| The degree measure as utility function over positions in networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
38 |
| The degree measure as utility function over positions in networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
| The degree measure as utility function over positions in networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
88 |
| The degree ratio ranking method for directed graphs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
6 |
11 |
| The degree ratio ranking method for directed graphs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
21 |
| The degree ratio ranking method for directed graphs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
17 |
| The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
142 |
| The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
62 |
| The role of policy flexibility and party strength in coalition formation - an analysis of Dutch elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
16 |
| Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
| Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
13 |
15 |
37 |
| Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
| Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
86 |
| Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
49 |
| Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
79 |
| Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
22 |
| When Social Networks Polarize: On the Number of Clusters in the Hegselmann-Krause Model |
0 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
11 |
| When Social Networks Polarize: On the Number of Clusters in the Hegselmann-Krause Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
| When social networks polarize: On the number of clusters in the Hegselmann-Krause model |
0 |
1 |
10 |
10 |
0 |
6 |
12 |
12 |
| Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
17 |
| Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
24 |
| Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
5 |
9 |
11 |
35 |
| Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
64 |
| Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
17 |
| Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
21 |
| Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
| k -additive upper approximation of TU-games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
14 |
| k -additive upper approximation of TU-games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
| k -additive upper approximation of TU-games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
23 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
8 |
82 |
3,894 |
233 |
1,772 |
2,572 |
13,672 |
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