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A Model of Influence Based on Aggregation Function |
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A Model of Influence Based on Aggregation Function |
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A Model of Influence Based on Aggregation Function |
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A Model of Influence Based on Aggregation Function |
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A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study |
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A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study |
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A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study |
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A Model of Ingratiation: An Experimental Study |
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A Relation-algebraic Approach to Simple Games |
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A consensus model of political decision-making |
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42 |
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296 |
A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities |
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A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents |
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A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents |
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A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents |
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A model of influence based on aggregation functions |
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79 |
A model of influence based on aggregation functions |
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77 |
A model of influence based on aggregation functions |
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A model of influence in a social network |
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168 |
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290 |
A model of influence in a social network |
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168 |
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141 |
A model of influence in a social network |
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A model of influence in a social network |
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A model of influence in a social network |
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A model of influence with a continuum of actions |
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A model of influence with a continuum of actions |
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A model of influence with a continuum of actions |
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A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions |
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A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions |
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A model of influence with a continuum of actions |
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A model of influence with a continuum of actions |
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40 |
A relation-algebraic approach to simple games |
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14 |
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41 |
A relation-algebraic approach to simple games |
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A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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22 |
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69 |
A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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28 |
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143 |
A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations |
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An Interdisciplinary Approach to Coalition Formation |
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19 |
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58 |
An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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4 |
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An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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38 |
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38 |
An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes |
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28 |
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An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
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16 |
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An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
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316 |
An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
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An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
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An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
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56 |
An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time |
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Anonymous Social Influence |
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Anonymous social influence |
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Anonymous social influence |
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Anonymous social influence |
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Anonymous social influence |
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Anonymous social influence |
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6 |
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76 |
Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation |
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1 |
97 |
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1 |
410 |
Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation |
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5 |
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1 |
31 |
Applying Relation Algebra and RelView to Measures in a Social Network |
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75 |
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236 |
Applying Relation Algebra and RelView to Measures in aSocial Network |
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Applying relational algebra and RelView to coalition formation |
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Applying relational algebra and RelView to measures in a social network |
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Applying relational algebra and RelView to measures in a social network |
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32 |
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Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies |
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Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies |
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Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies |
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21 |
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32 |
Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies |
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Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies |
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Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies |
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Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp |
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Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp |
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1 |
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Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility |
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10 |
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Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility |
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13 |
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32 |
Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility |
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Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility |
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Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility |
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40 |
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1 |
202 |
Coalition formation: the role of procedure and policy flexibility |
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12 |
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72 |
Collective Decision Making: Views from Social Choice and Game Theory |
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2 |
3 |
12 |
Collective Decision Making: Views from Social Choice and Game Theory |
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56 |
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
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6 |
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
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35 |
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1 |
43 |
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
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10 |
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
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24 |
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2 |
24 |
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
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19 |
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13 |
Competition for the access to and use of information in networks |
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4 |
Computational Social Choice Using Relation Algebra and RelView |
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Computations on Simple Games using REL VIEW |
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12 |
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64 |
Computations on Simple Games using REL VIEW |
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13 |
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35 |
Computations on Simple Games using REL VIEW |
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3 |
Computations on Simple Games using RelView |
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10 |
Computations on Simple Games using RelView |
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25 |
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40 |
Computing Tournament Solutions using Relation Algebra and REL VIEW |
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4 |
Computing Tournament Solutions using Relation Algebra and REL VIEW |
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5 |
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28 |
Computing Tournament Solutions using Relation Algebra and REL VIEW |
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12 |
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84 |
Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView |
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4 |
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Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView |
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Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView |
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6 |
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25 |
Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView |
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3 |
Consensus reaching in committees |
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16 |
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79 |
Determining influential models |
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24 |
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35 |
Determining influential models |
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33 |
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43 |
Determining influential models |
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12 |
Determining models of influence |
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30 |
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14 |
Determining models of influence |
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Determining models of influence |
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28 |
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25 |
Determining models of influence |
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Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games |
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49 |
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88 |
Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games |
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4 |
Diffusion in countably infinite networks |
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9 |
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Diffusion in countably infinite networks |
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4 |
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1 |
48 |
Diffusion in countably infinite networks |
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7 |
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31 |
Effects of opening national markets on the intensity competition (theoretical approach) |
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5 |
Effects of opening national markets on the intensity competition (theoretical approach) |
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Holdout threats during wage bargaining |
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6 |
Holdout threats during wage bargaining |
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2 |
Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining |
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2 |
Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining |
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1 |
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16 |
Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining |
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5 |
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1 |
41 |
Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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3 |
Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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5 |
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Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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6 |
Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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Influence Indices |
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36 |
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152 |
Influence Indices |
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5 |
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34 |
Influence Indices |
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16 |
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31 |
Influence functions, followers and command games |
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5 |
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58 |
Influence functions, followers and command games |
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15 |
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40 |
Influence functions, followers and command games |
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7 |
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1 |
1 |
103 |
Influence functions, followers and command games |
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10 |
Influence functions, followers and command games |
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14 |
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1 |
130 |
Influence functions, followers and command games |
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1 |
13 |
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60 |
Influence functions, followers and command games |
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7 |
Influence functions, followers and command games |
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10 |
Influence in social networks |
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Influence in social networks |
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Influence in social networks |
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Influence in social networks |
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Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations |
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16 |
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2 |
87 |
Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations |
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25 |
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16 |
Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations |
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21 |
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1 |
44 |
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
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Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
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27 |
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Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
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34 |
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
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83 |
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
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11 |
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96 |
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
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36 |
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20 |
Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
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Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence |
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45 |
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35 |
Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations |
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14 |
Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations |
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Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations |
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Ingratiation in the lab |
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Ingratiation in the lab |
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Ingratiation in the lab |
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Ingratiation in the lab |
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Ingratiation in the lab |
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Ingratiation in the lab |
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Ingratiation in the lab |
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Ingratiation in the lab |
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Ingratiation: Experimental Evidence |
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20 |
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Ingratiation: Experimental Evidence |
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13 |
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89 |
Iterating influence between players in a social network |
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34 |
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32 |
Iterating influence between players in a social network |
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37 |
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93 |
Iterating influence between players in a social network |
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Lattices in social networks with influence |
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1 |
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Lattices in social networks with influence |
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1 |
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Lattices in social networks with influence |
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32 |
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11 |
Lattices in social networks with influence |
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1 |
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Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders |
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Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: An Axiomatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
165 |
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Properties of the Qualified Majority Case |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Properties of the Qualified Majority Case |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
152 |
Measuring influence among players with an ordered set of possible actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
Measuring influence among players with an ordered set of possible actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
85 |
Measuring influence among players with an ordered set of possible actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
Measuring influence in command games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
Modifying the Hoede-Bakker index to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
Modifying the Hoede-Bakker index to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
Negotiating a stable government - an application of bargaining theory to a coalition formation model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
On Some Procedures of Forming a Multi-partner Alliance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
On some procedures of forming a multi partner alliance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
On some properties of the Hoede-Bakker index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
On the not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
80 |
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
Ordered Weighted Averaging in Social Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
Ordered Weighted Averaging in Social Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
Ordered Weighted Averaging in Social Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
Social networks: Prestige, centrality, and influence (Invited paper) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
Social networks: Prestige, centrality, and influence (Invited paper) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
95 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
175 |
Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
83 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
149 |
Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
Strategic influence in social networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
The Degree Measure as Utility Function over Positions in Networks |
0 |
0 |
2 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
75 |
The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
The Degree Ratio Ranking Method for Directed Networks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
The Hoede-Bakker index modified to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
The Hoede-Bakker index modified to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
The degree measure as utility function over positions in networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
The degree measure as utility function over positions in networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
The degree measure as utility function over positions in networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
74 |
The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
The role of policy flexibility and party strength in coalition formation - an analysis of Dutch elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions |
1 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
79 |
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
42 |
Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
76 |
Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
Total Working Papers |
2 |
3 |
17 |
3,517 |
13 |
37 |
158 |
10,580 |