Access Statistics for Jean-Louis Rullière

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Beyond the Deadline: Wage Bargaining Between the War of Attrition and the Preemption Game 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 33
Beyond the Deadline: wage bargaining between war of attrition and preemption game 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 232
Breaking Collusion in Auctions Through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Market 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 51
Choix de localisation résidentielle en agglomération et externalités de congestion: une approche par l'économie expérimentale 0 0 0 0 2 2 14 38
Comportements et santé: quel apport de l'économie expérimentale ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 33
Contrôle des activités illégales en présence d'un biais d'optimisme 0 0 0 19 1 2 5 143
Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ? 0 0 0 44 0 2 10 242
Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability? 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 39
Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability? 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 46
Equilibration et dépendance du contexte: une étude expérimentale 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 18
Evaluation économique des biens non marchands 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 27
Fairness and Free-Riding in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 18
Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 16
Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 27
Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 30
Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 25
Feedback On Individual Performance: Team And Trust 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 66
Free-riding and Fairness in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 51 0 0 4 161
Incentives and Anonymity Principle: Crowding Out Toward Users 0 0 1 39 0 1 14 551
Introduction to the special issue Special issue on Behavioral Public Economics 0 0 0 109 2 3 15 118
L'indétermination et la méthode de Nash 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 18
L'économie des ressources humaines: pouvoir et limites des incitations 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 25
La neuroéconomie dans l'agenda de l'économie comportementale 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 35
Le mieux ennemi du bien: approche expérimentale du contrôle comme mécanisme de filtrage 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 33
Le mieux, ennemi du bien: approche expérimentale du contrôle comme mécanisme de filtrage 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 36
Le paradoxe de l'adhésion syndicale: une approche expérimentale en termes de jeu de bien public 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 20
Mergers and Executive Compensation: An Experiment with Managers 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 19
Monitoring optimistic agents 0 0 1 46 1 2 12 175
On the reliability of reprocal fairness -An experimental study- 0 0 0 0 1 3 18 399
Personnel economics: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 16
Rank Order Tournaments with Relative Prizes: Theory and Experiment 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 35
Rank Order Tournaments with Relative Prizes: Theory and Experiment 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 38
Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students 0 0 0 93 0 1 11 646
Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students 0 0 0 135 1 1 13 597
Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students 0 0 0 13 0 0 7 115
Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a merger. An Experiment with Managers and Students 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 57
Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 23
Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company 0 0 0 0 1 1 16 32
Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 21
Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 16
Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 25
Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 17
Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company 1 1 1 164 1 1 9 936
Redesigning Teams and Incentives:A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company 0 0 0 23 0 0 8 137
Redesigning teams and incentives in a merger: An experiment with managers and students 0 0 0 6 1 1 14 160
Self-Confidence and Teamwork: An Experimental Test 0 0 0 166 0 0 10 1,136
Self-Confidence and Teamwork: An Experimental Test 0 0 0 37 0 1 8 153
Self-confidence and teamwork: An experimental test 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 40
Self-confidence and teamwork: An experimental test 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 41
Self-confidence and teamwork: An experimental test 0 0 0 0 0 1 18 47
Self-confidence and teamwork: An experimental test 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 43
Self-confidence and teamwork: An experimental test 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 80
Self-image and teamwork: An experimental test 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 30
Self-image and teamwork: An experimental test 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 28
The Pen or the Sword? Verbal Feedback in a Public Good Experiment 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 54
Trust and Reciprocity in Group-Individual interactions: Does Fairness Matter? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 44
Trust and competition within a team 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 39
Trust and competition within a team 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 39
Trust and competition within a team 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 46
Union Bargaining Strength as a Public Good: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 588
Verbal Feedback in a Public Good Game Experiment 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 39
Verbal feedback in a public good game experiment 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 27
Verbal feedback in a public good game experiment 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 32
Win for Being the Best or for Getting the Best: Theoretical and Experimental Evidence on Tournaments with Endogenous Prizes 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 40
Total Working Papers 1 1 3 947 23 43 502 8,091

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO 2 Emission Permit Markets 0 1 1 18 0 1 8 63
Contrôle des activités illégales en présence d'un biais d'optimisme 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 85
D'Adam Smith à Vernon L.Smith la main invisible observée à travers les comportements expérimentaux 0 0 0 1 0 1 15 49
Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability? 0 0 0 77 0 0 6 433
Equilibration et dépendance du contexte. Une évaluation expérimentale du jeu de négociation sous ultimatum 0 0 0 22 0 1 6 100
Evaluation économique des biens non marchands 0 0 0 2 0 1 7 31
Introduction to the Special Issue on Behavioral and Experimental Public Economics 0 0 0 9 1 1 4 51
L'indétermination et la méthode de John F. Nash 0 0 0 16 0 0 5 85
L'économie des ressources humaines: pouvoir et limites des incitations. Aperçu théorique et présentation générale 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 27
La neuroéconomie dans l’agenda de l’économie comportementale 0 0 1 8 0 0 8 38
Le mieux, ennemi du bien: approche expérimentale du contrôle comme mécanisme de filtrage 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 47
Le paradoxe de l'adhésion syndicale: une approche expérimentale en termes de jeu de bien public 0 0 0 1 1 2 9 33
Monitoring optimistic agents 0 0 0 10 0 0 14 107
Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students 0 0 0 10 1 2 10 90
Total Journal Articles 0 1 2 175 4 12 117 1,239

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-10-11