| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
171 |
| An introduction to ABED: Agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
29 |
105 |
| Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
38 |
| Cultural Integration and Its Discontents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
383 |
| Decompositions and potentials for normal form games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
77 |
| Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
146 |
| Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
193 |
| Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
71 |
| Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
435 |
| Evolution, Population Growth, and History Dependence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
118 |
| Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
195 |
| Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
119 |
| H. Peyton Young, Strategic Learning and Its Limits, Oxford Univ. Press (2004) 165 pages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
133 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
307 |
| HISTORY-INDEPENDENT PREDICTION IN EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
29 |
| Hamilton-Jacobi Equations with Semilinear Costs and State Constraints, with Applications to Large Deviations in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
| Large deviations and multinomial probit choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
65 |
| Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
40 |
| Large population potential games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
191 |
| Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
121 |
| Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
241 |
| Nested replicator dynamics, nested logit choice, and similarity-based learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
16 |
| On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
556 |
| Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
90 |
| Pairwise Comparison Dynamics and Evolutionary Foundations for Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
92 |
| Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
148 |
| Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
2 |
4 |
24 |
266 |
| Preface: Second DGAA Special Issue on Evolutionary Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
45 |
| Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
992 |
| Probabilistic Interpretations of Integrability for Game Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
51 |
| Riemannian game dynamics |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
57 |
| Ross Cressman, Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2003) |
1 |
1 |
1 |
71 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
173 |
| Sample Path Large Deviations for Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
28 |
| Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
8 |
40 |
128 |
| Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
79 |
| Simple formulas for stationary distributions and stochastically stable states |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
45 |
| Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
7 |
19 |
41 |
| Stable games and their dynamics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
167 |
| Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
78 |
| Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
169 |
| The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
77 |
| The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
111 |
| Total Journal Articles |
2 |
3 |
8 |
1,136 |
15 |
49 |
620 |
6,462 |
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