Access Statistics for Hamid Sabourian

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Banker Compensation and Confirmation Bias 0 0 1 168 2 2 3 501
Banker Compensation and Confirmation Bias 0 0 1 109 0 0 3 259
Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome 0 0 1 188 1 1 3 914
Complexity and Competition, Part I: Sequential Matching 0 0 0 65 0 0 0 308
Complexity and Competition, Part I: Sequential Matching 0 0 1 139 2 2 5 619
Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games and Negotiation 0 0 0 233 1 2 3 1,145
Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Negotiation 0 0 1 42 0 1 2 211
Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Negotiation 0 0 0 48 0 1 1 260
Complexity and Efficiency in the Negotiation Game 0 0 0 156 0 0 2 760
Cooperation and Computability in N-Player Games' 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 208
Cooperation and Effective Computability 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 385
Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon's Problem 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 328
Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem 0 0 0 68 0 0 3 472
Efficiency in Negotiation: Complexity and Costly Bargaining 0 1 1 211 0 1 2 1,358
Efficient Repeated Implementation 0 0 0 93 0 0 0 234
Herd Behavior in Efficient Financial Markets 0 0 0 449 0 0 2 1,283
Herding and Contrarian Behaviour in Financial Markets 0 0 0 200 1 1 2 472
Herding with Heterogeneous Ability: An Application to Organ Transplantation 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 12
Markov Equilibria in Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games 0 0 0 109 0 2 5 366
Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 396
Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 483
N-Person Bargaining and Strategic Complexity 0 0 0 67 1 1 1 218
N-Person Bargaining and Strategic Complexity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 178
The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules: A Global Stability Result 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 128
The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules: A Global Stability Result 0 0 1 137 2 2 3 777
Total Working Papers 0 1 7 2,484 10 16 46 12,275

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes 0 0 0 84 0 0 1 217
Bargaining and markets: complexity and the competitive outcome 0 0 0 39 0 0 3 151
Bounded memory Folk Theorem 0 0 0 23 1 5 12 120
Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs 0 1 1 58 0 1 2 196
Complexity and Competition 0 0 0 53 1 1 2 315
Complexity and repeated implementation 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 45
Cooperation and Effective Computability 0 0 0 32 1 1 3 252
Cooperation and computability in n-player games 0 0 0 36 1 1 2 150
Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem 0 0 0 50 1 1 3 192
Efficient Repeated Implementation 0 0 0 28 2 2 3 176
Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets 0 0 0 0 3 5 6 420
Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games 0 0 0 60 3 4 7 187
Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency 0 0 2 48 2 5 12 250
Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 279
Repeated games Some applications to under-cutting and harassment in the labour market 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 55
Repeated games with M-period bounded memory (pure strategies) 0 0 0 36 1 2 4 137
Repeated games with one-memory 0 0 1 95 1 3 9 266
Wage Norms and Involuntary Unemployment 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 102
Total Journal Articles 0 1 4 661 17 32 76 3,510

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Statistics updated 2025-11-08