| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
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3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
719 |
| A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
991 |
| AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC, NON-PRICE COMPETITION IN AN OLIGOPOLISTIC INDUSTRY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
18 |
1,529 |
| Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
602 |
| Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
514 |
| An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
648 |
| An Extension of the " Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
228 |
| CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS IN DUOPOLIES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
218 |
| CORRELATED AND MEDIATED EQUILIBRIA IN GAME WITH INCOMPETE INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
139 |
| Consumption, Commitmants and Preferences for Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
215 |
| Convergence of Learning Schemes on Supermodular Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
166 |
| Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
265 |
| Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
253 |
| DISAGREEMENT IN MARKETS WITH MATCHING AND BARGAINING |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
396 |
| DOMINATED STRATEGIES AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
159 |
| DOMINATED STRATEGIES AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
177 |
| DOMINATED STRATEGIES AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
307 |
| DUOPOLY SIGNAL JAMMING |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
389 |
| Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
310 |
| Drift |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
98 |
| Duopoly Signal Jamming |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
256 |
| EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN REPEATED GAMES PLAYED BY FINITE AUTOMATA |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
603 |
| EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN SYMMETRIC GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
230 |
| EVOLUTIONNARY STABILITY IN ASYMMETRIC GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
345 |
| EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
305 |
| EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
329 |
| EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
593 |
| Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
255 |
| Endogenous Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
452 |
| Endogenous inequality in integrated markets with two-sided research |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
706 |
| Evolution and Endogenous Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
291 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
983 |
| Evolution and Endogenous Interations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
216 |
| Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
22 |
473 |
| Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
281 |
| Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
272 |
| Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
358 |
| Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
415 |
| Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Game Played by Finite Automata |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
328 |
| Evolutionary Stability in Repeated games Played by Finite Automata |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
383 |
| FIRM ENTRY AND POST-ENTRY PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
476 |
| FIRM ENTRY AND POST-ENTRY PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
382 |
| Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
394 |
| Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
360 |
| How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
375 |
| How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
307 |
| How costly is the honest signaling of need? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
351 |
| How to Tremble if you Must |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
388 |
| Information and the evolution of the utility function |
0 |
0 |
0 |
769 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1,804 |
| Learning to Signal in Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
396 |
| Learning to Signal in Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
373 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
1,220 |
| Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
1,133 |
| MONOPOLY EXPERIMENTATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
261 |
| Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Section |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
162 |
| Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
153 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
705 |
| Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
244 |
| Muddling Through:Noisy Equilibrium Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
150 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
806 |
| Musical Chairs: Modelling Noisy Evolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
283 |
| Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
247 |
| Open Versus Closed Door Negotiations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
24 |
779 |
| PATTENRS OF FIRM ENTRY AND EXIT IN U.S. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
4 |
25 |
856 |
| PERFECT EQUILIBRIA IN SIMULTANEOUS- OFFERS BARGAINING |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
239 |
| PLANT TURNOVER AND GROSS EMPLOYMENT FLOWS IN THE U.S. MANUFACTURING SECTOR |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
890 |
| RATIONALITY ALONE DOES NOT ALLOW PLAYERS TO SOLVE ALL GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
164 |
| Risk dominance, payoff dominance and probabilistic choice learning |
0 |
0 |
1 |
393 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1,300 |
| Robust latent data representations |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
2 |
4 |
19 |
23 |
| STRATEGIC ADDITIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
135 |
| STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND THE RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF CAPITAL |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
513 |
| SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
477 |
| SUBGAME PERFECTION: AN INTRODUCTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
267 |
| Starting Small: Endogenous Stakes and Rational Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
77 |
| Strategic Information Manipulation in Duopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
506 |
| Strategic Information Manupulation in Duopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
652 |
| Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
248 |
| THE GROWTH AND FAILURE OF U.S. MANUFACTURING PLANTS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
34 |
1,673 |
| TO INNOVATE OR NOT TO INNOVATE: INCENTIVES AND INNOVATION IN HIERARCHIES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
736 |
| TO INNOVATE OR NOT TO INNOVATE: INCENTIVES AND INNOVATION IN HIERARCHIES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
337 |
| The Evolutionary Foundations of Backward and Forward Induction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
198 |
| Who Wants a Good Reputation? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
349 |
1 |
5 |
22 |
1,076 |
| Who Wants a Good Reputation?' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
408 |
| Who wants a good reputation? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
297 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
789 |
| Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be |
0 |
0 |
5 |
397 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
1,119 |
| Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
351 |
| Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be |
0 |
0 |
1 |
281 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
853 |
| extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
310 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
0 |
9 |
4,035 |
29 |
85 |
998 |
41,376 |