Access Statistics for Patrick W. Schmitz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts 0 0 0 13 0 4 12 138
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 229 1 3 10 633
Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions 0 0 0 134 0 4 14 461
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 43 1 5 16 93
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 4 0 6 20 44
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 0 0 142 2 4 21 510
Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 23 0 1 5 103
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 24 0 3 13 80
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 41 0 5 12 174
Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999) 0 0 0 92 1 14 18 298
Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) 0 0 0 242 3 7 14 940
Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999) 0 0 0 9 1 4 8 82
Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998) 0 0 0 21 0 0 2 106
Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003) 0 0 0 27 0 2 8 138
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 0 122 1 8 19 494
Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? 0 0 0 47 0 3 11 251
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence 0 0 1 202 4 10 28 553
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 8 0 1 10 56
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 32 0 3 11 232
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 1 1 143 0 8 19 487
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 13 0 2 15 85
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 190 0 12 45 579
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 0 1 3 35 0 8 18 40
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 0 0 0 6 0 3 5 23
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 1 2 15 2 7 20 48
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 0 0 5 2 8 13 48
Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 24 0 6 10 73
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 136 2 7 17 227
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 1 76 1 5 12 179
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 44 0 1 19 173
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 80 0 4 15 388
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 33 1 8 19 165
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 73 2 10 25 259
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 4 0 5 15 64
Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung 0 0 0 12 0 5 13 91
Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem 0 0 1 127 0 3 18 506
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern 0 0 0 14 0 3 11 128
Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 29 0 3 8 134
Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory 0 0 0 66 0 2 11 160
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 71 0 2 10 281
Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 179 0 2 9 772
Garbled Elections 0 0 1 29 0 1 8 155
Garbled Elections 0 0 0 10 0 1 3 88
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 99 0 4 8 425
Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 22 2 3 16 91
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 0 1 37 1 4 19 112
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory 0 0 0 84 0 4 13 205
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory 0 0 0 29 0 3 14 42
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 27 0 3 18 69
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 33 0 1 24 109
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 0 3 25 2 4 27 55
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 0 0 12 1 5 17 61
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 0 2 38 0 2 16 55
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 13
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 0 1 14 49
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 0 5 19 59
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 11 5 9 22 64
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 40 0 1 6 87
Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 284 0 1 6 807
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 34 0 1 13 139
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 24 1 4 18 96
Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework 0 0 0 38 0 4 12 208
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 0 543 0 5 21 1,248
Investments as Signals of Outside Options 0 0 0 76 0 6 15 278
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 36 0 3 8 125
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 10 0 1 10 64
Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 92 0 3 10 461
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 0 1 83 0 4 34 219
Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 102 0 0 5 445
Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 101 0 3 12 345
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 0 27 0 1 16 161
Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 44 2 4 15 156
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 76 0 3 9 229
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 42 0 1 15 98
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 1 30 2 5 11 45
On Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 17 0 2 7 65
On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition 0 0 0 107 0 2 10 364
On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 39 0 2 7 176
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 62 1 2 11 237
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 1 151 1 5 12 466
On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation 0 0 0 56 0 0 2 188
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 1 8 0 3 18 31
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 0 5 2 4 14 32
Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances 0 0 0 158 0 1 5 479
Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information 0 0 0 117 1 1 12 453
Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals 0 0 0 83 0 1 11 456
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 5 0 0 7 45
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 2 0 1 14 20
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 6 0 3 12 36
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 19 0 2 11 48
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 26 0 6 25 78
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 10 0 1 19 43
Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information 0 0 0 99 1 5 8 341
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 2 0 4 24 46
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 9 0 2 16 59
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 0 197 0 5 20 445
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 52 1 3 12 356
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 31 0 1 9 70
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 11 0 3 10 40
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 1 29 2 3 19 53
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 0 11 0 1 13 71
Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks 0 0 0 183 0 4 12 478
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 31 0 1 15 88
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 10 0 4 17 70
Public-Private Partnerships, Asymmetric Information, and Incomplete Contracts 0 1 17 17 1 4 25 25
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 0 61 0 2 14 291
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 118 0 2 20 381
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 172 0 6 27 338
Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation 0 1 1 141 1 5 12 440
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 34 1 4 21 163
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 110 0 1 17 276
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality 0 0 1 126 0 2 16 333
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 129 0 2 15 470
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 108 0 4 28 440
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 134 0 5 19 448
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 77 2 4 12 310
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 1 57 0 3 14 243
Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks? 0 0 1 53 0 4 17 174
Signaling an Outside Option 0 0 0 28 1 6 22 154
Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? 0 0 0 5 2 3 3 74
Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 64 0 3 9 236
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 0 99 0 3 9 172
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 59 0 7 12 209
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures 0 1 1 80 0 2 8 187
The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 1 742 0 5 19 1,609
The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 67 1 4 23 140
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 16 1 6 15 61
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 18
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 0 0 1 8 1 3 46 70
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 0 0 1 14 0 3 11 35
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 20 0 3 10 30
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 6 0 6 17 47
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 43 0 4 21 113
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 39 0 5 14 124
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 4 0 4 18 44
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 92 2 4 21 210
Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information 0 0 1 424 0 3 8 648
Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma 0 0 0 36 0 1 5 147
Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen 0 0 0 545 0 2 10 1,043
Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström 0 0 1 258 0 2 12 356
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 0 0 0 0 7 13 15
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 1 2 6 0 2 14 27
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 0 1 328 2 2 13 1,226
Total Working Papers 0 7 54 10,853 64 512 2,070 33,820
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts 0 0 1 64 1 3 13 307
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 2 3 8 24 1,135
Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law 0 0 0 6 1 4 11 45
Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 1 1 1 15 1 9 24 93
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 0 1 18 3 10 18 161
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 1 38 0 2 19 204
Book Review 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 57
Book reviews 0 0 0 7 4 5 8 64
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 1 30 1 7 14 201
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence 0 0 4 163 4 11 35 446
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases 1 2 5 200 6 14 46 915
Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory 0 6 12 91 1 9 35 133
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 1 6 504 3 6 29 977
Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information 0 0 1 19 1 2 18 95
Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study 0 1 4 27 0 3 12 46
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 25 0 5 11 121
Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? 0 0 0 23 1 7 19 134
Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 174
Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory 0 1 3 74 0 5 13 153
ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION * 0 0 0 53 0 1 4 252
Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382] 0 1 1 23 1 2 9 92
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 0 2 3 12 679
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard 0 0 0 77 0 2 5 215
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 1 6 101 0 4 25 278
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory 0 1 4 221 1 3 17 321
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 2 48 0 3 20 118
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts 0 0 2 72 1 2 18 106
Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction? 0 4 11 114 1 7 18 128
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 1 1 17 0 3 10 112
Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership 1 1 1 13 1 2 18 64
Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives 0 0 2 17 0 5 16 86
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information 0 0 2 110 1 6 16 262
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 3 559 0 5 37 1,744
Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework 0 0 0 61 0 2 6 161
Investments as signals of outside options 0 0 0 28 2 4 14 143
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 9 0 2 8 74
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 1 1 3 69 1 4 18 208
Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information 0 2 3 79 1 3 10 337
Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 26 0 3 8 145
Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 68 0 1 14 200
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 2 77 1 5 20 239
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 0 1 5 21 378
Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 1 1 1 13 2 4 15 58
On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 127 0 1 11 306
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition 0 0 0 76 0 1 9 229
On synergies and vertical integration 0 0 0 122 0 2 15 343
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 1 1 1 336 2 3 9 639
On the joint use of liability and safety regulation 0 0 2 101 1 3 15 323
On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries 1 3 5 28 2 8 15 58
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances 0 0 1 116 1 2 13 306
Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs 0 0 0 10 0 1 10 57
Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered 0 1 1 9 0 2 9 59
Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information 0 1 3 37 0 5 22 107
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information 0 0 1 102 0 0 8 287
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 7 1 2 7 56
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 1 8 0 12 24 526
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 22 0 1 11 151
Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments 0 0 1 33 1 7 15 84
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 1 1 1 20 1 2 5 79
Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation 0 2 3 12 4 8 22 51
Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered 0 0 0 10 0 1 12 56
Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks 0 0 4 310 0 6 24 677
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 3 66 2 5 20 291
Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 1 1 3 65 1 8 29 246
Public–private partnerships, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts 1 9 19 19 2 16 35 35
REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY 0 0 0 7 1 8 22 141
Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 49 0 2 8 140
Randomization in coalition contracts 0 0 1 4 1 3 12 78
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 42 1 6 30 158
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 216 0 7 19 658
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 91 1 6 21 396
Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 223 0 2 9 737
Task scheduling and moral hazard 0 0 0 38 0 1 8 138
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 1 26 0 2 46 212
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 1 47 2 8 14 142
The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 852
The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures 1 2 5 66 1 4 13 161
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 1 1 1 18 1 7 14 84
The management of innovation: Experimental evidence 1 3 4 13 3 8 18 79
The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information 0 0 0 8 0 3 11 61
The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts 0 1 8 105 1 7 28 140
The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract 1 1 2 15 1 3 18 51
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 31 1 4 19 148
When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods? 0 7 15 42 3 11 26 66
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 1 3 395 1 7 20 1,282
Total Journal Articles 14 60 175 6,237 82 394 1,422 22,551

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Statistics updated 2026-06-04