Access Statistics for Patrick W. Schmitz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts 0 0 0 13 3 3 7 130
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 229 0 1 1 624
Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions 0 0 0 134 4 4 4 451
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 43 0 1 1 78
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 25
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 0 0 142 3 5 7 494
Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 98
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 41 0 0 1 162
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 24 2 2 4 69
Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999) 0 0 0 92 2 2 4 282
Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) 0 0 0 242 1 2 7 929
Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999) 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 74
Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998) 0 0 0 21 1 1 2 105
Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003) 0 0 0 27 0 1 2 131
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 0 122 1 1 1 476
Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? 0 0 0 47 2 5 6 245
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence 0 1 1 202 0 3 5 528
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 32 3 3 6 226
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 190 1 1 5 538
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 2 13 0 2 4 72
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 1 8 1 2 3 48
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 142 1 2 4 470
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 0 0 0 6 1 1 5 19
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 0 2 3 34 0 2 4 24
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 1 1 14 1 3 5 32
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 36
Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study 0 0 2 24 0 1 6 66
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 75 3 3 3 170
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 136 1 3 5 213
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 44 4 6 7 161
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 33 1 1 3 149
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 4 3 4 5 53
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 80 3 6 6 379
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 73 0 0 3 234
Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung 0 0 0 12 2 5 6 83
Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem 0 1 2 127 3 9 12 498
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern 0 0 0 14 0 1 2 118
Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 29 1 2 3 128
Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory 0 0 1 66 2 2 3 151
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 71 0 0 4 273
Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 179 0 0 0 763
Garbled Elections 0 0 1 29 2 3 4 151
Garbled Elections 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 86
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 99 0 2 3 419
Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 22 2 2 5 79
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 1 1 37 1 3 3 96
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory 0 0 0 84 1 3 5 196
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory 0 0 0 29 2 4 5 33
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 33 5 5 8 90
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 27 0 1 5 53
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 2 2 24 0 2 4 31
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 0 0 12 1 2 4 48
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 1 1 37 4 6 7 46
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 0 0 1 2 2 4 8
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 0 2 4 42
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 0 1 1 36
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 40 0 1 3 82
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 11 0 1 2 43
Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 284 1 2 3 803
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 24 2 2 6 84
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 34 0 0 4 129
Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework 0 0 0 38 1 1 2 197
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 0 543 0 2 7 1,231
Investments as Signals of Outside Options 0 0 0 76 4 4 5 267
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 117
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 10 2 2 3 56
Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 91 0 1 4 452
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 1 1 83 2 7 9 193
Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 1 102 0 1 3 441
Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 101 3 4 6 338
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 0 27 0 0 4 145
Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 44 1 3 4 144
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 76 0 0 2 221
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 42 0 0 2 84
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 1 1 30 0 2 4 36
On Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 17 0 1 2 59
On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition 0 0 0 107 0 1 3 357
On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 169
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 62 3 4 8 231
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 1 151 0 0 2 455
On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation 0 0 0 56 0 0 2 187
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 1 1 8 4 6 7 19
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 0 5 0 2 3 20
Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances 0 0 0 158 1 1 3 476
Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information 0 0 0 117 2 2 3 443
Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals 0 0 0 83 1 4 5 450
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 38
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 2 8 9 10 15
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 6 1 1 1 25
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 19 2 3 4 41
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 26 0 1 5 57
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 1 1 10 1 2 7 28
Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information 0 0 0 99 1 2 2 335
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 23
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 43
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 0 197 3 4 6 430
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 52 0 1 1 345
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 11 0 0 2 30
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 31 1 2 3 63
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 0 11 2 2 3 61
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 1 29 4 4 8 40
Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks 0 0 0 183 2 3 8 470
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 31 1 1 2 75
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 10 0 1 3 55
Public-Private Partnerships, Asymmetric Information, and Incomplete Contracts 13 13 13 13 8 9 9 9
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 1 61 2 5 10 283
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 118 1 2 3 363
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 172 2 3 7 315
Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation 0 0 0 140 0 0 4 430
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 34 4 12 14 154
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 110 5 8 10 268
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality 0 0 1 126 3 5 12 326
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 129 2 4 7 460
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 108 5 6 7 419
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 134 1 1 4 432
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 1 1 57 0 1 1 230
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 77 0 0 1 298
Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks? 1 1 1 53 2 4 7 162
Signaling an Outside Option 0 0 0 28 1 1 2 133
Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 71
Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 64 0 0 5 227
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 0 99 1 1 2 164
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 59 2 3 4 201
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures 0 0 0 79 0 0 3 179
The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 1 1 2 742 4 5 13 1,597
The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 67 1 1 5 119
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 16 0 2 3 49
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 0 0 2 8 3 3 7 29
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 0 1 2 14 0 2 3 26
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 6 1 1 3 31
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 20 0 1 3 21
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 39 3 4 4 114
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 43 0 3 5 96
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 27
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 92 0 0 1 190
Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information 0 0 0 423 0 0 3 641
Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma 0 0 1 36 0 0 2 142
Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen 0 0 0 545 1 1 2 1,035
Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström 0 0 1 258 0 1 7 348
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 1 1 5 0 6 9 19
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 5
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 1 1 328 2 5 7 1,218
Total Working Papers 15 32 54 10,838 177 321 603 32,163
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts 1 1 1 64 2 2 6 299
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 1,112
Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 34
Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 14 2 3 5 74
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 0 1 17 2 2 5 145
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 1 2 38 3 11 16 197
Book Review 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 54
Book reviews 0 0 0 7 2 2 2 58
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 1 1 30 4 5 8 192
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence 1 3 5 162 9 12 23 426
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases 0 0 3 195 5 8 32 884
Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory 1 4 12 83 1 6 22 105
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 1 4 12 503 2 7 42 963
Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information 0 0 1 18 2 2 6 80
Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study 2 2 7 25 3 5 15 40
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 25 0 0 5 113
Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? 0 0 0 23 3 4 6 119
Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 170
Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory 0 1 3 73 0 1 5 144
ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION * 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 248
Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382] 0 0 0 22 1 3 4 87
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 671
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard 0 0 0 77 0 1 2 211
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 3 4 98 3 10 12 263
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory 1 3 4 220 4 7 10 312
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 1 2 47 1 2 7 102
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts 0 1 2 71 2 3 8 92
Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction? 2 5 13 108 2 5 16 115
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 16 1 1 4 105
Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership 0 0 1 12 0 1 3 48
Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives 0 1 1 16 1 4 7 77
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information 0 1 1 109 2 3 3 249
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach 0 2 4 558 5 8 21 1,718
Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework 0 0 0 61 1 1 2 156
Investments as signals of outside options 0 0 0 28 1 1 2 131
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 9 1 2 3 69
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 1 1 1 67 2 4 8 196
Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information 0 0 0 76 0 1 6 330
Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 1 26 2 2 4 139
Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 68 1 1 2 187
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 1 1 76 1 2 6 224
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 359
Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 12 1 1 5 47
On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 2 127 0 1 6 297
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition 0 0 0 76 0 1 2 221
On synergies and vertical integration 0 0 0 122 2 4 5 333
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 0 335 1 2 8 634
On the joint use of liability and safety regulation 0 0 1 99 2 3 7 312
On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries 0 1 4 24 0 2 7 45
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances 1 1 2 116 4 5 8 298
Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs 0 0 1 10 1 2 5 51
Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered 0 0 0 8 0 0 4 54
Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information 0 1 3 35 5 9 12 95
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information 0 1 3 102 0 1 4 280
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 50
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 1 1 1 8 2 4 7 507
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 3 22 0 1 6 143
Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments 0 0 1 33 1 2 3 72
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 19 1 1 2 75
Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation 0 1 1 10 1 3 7 35
Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered 0 0 0 10 2 2 4 48
Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks 1 2 5 309 4 10 28 668
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 2 2 65 1 6 10 277
Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 2 64 7 12 19 232
Public–private partnerships, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts 6 7 7 7 6 8 8 8
REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY 0 0 0 7 2 2 5 121
Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 49 0 1 2 134
Randomization in coalition contracts 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 69
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 42 3 4 6 133
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 216 3 4 9 644
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 91 1 4 8 380
Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 223 1 2 3 730
Task scheduling and moral hazard 0 0 2 38 1 1 4 131
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 0 25 4 5 9 173
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 46 0 0 1 129
The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 0 0 2 3 8 847
The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures 0 1 1 62 0 2 4 151
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 71
The management of innovation: Experimental evidence 1 1 1 10 1 1 3 64
The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information 0 0 0 8 1 1 4 53
The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts 2 4 18 102 4 7 28 122
The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract 0 0 1 13 3 4 7 37
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 31 1 4 9 137
When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods? 2 6 16 33 2 7 22 48
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 1 2 3 394 1 4 14 1,268
Total Journal Articles 25 67 163 6,137 145 276 664 21,522

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06