| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
138 |
| Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
229 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
633 |
| Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
461 |
| Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
94 |
| Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
6 |
20 |
44 |
| Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
142 |
1 |
5 |
22 |
511 |
| Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
103 |
| Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
175 |
| Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
80 |
| Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
4 |
18 |
298 |
| Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
242 |
1 |
6 |
14 |
941 |
| Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
82 |
| Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
106 |
| Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
139 |
| Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
122 |
2 |
5 |
21 |
496 |
| Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
251 |
| Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence |
1 |
1 |
2 |
203 |
1 |
8 |
29 |
554 |
| Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
232 |
| Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases |
0 |
0 |
0 |
190 |
1 |
2 |
45 |
580 |
| Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
86 |
| Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
56 |
| Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases |
0 |
1 |
1 |
143 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
487 |
| Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
23 |
| Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory |
0 |
0 |
3 |
35 |
1 |
7 |
19 |
41 |
| Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
0 |
6 |
19 |
48 |
| Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
6 |
13 |
48 |
| Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
7 |
11 |
74 |
| Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study |
1 |
1 |
1 |
137 |
1 |
8 |
18 |
228 |
| Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
179 |
| Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
173 |
| Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
388 |
| Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
8 |
25 |
259 |
| Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
5 |
19 |
165 |
| Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
64 |
| Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
91 |
| Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
127 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
506 |
| Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
128 |
| Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
134 |
| Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
160 |
| Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
281 |
| Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
179 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
772 |
| Garbled Elections |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
156 |
| Garbled Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
88 |
| Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
425 |
| Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
91 |
| Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
113 |
| Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
205 |
| Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
2 |
5 |
16 |
44 |
| How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
109 |
| How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
69 |
| How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
61 |
| How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts |
0 |
0 |
3 |
25 |
0 |
4 |
26 |
55 |
| Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
38 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
55 |
| Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
13 |
| Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
49 |
| Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
59 |
| Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
9 |
22 |
64 |
| Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
87 |
| Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
284 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
807 |
| Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
140 |
| Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
4 |
16 |
96 |
| Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
208 |
| Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
543 |
2 |
7 |
22 |
1,250 |
| Investments as Signals of Outside Options |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
278 |
| Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
125 |
| Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
65 |
| Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
92 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
461 |
| Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
1 |
83 |
0 |
3 |
34 |
219 |
| Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
445 |
| Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
345 |
| Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
161 |
| Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
156 |
| Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
229 |
| Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
2 |
3 |
17 |
100 |
| Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
46 |
| On Randomization in Coalition Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
65 |
| On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
364 |
| On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
176 |
| On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
238 |
| On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
466 |
| On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
188 |
| On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
32 |
| On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
32 |
| Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
479 |
| Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
454 |
| Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
456 |
| Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
45 |
| Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
20 |
| Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
48 |
| Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
36 |
| Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
43 |
| Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
1 |
5 |
26 |
79 |
| Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
342 |
| Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
59 |
| Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
4 |
24 |
46 |
| Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
197 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
445 |
| Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
356 |
| Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
40 |
| Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
70 |
| Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
3 |
19 |
53 |
| Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
71 |
| Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
183 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
479 |
| Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
88 |
| Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
70 |
| Public-Private Partnerships, Asymmetric Information, and Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Public-Private Partnerships, Asymmetric Information, and Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
17 |
17 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
25 |
| Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
292 |
| Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
0 |
5 |
26 |
338 |
| Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
381 |
| Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
141 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
440 |
| Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
110 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
276 |
| Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
163 |
| Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
333 |
| Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
129 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
471 |
| Reserve prices in auctions as reference points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
0 |
5 |
19 |
448 |
| Reserve prices in auctions as reference points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
1 |
3 |
28 |
441 |
| Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
243 |
| Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
310 |
| Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
174 |
| Signaling an Outside Option |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
6 |
22 |
154 |
| Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
74 |
| Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
236 |
| The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
172 |
| The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
209 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures |
0 |
1 |
1 |
80 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
187 |
| The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
742 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
1,610 |
| The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
5 |
24 |
141 |
| The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
6 |
15 |
61 |
| The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
18 |
| The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
3 |
45 |
70 |
| The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
35 |
| The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
4 |
17 |
47 |
| The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
30 |
| The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
124 |
| The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
4 |
21 |
113 |
| Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
1 |
4 |
22 |
211 |
| Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
45 |
| Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
424 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
648 |
| Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
147 |
| Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
545 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
1,043 |
| Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström |
0 |
0 |
0 |
258 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
356 |
| When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
14 |
16 |
| When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
27 |
| Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages |
0 |
0 |
1 |
328 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
1,226 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
5 |
52 |
10,855 |
38 |
415 |
2,079 |
33,858 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
64 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
307 |
| Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
8 |
25 |
1,136 |
| Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
45 |
| Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm |
0 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
5 |
24 |
93 |
| Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
7 |
19 |
162 |
| Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
204 |
| Book Review |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
57 |
| Book reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
64 |
| Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
201 |
| Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence |
1 |
1 |
5 |
164 |
4 |
13 |
38 |
450 |
| Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases |
0 |
2 |
5 |
200 |
0 |
11 |
43 |
915 |
| Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory |
0 |
1 |
12 |
91 |
0 |
4 |
34 |
133 |
| Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study |
0 |
1 |
6 |
504 |
0 |
5 |
26 |
977 |
| Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
95 |
| Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study |
0 |
0 |
4 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
46 |
| Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
121 |
| Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
6 |
19 |
134 |
| Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
174 |
| Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory |
0 |
0 |
2 |
74 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
154 |
| ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION * |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
252 |
| Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382] |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
92 |
| Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
680 |
| Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
215 |
| Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions |
0 |
1 |
6 |
101 |
1 |
5 |
26 |
279 |
| Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory |
0 |
0 |
4 |
221 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
322 |
| How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects |
0 |
0 |
2 |
48 |
0 |
3 |
19 |
118 |
| How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
72 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
106 |
| Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction? |
0 |
0 |
11 |
114 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
128 |
| Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods |
0 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
112 |
| Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership |
0 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
64 |
| Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives |
0 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
86 |
| Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
110 |
2 |
6 |
18 |
264 |
| Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach |
0 |
0 |
3 |
559 |
0 |
4 |
37 |
1,744 |
| Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
161 |
| Investments as signals of outside options |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
143 |
| Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
74 |
| Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered |
0 |
1 |
3 |
69 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
208 |
| Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information |
0 |
1 |
3 |
79 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
337 |
| Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
145 |
| Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
200 |
| Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
77 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
239 |
| Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
22 |
379 |
| Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm |
0 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
58 |
| On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
127 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
306 |
| On second-price auctions and imperfect competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
229 |
| On synergies and vertical integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
122 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
343 |
| On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems |
0 |
1 |
1 |
336 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
640 |
| On the joint use of liability and safety regulation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
101 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
323 |
| On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries |
0 |
1 |
5 |
28 |
0 |
5 |
15 |
58 |
| Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances |
0 |
0 |
1 |
116 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
306 |
| Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
57 |
| Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered |
0 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
59 |
| Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information |
0 |
1 |
3 |
37 |
1 |
6 |
23 |
108 |
| Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
102 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
287 |
| Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
56 |
| Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
10 |
25 |
527 |
| Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
151 |
| Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
7 |
14 |
84 |
| Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information |
0 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
79 |
| Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation |
0 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
0 |
8 |
21 |
51 |
| Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
56 |
| Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks |
0 |
0 |
3 |
310 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
677 |
| Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering |
1 |
1 |
4 |
67 |
2 |
6 |
22 |
293 |
| Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation |
0 |
1 |
3 |
65 |
0 |
4 |
29 |
246 |
| Public–private partnerships, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts |
0 |
1 |
19 |
19 |
1 |
5 |
36 |
36 |
| REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
7 |
22 |
141 |
| Randomization in Coalition Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
140 |
| Randomization in coalition contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
78 |
| Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
4 |
30 |
158 |
| Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
216 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
658 |
| Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
6 |
21 |
396 |
| Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem |
1 |
1 |
1 |
224 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
738 |
| Task scheduling and moral hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
139 |
| The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
1 |
2 |
46 |
213 |
| The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
142 |
| The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
852 |
| The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures |
0 |
2 |
5 |
66 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
161 |
| The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability |
0 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
7 |
14 |
84 |
| The management of innovation: Experimental evidence |
0 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
1 |
8 |
19 |
80 |
| The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
61 |
| The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts |
0 |
1 |
7 |
105 |
0 |
4 |
26 |
140 |
| The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract |
0 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
51 |
| Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
2 |
4 |
20 |
150 |
| When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods? |
0 |
1 |
15 |
42 |
0 |
5 |
26 |
66 |
| Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages |
0 |
1 |
3 |
395 |
2 |
8 |
22 |
1,284 |
| Total Journal Articles |
3 |
32 |
174 |
6,240 |
27 |
311 |
1,423 |
22,578 |
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