Access Statistics for Patrick W. Schmitz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts 0 0 0 13 0 0 12 138
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 229 1 2 11 634
Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions 0 0 0 134 1 1 15 462
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 4 0 0 19 44
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 43 0 2 17 94
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 0 0 142 0 3 22 511
Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 23 1 1 6 104
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 24 0 0 13 80
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 41 0 1 13 175
Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999) 0 0 0 92 1 2 19 299
Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) 0 0 0 242 0 4 14 941
Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999) 0 0 0 9 0 1 8 82
Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998) 0 0 0 21 0 0 2 106
Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003) 0 0 0 27 0 1 9 139
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 0 122 0 3 21 496
Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? 0 0 0 47 0 0 11 251
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence 0 1 2 203 0 5 29 554
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 1 1 1 191 2 3 46 582
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 13 0 1 16 86
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 1 1 1 33 1 1 11 233
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 8 0 0 10 56
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 1 143 0 0 19 487
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 0 0 0 6 0 0 5 23
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 0 0 3 35 0 1 19 41
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 0 0 5 1 3 14 49
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 0 2 15 0 2 19 48
Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 24 0 1 10 74
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 1 1 137 0 3 18 228
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 1 76 0 1 12 179
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 44 0 0 18 173
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 33 0 1 19 165
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 4 0 0 15 64
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 1 1 1 81 1 1 16 389
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 73 1 3 26 260
Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung 0 0 0 12 0 0 13 91
Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem 0 0 1 127 1 1 19 507
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern 0 0 0 14 0 0 11 128
Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 29 0 0 8 134
Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory 0 0 0 66 1 1 12 161
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 71 0 0 8 281
Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 179 1 1 10 773
Garbled Elections 0 0 1 29 0 1 9 156
Garbled Elections 1 1 1 11 1 1 4 89
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 99 0 0 8 425
Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 22 0 2 15 91
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 0 1 37 2 4 22 115
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory 0 0 0 84 0 0 12 205
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory 0 0 0 29 0 2 15 44
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 27 0 0 17 69
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 33 0 0 24 109
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 0 3 25 0 2 26 55
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 0 0 12 0 1 15 61
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 0 2 38 0 0 15 55
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 13
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 0 0 19 59
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 0 0 14 49
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 40 0 0 6 87
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 11 0 5 22 64
Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 284 1 1 7 808
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 24 0 1 15 96
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 34 0 1 11 140
Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework 0 0 0 38 0 0 12 208
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 0 543 0 2 22 1,250
Investments as Signals of Outside Options 0 0 0 76 1 1 16 279
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 10 0 1 11 65
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 36 0 0 8 125
Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 92 0 0 10 461
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 0 1 83 0 0 33 219
Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 102 0 0 5 445
Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 101 0 0 12 345
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 0 27 0 0 16 161
Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 44 0 2 15 156
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 76 0 0 8 229
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 42 0 2 16 100
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 1 30 0 3 12 46
On Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 17 0 0 7 65
On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition 0 0 0 107 0 0 9 364
On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 39 0 0 7 176
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 62 0 2 12 238
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 0 151 0 1 11 466
On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation 0 0 0 56 0 0 2 188
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 1 8 0 1 19 32
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 0 5 0 2 14 32
Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances 0 0 0 158 0 0 4 479
Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information 0 0 0 117 1 3 14 455
Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals 0 0 0 83 0 0 10 456
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 2 0 0 14 20
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 5 0 0 7 45
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 19 0 0 10 48
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 6 0 0 12 36
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 26 0 1 26 79
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 10 0 0 17 43
Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information 0 0 0 99 0 2 9 342
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 9 0 0 16 59
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 2 0 0 24 46
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 0 197 0 0 20 445
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 52 0 1 12 356
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 11 0 0 10 40
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 31 0 0 9 70
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 0 11 0 0 13 71
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 1 29 0 2 19 53
Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks 0 0 0 183 0 1 12 479
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 10 0 0 16 70
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 31 1 1 16 89
Public-Private Partnerships, Asymmetric Information, and Incomplete Contracts 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
Public-Private Partnerships, Asymmetric Information, and Incomplete Contracts 1 1 18 18 1 2 26 26
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 0 61 2 3 17 294
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 172 0 0 26 338
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 118 0 0 20 381
Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation 0 0 1 141 0 1 10 440
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 110 0 0 17 276
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 34 0 1 21 163
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality 0 0 0 126 3 3 15 336
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 129 0 1 15 471
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 134 1 1 19 449
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 108 1 2 29 442
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 1 57 0 0 14 243
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 77 0 2 12 310
Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks? 0 0 1 53 0 0 17 174
Signaling an Outside Option 0 0 0 28 0 1 22 154
Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? 0 0 0 5 0 2 3 74
Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 64 1 1 10 237
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 0 99 0 0 9 172
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 59 0 0 12 209
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures 0 0 1 80 0 0 8 187
The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 2 2 3 744 2 3 20 1,612
The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 67 1 3 24 142
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 16 0 1 15 61
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 18
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 0 0 0 8 0 1 45 70
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 0 0 1 14 0 0 11 35
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 6 0 0 17 47
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 20 0 0 10 30
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 39 0 0 14 124
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 43 0 0 21 113
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 4 0 1 19 45
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 92 0 3 21 211
Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information 1 1 2 425 2 2 9 650
Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma 0 0 0 36 0 0 5 147
Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen 0 0 0 545 1 1 10 1,044
Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström 0 0 0 258 0 0 10 356
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 0 2 6 0 0 14 27
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 0 0 0 0 1 13 16
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 0 1 328 0 2 13 1,226
Total Working Papers 10 12 62 10,865 35 137 2,086 33,893
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts 0 0 1 64 0 1 10 307
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 2 1 5 26 1,137
Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law 0 0 0 6 1 2 12 46
Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 1 1 15 0 1 22 93
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 0 1 18 0 4 19 162
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 1 38 1 1 19 205
Book Review 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 57
Book reviews 0 0 0 7 1 5 9 65
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 1 30 2 3 16 203
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence 0 1 5 164 0 8 37 450
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases 1 2 6 201 2 8 44 917
Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory 0 0 12 91 0 1 34 133
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 5 504 0 3 21 977
Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information 0 0 1 19 1 2 19 96
Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study 0 0 4 27 0 0 11 46
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 25 0 0 8 121
Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? 0 0 0 23 0 1 19 134
Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 174
Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory 0 0 2 74 0 1 11 154
ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION * 0 0 0 53 0 0 4 252
Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382] 0 0 1 23 0 1 9 92
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 0 1 4 13 681
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard 0 0 0 77 0 0 5 215
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 1 1 7 102 1 2 27 280
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory 0 0 4 221 0 2 17 322
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 2 48 0 0 19 118
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts 0 0 2 72 1 2 19 107
Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction? 0 0 11 114 0 1 18 128
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 1 17 0 0 8 112
Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership 0 1 1 13 2 3 19 66
Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives 0 0 2 17 0 0 14 86
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information 0 0 2 110 0 3 18 264
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 3 559 2 2 39 1,746
Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework 0 0 0 61 1 1 7 162
Investments as signals of outside options 0 0 0 28 1 3 14 144
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 9 0 0 7 74
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 1 3 69 0 1 16 208
Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information 0 0 3 79 0 1 9 337
Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 26 0 0 8 145
Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 68 1 1 15 201
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 2 77 0 1 18 239
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 0 0 2 22 379
Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 1 1 13 0 2 13 58
On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 127 0 0 11 306
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition 0 0 0 76 0 0 9 229
On synergies and vertical integration 0 0 0 122 0 0 14 343
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 1 2 2 337 1 4 9 641
On the joint use of liability and safety regulation 0 0 2 101 0 1 14 323
On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries 0 1 5 28 2 4 17 60
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances 0 0 1 116 0 1 13 306
Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs 0 0 0 10 0 0 8 57
Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered 0 0 1 9 0 0 5 59
Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information 0 0 3 37 0 1 23 108
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information 0 0 1 102 0 0 8 287
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 7 0 1 6 56
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 1 8 0 1 25 527
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 22 0 0 9 151
Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments 0 0 0 33 1 2 15 85
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 1 2 2 21 2 3 7 81
Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation 0 0 3 12 0 4 19 51
Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered 0 0 0 10 0 0 10 56
Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks 1 1 4 311 3 3 22 680
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 1 2 5 68 1 5 23 294
Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 1 2 65 0 1 28 246
Public–private partnerships, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts 0 1 19 19 0 3 36 36
REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY 0 0 0 7 0 1 22 141
Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 49 1 1 8 141
Randomization in coalition contracts 0 0 1 4 0 1 10 78
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 42 0 1 29 158
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 216 0 0 18 658
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 91 0 1 21 396
Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 1 1 224 1 2 11 739
Task scheduling and moral hazard 0 0 0 38 1 2 10 140
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 1 26 0 1 45 213
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 1 47 0 2 14 142
The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 853
The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures 0 1 5 66 0 1 12 161
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 1 1 18 0 1 14 84
The management of innovation: Experimental evidence 0 1 4 13 0 4 18 80
The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information 0 0 0 8 2 2 11 63
The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts 0 0 7 105 0 1 26 140
The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract 0 1 2 15 1 2 19 52
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 31 1 4 18 151
When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods? 0 0 15 42 0 3 25 66
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 0 3 395 1 4 22 1,285
Total Journal Articles 6 23 178 6,246 38 147 1,397 22,616

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Statistics updated 2026-08-07