Access Statistics for Patrick W. Schmitz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 115
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 228 0 0 2 618
Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions 0 0 0 132 0 0 2 443
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 42 0 0 4 72
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 1 1 1 4 1 1 2 22
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 0 1 141 0 1 2 483
Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 1 23 0 0 3 96
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 1 41 0 0 5 160
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 24 0 0 3 63
Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999) 0 0 1 92 1 2 5 273
Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) 0 0 0 239 0 2 6 908
Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999) 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 72
Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998) 0 0 1 20 0 0 1 100
Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003) 0 0 0 27 0 0 1 126
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 0 122 0 0 3 472
Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? 0 0 0 47 0 0 4 238
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 201 0 0 5 522
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 8 0 0 13 61
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 1 139 0 1 13 450
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 41
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 188 0 0 0 528
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 32 0 2 6 217
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 0 0 12 0 1 5 23
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 0 1 3 0 0 8 26
Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study 0 0 2 15 0 0 7 41
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 1 73 0 1 6 163
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 1 136 0 0 3 206
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 44 0 0 1 153
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 1 33 0 0 2 143
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 45
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 229
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 1 1 79 0 1 7 366
Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 75
Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem 1 1 9 122 2 3 21 475
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern 0 0 0 13 0 1 3 110
Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 29 0 1 3 125
Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory 0 0 1 60 1 3 5 138
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 1 1 1 68 3 4 10 260
Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 179 0 0 4 758
Garbled Elections 0 0 1 10 0 0 1 84
Garbled Elections 0 0 0 28 0 0 3 147
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 99 0 1 2 415
Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence 0 0 1 17 3 3 4 60
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 0 1 33 0 0 3 89
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory 0 0 0 84 0 0 3 191
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory 0 0 0 29 0 1 4 25
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 2 32 0 0 25 77
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 26 1 1 5 44
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 2 20 20 0 2 16 16
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 1 8 8 0 2 19 19
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 0 1 2 38
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 0 1 1 34
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 40
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 1 40 0 0 3 77
Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 283 1 1 12 796
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 77
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 34 0 1 4 125
Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 194
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach 0 1 1 541 0 2 6 1,211
Investments as Signals of Outside Options 0 0 0 76 0 0 0 255
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 36 0 0 1 116
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 50
Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 91 0 0 0 447
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 0 0 82 0 0 3 184
Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 101 0 0 3 437
Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 3 99 0 0 5 328
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 1 27 0 1 4 137
Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 43 0 0 2 137
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 74 0 2 3 210
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 28 0 2 4 29
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 81
On Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 56
On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition 0 0 0 107 0 0 2 353
On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 3 39 0 0 8 168
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 62 1 1 6 222
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 0 150 0 0 1 452
On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation 0 0 0 55 0 0 1 181
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 0 4 0 1 5 14
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 10
Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances 0 0 1 158 0 1 5 470
Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information 0 0 0 117 0 0 1 439
Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals 0 0 0 83 0 0 1 442
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 37
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 5
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 24
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 36
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 3 8 0 1 8 19
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 8 15 2 2 21 35
Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information 0 0 0 99 0 0 1 332
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 19
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 40
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 0 196 0 0 2 421
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 52 0 0 1 340
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 31 1 1 3 59
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 28
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 0 28 0 1 1 32
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 55
Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks 0 0 0 182 0 0 7 460
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 31 0 0 2 73
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 10 0 0 4 52
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 1 1 1 58 1 2 5 265
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 1 341 2 3 10 1,010
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 117 2 3 7 355
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 1 166 0 0 3 291
Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation 0 0 0 139 0 0 0 419
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 110 0 1 2 258
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 34 0 0 6 138
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality 0 0 1 122 0 0 5 304
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 127 0 0 1 448
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 107 0 0 3 405
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 134 0 0 1 428
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 77 0 0 2 297
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 56 0 1 1 229
Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks? 0 0 0 52 0 0 1 152
Signaling an Outside Option 0 0 0 27 0 0 3 128
Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 69
Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 63 0 0 2 219
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 1 98 1 1 4 157
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 196
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures 0 0 0 79 0 0 1 175
The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 1 3 7 733 1 7 24 1,557
The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence 0 1 1 66 0 1 6 107
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 16 0 0 3 45
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 6 0 0 5 26
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 18 0 1 1 13
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 43 0 0 5 90
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 38 0 0 3 109
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 90 0 0 2 182
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 22
Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information 0 1 2 422 0 1 3 632
Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 139
Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen 0 0 1 545 0 1 5 1,032
Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström 0 4 7 253 0 7 17 330
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 0 0 323 0 0 3 1,201
Total Working Papers 5 18 103 10,904 24 82 536 31,897


Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts 0 0 1 63 1 1 6 289
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 2 0 2 13 1,097
Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 27
Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 1 12 0 0 4 66
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 1 2 16 0 3 8 133
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 32 0 5 6 158
Book Review 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 51
Book reviews 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 54
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 0 28 0 0 4 178
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence 0 0 5 140 3 4 18 379
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases 1 2 9 185 4 8 43 801
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 7 41 81 301 7 44 118 671
Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information 0 0 8 12 0 0 30 62
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 100
Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? 1 1 1 22 2 3 10 105
Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 168
Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory 5 26 33 45 5 26 38 107
ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION * 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 247
Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382] 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 81
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 655
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard 0 0 0 77 0 1 1 205
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 3 7 9 76 3 7 15 225
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory 6 39 79 168 6 41 81 250
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 4 13 21 0 5 47 65
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 14 0 0 3 94
Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership 0 1 1 5 0 1 3 34
Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives 0 0 1 10 0 0 3 62
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information 0 0 0 107 1 1 2 235
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach 0 1 4 515 2 13 51 1,605
Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework 0 0 1 61 0 0 4 153
Investments as signals of outside options 1 1 2 27 1 2 4 122
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 62
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 0 4 24 0 0 9 141
Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information 0 0 0 75 0 1 12 306
Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 25 0 1 4 134
Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 65 0 1 3 175
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 1 75 0 1 4 212
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 0 0 2 15 333
Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 30
On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 120 0 0 1 281
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition 0 0 0 76 0 0 2 218
On synergies and vertical integration 0 0 1 118 1 1 5 321
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 2 6 331 0 3 8 615
On the joint use of liability and safety regulation 0 0 1 95 0 1 5 296
On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries 0 1 10 13 0 1 16 27
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances 0 0 2 111 0 3 5 280
Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 42
Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 48
Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information 3 6 13 16 4 12 39 53
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information 0 0 0 97 0 0 0 274
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 46
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 2 6 0 0 6 494
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 13 0 0 4 126
Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments 0 0 0 28 0 0 4 61
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 18 0 0 2 66
Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation 0 0 2 5 1 1 7 20
Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered 0 0 0 7 0 0 3 36
Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks 3 5 17 300 3 6 30 607
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 3 56 0 0 9 237
Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 1 6 57 2 5 18 187
REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY 0 0 2 2 0 0 8 103
Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 131
Randomization in coalition contracts 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 66
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 1 41 1 1 5 123
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 216 0 2 6 624
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 1 1 89 0 4 13 360
Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 1 1 220 0 2 5 716
Task scheduling and moral hazard 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 122
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 1 25 1 2 8 151
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 44 1 3 4 118
The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 830
The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures 0 0 0 59 0 0 2 140
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 14 0 0 3 66
The management of innovation: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 8 1 3 3 56
The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 45
The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract 0 0 3 6 0 0 10 20
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 1 1 2 26 1 2 6 115
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 1 12 386 1 2 28 1,222
Total Journal Articles 31 143 342 5,039 54 230 849 19,215


Statistics updated 2022-09-05