Access Statistics for Patrick W. Schmitz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts 0 0 0 13 0 0 4 126
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 229 0 0 0 623
Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions 0 0 0 134 0 0 2 447
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 77
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 24
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 0 0 142 0 0 2 489
Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 23 0 1 2 98
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 24 0 0 2 67
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 41 0 1 1 162
Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999) 0 0 0 92 0 1 4 280
Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) 0 0 0 242 1 4 7 927
Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999) 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 74
Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998) 0 0 0 21 0 1 1 104
Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003) 0 0 0 27 0 1 2 130
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 0 122 0 0 0 475
Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? 0 0 0 47 0 0 1 240
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 201 0 2 2 525
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 190 1 1 4 535
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 142 0 2 7 468
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 2 3 13 0 2 3 70
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 1 1 8 0 1 2 46
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 32 1 1 2 222
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 0 0 1 32 0 1 2 22
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 0 0 2 6 0 1 9 18
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 0 0 13 1 1 2 29
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 35
Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study 0 1 4 24 0 1 7 63
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 136 0 1 2 210
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 75 0 0 0 167
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 154
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 80 0 0 3 373
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 33 0 0 1 146
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 49
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 73 0 1 3 234
Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung 0 0 0 12 0 1 2 78
Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem 0 1 1 126 0 2 4 488
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern 0 0 0 14 0 1 3 117
Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 29 0 1 1 126
Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory 0 0 1 66 0 0 1 149
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 71 2 3 5 273
Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 179 0 0 0 763
Garbled Elections 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 85
Garbled Elections 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 147
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 99 0 0 1 417
Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 22 1 1 3 76
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 93
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory 0 0 0 84 0 1 1 192
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 28
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 1 27 1 1 6 52
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 33 0 0 3 85
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 0 0 12 1 1 10 45
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 0 0 22 1 1 2 29
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 6
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 0 0 36 1 1 1 40
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 0 1 2 40
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 35
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 40 0 1 3 81
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 11 0 1 1 42
Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information 0 1 1 284 0 1 1 801
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 24 2 2 2 80
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 34 0 1 1 126
Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework 0 0 0 38 0 1 1 196
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 1 543 1 2 9 1,228
Investments as Signals of Outside Options 0 0 0 76 0 0 1 263
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 10 0 1 1 54
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 117
Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 91 0 0 3 451
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 0 0 82 0 1 1 185
Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 1 102 0 0 3 440
Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 101 0 1 2 333
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 0 27 0 1 5 145
Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 44 0 1 1 141
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 76 1 2 2 221
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 42 0 0 1 83
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 1 29 0 0 4 34
On Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 58
On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition 0 0 0 107 0 0 0 354
On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 169
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 62 0 2 3 226
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 1 1 1 151 1 2 2 455
On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation 0 0 1 56 0 1 2 186
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 18
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 13
Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances 0 0 0 158 0 0 2 474
Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information 0 0 0 117 0 0 1 441
Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals 0 0 0 83 1 1 2 446
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 6
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 38
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 24
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 19 1 1 2 38
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 4 25 0 0 6 53
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 9 2 2 5 26
Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information 0 0 0 99 0 0 0 333
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 43
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 22
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 0 197 0 0 2 425
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 52 0 0 1 344
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 11 0 1 2 30
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 31 0 0 2 61
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 0 28 0 1 2 34
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 58
Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks 0 0 0 183 0 0 4 466
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 73
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 10 1 2 2 54
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 2 61 0 1 5 277
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 1 172 1 2 6 312
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 118 0 0 1 361
Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation 0 0 0 140 0 0 2 428
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 34 0 1 2 142
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 110 0 0 1 259
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality 1 1 2 126 3 4 8 320
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 129 0 1 2 455
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 108 1 1 1 413
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 134 0 0 1 429
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 229
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 77 0 0 1 298
Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks? 0 0 0 52 0 0 4 157
Signaling an Outside Option 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 132
Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 71
Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 64 0 1 6 227
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 0 99 0 0 1 163
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 197
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures 0 0 0 79 0 0 3 179
The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 1 2 741 0 5 13 1,590
The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 67 0 0 3 117
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 46
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 1 1 2 8 1 1 6 25
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 0 0 2 13 0 0 2 24
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 30
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 20 0 0 2 20
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 110
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 43 0 0 2 92
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 26
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 92 0 0 3 189
Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information 0 0 0 423 0 2 3 640
Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma 0 1 1 36 0 2 2 142
Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen 0 0 0 545 1 1 1 1,034
Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström 1 1 1 258 1 4 5 345
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 0 4 4 0 0 13 13
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 0 0 327 0 0 3 1,213
Total Working Papers 4 12 42 10,803 29 100 332 31,779
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts 0 0 0 63 1 1 4 295
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 1,111
Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law 0 0 0 6 0 0 3 34
Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 69
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 1 1 17 0 1 3 143
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 2 37 0 0 6 185
Book Review 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 54
Book reviews 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 56
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 0 29 0 1 4 187
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence 0 1 2 159 1 4 10 412
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases 0 1 4 195 3 11 25 872
Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory 0 1 13 79 1 4 24 99
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 17 498 3 5 55 951
Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information 0 0 2 18 0 1 4 77
Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study 0 0 12 23 1 1 18 35
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 25 1 1 4 111
Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? 0 0 0 23 0 0 3 115
Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 169
Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory 1 1 2 72 2 2 4 142
ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION * 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 248
Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382] 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 83
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 667
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard 0 0 0 77 0 1 1 210
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 0 4 95 0 0 6 253
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory 0 0 1 217 0 0 3 304
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 1 9 46 1 2 12 99
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts 0 0 6 70 0 2 10 88
Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction? 0 1 13 103 0 1 16 110
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 16 0 1 2 102
Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership 0 1 1 12 0 1 1 46
Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives 0 0 0 15 1 1 1 71
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information 0 0 0 108 0 0 0 246
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 5 556 0 2 19 1,707
Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework 0 0 0 61 0 0 1 155
Investments as signals of outside options 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 129
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 66
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 0 1 66 1 2 4 191
Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information 0 0 0 76 0 2 6 327
Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 1 26 0 0 2 137
Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 68 0 1 2 186
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 0 75 1 1 2 220
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 357
Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 43
On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 126 0 0 5 295
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition 0 0 0 76 0 0 1 220
On synergies and vertical integration 0 0 0 122 0 0 0 328
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 0 335 1 2 7 631
On the joint use of liability and safety regulation 0 0 2 99 0 0 8 308
On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries 0 1 3 23 0 1 6 43
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances 0 0 1 115 0 1 5 293
Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs 0 0 1 10 0 0 2 47
Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 50
Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information 0 2 3 34 0 2 5 85
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information 0 0 2 101 0 0 3 279
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 49
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 1 7 0 0 3 502
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 3 22 0 0 3 140
Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments 1 1 1 33 1 1 2 70
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 19 0 0 2 74
Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation 0 0 1 9 1 1 3 30
Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered 0 0 1 10 0 0 2 44
Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks 1 1 4 307 2 7 18 655
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 1 63 0 1 8 271
Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 1 62 0 1 9 217
REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY 0 0 1 7 0 2 4 119
Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 132
Randomization in coalition contracts 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 66
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 42 0 1 1 128
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 216 0 0 6 639
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 91 0 1 6 375
Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 223 0 0 2 728
Task scheduling and moral hazard 0 1 2 38 0 1 3 130
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 0 25 1 2 6 167
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 46 0 0 1 128
The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 842
The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures 0 0 0 61 0 0 1 148
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 70
The management of innovation: Experimental evidence 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 61
The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 50
The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts 1 4 30 98 2 7 37 114
The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract 0 0 3 13 0 0 5 33
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 31 1 1 4 130
When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods? 0 2 27 27 0 3 40 40
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 0 3 392 0 4 14 1,262
Total Journal Articles 4 20 188 6,066 26 93 501 21,155

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Statistics updated 2025-07-04