Access Statistics for Patrick W. Schmitz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts 0 0 0 13 2 2 10 111
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 226 0 1 7 605
Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions 0 0 0 131 1 2 11 436
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 42 1 3 8 59
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 2 1 3 11 14
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 1 1 138 1 3 9 475
Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 22 0 0 5 91
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 1 23 0 0 7 57
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 40 3 5 29 143
Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999) 0 0 0 88 1 1 7 260
Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) 0 0 2 237 2 2 15 891
Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999) 0 0 0 9 2 2 6 72
Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998) 0 0 2 17 1 1 6 96
Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003) 0 0 0 27 0 0 4 125
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 2 121 2 3 13 463
Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? 0 0 1 46 2 2 13 227
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence 0 1 3 200 1 5 18 507
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 5 135 1 3 24 422
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 7 2 2 11 40
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 1 1 7 1 2 9 33
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 32 1 1 14 202
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 1 1 2 186 1 1 15 512
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 71 1 2 10 142
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 1 135 2 4 12 197
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 44 1 2 11 146
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 32 0 1 4 136
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 3 0 1 7 32
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 71 1 2 7 214
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 2 74 1 2 9 336
Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung 0 0 0 8 1 1 5 69
Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem 0 0 7 106 1 8 29 427
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern 0 0 0 13 1 1 3 95
Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 28 1 1 6 120
Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory 0 0 0 59 1 1 6 130
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 2 64 1 2 14 239
Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 178 2 5 11 709
Garbled Elections 0 0 0 9 1 1 4 81
Garbled Elections 0 0 0 28 1 1 6 140
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence 1 1 3 99 3 4 9 406
Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence 1 1 1 16 1 1 9 48
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 1 1 2 32 2 2 8 84
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory 0 0 3 84 0 2 16 179
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory 0 0 29 29 0 4 18 18
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 24 24 0 8 19 20
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 4 30 0 2 18 42
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 6 14 1 2 19 27
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 1 12 12 2 5 23 26
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 3 10 2 3 13 29
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 1 38 1 1 12 66
Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information 0 1 1 281 0 3 8 716
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 1 1 34 0 1 6 112
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 22 1 2 5 66
Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework 0 0 0 38 0 0 5 188
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 0 539 1 2 8 1,197
Investments as Signals of Outside Options 0 0 0 76 0 2 12 249
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 10 0 1 7 46
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 1 36 0 5 44 112
Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 3 91 0 0 6 444
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 0 0 82 1 1 10 177
Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 101 1 2 8 430
Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 96 2 2 4 316
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 0 24 1 2 6 127
Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 43 1 1 6 133
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 1 1 1 73 1 1 7 202
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 27 27 0 2 16 16
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 17 41 3 5 53 67
On Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 17 0 0 5 54
On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition 0 0 0 107 0 0 7 348
On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 1 1 4 33 2 4 18 150
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 3 61 3 3 20 208
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 0 148 0 0 5 445
On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation 0 0 1 54 1 2 9 175
Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances 0 0 0 157 1 2 14 458
Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information 0 0 0 117 0 2 8 429
Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals 0 1 1 82 0 1 7 431
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 4
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 5 0 2 8 36
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 30
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 5 0 2 3 14
Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information 0 1 1 99 0 1 5 324
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 8
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 9 0 1 5 40
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 2 196 0 0 8 414
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 52 2 2 6 337
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 1 31 4 4 9 51
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 2 3 10 2 6 11 23
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 0 10 1 1 12 49
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 0 27 0 0 5 25
Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks 0 0 0 181 1 2 10 446
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 31 2 2 5 67
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 10 1 1 10 43
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 3 338 1 3 16 991
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 1 57 1 1 12 251
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 1 2 117 2 4 10 337
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 3 164 1 1 8 279
Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation 0 0 0 137 2 2 8 411
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 1 34 1 4 9 123
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 109 0 1 8 246
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality 0 0 0 120 2 3 12 293
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 125 2 3 9 437
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 1 1 1 104 1 3 11 394
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 1 133 1 1 8 418
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 56 2 2 8 222
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 77 0 0 4 293
Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks? 0 0 0 51 0 0 6 146
Signaling an Outside Option 0 0 0 27 1 3 9 118
Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? 0 0 0 4 1 1 7 64
Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 62 0 2 11 213
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 1 96 2 3 9 147
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 58 0 1 8 193
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures 0 0 0 79 2 2 5 172
The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 11 717 2 4 31 1,506
The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 64 1 3 13 95
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 7
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 16 1 1 3 37
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 1 38 3 3 9 106
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 1 39 1 1 8 69
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 3 0 1 7 16
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 90 1 1 5 172
Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information 0 0 3 419 1 1 9 627
Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma 0 0 0 33 1 1 8 134
Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen 0 0 2 544 2 3 18 1,017
Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström 0 40 89 199 0 53 116 250
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 0 0 322 1 2 15 1,187
Total Working Papers 7 58 307 10,570 122 298 1,393 30,177


Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts 0 0 2 61 1 2 7 273
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 2 2 5 17 1,074
Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 24
Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 11 0 3 12 57
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 1 2 12 1 3 7 121
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 2 29 0 2 11 138
Book Review 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 50
Book reviews 0 0 0 7 0 0 3 52
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 1 1 2 27 1 2 9 167
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence 0 0 14 131 1 7 38 339
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases 1 3 20 162 6 15 86 683
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 6 21 74 157 13 38 178 412
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 21 0 1 4 94
Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? 0 0 3 19 1 3 16 75
Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 166
Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory 0 0 1 10 1 1 11 59
ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION * 0 0 1 53 0 1 6 246
Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382] 0 0 0 19 0 2 4 77
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 645
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard 0 0 0 77 0 2 5 199
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 0 6 66 0 1 18 191
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory 2 13 25 48 3 16 47 99
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 14 0 0 4 80
Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership 0 1 3 3 0 3 20 20
Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives 0 0 4 8 1 3 19 53
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information 1 1 1 106 1 1 5 224
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 9 504 3 15 103 1,426
Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework 0 0 1 59 0 0 6 145
Investments as signals of outside options 1 1 3 25 2 3 10 108
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 1 1 6 1 3 7 55
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 0 0 17 0 0 9 125
Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information 0 1 1 74 1 7 28 259
Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 25 1 2 7 128
Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 65 0 1 6 168
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 0 74 1 2 12 204
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 0 5 13 86 277
Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 1 1 4 4 2 5 11 11
On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 120 0 1 14 277
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition 0 0 0 76 0 0 4 214
On synergies and vertical integration 0 0 1 117 2 2 12 311
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 2 323 0 0 5 601
On the joint use of liability and safety regulation 0 1 6 90 1 5 17 277
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances 0 0 1 107 0 1 7 266
Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs 0 0 0 7 0 4 9 33
Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered 0 0 0 7 0 1 2 42
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information 0 0 0 97 0 1 5 269
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 5 0 0 8 42
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 1 1 2 3 1 2 11 482
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 1 12 0 1 9 118
Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments 1 2 6 24 1 5 18 43
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 1 16 0 1 7 58
Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered 0 0 1 7 0 0 6 33
Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks 0 1 4 277 2 3 13 556
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 3 50 1 3 18 208
Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 1 2 46 1 2 12 150
REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY 0 0 0 0 1 2 9 89
Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 1 49 0 0 5 129
Randomization in coalition contracts 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 59
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 1 40 0 1 7 110
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 1 3 212 2 4 16 601
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 1 87 1 2 8 331
Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 4 217 4 4 15 696
Task scheduling and moral hazard 0 0 1 35 0 0 6 119
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 2 2 24 1 7 20 133
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 4 44 0 0 7 111
The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 0 0 2 4 9 805
The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures 0 0 1 59 0 0 6 134
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 2 13 0 1 12 60
The management of innovation: Experimental evidence 0 0 1 7 0 2 12 42
The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information 0 0 0 4 0 2 7 37
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 1 1 3 22 1 2 22 99
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 0 5 368 1 8 44 1,145
Total Journal Articles 16 55 239 4,469 70 234 1,210 17,204


Statistics updated 2020-09-04