Access Statistics for Patrick W. Schmitz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts 0 0 0 13 1 4 9 135
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 229 0 4 7 630
Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions 0 0 0 134 1 6 11 458
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 4 0 12 14 38
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 43 2 12 13 90
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 0 0 142 0 11 17 506
Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 23 0 3 5 102
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 41 2 7 10 171
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 24 3 11 13 80
Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999) 0 0 0 92 10 10 15 294
Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) 0 0 0 242 2 4 12 935
Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999) 0 0 0 9 0 2 4 78
Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998) 0 0 0 21 0 1 3 106
Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003) 0 0 0 27 0 2 7 136
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 0 122 5 14 16 491
Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? 0 0 0 47 2 4 10 250
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence 0 0 1 202 3 16 23 546
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 32 2 4 10 231
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 1 8 1 5 11 56
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 2 13 0 9 15 83
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 142 4 12 17 483
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 190 11 38 44 578
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 1 1 3 35 2 7 13 34
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 0 0 0 6 0 1 3 20
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 1 1 2 15 1 10 14 42
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 0 0 5 2 4 7 42
Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study 0 0 1 24 0 1 5 67
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 136 0 6 11 220
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 1 76 1 3 8 175
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 44 0 9 18 172
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 33 3 10 14 160
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 4 2 8 12 61
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 80 0 3 11 384
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 73 2 16 18 251
Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung 0 0 0 12 0 3 9 86
Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem 0 0 2 127 1 3 18 504
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern 0 0 0 14 0 4 9 125
Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 29 0 2 6 131
Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory 0 0 0 66 0 6 9 158
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 71 0 2 9 279
Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 179 2 8 9 772
Garbled Elections 0 0 1 29 0 2 7 154
Garbled Elections 0 0 0 10 1 2 3 88
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 99 1 3 5 422
Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 22 0 7 13 88
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 0 1 37 0 10 15 108
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory 0 0 0 84 2 6 12 203
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory 0 0 0 29 0 3 11 39
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 27 0 11 15 66
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 33 0 14 23 108
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 0 0 12 2 9 14 58
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 1 3 25 0 18 23 51
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 0 2 38 0 4 14 53
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 0 0 1 0 4 7 13
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 1 12 14 49
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 1 13 16 55
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 11 0 11 14 55
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 40 0 4 6 86
Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 284 0 1 6 806
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 34 0 9 13 138
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 24 0 6 14 92
Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework 0 0 0 38 0 6 9 204
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 0 543 0 9 17 1,243
Investments as Signals of Outside Options 0 0 0 76 2 6 11 274
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 36 1 5 6 123
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 10 0 5 10 63
Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information 0 1 1 92 1 6 8 459
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 0 1 83 1 23 32 216
Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 102 0 3 5 445
Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 101 1 5 11 343
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 0 27 0 13 16 160
Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 44 0 7 12 152
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 76 1 4 8 227
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 42 0 13 14 97
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 1 30 3 7 9 43
On Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 17 0 3 6 63
On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition 0 0 0 107 0 4 8 362
On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 39 0 3 5 174
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 62 0 4 11 235
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 1 151 0 5 8 461
On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation 0 0 0 56 0 1 3 188
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 0 5 1 9 11 29
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 1 8 1 9 16 29
Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances 0 0 0 158 0 1 4 478
Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information 0 0 0 117 0 1 11 452
Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals 0 0 0 83 1 5 11 456
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 5 0 5 8 45
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 2 0 4 13 19
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 6 0 7 9 33
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 19 0 4 9 46
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 26 2 14 21 74
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 10 1 15 19 43
Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information 0 0 0 99 2 3 5 338
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 9 1 13 15 58
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 2 0 17 21 42
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 0 197 1 8 16 441
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 52 1 8 10 354
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 11 1 8 9 38
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 31 0 5 8 69
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 0 11 1 9 13 71
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 1 29 0 9 17 50
Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks 0 0 0 183 1 3 9 475
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 31 1 13 15 88
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 10 2 11 16 68
Public-Private Partnerships, Asymmetric Information, and Incomplete Contracts 1 3 17 17 2 12 23 23
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 0 61 0 5 13 289
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 172 1 13 23 333
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 118 2 17 20 381
Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation 1 1 1 141 4 9 11 439
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 110 0 6 16 275
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 34 1 5 19 160
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality 0 0 1 126 1 6 16 332
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 129 0 6 14 468
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 108 2 17 26 438
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 134 0 7 14 443
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 1 57 0 10 11 240
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 77 2 8 10 308
Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks? 0 0 1 53 2 10 15 172
Signaling an Outside Option 0 0 0 28 0 11 16 148
Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 71
Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 64 1 4 8 234
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 0 99 0 4 6 169
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 59 2 3 7 204
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures 0 0 0 79 0 4 6 185
The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 2 742 2 9 21 1,606
The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 67 0 16 19 136
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 1 6 8 18
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 16 0 4 9 55
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 0 0 1 8 0 32 43 67
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 0 0 1 14 0 5 8 32
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 6 2 8 14 43
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 20 2 8 9 29
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 43 0 11 17 109
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 39 1 4 10 120
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 92 1 16 18 207
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 4 2 14 17 42
Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information 0 1 1 424 2 4 9 647
Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma 0 0 1 36 0 3 6 146
Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen 0 0 0 545 0 3 8 1,041
Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström 0 0 1 258 1 6 14 355
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 0 1 5 1 6 13 26
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 8
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 0 1 328 0 3 11 1,224
Total Working Papers 4 9 59 10,850 135 1,075 1,764 33,443
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts 0 0 1 64 0 5 10 304
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 2 1 14 18 1,128
Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law 0 0 0 6 1 7 8 42
Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 14 4 14 19 88
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 1 2 18 4 10 13 155
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 1 38 0 2 17 202
Book Review 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 56
Book reviews 0 0 0 7 0 0 3 59
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 1 30 2 2 10 196
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence 0 1 5 163 2 9 29 437
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases 0 1 4 198 3 13 43 904
Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory 5 7 12 90 5 23 34 129
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 5 503 1 8 26 972
Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information 0 1 1 19 0 12 17 93
Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study 1 2 4 27 1 4 10 44
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 25 1 4 7 117
Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? 0 0 0 23 1 9 13 128
Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 170
Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory 1 1 3 74 2 4 10 150
ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION * 0 0 0 53 1 3 4 252
Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382] 1 1 1 23 1 3 8 91
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 676
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard 0 0 0 77 0 2 4 213
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 2 5 100 0 9 21 274
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory 1 1 4 221 1 7 15 319
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 1 3 48 0 10 18 115
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts 0 1 2 72 1 13 19 105
Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction? 4 6 12 114 5 9 17 126
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 16 1 5 9 110
Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership 0 0 1 12 0 12 17 62
Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives 0 1 2 17 1 5 12 82
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information 0 1 2 110 2 7 12 258
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 3 559 1 20 35 1,740
Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework 0 0 0 61 2 3 6 161
Investments as signals of outside options 0 0 0 28 1 7 11 140
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 9 0 2 6 72
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 0 2 68 1 6 16 205
Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information 1 2 2 78 1 4 10 335
Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 26 1 2 6 143
Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 68 0 11 14 199
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 1 2 77 1 10 16 235
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 0 1 13 19 374
Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 12 1 7 12 55
On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 127 0 7 10 305
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition 0 0 0 76 0 7 8 228
On synergies and vertical integration 0 0 0 122 0 6 13 341
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 0 335 1 3 8 637
On the joint use of liability and safety regulation 0 1 2 101 1 7 13 321
On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries 2 3 5 27 3 7 11 53
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances 0 0 1 116 0 5 12 304
Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs 0 0 0 10 0 2 9 56
Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered 0 0 0 8 0 2 7 57
Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information 0 1 4 36 0 5 19 102
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information 0 0 1 102 0 7 8 287
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 7 0 3 5 54
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 1 8 3 9 15 517
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 22 0 6 10 150
Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments 0 0 1 33 0 4 8 77
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 19 0 2 3 77
Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation 0 0 1 10 0 6 14 43
Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered 0 0 0 10 1 4 12 56
Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks 0 1 4 310 5 8 28 676
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 3 66 1 8 17 287
Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 2 64 4 9 26 242
Public–private partnerships, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts 8 10 18 18 12 19 31 31
REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY 0 0 0 7 1 10 17 134
Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 49 0 3 6 138
Randomization in coalition contracts 0 1 1 4 0 4 9 75
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 42 2 21 27 154
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 216 3 7 15 654
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 91 0 8 16 390
Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 223 1 4 8 736
Task scheduling and moral hazard 0 0 1 38 0 4 8 137
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 1 26 1 24 46 211
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 1 1 47 5 10 11 139
The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 850
The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures 0 0 3 64 0 4 9 157
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 17 0 5 7 77
The management of innovation: Experimental evidence 1 1 2 11 1 8 11 72
The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information 0 0 0 8 0 5 8 58
The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts 0 2 10 104 3 13 29 136
The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract 0 1 1 14 1 11 16 49
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 31 2 9 17 146
When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods? 6 8 16 41 6 11 24 61
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 0 2 394 1 7 18 1,276
Total Journal Articles 31 61 162 6,208 110 623 1,205 22,267

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Statistics updated 2026-04-09