Access Statistics for Patrick W. Schmitz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts 0 0 0 13 2 6 9 133
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 229 4 6 7 630
Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions 0 0 0 134 5 10 10 457
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 4 11 12 13 37
Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 43 5 5 6 83
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 0 0 0 142 11 15 19 506
Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 23 3 4 5 102
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 24 5 7 8 74
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 41 2 4 5 166
Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999) 0 0 0 92 0 4 6 284
Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) 0 0 0 242 2 5 11 933
Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999) 0 0 0 9 2 4 4 78
Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998) 0 0 0 21 1 2 3 106
Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003) 0 0 0 27 2 5 7 136
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 0 122 6 8 8 483
Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? 0 0 0 47 2 5 9 248
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence 0 0 1 202 5 7 12 535
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 1 8 4 8 10 55
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 2 13 7 9 13 81
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 32 2 6 9 229
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 142 4 6 9 475
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 0 0 0 190 17 20 24 557
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 0 0 0 6 0 1 3 19
Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory 0 0 3 34 5 8 12 32
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 0 0 5 1 3 4 39
Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information 0 0 1 14 7 8 11 39
Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study 0 0 2 24 1 1 7 67
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 1 1 76 2 7 7 174
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 136 4 6 9 218
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 44 6 12 15 169
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 4 6 9 11 59
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 73 6 7 9 241
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 33 7 9 11 157
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 0 0 80 3 8 11 384
Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung 0 0 0 12 3 5 9 86
Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem 0 0 2 127 1 7 16 502
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern 0 0 0 14 4 7 9 125
Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 0 29 2 4 6 131
Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory 0 0 1 66 3 6 7 155
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 71 2 6 10 279
Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 179 5 6 6 769
Garbled Elections 0 0 1 29 1 4 6 153
Garbled Elections 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 87
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 99 2 2 5 421
Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 22 5 9 12 86
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 0 0 1 37 4 7 9 102
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory 0 0 0 84 4 6 10 201
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory 0 0 0 29 3 8 11 39
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 27 10 12 15 65
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 0 33 12 21 23 106
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 0 0 12 5 7 10 54
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts 0 0 2 24 17 19 23 50
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 0 0 1 4 7 9 13
Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? 0 1 2 38 4 11 14 53
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 9 9 12 51
Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership 0 0 0 14 5 6 7 42
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 40 3 3 6 85
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives 0 0 0 11 8 9 11 52
Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 284 1 4 6 806
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 34 8 8 12 137
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 24 5 9 13 91
Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework 0 0 0 38 6 8 9 204
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach 0 0 0 543 9 12 17 1,243
Investments as Signals of Outside Options 0 0 0 76 4 9 10 272
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 36 3 4 4 121
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 10 4 8 9 62
Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information 1 1 1 92 2 3 6 455
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 0 1 83 17 19 26 210
Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 102 2 3 5 444
Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 101 3 6 9 341
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 0 27 5 7 8 152
Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 44 6 8 11 151
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 76 2 4 6 225
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 1 30 2 2 5 38
Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 42 11 11 13 95
On Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 17 3 4 6 63
On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition 0 0 0 107 3 4 7 361
On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 39 2 4 4 173
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 62 3 6 11 234
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 1 151 5 6 8 461
On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation 0 0 0 56 1 1 3 188
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 0 5 3 3 6 23
On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries 0 0 1 8 4 9 12 24
Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances 0 0 0 158 1 3 4 478
Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information 0 0 0 117 1 11 12 452
Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals 0 0 0 83 3 5 9 454
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 5 5 7 8 45
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered 0 0 0 2 2 10 11 17
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 19 3 6 8 45
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs 0 0 0 6 5 7 7 31
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 10 13 14 19 41
Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 26 11 14 18 71
Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information 0 0 0 99 1 2 3 336
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 2 7 9 11 32
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 9 10 12 14 55
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 0 197 5 11 14 438
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 52 2 3 4 348
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 31 2 4 6 66
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 11 7 7 9 37
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 1 29 5 10 14 46
Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered 0 0 0 11 4 7 8 66
Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks 0 0 0 183 1 5 9 473
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 10 7 9 12 64
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 31 6 7 8 81
Public-Private Partnerships, Asymmetric Information, and Incomplete Contracts 2 16 16 16 8 18 19 19
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 1 61 3 6 12 287
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 118 13 15 16 377
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 0 0 172 11 18 22 331
Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation 0 0 0 140 1 1 3 431
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 110 6 12 17 275
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 34 3 8 18 158
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality 0 0 1 126 3 6 15 329
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 129 6 10 15 468
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 108 5 12 14 426
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 0 0 0 134 5 10 12 441
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 77 6 8 9 306
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 1 57 10 10 11 240
Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks? 0 1 1 53 7 9 14 169
Signaling an Outside Option 0 0 0 28 9 14 14 146
Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 71
Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard 0 0 0 64 2 5 8 232
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 0 99 1 3 3 166
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 59 1 3 5 202
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures 0 0 0 79 4 6 9 185
The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 1 2 742 4 8 17 1,601
The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 67 11 13 17 131
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 16 3 5 8 54
The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 5 7 7 17
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 0 0 2 8 25 34 37 60
The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts 0 0 2 14 4 5 8 31
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 20 3 3 5 24
The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract 0 0 0 6 4 9 11 39
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 39 2 7 8 118
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 43 8 10 14 106
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 92 12 13 14 203
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 4 9 10 13 37
Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information 1 1 1 424 2 4 7 645
Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma 0 0 1 36 3 4 6 146
Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen 0 0 0 545 3 7 8 1,041
Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström 0 0 1 258 4 5 12 353
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 0 0 0 1 3 7 8
When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods? 0 0 1 5 3 4 12 23
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 0 1 328 2 7 11 1,223
Total Working Papers 4 22 60 10,845 694 1,076 1,458 33,062
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts 0 1 1 64 4 6 9 303
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 2 5 7 10 1,119
Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law 0 0 0 6 6 7 8 41
Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 14 9 11 14 83
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 1 1 2 18 6 8 10 151
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach 0 0 1 38 1 7 19 201
Book Review 0 0 0 4 1 2 3 56
Book reviews 0 0 0 7 0 3 3 59
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 0 1 30 0 6 10 194
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence 0 1 5 162 6 17 29 434
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases 0 2 5 197 5 17 39 896
Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory 0 1 10 83 14 16 35 120
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study 0 1 10 503 5 8 39 969
Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information 0 0 1 18 10 13 16 91
Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study 0 2 6 25 2 5 13 42
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments 0 0 0 25 3 3 8 116
Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? 0 0 0 23 5 8 11 124
Die Bedeutung von privater Information f³r Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Kõufern und Verkõufern 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 170
Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory 0 0 3 73 2 4 9 148
ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION * 0 0 0 53 1 2 2 250
Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382] 0 0 0 22 2 4 7 90
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 0 5 7 10 676
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard 0 0 0 77 2 2 4 213
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions 1 1 4 99 6 11 18 271
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory 0 1 4 220 6 10 15 318
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects 0 0 2 47 5 9 13 110
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts 0 0 2 71 5 7 12 97
Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction? 0 2 12 108 2 6 17 119
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods 0 0 0 16 3 4 7 108
Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership 0 0 1 12 11 13 16 61
Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives 0 0 1 16 2 3 9 79
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information 0 0 1 109 2 6 7 253
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach 0 1 4 559 10 17 28 1,730
Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework 0 0 0 61 1 4 5 159
Investments as signals of outside options 0 0 0 28 2 5 6 135
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach 0 0 0 9 2 4 6 72
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered 0 2 2 68 4 9 14 203
Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information 1 1 1 77 3 4 10 334
Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 0 0 26 1 5 5 142
Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 68 8 10 11 196
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 0 1 76 5 7 11 230
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 0 0 0 0 7 10 13 368
Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 12 6 8 11 54
On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 0 0 2 127 6 7 12 304
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition 0 0 0 76 6 6 8 227
On synergies and vertical integration 0 0 0 122 5 9 12 340
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 0 0 0 335 1 2 8 635
On the joint use of liability and safety regulation 0 1 1 100 3 7 11 317
On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries 0 0 3 24 3 4 9 49
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances 0 1 2 116 3 8 12 302
Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs 0 0 0 10 2 6 9 56
Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered 0 0 0 8 2 3 7 57
Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information 0 0 3 35 4 11 18 101
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information 0 0 3 102 6 6 10 286
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted 0 0 0 7 3 4 5 54
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 1 1 8 5 8 13 513
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 0 0 22 5 6 9 149
Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments 0 0 1 33 3 5 7 76
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 0 0 0 19 2 3 4 77
Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation 0 0 1 10 6 9 15 43
Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered 0 0 0 10 1 7 9 53
Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks 0 1 5 309 1 5 26 669
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering 0 1 3 66 6 9 17 285
Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation 0 0 2 64 3 11 21 236
Public–private partnerships, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts 0 7 8 8 2 12 14 14
REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY 0 0 0 7 6 11 14 130
Randomization in Coalition Contracts 0 0 0 49 3 4 6 138
Randomization in coalition contracts 0 0 0 3 2 4 7 73
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment 0 0 0 42 11 14 17 144
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 0 0 216 4 10 14 651
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 0 0 91 3 6 12 385
Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 0 0 0 223 3 6 7 735
Task scheduling and moral hazard 0 0 1 38 4 7 9 137
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 1 1 26 23 41 45 210
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 0 0 0 46 2 2 3 131
The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 0 0 2 4 9 849
The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures 0 2 3 64 3 5 9 156
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability 0 0 0 17 3 4 5 75
The management of innovation: Experimental evidence 0 1 1 10 2 3 5 66
The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information 0 0 0 8 3 4 7 56
The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts 1 3 16 103 6 11 31 129
The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract 0 0 1 13 9 13 16 47
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm 0 0 0 31 6 7 15 143
When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods? 0 2 14 33 3 7 24 53
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 0 1 3 394 6 8 19 1,275
Total Journal Articles 4 39 155 6,151 367 634 1,074 22,011

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Statistics updated 2026-02-12