| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
7 |
9 |
13 |
241 |
| A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
105 |
| A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation |
2 |
3 |
5 |
3,114 |
13 |
36 |
68 |
9,902 |
| A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation |
2 |
3 |
7 |
934 |
11 |
14 |
28 |
2,886 |
| A comment on Gayer and Shy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
89 |
| A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
28 |
44 |
564 |
| Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
587 |
| Adding a stick to the carrot? The interaction of bonuses and fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
43 |
| An Economic Approach to Article 82 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
243 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
770 |
| An Economic Approach to Article 82 - Report by the European Advisory Group on Competition Policy |
0 |
0 |
2 |
427 |
2 |
8 |
15 |
1,201 |
| Auctions versus Negotiations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
6 |
7 |
7 |
64 |
| Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
6 |
8 |
8 |
53 |
| Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
83 |
| Auctions vs. Negotiations:The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
60 |
| Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
53 |
| Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
65 |
| Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
141 |
| Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
34 |
| Competition and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
3 |
9 |
15 |
295 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
3 |
8 |
11 |
252 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
166 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
196 |
| Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
288 |
| Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
401 |
| Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
287 |
| Contracts, Fairness and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
279 |
| Contracts, Fairness and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
164 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
348 |
| Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
282 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
744 |
| Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
2 |
166 |
7 |
10 |
15 |
473 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
424 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
1,382 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
600 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
2,191 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
12 |
109 |
| Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
3 |
7 |
9 |
123 |
| Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
84 |
4 |
9 |
17 |
247 |
| Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
225 |
6 |
8 |
10 |
1,041 |
| Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
51 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
377 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
236 |
21 |
21 |
22 |
934 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion, Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
8 |
13 |
20 |
951 |
| Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
30 |
| Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
38 |
| Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
6 |
8 |
11 |
222 |
| Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
124 |
| Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
67 |
| Fairness and Contract Design |
0 |
1 |
1 |
518 |
7 |
15 |
18 |
1,285 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
458 |
8 |
11 |
13 |
1,326 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
243 |
4 |
8 |
11 |
873 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
229 |
3 |
6 |
11 |
1,288 |
| Fairness and contract design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
10 |
91 |
| Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
80 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
2 |
8 |
11 |
603 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
265 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
5 |
6 |
6 |
336 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
242 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
4 |
8 |
11 |
381 |
| Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
53 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
238 |
10 |
13 |
13 |
902 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
7 |
11 |
14 |
376 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
142 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
617 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
421 |
| Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
332 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
1,274 |
| Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
138 |
| Genome-wide association analyses of risk tolerance and risky behaviors in over one million individuals identify hundreds of loci and shared genetic influences |
0 |
0 |
2 |
168 |
10 |
22 |
50 |
846 |
| Incomplete contracts and privatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
50 |
| Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
101 |
| Licensing Complementary Patents and Vertical Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
250 |
| Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trollsâ€, Market Structure, and “Excessive†Royalties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
5 |
7 |
7 |
182 |
| Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
5 |
7 |
8 |
53 |
| Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
101 |
| Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
89 |
| Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
446 |
5 |
14 |
17 |
1,158 |
| Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
16 |
188 |
| Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways |
0 |
0 |
0 |
505 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
1,853 |
| Neuæplné smlouvy a privatizace |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
29 |
| On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked |
0 |
0 |
0 |
345 |
5 |
6 |
6 |
737 |
| On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
125 |
| Option contracts and renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
12 |
86 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
1 |
4 |
34 |
5 |
9 |
17 |
117 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
4 |
6 |
9 |
175 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
59 |
7 |
9 |
11 |
164 |
| Pay What You Want as a Pricing Model for Open Access Publishing? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
68 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
85 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
1 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
102 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
525 |
| Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
43 |
| Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies |
0 |
0 |
2 |
48 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
67 |
| Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
292 |
3 |
8 |
11 |
883 |
| Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
68 |
| Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
6 |
7 |
7 |
80 |
| Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
8 |
11 |
204 |
| Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
84 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
232 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
86 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
139 |
| Reputation in perturbed repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
9 |
9 |
45 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
89 |
4 |
9 |
12 |
173 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
175 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
4 |
9 |
14 |
156 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
7 |
13 |
118 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
161 |
| Screening, competition, and job design: Economic origins of good jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
63 |
| Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
7 |
9 |
9 |
340 |
| Sequential Investments and Options to Own |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
236 |
| Sequential Investments and Options to Own |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
506 |
| Sequential investments and options to own |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
9 |
64 |
| Social Preferences and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
4 |
7 |
10 |
242 |
| Social Preferences and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
3 |
6 |
11 |
310 |
| Social preferences and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
12 |
14 |
86 |
| Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
3 |
7 |
14 |
166 |
| The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
207 |
11 |
19 |
24 |
125 |
| The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
726 |
6 |
11 |
16 |
2,020 |
| The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories |
0 |
1 |
3 |
920 |
7 |
9 |
15 |
1,684 |
| The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
210 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
567 |
| The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
451 |
| The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion – Reply |
0 |
0 |
1 |
230 |
4 |
6 |
13 |
371 |
| The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion- A Reply |
0 |
0 |
2 |
174 |
6 |
8 |
11 |
391 |
| The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
275 |
2 |
8 |
10 |
660 |
| The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
6 |
8 |
9 |
425 |
| The Role of Equality and Equity in Social Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
4 |
8 |
10 |
508 |
| The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
6 |
55 |
| The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel |
0 |
0 |
1 |
341 |
5 |
6 |
11 |
1,326 |
| The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
301 |
| The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
15 |
125 |
| The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
49 |
| The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
47 |
| The role of experiments for the development of economic theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
6 |
31 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
401 |
15 |
20 |
24 |
1,178 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications |
2 |
2 |
5 |
1,630 |
11 |
15 |
32 |
4,363 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications |
0 |
0 |
1 |
339 |
3 |
9 |
17 |
870 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications |
0 |
1 |
2 |
261 |
7 |
9 |
18 |
922 |
| Two Tales on Resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
7 |
11 |
12 |
209 |
| Two Tales on Resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
113 |
| Two tales on resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
38 |
| Unverifiable Information, Incomplete Contracts, and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
333 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
142 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
4 |
7 |
10 |
128 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority - A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
242 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
103 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
98 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
92 |
| Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
5 |
10 |
10 |
186 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
6 |
9 |
14 |
115 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
158 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
130 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
5 |
9 |
10 |
154 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
139 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
5 |
8 |
10 |
275 |
| [Rezension zu:] Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tiróle, Jean: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, Mass., 1993 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
10 |
86 |
| Total Working Papers |
7 |
15 |
55 |
21,829 |
576 |
1,042 |
1,507 |
70,026 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Comment on Gayer and Shy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
| A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation |
2 |
10 |
33 |
3,169 |
34 |
77 |
200 |
10,884 |
| Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
7 |
9 |
10 |
359 |
| Arbeitsmarktreform und Mindestlöhne:Ein Schritt vor, zwei Schritte zurück |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
| Auctions versus negotiations: the effects of inefficient renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
3 |
8 |
11 |
48 |
| Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game |
0 |
1 |
3 |
63 |
3 |
6 |
11 |
131 |
| Competition and incentives |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
4 |
6 |
13 |
94 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
11 |
16 |
94 |
| Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to Contract Theory |
0 |
1 |
3 |
27 |
3 |
7 |
10 |
90 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
2 |
3 |
220 |
7 |
11 |
16 |
603 |
| Delegating pricing power to customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
130 |
| Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
214 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
689 |
| Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
8 |
10 |
15 |
147 |
| Fairness and Contract Design |
0 |
2 |
4 |
299 |
7 |
17 |
23 |
1,174 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model |
0 |
2 |
2 |
166 |
4 |
10 |
14 |
654 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
14 |
15 |
18 |
309 |
| Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
128 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
395 |
| Incomplete contracts and privatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
203 |
3 |
8 |
13 |
399 |
| Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
4 |
8 |
14 |
357 |
| JEEA-FBBVA Lecture 2012: USE AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: A BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
127 |
| Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
2 |
2 |
27 |
6 |
10 |
14 |
148 |
| Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition |
2 |
3 |
6 |
419 |
8 |
16 |
39 |
1,101 |
| On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked |
0 |
1 |
1 |
190 |
3 |
9 |
14 |
560 |
| Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
323 |
4 |
6 |
15 |
929 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
4 |
12 |
20 |
108 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
1 |
1 |
2 |
115 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
315 |
| REFERENCE POINTS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND FAIRNESS IN CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS |
1 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
9 |
9 |
12 |
112 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
3 |
8 |
9 |
282 |
| Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
191 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
370 |
| Sequential Investments and Options to Own |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
483 |
| Social Preferences and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
178 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
10 |
19 |
1,269 |
| The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
119 |
| The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
373 |
| The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
219 |
| Two tales on resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
114 |
| Vertragstheorie: Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
40 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
4 |
10 |
18 |
276 |
| Total Journal Articles |
6 |
26 |
66 |
6,511 |
194 |
361 |
650 |
24,151 |
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