Access Statistics for Klaus M. Schmidt

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation 0 1 1 48 0 1 11 112
A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation 0 0 0 70 0 0 17 246
A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation 0 1 7 3,117 3 6 76 9,933
A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation 0 0 6 936 6 11 40 2,909
A comment on Gayer and Shy 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 92
A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation 0 0 0 0 3 7 49 582
Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines 0 0 0 206 0 1 9 590
Adding a stick to the carrot? The interaction of bonuses and fines 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 47
An Economic Approach to Article 82 0 0 0 243 0 0 11 775
An Economic Approach to Article 82 - Report by the European Advisory Group on Competition Policy 0 0 1 427 0 0 18 1,208
Auctions versus Negotiations 0 0 0 54 0 0 13 70
Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation 0 0 1 15 0 2 15 91
Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation 0 0 1 22 0 0 13 58
Auctions vs. Negotiations:The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation 0 0 0 38 2 3 23 76
Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem 0 0 1 17 0 0 15 63
Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game 0 0 0 33 0 0 15 72
Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 141
Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 38
Competition and Incentives 0 0 1 73 1 2 20 306
Complementary Patents and Market Structure 0 0 0 115 0 0 22 265
Complementary Patents and Market Structure 0 0 0 57 0 0 14 174
Complementary Patents and Market Structure 0 0 0 93 0 1 8 199
Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance 0 0 1 112 1 1 4 405
Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance 0 0 0 71 0 0 7 292
Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Firms 0 0 0 87 0 1 5 289
Contracts, Fairness and Incentives 0 0 0 117 0 0 4 281
Contracts, Fairness and Incentives 0 0 0 164 0 0 7 352
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives 0 0 1 283 0 0 11 749
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives 0 0 0 166 0 0 17 480
Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance 0 1 1 601 0 2 16 2,201
Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 111
Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance 0 0 0 424 0 2 14 1,390
Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price 0 0 0 47 0 1 11 127
Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price? 0 0 1 85 2 3 25 262
Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen 0 0 0 225 1 1 15 1,046
Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen 0 0 0 0 2 3 13 57
Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 381
Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision 0 0 0 236 2 2 29 942
Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion, Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision 0 0 0 146 2 2 28 962
Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision 0 0 1 3 0 0 14 38
Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 38
Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction 0 0 0 85 0 1 14 226
Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction 0 0 0 68 1 1 6 128
Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 71
Fairness and Contract Design 0 0 1 518 1 2 25 1,293
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model 0 0 0 458 0 1 18 1,333
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model 0 0 0 243 2 2 12 876
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model 0 0 0 229 0 1 15 1,294
Fairness and contract design 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 100
Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 84
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights 0 0 0 138 0 1 13 607
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights 0 0 0 40 0 1 13 249
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights 0 0 0 56 0 0 13 273
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights 0 0 0 68 0 0 9 339
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights 0 0 0 99 2 4 27 397
Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 57
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness 0 0 0 79 0 0 15 378
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness 0 0 0 238 3 3 25 914
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness 0 0 0 108 1 3 14 428
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness 0 0 0 142 1 2 13 624
Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices 0 0 0 332 0 1 11 1,280
Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 140
Genome-wide association analyses of risk tolerance and risky behaviors in over one million individuals identify hundreds of loci and shared genetic influences 0 0 1 168 0 9 50 870
Incomplete contracts and privatization 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 55
Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: Comment 0 0 0 0 3 5 15 111
Licensing Complementary Patents and Vertical Integration 0 0 0 95 0 0 13 257
Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trollsâ€, Market Structure, and “Excessive†Royalties 0 0 0 76 0 1 11 186
Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation 0 0 0 20 0 0 9 55
Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation 0 0 0 14 2 2 14 108
Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation 0 0 0 29 2 3 21 107
Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition 0 0 0 0 0 1 18 195
Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition 0 0 0 446 1 2 21 1,164
Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways 0 0 0 505 1 2 12 1,860
Neuæplné smlouvy a privatizace 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 30
On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked 0 0 0 345 0 1 19 750
On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 128
Option contracts and renegotiation 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 89
Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets 0 0 0 59 0 0 13 168
Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets 0 0 1 34 2 2 18 125
Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets 0 0 0 46 0 0 10 179
Pay What You Want as a Pricing Model for Open Access Publishing? 0 0 0 43 1 3 13 76
Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe 0 0 1 15 0 0 8 104
Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe 0 0 0 10 0 0 5 88
Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 528
Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies 0 0 0 23 0 0 7 46
Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies 0 0 0 48 2 2 9 71
Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market 0 0 0 292 1 1 16 890
Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition 0 0 0 28 0 0 8 70
Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition 0 0 0 66 0 0 20 93
Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations 0 0 0 41 1 3 17 211
Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition 0 0 0 24 0 0 8 90
Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests 0 0 0 103 1 1 9 237
Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests 0 0 0 9 0 1 8 88
Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 145
Reputation in perturbed repeated games 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 54
Screening, Competition, and Job Design 0 0 0 89 0 2 17 180
Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs 0 0 0 48 0 1 11 177
Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs 0 0 0 40 0 0 16 159
Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs 0 0 0 13 0 1 10 121
Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs 0 0 0 77 0 1 5 163
Screening, competition, and job design: Economic origins of good jobs 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 72
Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs 0 0 0 99 0 0 19 350
Sequential Investments and Options to Own 0 0 0 90 0 1 14 243
Sequential Investments and Options to Own 0 0 0 135 1 1 9 512
Sequential investments and options to own 0 0 0 0 3 3 19 75
Social Preferences and Competition 0 0 0 106 0 3 16 251
Social Preferences and Competition 0 0 0 139 2 5 18 318
Social preferences and competition 0 0 0 0 0 1 18 90
Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools 0 0 0 135 0 0 17 174
The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory 0 0 1 208 1 4 30 135
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories 0 0 0 726 3 6 23 2,031
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories 0 0 5 923 0 3 26 1,698
The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation 0 0 0 210 0 0 12 571
The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation 0 0 0 106 0 0 15 460
The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion – Reply 0 0 0 230 0 1 19 382
The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion- A Reply 0 0 0 174 0 1 13 396
The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences 0 0 0 275 0 2 16 668
The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences 0 0 0 107 0 0 13 430
The Role of Equality and Equity in Social Preferences 0 0 0 169 1 1 13 513
The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 59
The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel 0 0 0 341 0 0 9 1,328
The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories 0 0 0 119 0 0 10 304
The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach 0 0 0 0 1 2 17 131
The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 54
The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 49
The role of experiments for the development of economic theories 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 33
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity 0 0 0 401 0 2 40 1,198
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications 1 1 5 1,632 2 3 32 4,374
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications 0 0 1 339 0 0 15 873
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications 0 0 1 261 0 0 16 927
Two Tales on Resale 0 0 0 35 0 0 8 116
Two Tales on Resale 0 0 0 74 0 0 16 213
Two tales on resale 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 40
Unverifiable Information, Incomplete Contracts, and Renegotiation 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 335
Use and Abuse of Authority 0 0 0 102 0 0 8 143
Use and Abuse of Authority 0 0 0 123 0 2 15 135
Use and Abuse of Authority - A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation 0 0 0 39 2 3 14 250
Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation 0 1 2 13 0 1 11 95
Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation 0 0 1 103 1 2 11 102
Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation 0 0 0 116 2 4 19 195
You Owe Me 0 0 0 60 2 2 16 122
You Owe Me 0 0 0 11 1 1 16 160
You Owe Me 0 0 0 25 1 3 14 166
You Owe Me 0 0 0 62 1 2 10 136
You Owe Me 0 0 1 12 6 6 22 153
You Owe Me 0 0 0 112 4 4 14 281
[Rezension zu:] Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tiróle, Jean: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, Mass., 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 88
Total Working Papers 1 5 45 21,850 95 201 2,157 70,998

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Comment on Gayer and Shy 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 22
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation 0 1 18 3,173 9 46 230 11,001
Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines 1 1 1 80 2 2 19 369
Arbeitsmarktreform und Mindestlöhne:Ein Schritt vor, zwei Schritte zurück 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 51
Auctions versus negotiations: the effects of inefficient renegotiation 0 0 0 6 0 1 11 51
Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game 0 0 1 63 0 1 11 136
Competition and incentives 0 0 0 7 0 1 16 101
Complementary Patents and Market Structure 0 0 0 5 0 1 22 104
Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to Contract Theory 0 0 2 28 0 1 11 94
Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance 0 1 4 222 0 3 25 615
Delegating pricing power to customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price? 0 0 0 29 0 1 10 135
Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen 0 0 0 35 0 1 6 218
Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision 0 0 0 135 0 0 11 692
Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction 0 0 0 31 0 1 15 151
Fairness and Contract Design 0 0 4 301 0 1 27 1,183
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model 0 0 3 167 0 1 24 666
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights 0 0 0 54 0 0 29 322
Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices 0 0 0 128 1 1 9 400
Incomplete contracts and privatization 0 0 0 203 0 1 16 406
Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment 0 0 0 113 1 4 21 367
JEEA-FBBVA Lecture 2012: USE AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: A BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 0 0 0 17 2 2 10 133
Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation 0 0 2 27 0 3 18 155
Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition 0 1 7 422 2 6 37 1,118
On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked 0 1 2 191 0 2 14 565
Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem 0 1 4 327 0 2 18 939
Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets 0 0 1 25 1 1 19 114
Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe 0 0 1 115 0 1 12 321
REFERENCE POINTS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND FAIRNESS IN CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS 0 1 2 22 0 1 21 123
Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests 0 0 0 94 0 0 9 283
Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games 0 0 1 72 0 0 11 196
Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs 0 0 1 68 1 2 15 377
Sequential Investments and Options to Own 0 0 0 82 0 0 7 486
Social Preferences and Competition 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 184
The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach 0 0 0 0 0 2 21 1,279
The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories 0 0 0 27 0 0 7 121
The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts 0 0 0 114 1 1 11 377
The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation 0 0 0 71 0 1 13 225
Two tales on resale 0 0 1 34 1 1 13 122
Vertragstheorie: Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström 0 0 1 7 0 0 8 46
You Owe Me 0 0 0 34 1 1 17 282
Total Journal Articles 1 7 56 6,535 23 96 813 24,530

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation 0 0 0 0 0 2 32 369
Methods of privatization: Auctions, bargaining, and giveaways 0 0 0 0 1 1 18 234
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories 0 0 0 0 2 5 23 162
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories 0 2 4 1,216 1 7 28 3,978
Total Chapters 0 2 4 1,216 4 15 101 4,743

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-09-10