| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
246 |
| A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
112 |
| A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
8 |
936 |
2 |
5 |
37 |
2,903 |
| A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation |
1 |
2 |
8 |
3,117 |
2 |
8 |
79 |
9,930 |
| A comment on Gayer and Shy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
92 |
| A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
48 |
579 |
| Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
590 |
| Adding a stick to the carrot? The interaction of bonuses and fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
46 |
| An Economic Approach to Article 82 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
243 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
775 |
| An Economic Approach to Article 82 - Report by the European Advisory Group on Competition Policy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
427 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
1,208 |
| Auctions versus Negotiations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
70 |
| Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
58 |
| Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
91 |
| Auctions vs. Negotiations:The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
74 |
| Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
63 |
| Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
72 |
| Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
141 |
| Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
38 |
| Competition and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
305 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
199 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
174 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
265 |
| Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
292 |
| Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
112 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
404 |
| Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
289 |
| Contracts, Fairness and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
281 |
| Contracts, Fairness and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
164 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
352 |
| Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
1 |
283 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
749 |
| Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
166 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
480 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
111 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
1 |
1 |
1 |
601 |
2 |
4 |
16 |
2,201 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
424 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
1,390 |
| Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
127 |
| Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
260 |
| Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
55 |
| Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
225 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1,045 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
236 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
940 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
381 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion, Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
960 |
| Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
38 |
| Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
38 |
| Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
226 |
| Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
127 |
| Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
70 |
| Fairness and Contract Design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
518 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
1,292 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
243 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
874 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
458 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
1,333 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
229 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
1,294 |
| Fairness and contract design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
100 |
| Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
83 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
273 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
339 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
249 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
3 |
25 |
395 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
607 |
| Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
57 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
142 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
623 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
378 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
427 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
238 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
911 |
| Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
332 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
1,280 |
| Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
139 |
| Genome-wide association analyses of risk tolerance and risky behaviors in over one million individuals identify hundreds of loci and shared genetic influences |
0 |
0 |
1 |
168 |
6 |
13 |
51 |
870 |
| Incomplete contracts and privatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
55 |
| Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
108 |
| Licensing Complementary Patents and Vertical Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
257 |
| Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trollsâ€, Market Structure, and “Excessive†Royalties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
186 |
| Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
55 |
| Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
106 |
| Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
105 |
| Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
446 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
1,163 |
| Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
195 |
| Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways |
0 |
0 |
0 |
505 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
1,859 |
| Neuæplné smlouvy a privatizace |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
29 |
| On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked |
0 |
0 |
0 |
345 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
750 |
| On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
127 |
| Option contracts and renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
89 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
179 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
2 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
123 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
168 |
| Pay What You Want as a Pricing Model for Open Access Publishing? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
75 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
88 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
104 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
528 |
| Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
69 |
| Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
46 |
| Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
292 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
889 |
| Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
93 |
| Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
70 |
| Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
210 |
| Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
90 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
236 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
88 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
144 |
| Reputation in perturbed repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
54 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
180 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
177 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
159 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
163 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
121 |
| Screening, competition, and job design: Economic origins of good jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
72 |
| Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
350 |
| Sequential Investments and Options to Own |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
243 |
| Sequential Investments and Options to Own |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
511 |
| Sequential investments and options to own |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
72 |
| Social Preferences and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
2 |
3 |
16 |
316 |
| Social Preferences and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
251 |
| Social preferences and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
90 |
| Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
174 |
| The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
208 |
0 |
3 |
31 |
134 |
| The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
726 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
2,028 |
| The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories |
0 |
1 |
5 |
923 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
1,698 |
| The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
460 |
| The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
210 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
571 |
| The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion – Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
230 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
382 |
| The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion- A Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
174 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
396 |
| The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
275 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
668 |
| The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
430 |
| The Role of Equality and Equity in Social Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
512 |
| The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
59 |
| The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
341 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1,328 |
| The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
304 |
| The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
130 |
| The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
54 |
| The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
49 |
| The role of experiments for the development of economic theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
32 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
401 |
2 |
2 |
40 |
1,198 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications |
0 |
0 |
1 |
339 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
873 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1,631 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
4,372 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications |
0 |
0 |
1 |
261 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
927 |
| Two Tales on Resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
213 |
| Two Tales on Resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
116 |
| Two tales on resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
40 |
| Unverifiable Information, Incomplete Contracts, and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
335 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
135 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
143 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority - A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
248 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
103 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
101 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation |
1 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
95 |
| Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
193 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
135 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
165 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
159 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
120 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
277 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
147 |
| [Rezension zu:] Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tiróle, Jean: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, Mass., 1993 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
88 |
| Total Working Papers |
3 |
7 |
49 |
21,849 |
38 |
189 |
2,106 |
70,903 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Comment on Gayer and Shy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
| A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation |
1 |
1 |
27 |
3,173 |
22 |
53 |
244 |
10,992 |
| Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
367 |
| Arbeitsmarktreform und Mindestlöhne:Ein Schritt vor, zwei Schritte zurück |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
51 |
| Auctions versus negotiations: the effects of inefficient renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
51 |
| Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
63 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
136 |
| Competition and incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
101 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
104 |
| Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to Contract Theory |
0 |
1 |
2 |
28 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
94 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
1 |
1 |
5 |
222 |
1 |
4 |
27 |
615 |
| Delegating pricing power to customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
135 |
| Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
218 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
692 |
| Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
151 |
| Fairness and Contract Design |
0 |
1 |
4 |
301 |
0 |
3 |
28 |
1,183 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model |
0 |
1 |
3 |
167 |
0 |
3 |
24 |
666 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
322 |
| Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
128 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
399 |
| Incomplete contracts and privatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
203 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
406 |
| Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
2 |
3 |
20 |
366 |
| JEEA-FBBVA Lecture 2012: USE AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: A BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
131 |
| Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
155 |
| Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition |
0 |
2 |
7 |
422 |
1 |
10 |
35 |
1,116 |
| On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked |
1 |
1 |
2 |
191 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
565 |
| Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem |
1 |
1 |
4 |
327 |
2 |
2 |
19 |
939 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
113 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
1 |
115 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
321 |
| REFERENCE POINTS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND FAIRNESS IN CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS |
1 |
1 |
2 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
123 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
283 |
| Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
196 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
68 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
376 |
| Sequential Investments and Options to Own |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
486 |
| Social Preferences and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
184 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
22 |
1,279 |
| The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
121 |
| The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
376 |
| The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
225 |
| Two tales on resale |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
121 |
| Vertragstheorie: Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
46 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
281 |
| Total Journal Articles |
5 |
10 |
65 |
6,534 |
42 |
119 |
828 |
24,507 |
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