| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
1 |
2 |
4 |
66 |
3 |
39 |
65 |
162 |
| A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
92 |
| A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation |
4 |
5 |
18 |
3,093 |
14 |
39 |
151 |
9,712 |
| A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation |
2 |
2 |
8 |
909 |
12 |
24 |
95 |
2,739 |
| A comment on Gayer and Shy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
84 |
| A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
27 |
109 |
370 |
| Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
203 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
572 |
| Adding a stick to the carrot? The interaction of bonuses and fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
29 |
| An Economic Approach to Article 82 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
234 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
722 |
| An Economic Approach to Article 82 - Report by the European Advisory Group on Competition Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
412 |
3 |
8 |
22 |
1,127 |
| Auctions versus Negotiations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
36 |
| Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
41 |
| Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
67 |
| Auctions vs. Negotiations:The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
45 |
| Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
27 |
| Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
49 |
| Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
133 |
| Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
19 |
| Competition and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
2 |
65 |
1 |
20 |
54 |
147 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
230 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
1 |
1 |
91 |
2 |
6 |
22 |
165 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
145 |
| Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
270 |
| Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
390 |
| Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
265 |
| Contracts, Fairness and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
1 |
117 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
276 |
| Contracts, Fairness and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
164 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
338 |
| Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
163 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
445 |
| Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
1 |
282 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
733 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
421 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
1,358 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
2 |
595 |
2 |
6 |
26 |
2,129 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
15 |
72 |
| Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price |
0 |
0 |
6 |
45 |
3 |
5 |
20 |
99 |
| Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price? |
0 |
1 |
25 |
75 |
0 |
9 |
55 |
178 |
| Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
39 |
| Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen |
0 |
0 |
2 |
220 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
1,006 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
366 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
234 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
893 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion, Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
145 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
926 |
| Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
| Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
27 |
| Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
1 |
84 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
201 |
| Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
111 |
| Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
47 |
| Fairness and Contract Design |
1 |
1 |
2 |
509 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
1,240 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
241 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
846 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model |
1 |
1 |
1 |
454 |
4 |
7 |
14 |
1,276 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
226 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
1,260 |
| Fairness and contract design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
62 |
| Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
63 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
228 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
585 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
250 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
1 |
67 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
324 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
365 |
| Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
42 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
2 |
141 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
603 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
346 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
2 |
106 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
404 |
| Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
237 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
885 |
| Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
332 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1,263 |
| Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
102 |
| Genome-wide association analyses of risk tolerance and risky behaviors in over one million individuals identify hundreds of loci and shared genetic influences |
2 |
3 |
6 |
142 |
9 |
26 |
87 |
528 |
| Incomplete contracts and privatization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
35 |
| Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
14 |
76 |
| Licensing Complementary Patents and Vertical Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
243 |
| Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trollsâ€, Market Structure, and “Excessive†Royalties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
171 |
| Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
80 |
| Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
41 |
| Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
75 |
| Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition |
0 |
0 |
2 |
439 |
3 |
5 |
22 |
1,076 |
| Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
46 |
112 |
| Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give-Aways |
0 |
1 |
4 |
498 |
15 |
43 |
62 |
1,771 |
| Neuæplné smlouvy a privatizace |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
25 |
| On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked |
0 |
0 |
2 |
341 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
715 |
| On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
114 |
| Option contracts and renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
60 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
77 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
1 |
1 |
44 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
153 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
138 |
| Pay What You Want as a Pricing Model for Open Access Publishing? |
0 |
0 |
3 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
51 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
91 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
78 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
509 |
| Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies |
0 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
26 |
| Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies |
0 |
1 |
1 |
44 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
38 |
| Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market |
0 |
3 |
5 |
288 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
847 |
| Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
69 |
| Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
57 |
| Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations |
0 |
1 |
3 |
41 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
183 |
| Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
79 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
1 |
103 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
222 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
129 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
73 |
| Reputation in perturbed repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
33 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
155 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
151 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
2 |
6 |
76 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
145 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
97 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
136 |
| Screening, competition, and job design: Economic origins of good jobs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
47 |
| Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
98 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
315 |
| Sequential Investments and Options to Own |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
498 |
| Sequential Investments and Options to Own |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
217 |
| Sequential investments and options to own |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
44 |
| Social Preferences and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
222 |
| Social Preferences and Competition |
0 |
0 |
1 |
139 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
287 |
| Social preferences and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
60 |
| Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools |
0 |
0 |
1 |
134 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
140 |
| The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory |
0 |
1 |
1 |
195 |
0 |
5 |
15 |
64 |
| The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories |
0 |
0 |
3 |
719 |
2 |
7 |
26 |
1,951 |
| The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories |
1 |
5 |
29 |
892 |
11 |
16 |
56 |
1,613 |
| The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
439 |
| The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
210 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
556 |
| The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion – Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
228 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
357 |
| The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion- A Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
372 |
| The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
273 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
640 |
| The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
406 |
| The Role of Equality and Equity in Social Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
168 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
485 |
| The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
36 |
| The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel |
0 |
0 |
3 |
338 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
1,301 |
| The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories |
0 |
0 |
1 |
116 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
287 |
| The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
88 |
| The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
36 |
| The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
33 |
| The role of experiments for the development of economic theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
20 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity |
0 |
2 |
3 |
389 |
1 |
5 |
16 |
1,087 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications |
0 |
0 |
5 |
335 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
820 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications |
1 |
4 |
13 |
1,589 |
6 |
19 |
58 |
4,191 |
| Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications |
0 |
0 |
2 |
241 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
836 |
| Two Tales on Resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
193 |
| Two Tales on Resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
103 |
| Two tales on resale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
28 |
| Unverifiable Information, Incomplete Contracts, and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
320 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
99 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority |
0 |
0 |
1 |
102 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
131 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority - A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
228 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
70 |
| Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation |
0 |
1 |
3 |
102 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
82 |
| Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
160 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
141 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
132 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
2 |
8 |
16 |
231 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
112 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
100 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
76 |
| [Rezension zu:] Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tiróle, Jean: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, Mass., 1993 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
68 |
| Total Working Papers |
13 |
41 |
197 |
21,422 |
153 |
502 |
1,883 |
65,423 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Comment on Gayer and Shy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
| A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation |
4 |
9 |
71 |
2,980 |
21 |
73 |
320 |
9,762 |
| Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines |
0 |
0 |
1 |
79 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
330 |
| An Economic Approach to Article 82 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
86 |
| Arbeitsmarktreform und Mindestlöhne:Ein Schritt vor, zwei Schritte zurück |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
42 |
| Auctions versus negotiations: the effects of inefficient renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
25 |
| Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
104 |
| Competition and incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
61 |
| Complementary Patents and Market Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
53 |
| Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to Contract Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
56 |
| Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
203 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
543 |
| Delegating pricing power to customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price? |
2 |
4 |
6 |
18 |
4 |
8 |
25 |
80 |
| Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
200 |
| Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision |
0 |
0 |
1 |
135 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
665 |
| Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
112 |
| Fairness and Contract Design |
0 |
6 |
12 |
282 |
1 |
13 |
41 |
1,102 |
| Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model |
1 |
2 |
3 |
152 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
604 |
| Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights |
0 |
1 |
1 |
53 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
279 |
| Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices |
0 |
0 |
4 |
113 |
0 |
2 |
23 |
341 |
| Incomplete contracts and privatization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
190 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
358 |
| Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment |
0 |
0 |
3 |
99 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
297 |
| JEEA-FBBVA Lecture 2012: USE AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: A BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
97 |
| Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation |
0 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
1 |
8 |
13 |
102 |
| Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition |
0 |
1 |
10 |
378 |
3 |
10 |
53 |
922 |
| On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked |
0 |
5 |
15 |
169 |
4 |
13 |
47 |
449 |
| Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem |
1 |
1 |
3 |
303 |
4 |
6 |
21 |
859 |
| Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
34 |
| Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
295 |
| REFERENCE POINTS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND FAIRNESS IN CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS |
1 |
4 |
4 |
12 |
1 |
11 |
28 |
69 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
257 |
| Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
180 |
| Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs |
0 |
0 |
2 |
62 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
322 |
| Sequential Investments and Options to Own |
1 |
2 |
3 |
77 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
448 |
| Social Preferences and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
151 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
1,208 |
| The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
110 |
| The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
340 |
| The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
202 |
| Two tales on resale |
0 |
0 |
2 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
93 |
| Vertragstheorie: Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
| You Owe Me |
0 |
0 |
3 |
30 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
213 |
| Total Journal Articles |
10 |
38 |
157 |
6,053 |
54 |
203 |
845 |
21,492 |
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