| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Advertising Expensive Mortgages |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
4 |
7 |
25 |
125 |
| Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
19 |
| Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
31 |
| Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
4 |
15 |
104 |
| Banking without Deposits: Evidence from Shadow Bank Call Reports |
2 |
4 |
20 |
55 |
8 |
23 |
90 |
147 |
| Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy |
1 |
2 |
6 |
38 |
3 |
13 |
34 |
105 |
| Debt Relief and Slow Recovery: A Decade after Lehman |
0 |
1 |
5 |
41 |
1 |
5 |
19 |
67 |
| Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
78 |
0 |
6 |
20 |
268 |
| Financial Innovation in the 21st Century: Evidence from U.S. Patents |
1 |
9 |
34 |
34 |
5 |
28 |
54 |
54 |
| Financing Labor |
0 |
6 |
10 |
85 |
3 |
15 |
48 |
319 |
| Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
2 |
2 |
5 |
110 |
3 |
7 |
46 |
324 |
| Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
1 |
3 |
8 |
84 |
3 |
8 |
38 |
170 |
| Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
16 |
3 |
10 |
50 |
50 |
| Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence From Banking |
0 |
0 |
4 |
97 |
1 |
5 |
40 |
339 |
| Information, credit, and organization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
72 |
| Measuring Technological Innovation over the Long Run |
3 |
6 |
29 |
265 |
13 |
26 |
140 |
510 |
| Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
0 |
4 |
64 |
1 |
5 |
29 |
198 |
| Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
1 |
2 |
44 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
120 |
| Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program |
0 |
0 |
7 |
50 |
2 |
8 |
39 |
187 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
6 |
13 |
34 |
133 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
2 |
14 |
37 |
95 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
17 |
38 |
136 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
13 |
38 |
194 |
| Regional Redistribution Through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
133 |
| Regional Redistribution through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
44 |
| Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
175 |
| Searching for Approval |
1 |
1 |
10 |
16 |
3 |
5 |
44 |
70 |
| Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis |
0 |
0 |
6 |
51 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
198 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
31 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
96 |
| Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth |
1 |
5 |
10 |
297 |
11 |
25 |
112 |
919 |
| The Failure of Models That Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives, and Defaults |
0 |
2 |
10 |
30 |
6 |
11 |
31 |
99 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
94 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
1 |
7 |
19 |
85 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
196 |
| The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
78 |
| The Use and Misuse of Patent Data: Issues for Corporate Finance and Beyond |
2 |
2 |
13 |
73 |
2 |
6 |
54 |
171 |
| The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
85 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
1 |
3 |
5 |
40 |
5 |
9 |
38 |
127 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
48 |
| Why is Intermediating Houses so Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers |
0 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
40 |
40 |
| Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
68 |
| Total Working Papers |
15 |
48 |
218 |
2,044 |
100 |
327 |
1,341 |
6,524 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Advertising Expensive Mortgages |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
3 |
8 |
16 |
96 |
| Affiliated firms and financial support: Evidence from Indian business groups |
1 |
2 |
17 |
187 |
4 |
12 |
77 |
693 |
| Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs? |
0 |
1 |
5 |
89 |
3 |
8 |
25 |
306 |
| Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
67 |
| Debt relief and slow recovery: A decade after Lehman |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
9 |
9 |
9 |
| Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans |
5 |
9 |
39 |
560 |
19 |
41 |
156 |
1,730 |
| Disguised corruption: Evidence from consumer credit in China |
0 |
2 |
11 |
14 |
2 |
13 |
77 |
112 |
| Financial market frictions and diversification |
1 |
2 |
6 |
35 |
3 |
5 |
22 |
139 |
| Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans |
2 |
3 |
14 |
200 |
5 |
12 |
42 |
698 |
| Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks |
2 |
14 |
77 |
152 |
22 |
67 |
290 |
578 |
| Firm boundaries matter: Evidence from conglomerates and R&D activity |
3 |
7 |
45 |
325 |
11 |
29 |
180 |
1,034 |
| Fund Manager Use of Public Information: New Evidence on Managerial Skills |
0 |
0 |
2 |
131 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
445 |
| Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking |
1 |
6 |
41 |
151 |
7 |
24 |
145 |
558 |
| Interest Rate Pass-Through: Mortgage Rates, Household Consumption, and Voluntary Deleveraging |
0 |
0 |
5 |
67 |
2 |
8 |
45 |
337 |
| Internal Capital Market and Dividend Policies: Evidence From Business Groups |
0 |
1 |
7 |
27 |
3 |
8 |
44 |
158 |
| Learning by Trading |
0 |
1 |
11 |
84 |
6 |
11 |
37 |
271 |
| Lender Screening and the Role of Securitization: Evidence from Prime and Subprime Mortgage Markets |
0 |
1 |
9 |
56 |
1 |
5 |
29 |
188 |
| Measuring Technological Innovation over the Long Run |
1 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
11 |
24 |
24 |
24 |
| Mortgage Market Design: Lessons from the Great Recession |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
31 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
1 |
3 |
10 |
51 |
3 |
14 |
83 |
340 |
| Regional Redistribution through the US Mortgage Market |
1 |
1 |
5 |
51 |
3 |
9 |
55 |
322 |
| Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates |
0 |
2 |
6 |
28 |
2 |
9 |
24 |
108 |
| Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis |
0 |
0 |
23 |
223 |
3 |
6 |
90 |
700 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
71 |
| Statistical Default Models and Incentives |
1 |
1 |
2 |
56 |
3 |
5 |
13 |
194 |
| Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth |
8 |
18 |
97 |
277 |
49 |
107 |
433 |
1,162 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
3 |
4 |
21 |
46 |
8 |
21 |
81 |
232 |
| The failure of models that predict failure: Distance, incentives, and defaults |
1 |
5 |
21 |
142 |
10 |
23 |
91 |
546 |
| The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation |
1 |
2 |
3 |
38 |
3 |
5 |
20 |
208 |
| Total Journal Articles |
33 |
91 |
485 |
3,024 |
193 |
489 |
2,155 |
11,357 |
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