| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Advertising Expensive Mortgages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
156 |
| Aggregate Lending and Modern Financial Intermediation: Why Bank Balance Sheet Models are Miscalibrated |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
38 |
| Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
37 |
| Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
59 |
| Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
124 |
| Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
2 |
2 |
23 |
191 |
| Book Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, HTM Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
32 |
| Book Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, HTM Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
54 |
| Debt Relief and Slow Recovery: A Decade after Lehman |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
5 |
18 |
100 |
| Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending? |
1 |
1 |
1 |
85 |
1 |
5 |
29 |
345 |
| Financial Innovation in the 21st Century: Evidence from U.S. Patents |
0 |
1 |
1 |
52 |
5 |
10 |
24 |
140 |
| Financing Labor |
0 |
0 |
1 |
106 |
2 |
6 |
27 |
432 |
| Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
0 |
5 |
26 |
286 |
| Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
0 |
1 |
3 |
135 |
5 |
27 |
52 |
493 |
| Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
| Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
109 |
| Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence From Banking |
0 |
0 |
3 |
107 |
4 |
5 |
26 |
424 |
| Information, credit, and organization |
1 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
3 |
3 |
21 |
106 |
| Measuring Technological Innovation over the Long Run |
2 |
4 |
17 |
332 |
10 |
21 |
110 |
833 |
| Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
68 |
| Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
1 |
5 |
22 |
115 |
| Monetary Tightening, Commercial Real Estate Distress, and US Bank Fragility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
59 |
| Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
1 |
1 |
66 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
233 |
| Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
0 |
6 |
54 |
1 |
6 |
31 |
166 |
| Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
4 |
30 |
263 |
| NAR Settlement, House Prices, and Consumer Welfare |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
2 |
11 |
26 |
38 |
| Noisy Experts? Discretion in Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
14 |
| One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Heterogeneous Depositor Compensation During Periods of Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
33 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
3 |
4 |
21 |
313 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
209 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
203 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
220 |
| Private Credit, Balance Sheets and Financial Stability |
0 |
1 |
22 |
22 |
3 |
18 |
48 |
48 |
| Regional Redistribution Through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
150 |
| Regional Redistribution through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
61 |
| Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
1 |
4 |
41 |
240 |
| Searching for Approval |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
27 |
| Searching for Approval |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
2 |
34 |
167 |
| Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis |
0 |
1 |
1 |
53 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
223 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
126 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
53 |
| Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth |
1 |
2 |
4 |
323 |
4 |
16 |
68 |
1,149 |
| The Failure of Models That Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives, and Defaults |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
150 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
29 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
122 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
225 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
134 |
| The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
101 |
| The Secular Decline of Bank Balance Sheet Lending |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
95 |
| The Secular Decline of Bank Balance Sheet Lending |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
6 |
25 |
34 |
| The Use and Misuse of Patent Data: Issues for Corporate Finance and Beyond |
0 |
0 |
2 |
84 |
1 |
3 |
30 |
244 |
| The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
129 |
| Weighted Noise: Discretion in Regulation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
24 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
26 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
78 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
0 |
3 |
33 |
190 |
| Which Banks are (Over) Levered? Insights from Shadow Banks and Uninsured Leverage |
0 |
0 |
3 |
81 |
2 |
7 |
37 |
325 |
| Who Pays for Payments? |
0 |
8 |
23 |
23 |
0 |
12 |
24 |
24 |
| Why is Intermediating Houses so Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers |
0 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
0 |
8 |
30 |
104 |
| Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
84 |
| Total Working Papers |
5 |
25 |
107 |
2,682 |
58 |
236 |
1,378 |
10,270 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Advertising Expensive Mortgages |
0 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
145 |
| Affiliated firms and financial support: Evidence from Indian business groups |
1 |
2 |
8 |
224 |
2 |
7 |
40 |
831 |
| Aggregate Lending and Modern Financial Intermediation: Why Bank Balance Sheet Models Are Miscalibrated |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
30 |
| Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
16 |
16 |
| Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
98 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
340 |
| Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
98 |
| Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy |
2 |
3 |
11 |
33 |
3 |
6 |
54 |
128 |
| Debt relief and slow recovery: A decade after Lehman |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
75 |
| Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans |
1 |
13 |
22 |
675 |
7 |
45 |
91 |
2,082 |
| Disguised corruption: Evidence from consumer credit in China |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
204 |
| Financial Innovation in the Twenty-First Century: Evidence from US Patents |
0 |
4 |
31 |
147 |
4 |
19 |
68 |
302 |
| Financial market frictions and diversification |
0 |
1 |
2 |
53 |
3 |
4 |
14 |
207 |
| Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
222 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
795 |
| Financing Labor* |
0 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
1 |
11 |
36 |
85 |
| Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks |
1 |
8 |
41 |
342 |
17 |
79 |
255 |
1,430 |
| Firm boundaries matter: Evidence from conglomerates and R&D activity |
0 |
0 |
10 |
427 |
5 |
24 |
82 |
1,396 |
| Fund Manager Use of Public Information: New Evidence on Managerial Skills |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
0 |
4 |
16 |
500 |
| Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
5 |
22 |
44 |
| Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking |
0 |
3 |
9 |
217 |
3 |
10 |
49 |
840 |
| Interest Rate Pass-Through: Mortgage Rates, Household Consumption, and Voluntary Deleveraging |
1 |
4 |
8 |
107 |
2 |
6 |
35 |
484 |
| Internal Capital Market and Dividend Policies: Evidence From Business Groups |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
220 |
| Learning by Trading |
1 |
3 |
7 |
116 |
9 |
17 |
44 |
390 |
| Lender Screening and the Role of Securitization: Evidence from Prime and Subprime Mortgage Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
4 |
38 |
258 |
| Measuring Technological Innovation over the Long Run |
5 |
31 |
76 |
272 |
19 |
79 |
217 |
781 |
| Monetary Tightening, Commercial Real Estate Distress, and US Bank Fragility |
1 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
2 |
7 |
14 |
14 |
| Monetary tightening and U.S. bank fragility in 2023: Mark-to-market losses and uninsured depositor runs? |
3 |
8 |
27 |
31 |
12 |
41 |
170 |
192 |
| Mortgage Market Design: Lessons from the Great Recession |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
67 |
| Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinance Program |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
1 |
5 |
27 |
44 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
1 |
1 |
1 |
71 |
3 |
7 |
40 |
509 |
| Regional Redistribution through the US Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
2 |
2 |
21 |
376 |
| Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
168 |
| Searching for Approval |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
0 |
3 |
28 |
66 |
| Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis |
0 |
1 |
3 |
242 |
2 |
6 |
46 |
786 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
4 |
19 |
108 |
| Shadow Bank Distress and Household Debt Relief: Evidence from the CARES Act |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
96 |
| Statistical Default Models and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
213 |
| Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth |
3 |
20 |
53 |
569 |
14 |
55 |
242 |
2,408 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
1 |
12 |
122 |
2 |
8 |
45 |
481 |
| The Problem of Good Conduct among Financial Advisers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
27 |
| The Use and Misuse of Patent Data: Issues for Finance and Beyond |
2 |
4 |
9 |
29 |
4 |
14 |
46 |
113 |
| The failure of models that predict failure: Distance, incentives, and defaults |
0 |
0 |
2 |
180 |
1 |
7 |
35 |
700 |
| The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation |
0 |
1 |
2 |
64 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
333 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
4 |
20 |
52 |
146 |
| Total Journal Articles |
22 |
114 |
365 |
4,844 |
133 |
526 |
2,088 |
18,528 |