Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Advertising Expensive Mortgages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
139 |
Aggregate Lending and Modern Financial Intermediation: Why Bank Balance Sheet Models are Miscalibrated |
0 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
20 |
Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
46 |
Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
111 |
Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy |
0 |
1 |
4 |
53 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
164 |
Book Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, HTM Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates |
0 |
0 |
12 |
12 |
1 |
12 |
37 |
37 |
Book Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, HTM Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
7 |
12 |
12 |
Debt Relief and Slow Recovery: A Decade after Lehman |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
82 |
Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
313 |
Financial Innovation in the 21st Century: Evidence from U.S. Patents |
0 |
0 |
7 |
51 |
1 |
2 |
25 |
113 |
Financing Labor |
0 |
0 |
2 |
105 |
0 |
4 |
16 |
397 |
Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
2 |
3 |
5 |
102 |
3 |
8 |
24 |
253 |
Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
0 |
2 |
5 |
131 |
3 |
6 |
24 |
427 |
Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
88 |
Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence From Banking |
1 |
1 |
1 |
103 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
393 |
Information, credit, and organization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
82 |
Measuring Technological Innovation over the Long Run |
1 |
3 |
8 |
312 |
6 |
12 |
38 |
707 |
Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs? |
0 |
1 |
6 |
53 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
92 |
Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs? |
0 |
0 |
5 |
31 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
45 |
Monetary Tightening, Commercial Real Estate Distress, and US Bank Fragility |
0 |
0 |
3 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
39 |
Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
135 |
Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
213 |
Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program |
0 |
1 |
2 |
56 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
231 |
NAR Settlement, House Prices, and Consumer Welfare |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
12 |
Noisy Experts? Discretion in Regulation |
0 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
9 |
Noisy Experts? Discretion in Regulation |
0 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Heterogeneous Depositor Compensation During Periods of Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
1 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
184 |
Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
197 |
Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
204 |
Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
1 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
4 |
7 |
10 |
291 |
Regional Redistribution Through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
Regional Redistribution through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
48 |
Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
198 |
Searching for Approval |
0 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
14 |
Searching for Approval |
0 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
132 |
Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
211 |
Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth |
0 |
0 |
2 |
319 |
1 |
5 |
33 |
1,072 |
The Failure of Models That Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives, and Defaults |
0 |
0 |
1 |
35 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
133 |
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
112 |
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
106 |
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
203 |
The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
The Secular Decline of Bank Balance Sheet Lending |
0 |
0 |
28 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
8 |
The Secular Decline of Bank Balance Sheet Lending |
0 |
0 |
17 |
46 |
1 |
2 |
28 |
71 |
The Use and Misuse of Patent Data: Issues for Corporate Finance and Beyond |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
212 |
The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
98 |
When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
153 |
When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
65 |
Which Banks are (Over) Levered? Insights from Shadow Banks and Uninsured Leverage |
0 |
0 |
6 |
77 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
284 |
Why is Intermediating Houses so Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
69 |
Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
77 |
Total Working Papers |
6 |
22 |
150 |
2,559 |
38 |
126 |
515 |
8,745 |