| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Advertising Expensive Mortgages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
4 |
19 |
159 |
| Aggregate Lending and Modern Financial Intermediation: Why Bank Balance Sheet Models are Miscalibrated |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
40 |
| Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
61 |
| Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
37 |
| Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
125 |
| Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
4 |
25 |
193 |
| Book Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, HTM Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
33 |
| Book Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, HTM Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
55 |
| Chinese Sputnik Moments? |
9 |
14 |
14 |
14 |
5 |
24 |
24 |
24 |
| Debt Relief and Slow Recovery: A Decade after Lehman |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
101 |
| Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
85 |
2 |
6 |
31 |
350 |
| Do Social Norms Substitute for Enforcement? Evidence from Public Officials’ Home Purchases in Singapore |
11 |
11 |
11 |
11 |
20 |
20 |
20 |
20 |
| Financial Innovation in the 21st Century: Evidence from U.S. Patents |
0 |
1 |
2 |
53 |
2 |
9 |
28 |
144 |
| Financing Labor |
0 |
0 |
1 |
106 |
0 |
3 |
25 |
433 |
| Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
1 |
1 |
4 |
136 |
5 |
11 |
56 |
499 |
| Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
2 |
4 |
26 |
290 |
| Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
| Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
2 |
5 |
20 |
114 |
| Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence From Banking |
0 |
0 |
3 |
107 |
1 |
7 |
27 |
427 |
| Information, credit, and organization |
0 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
1 |
4 |
22 |
107 |
| Measuring Technological Innovation over the Long Run |
2 |
5 |
15 |
335 |
5 |
23 |
107 |
846 |
| Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
55 |
1 |
4 |
23 |
118 |
| Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
69 |
| Monetary Tightening, Commercial Real Estate Distress, and US Bank Fragility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
61 |
| Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
0 |
5 |
54 |
2 |
7 |
36 |
172 |
| Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
2 |
3 |
22 |
236 |
| Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
1 |
2 |
30 |
265 |
| NAR Settlement, House Prices, and Consumer Welfare |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
5 |
29 |
41 |
| Noisy Experts? Discretion in Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
15 |
| One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Heterogeneous Depositor Compensation During Periods of Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
33 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
206 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
222 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
314 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
209 |
| Private Credit, Balance Sheets and Financial Stability |
0 |
0 |
22 |
22 |
6 |
14 |
59 |
59 |
| Regional Redistribution Through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
151 |
| Regional Redistribution through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
63 |
| Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
2 |
4 |
42 |
243 |
| Searching for Approval |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
167 |
| Searching for Approval |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
27 |
| Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
224 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
1 |
1 |
1 |
57 |
3 |
4 |
22 |
130 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
54 |
| Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth |
0 |
1 |
4 |
323 |
4 |
11 |
72 |
1,156 |
| The Failure of Models That Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives, and Defaults |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
153 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
125 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
2 |
4 |
20 |
33 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
136 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
3 |
3 |
21 |
228 |
| The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
101 |
| The Secular Decline of Bank Balance Sheet Lending |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
34 |
| The Secular Decline of Traditional Banking: Drivers and the Changing Transmission of Regulation and Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
96 |
| The Use and Misuse of Patent Data: Issues for Corporate Finance and Beyond |
0 |
0 |
2 |
84 |
1 |
3 |
29 |
246 |
| The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
3 |
30 |
132 |
| Weighted Noise: Discretion in Regulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
3 |
3 |
17 |
27 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
79 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
1 |
2 |
32 |
192 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
27 |
| Which Banks are (Over) Levered? Insights from Shadow Banks and Uninsured Leverage |
0 |
0 |
2 |
81 |
4 |
9 |
41 |
332 |
| Who Pays for Payments? |
0 |
0 |
23 |
23 |
1 |
2 |
26 |
26 |
| Why is Intermediating Houses so Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers |
0 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
1 |
5 |
33 |
109 |
| Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
85 |
| Total Working Papers |
24 |
37 |
131 |
2,714 |
94 |
257 |
1,485 |
10,469 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Advertising Expensive Mortgages |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
2 |
3 |
18 |
148 |
| Affiliated firms and financial support: Evidence from Indian business groups |
1 |
4 |
11 |
227 |
5 |
11 |
42 |
840 |
| Aggregate Lending and Modern Financial Intermediation: Why Bank Balance Sheet Models Are Miscalibrated |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
30 |
| Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
16 |
| Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
340 |
| Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
99 |
| Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy |
0 |
3 |
10 |
34 |
2 |
7 |
50 |
132 |
| Debt relief and slow recovery: A decade after Lehman |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
76 |
| Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans |
6 |
9 |
29 |
683 |
18 |
33 |
114 |
2,108 |
| Disguised corruption: Evidence from consumer credit in China |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
5 |
10 |
34 |
214 |
| Financial Innovation in the Twenty-First Century: Evidence from US Patents |
1 |
1 |
26 |
148 |
3 |
8 |
62 |
306 |
| Financial market frictions and diversification |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
209 |
| Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
222 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
795 |
| Financing Labor* |
0 |
1 |
4 |
22 |
1 |
3 |
37 |
87 |
| Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks |
5 |
9 |
46 |
350 |
17 |
39 |
253 |
1,452 |
| Firm boundaries matter: Evidence from conglomerates and R&D activity |
0 |
0 |
9 |
427 |
5 |
10 |
83 |
1,401 |
| Fund Manager Use of Public Information: New Evidence on Managerial Skills |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
2 |
3 |
19 |
503 |
| Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
45 |
| Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking |
0 |
0 |
8 |
217 |
1 |
8 |
46 |
845 |
| Interest Rate Pass-Through: Mortgage Rates, Household Consumption, and Voluntary Deleveraging |
1 |
4 |
11 |
110 |
9 |
14 |
45 |
496 |
| Internal Capital Market and Dividend Policies: Evidence From Business Groups |
1 |
1 |
1 |
39 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
221 |
| Learning by Trading |
1 |
2 |
6 |
117 |
7 |
22 |
51 |
403 |
| Lender Screening and the Role of Securitization: Evidence from Prime and Subprime Mortgage Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
1 |
3 |
39 |
260 |
| Measuring Technological Innovation over the Long Run |
6 |
14 |
78 |
281 |
16 |
50 |
223 |
812 |
| Monetary Tightening, Commercial Real Estate Distress, and US Bank Fragility |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
17 |
| Monetary tightening and U.S. bank fragility in 2023: Mark-to-market losses and uninsured depositor runs? |
4 |
12 |
34 |
40 |
17 |
50 |
194 |
230 |
| Mortgage Market Design: Lessons from the Great Recession |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
67 |
| Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinance Program |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
2 |
5 |
28 |
48 |
| Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
2 |
2 |
72 |
5 |
11 |
43 |
517 |
| Regional Redistribution through the US Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
2 |
4 |
21 |
378 |
| Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
169 |
| Searching for Approval |
1 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
2 |
5 |
27 |
71 |
| Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis |
0 |
0 |
3 |
242 |
2 |
6 |
49 |
790 |
| Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
5 |
23 |
112 |
| Shadow Bank Distress and Household Debt Relief: Evidence from the CARES Act |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
98 |
| Statistical Default Models and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
214 |
| Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth |
4 |
9 |
54 |
575 |
18 |
43 |
244 |
2,437 |
| The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
1 |
1 |
11 |
123 |
6 |
11 |
50 |
490 |
| The Problem of Good Conduct among Financial Advisers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
28 |
| The Use and Misuse of Patent Data: Issues for Finance and Beyond |
0 |
2 |
7 |
29 |
2 |
9 |
44 |
118 |
| The failure of models that predict failure: Distance, incentives, and defaults |
0 |
0 |
2 |
180 |
8 |
15 |
48 |
714 |
| The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
64 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
336 |
| When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
5 |
12 |
56 |
154 |
| Total Journal Articles |
32 |
77 |
376 |
4,899 |
170 |
431 |
2,184 |
18,826 |