Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Advertising Expensive Mortgages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
137 |
Aggregate Lending and Modern Financial Intermediation: Why Bank Balance Sheet Models are Miscalibrated |
0 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
17 |
Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
44 |
Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
108 |
Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
5 |
52 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
156 |
Book Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, HTM Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates |
1 |
2 |
11 |
11 |
2 |
7 |
21 |
21 |
Debt Relief and Slow Recovery: A Decade after Lehman |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
81 |
Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
305 |
Financial Innovation in the 21st Century: Evidence from U.S. Patents |
1 |
2 |
8 |
48 |
5 |
7 |
23 |
100 |
Financing Labor |
0 |
0 |
3 |
104 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
387 |
Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
0 |
0 |
5 |
99 |
0 |
4 |
25 |
241 |
Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks |
0 |
1 |
6 |
128 |
0 |
3 |
22 |
410 |
Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
23 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
81 |
Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence From Banking |
0 |
0 |
1 |
102 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
390 |
Information, credit, and organization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
81 |
Measuring Technological Innovation over the Long Run |
1 |
2 |
16 |
308 |
1 |
8 |
47 |
681 |
Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs? |
0 |
2 |
9 |
52 |
1 |
8 |
38 |
87 |
Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs? |
0 |
1 |
8 |
28 |
0 |
5 |
19 |
36 |
Monetary Tightening, Commercial Real Estate Distress, and US Bank Fragility |
0 |
1 |
19 |
19 |
0 |
4 |
34 |
34 |
Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
210 |
Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
133 |
Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
223 |
NAR Settlement, House Prices, and Consumer Welfare |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
Noisy Experts? Discretion in Regulation |
0 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
7 |
One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Heterogeneous Depositor Compensation During Periods of Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
181 |
Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
284 |
Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
195 |
Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
202 |
Regional Redistribution Through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
Regional Redistribution through the U.S. Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
195 |
Searching for Approval |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
129 |
Searching for Approval |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
211 |
Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
105 |
Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth |
0 |
2 |
7 |
319 |
3 |
15 |
46 |
1,057 |
The Failure of Models That Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives, and Defaults |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
129 |
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
103 |
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
106 |
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
202 |
The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
The Secular Decline of Bank Balance Sheet Lending |
1 |
2 |
46 |
46 |
1 |
9 |
66 |
66 |
The Use and Misuse of Patent Data: Issues for Corporate Finance and Beyond |
0 |
1 |
2 |
82 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
208 |
The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
95 |
When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
149 |
When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
64 |
When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
Which Banks are (Over) Levered? Insights from Shadow Banks and Uninsured Leverage |
1 |
3 |
7 |
75 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
274 |
Why is Intermediating Houses so Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
64 |
Worker Flows in Banking Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
75 |
Total Working Papers |
6 |
25 |
175 |
2,480 |
32 |
116 |
564 |
8,453 |
Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Advertising Expensive Mortgages |
1 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
125 |
Affiliated firms and financial support: Evidence from Indian business groups |
0 |
2 |
13 |
213 |
2 |
4 |
21 |
777 |
Aggregate Lending and Modern Financial Intermediation: Why Bank Balance Sheet Models Are Miscalibrated |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs? |
0 |
0 |
4 |
95 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
326 |
Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market |
0 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
77 |
Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy |
1 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
4 |
9 |
21 |
21 |
Debt relief and slow recovery: A decade after Lehman |
0 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
50 |
Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans |
1 |
5 |
26 |
639 |
3 |
11 |
61 |
1,947 |
Disguised corruption: Evidence from consumer credit in China |
0 |
0 |
4 |
27 |
3 |
5 |
18 |
168 |
Financial Innovation in the Twenty-First Century: Evidence from US Patents |
9 |
35 |
62 |
62 |
12 |
70 |
130 |
130 |
Financial market frictions and diversification |
0 |
1 |
4 |
49 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
187 |
Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans |
0 |
1 |
7 |
220 |
3 |
5 |
20 |
760 |
Financing Labor* |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
31 |
Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks |
1 |
6 |
34 |
272 |
12 |
34 |
138 |
1,064 |
Firm boundaries matter: Evidence from conglomerates and R&D activity |
1 |
5 |
22 |
414 |
5 |
17 |
75 |
1,284 |
Fund Manager Use of Public Information: New Evidence on Managerial Skills |
0 |
0 |
2 |
137 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
477 |
Government and Private Household Debt Relief during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
10 |
Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking |
0 |
2 |
12 |
202 |
3 |
10 |
47 |
764 |
Interest Rate Pass-Through: Mortgage Rates, Household Consumption, and Voluntary Deleveraging |
0 |
1 |
12 |
95 |
2 |
8 |
33 |
426 |
Internal Capital Market and Dividend Policies: Evidence From Business Groups |
0 |
1 |
2 |
35 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
201 |
Learning by Trading |
1 |
1 |
6 |
105 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
334 |
Lender Screening and the Role of Securitization: Evidence from Prime and Subprime Mortgage Markets |
0 |
0 |
2 |
67 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
216 |
Measuring Technological Innovation over the Long Run |
4 |
12 |
61 |
152 |
9 |
28 |
141 |
437 |
Monetary tightening and U.S. bank fragility in 2023: Mark-to-market losses and uninsured depositor runs? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
Mortgage Market Design: Lessons from the Great Recession |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
46 |
Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinance Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program |
0 |
0 |
6 |
67 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
446 |
Regional Redistribution through the US Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
3 |
56 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
348 |
Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates |
0 |
0 |
5 |
39 |
3 |
3 |
12 |
143 |
Searching for Approval |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis |
0 |
1 |
4 |
238 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
732 |
Selling Failed Banks |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
86 |
Shadow Bank Distress and Household Debt Relief: Evidence from the CARES Act |
0 |
0 |
3 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
86 |
Statistical Default Models and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
204 |
Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth |
3 |
12 |
51 |
487 |
14 |
56 |
213 |
2,014 |
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct |
0 |
2 |
19 |
87 |
3 |
15 |
59 |
372 |
The Use and Misuse of Patent Data: Issues for Finance and Beyond |
0 |
0 |
7 |
16 |
2 |
2 |
22 |
54 |
The failure of models that predict failure: Distance, incentives, and defaults |
0 |
0 |
6 |
174 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
652 |
The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation |
2 |
5 |
10 |
54 |
3 |
10 |
21 |
282 |
When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct |
0 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
75 |
Total Journal Articles |
24 |
98 |
408 |
4,184 |
96 |
327 |
1,256 |
15,365 |